Introduction
This Element charts and contributes to the conversation on Islam and pseudoscience. At first, such a conversation may look like a minor one, but it is persistent and important. The presence of pseudoscience in theories and practices related to Islam and modern science has grown increasingly apparent, inviting critical reflections and pedagogic action.
What is pseudoscience?Footnote 1 The Cambridge Dictionary defines “pseudoscience” as “a system of thought or a theory that is not formed in a scientific way.”Footnote 2 According to the Collins English Dictionary, “pseudoscience” is “a discipline or approach that pretends to be or has a close resemblance to science.”Footnote 3 For the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “pseudoscience” is “a system of theories, assumptions, and methods erroneously regarded as scientific.”Footnote 4
Such definitions, however, just provide a starting point. First, dictionary authors write succinctly and assume that their readers intuitively understand words like “scientific” and “science.” However, a fully fledged definition of “science” is needed. This may seem like a difficult task, considering that professional philosophers have long debated how to characterize science, sometimes showing radical divergence.
Second, philosophers also disagree over the distinction between science and pseudoscience. This is known technically as the “demarcation problem.” Some go as far as to deny the very possibility of identifying such a distinction.
Third, “pseudoscience” is a term of reproach: It is composed with the Greek word-forming element pseudo-, which means “lie,” “mistake,” and “false appearance.” Historian Michael D. Gordin writes: “No one in the history of the world has ever self-identified as a pseudoscientist. There is no person who wakes up in the morning and thinks to himself, ‘I’ll just head into my pseudolaboratory and perform some pseudoexperiments to try to confirm my pseudotheories with pseudofacts’” (Gordin Reference Gordin2012: 1).
In sum, pseudoscience seems elusive, complex, and sensitive. With that said, this Element takes a stance; it defines some ideas and approaches as pseudoscience and recommends rejecting them. To be sure, I do not set out to reconstruct in detail the debate on science and pseudoscience, let alone to solve the problem of demarcation. Interested readers can find rich (if mostly technical) literature elsewhere. A collection of essays unsurpassed for quality, variety, and depth is Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, edited by Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry (Pigliucci & Boudry Reference Pigliucci and Boudry2013). (For an overview of the debate on demarcation, see also Gordin Reference Gordin2023: 1–15 and Pigliucci Reference Pigliucci2023; for a broad-ranging discussion of pseudoscience, including case studies, see Kaufman and Kaufman 2018).
The discussion offered here does not begin by positing or embracing one specific definition of pseudoscience followed by the attempt at identifying ideas and approaches that fall under the latter. This Element adopts a gradual and inclusive approach.
Section 1 recalls the stances of several participants in the discourse on Islam and modern science, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who point out the presence in that very discourse of different forms of pseudoscience. That is, the authors in question criticize other contributors to the discourse by pointing out that their ideas and approaches (e.g., deriving scientific knowledge from scripture) may give the impression of being scientific but do not really qualify as such. Some of these critics spell out what they mean by “science” and “pseudoscience.” Others are less systematic, but their ideas are still clear. Additionally, I approached authors asking for definitions of “pseudoscience” that I included in the discussion. I let a definition of “pseudoscience” (and of “science”) emerge from the positions I reconstruct.
Section 2 focuses on three “usual suspects” – that is, three approaches which the critics regularly denounce: iʿjāz ʿilmī or the “miraculous scientific content of the Qur’an”; creationism; and ideas and techniques related to hygiene, nutrition, health, and illness (e.g., the “medical” use of plants mentioned in the sacred scriptures, hijama or cupping, and Qur’anic recitation employed as a cure). Elaborating on the discussions reconstructed in Section 1, I systematically analyze the “three suspects” and explain why some of their variants qualify as pseudoscientific.
Section 3 covers miscellaneous practices and ideas that do not qualify as pseudoscience but promote and accompany it, or they express an erroneous approach to science: The former include poor pedagogy of science and lack of peer review; the latter include attempts at “Islamizing” science, resistance to vaccines, resistance to modern astronomy in religious practice, ideological interpretations of the history of science, and conspiracy thinking applied to scientific matters.
Section 4 discusses overarching questions about Islam and pseudoscience to prompt further analysis and reflection. Among other things, I bridge the philosophical debate on pseudoscience and the one on Islam-related pseudoscience. I remark that most philosophers who debate demarcation do not deny that science and pseudoscience exist; they think that the two are placed on a continuum and discuss how best to chart it. I argue that such philosophers would agree that the ideas and approaches I identify as pseudoscience fall in the pseudoscientific area of the continuum. I also contend that other philosophers who deny the existence of a clear boundary for what one can consider as science (and hence the possibility of identifying pseudoscience) simply create confusion.
I am convinced that the pseudoscience discussed in this Element is detrimental to Islam and science. The explorative questions at the intersection of science and religion are a crucial branch of human thought. However, pseudoscience only creates the illusion of a harmony between religion and science; in particular, it may convince believers that science asserts the same things as religion or that it even confirms religion, while in fact such claims are constructed in reference to a form of knowledge that is not scientific at all and that presents various flaws. Furthermore, pseudoscience damages the pedagogy and practice of science. It can induce harmful choices (especially in relation to health). It brings discredit to the very discussion of Islam/religion and science. Finally, many Muslim critics think that pseudoscientific approaches to Islam could hurt one’s faith if a Muslim deeply invested in them eventually realizes how erroneous they are.
I am a scholar specializing in the study of Islam and science and an educator with years-long experience in the Muslim world. I understand that the ideas dissected in this Element are dear to countless Muslims around the world. Seeing them criticized may elicit strong feelings in some Muslim readers. With that in mind, I want to briefly elaborate on my background, motives, and approach. I was originally trained in the philosophy of science. I am deeply interested in the interactions of religion and science, and I am particularly sensitive to matters of argumentative rigor and consistency. While being deeply fascinated by ideas and arguments about God’s existence, attributes, and agency in the world, I am not religious. I wasn’t raised religious and, in my mature years, despite extensive and deep exploration, I failed to find a theology that fully captured both my reason and feelings. However, I cannot exclude such a scenario. Likewise, I cannot exclude that such an encounter could transform me into a better version of myself. In this sense, I self-identify as a hopeful agnostic. Additionally, I appreciate that some of the most intelligent, scientifically competent, and ethical individuals I know are religious. While I understand that religion can be combined with harmful ideas and practices (including pseudoscience), I do not think that this is invariably the case, and, when it does happen, I ultimately attribute it to universal human frailty and limitations rather than to religion per se. In sum, differently from other authors, I am not interested in weakening or destroying other people’s faith, let alone by pitting it against science. I do claim the right, however, to rigorously and honestly assess the rationality and logic of theological statements, or of any statements about religion and science, especially when they are offered by someone who insists that such statements are rational and logical and demonstrate the harmony of religion and science. Finally, I think that the appreciation of science as well as the rigorous and honest inspection of questions about religion and science should make for an important part of everyone’s education. It is in this spirit that I explore Islam-related pseudoscience and offer pedagogic suggestions.
One last stipulation: I analyze ideas and approaches by dissecting, listing, and classifying their elements. My taste for lists and typologies reveals my training in the analytic philosophical tradition. I think they are useful to effectively think through multifaceted and intricate matters. While I always try to construct typologies that are as comprehensive and precise as possible, I do not want to suggest that any list is final or exhaustive, or that any single item described in it is monolithic. Lists and typologies are not a goal but a means. Readers are encouraged to think through my classifications, refine them, and challenge them. Only then will they fulfill their function.
1 Islam and Pseudoscience: The Critics
This section traces the emergence of the debate on Islam and pseudoscience. I discuss, chronologically, the stances of authors who criticize as pseudoscientific several ideas and approaches presented by other authors engaged in the discourse on Islam and modern science. I focus on critics who use the very terms “pseudoscience” or “pseudoscientific” (and their equivalents in other languages). Additionally, I consider critics that, without using such terms, clearly imply that other authors wrongly use the term “science.” I extend the discussion to web pages and videos. Finally, in the interest of completeness, I touch on how authors that the critics regard as pseudoscientific handle the very term “pseudoscience.”
1.1 Ziauddin Sardar
In 1985, the British-Pakistani author Ziauddin Sardar (b. 1951) published the article “Between Two Masters: Qur’an or Science?” (Sardar Reference Sardar1985). In this piece,Footnote 5 Sardar, an astute and versatile cultural critic with a background in physics and information science,Footnote 6 takes issue with interpreters of the Qur’an who are convinced that one can identify scientific notions in its verses. This approach is known as iʿjāz ʿilmī (henceforth: iʿjāz) or “miraculous scientific content of the Qur’an” or “scientific miraculousness.” Its underpinning idea is that, if scripture demonstrably carries scientific information unavailable to humans at the time of revelation, this is evidence of its divine origin. Sardar observes that the popularity of this approach was boosted by the 1976 book The Bible, the Qur’an and Science by the French physician Maurice Bucaille (1920–1998).
Sardar appreciates that most authors, including Bucaille, embraced this approach motivated by good intentions. Additionally, he acknowledges that the Qur’an invites humankind to observe nature. However, he identifies several problems carried by extreme versions of this approach, which he calls “Bucaillism.” Egyptian author Muhammad Jamaluddin El-Fandy claims, for example, that the Qur’an is “the best example of scientific expression,” yet this, comments Sardar, is “an unsuitable claim as the ideal form of scientific expression is a mathematical equation; and there certainly are no equations in the Quran.” The same author tries to find astronomical discoveries and theories in the Qur’an, also superimposing scriptural/religious imagery onto scientific notions; he claims, for example, that gravity, centrifugal force, atmosphere, and light are like “pillars.” Additionally, he speculates on the possible appearance of extraterrestrials, whose existence, he argues, is indicated by the Qur’an. “All this,” points out Sardar, is “bad science.”
Sardar notes that this approach strives to demonstrate the truth of the Qur’an, that, however, Muslims should simply assume; and that
Bucaillism opens the Qur’an to the counter argument of Popper’s criteria of refutation: would the Qur’an be proved false and written off … if a particular scientific fact does not tally with it or if a particular fact mentioned in the Qur’an is refuted by modern science? And what if a particular theory, which is “confirmed” by the Qur’an and is in vogue today is abandoned tomorrow for another theory that presents an opposite picture? Does that mean that the Qur’an is valid today but will not be valid tomorrow?
Another risk is that “by raising science to the level of sacred knowledge, Bucaillism effectively undermines any criticism of science,” but “science is not the pursuit of Truth,” writes Sardar, and he continues: “Its ‘discoveries,’ and ‘facts’ do not, and cannot have the same validity as the verses of the Qur’an. Science is a problem-solving enterprise: it is a method, a technique, for solving problems within a given paradigm and worldview” (Sardar Reference Sardar1985).
Sardar keeps in mind that science is value-laden; in fact, he sees it as laden with Western values and deplores that the advocates of Bucaillism uncritically glorify it. He calls Bucaillism “apologia of the worst type” and Bucaille’s book “essential reading for Muslims with larger than life inferiority complexes” (Sardar Reference Sardar1985). Sardar does not use the term “pseudoscience.” However, he strongly criticizes Bucaillism as an approach that wrongly invokes science, or that relies on a misled and misleading conception of science. There are earlier critics of the “miraculous scientific content,” for example, the Egyptian Amīn Al-Khūlī (1895–1966) and ʻĀʾishah ʻAbd al-Raḥman (1913–1998) (see Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023a: 2; Naguib Reference Naguib2019). However, Sardar’s essay is a good starting point considering that he is, by education, familiar with science; he is conversant with the philosophy of science; he writes when iʿjāz is being propelled to global success; and he explicitly mentions “bad science.” At the time of writing this Element, Sardar confirmed that he regards “Bucaillism” and “pseudoscience” as synonyms (Sardar, personal communication, May 16, 2024).
1.2 Pervez Hoodbhoy
In 1991, the Pakistani nuclear physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy (b. 1950), an MIT alumnus, published the monograph Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (Hoodbhoy Reference Hoodbhoy1991). In this book, Hoodbhoy lambasts several attempts at merging Islam and science. Hoodbhoy explains that iʿjāz, which he calls “pseudo-scientific” (68), is the projection of modern science onto the Qur’an by interpreters facilitated by the complexity of Qur’anic language; Muslims, according to Hoodbhoy, tend to revere someone like Bucaille because he is a “white man” (67). Similarly to Sardar, Hoodbhoy emphasizes that such an approach is pointless even from a religious perspective, since it “proves” the divine origin of the Qur’an that Muslims take for granted; additionally, it makes eternal truth dependent on changeable scientific theories; finally, it allows no prediction of unknown physical facts (67–68).Footnote 7
In the book’s appendix, titled “They Call It Islamic Science” (140–154), Hoodbhoy decries an international conference held in Islamabad in 1987, as well as the articles published in a journal supported by the Pakistani scientific establishment. In both venues, scientific and technological notions were allegedly found or derived from Qur’anic verses (e.g., an engineer deduced from the sacred text how to build ammunition [142]); and religious notions were interpreted in allegedly scientific fashion (e.g., a researcher presented a formula to quantify hypocrisy in society [142–143]).
Hoodbhoy explains that
Modern science is a set of definite rules by which one seeks a rational comprehension of the physical universe. It derives its awesome power and authority entirely from a method that combines observation and inference. All scientific knowledge is constructed on the objective base of our sense experiences. This objectivity is made possible because experiment and logical consistency are the sole arbiters of truth – of no consequence is the scientist’s mood or moral character, his political beliefs or nationality, or even his status in the world of science. (145)
Regarding the distinction between “true science” and “nonscience,” Hoodbhoy writes,
This is not altogether a settled matter, but one persuasive answer is to be found in the principle of falsifiability, enunciated in clear terms by the English philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper. If we are to call this or that a scientific theory, says Popper, then it is absolutely necessary that the theory make predictions which can be checked for correctness against observation and experiment. If the theory makes no testable prediction, then there is no way to prove that it is wrong. Any unfalsifiable theory is simply not a scientific theory. This does not mean that it is bad or wrong or whatever, but merely that it is not to be considered a theory of science. (146)
Hoodbhoy labels the ideas that he criticizes “Islamic science,” and writes that such an approach
seeks to reaffirm what is already known, not search into the unknown. No new mathematical principles are sought, no experiments will be designed for its verification, and no new devices or machines will ever be built on account of it. The new Islamic science, like Creationism in the West, is a reaction against modern science. It is not a new direction of science. … In truth the new Islamic science is nothing but a fraudulent use of the word science. (149)
Finally, Hoodbhoy observes that “Islamic science” is popular among Muslim migrants in the West. He interprets it as a “a form of psychological defence against the continuous battering by modern science in its many manifestations” and as a persisting phenomenon; additionally, he sees it as “a refuge from the challenge of doing difficult science,” “an extension of the domain of religious law into the area of natural phenomena, and thus a means of challenging the growing dominance of secular science. For the ruling elite, however,” adds Hoodbhoy, “it is part of a calculated and cynical manipulation of religious sentiment”; the very elite that sponsors Islamic science privately scoffs it, and resorts to modern methods, for example, solving medical problems (150).
Hoodbhoy strongly advocates the separation of religion and science; he depicts the discourse on Islam and modern science as largely constituted of erroneous ideas regarding the method and the history of science. After publishing the monograph, Hoodbhoy continued his engagement with the subject over the years by publishing popular press articles denouncing pseudoscience and scientific malpractice in his native Pakistan (see Hoodbhoy Reference Hoodbhoy2015).
In a 2017 interview, Hoodbhoy defines pseudoscience as “statements about nature that are spurious and do not pass the test of scientific validity.” He acknowledges that science fares well in countries like Iran and Turkey due to their special tradition and culture. He emphasizes, however, that, generally, “science resolutely refuses to take root in Muslim countries” and that, therefore, “it’s much harder there to summon forces against pseudoscience.” Regarding Pakistan, Hoodbhoy blames two factors: “First, the insistence that religion must be brought into everything – including science – puts certain critical faculties to sleep. Second, kids are taught science as though they were memorising a holy text. The student is asked to reproduce facts of science, not to use them in a manner that demands reasoning.” To this, Hoodbhoy adds the lack of role models for young Pakistanis. As examples of pseudoscience in Pakistan, he mentions the case of someone who claimed he had invented a car running on water (and received governmental endorsement), “Islamic cures such as bleeding, cupping, or snails that suck blood,” faith healers, and theories about the exploitation of jinn as energy sources (mentioned in the Qur’an, jinn are creatures whose behavior and nature are variously interpreted; for a comprehensive discussion, see El-Zein Reference El-Zein2009). Additionally, Hoodbhoy deplores that Pakistani university professors and schoolbooks “flatly deny” evolution. Finally, he observes that “the support for pseudoscience in Pakistan does not come largely from the state any more. Instead, there are private TV channels that propagate so-called Islamic healing and miracles, and rail against evolution” (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2017b).
1.3 Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad
In 1992, the Palestinian-American astronomer Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad (b. 1948) published Signs in the Heavens: A Muslim Astronomer’s Perspective on Religion and Science (Ahmad Reference Ahmad1992). The book sets out to show that the incompatibility of religion and science is a myth born of Western history and that in the “classical Islamic era … much progress was made in scientific research and techniques” although contemporary Muslims largely neglect the principles that were conducive to such progress (Ahmad Reference Ahmad1992: xiv–xv; Ahmad lists such principles on p. 37 and elaborates on them over the following pages). Ahmad thinks that “monotheism and reason are allies against pagan superstition” and that historically “Muslim astronomy … paved the way for a scientific model in which all creation is equal under God” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad1992: xv–xvi). An expanded edition of the book followed in 2006. Here, the author extensively uses the term “pseudoscience” in a chapter added before the last one, significantly titled “The Incoherence of Muslim Pseudoscience” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2006: 159–166).
Ahmad remarks that “there are among the Muslims, literalists who, while sincerely believing themselves to be enthusiasts of science, are laying the groundwork for an anti-science backlash by repeating the mistake of the medieval Church, i.e., marrying their interpretation of scripture to current scientific theory” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2006: 159). In the 1992 edition, one finds a few largely positive references to Bucaille; Ahmad describes Bucaille’s 1976 book as a “fascinating” one: “While some of his statements on astronomy are open to question,” he writes, “I found his observations on biology and physiology (Bucaille is a physician) compelling” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad1992: 48n21).Footnote 8 In the second edition, Ahmad retains the references to Bucaille, but he adds to the first footnote about the French physician that his work “has inspired a wave of Muslim pseudoscience” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2006: 55n87).Footnote 9 The author of The Bible, the Qur’an and Science, writes Ahmad, “correctly insisted that the Qur’an is not a scientific textbook. He never suggested that one could derive scientific knowledge from the analysis of the Qur’an. Yet, Bucaille’s imitators have argued that the theory of special relativity, and even the precise speed of light, can be deduced from the Qur’an” (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2006: 160–161, original emphasis).
Ahmad mentions Dr. Mansour Hassab-Elnaby, an Egyptian physicist, who allegedly calculated the speed of light from a Qur’anic verse, and suggested that his analysis validated the special theory of relativity. Ahmad remarks that the numbers used by that author do not work: His mistakes would have been detected if his paper had been examined by experts, but “pseudoscience does not undergo peer review” (164). Additionally, he emphasizes that, if Muslims marry the Qur’an and a specific scientific theory, they turn such a theory into a dogma and “set themselves up to persecute any scientist who questions that theory as Galileo was persecuted.” But, he contends, “a theory about the physical universe stands or falls on its power to help us understand the universe and its success in doing so. An interpretation of a verse of scripture stands or falls on its ability to bring us closer to the Divine and into submission with His Will” (164).
Another major shortcoming of such an approach, according to Ahmad, “is that it misrepresents science as a body of facts instead of the process that it is”; he adds that it “draws on the educational system now dominant in the Muslim world in which knowledge in general is a body of facts to be memorized rather than a human construction that tries to bring all known facts into a coherent whole” (164–165).
Ahmad deplores that Hoodbhoy calls “Islamic science” the pseudoscientific attempt at turning the Qur’an into “a scientific textbook,” thus neglecting that, historically, Islam fruitfully inspired the scientific method (160). More generally, points out Ahmad, the existence of pseudoscience that “turned ‘Islamic science’ into a sad joke” empowers the harshest critics of Islam (165).
1.4 Taner Edis
In 2007, Taner Edis (b. 1967) published An Illusion of Harmony in which he systematically deconstructs the integration of Islam and science. Edis, a university professor of physics, was born and raised in Turkey but has lived in the US since the time of his master’s degree. He is an atheist who deems religious beliefs incompatible with science. Edis, however, advocates a fair treatment of Islam, acknowledging that it comprises a wide spectrum of positions; additionally, he understands that the West has its own “illusions of harmony” about religion and science (250–251).
Edis takes issue with Islamic forms of creationism (115–146) and with iʿjāz. The latter, he points out, contains myths which are “easily dispelled by elementary factchecking” (e.g., stories about Western scientists converting to Islam after appreciating the match between Qur’an and science [94]). However, such “fake news” (to use a current expression) isn’t the only reason identified by Edis to describe iʿjāz as pseudoscience. The advocates of iʿjāz exploit “vague and general” Qur’anic verses (96) and overlook the fact that the Qur’an reflects ancient, prescientific medical theories and cosmologies (96–99). Additionally, they sometimes neglect “traditional interpretations of verses and important doctrines just to find some science” (100) or rely on “ideas that are speculative or that arise from the fringes of science” (101).
Edis concludes,
It is striking how little writers of the science-in-the-Quran genre know about science. They might have mastered some lists of textbook items, and many are accomplished in particular technical specialties such as medicine. But they conceive of science as a set of practical applications and concrete facts to be collected and organized like stamps. This view is not even medieval; medieval science at least enriched its stamp collections with an elaborate God-centered perception of nature. In any case, the science-in-the-Quran genre displays very little awareness of the powerful conceptual schemes that make modern science so compelling to scientists. Getting concepts such as magnetic fields wrong are relatively trivial mistakes, but representing modern sciences such as physics and cosmology as a list of facts indicates a much deeper misconception. (101–102)
In An Illusion of Harmony, Edis uses the term “pseudoscience” several times; he doesn’t define it but rather lets the meaning emerge from the context. Edis uses “pseudoscience” in reference to Islamic creationism (120, 125, 126, 134, 143, 202), but he also suggests that there exist “varieties of pseudoscientific ideas in the Islamic world” (9; see also 240) including “pseudoscientific apologetics” (25).
Edis similarly uses the term in the Element Islam’s Encounter with Modern Science (Edis Reference Edis2023: 31, 33, 57); there, he also labels as “pseudoscientific” the “enterprises [that] attempt to combine … traditional medical practices with an image of modern expertise” (5). In both books, Edis briefly remarks on the similarity between Islam-related pseudoscience (and other forms of harmonization of science and religion he criticizes) and Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist discourses (Edis Reference Edis2007: 106–107; Edis Reference Edis2023: 10).
Finally, Edis advances critical suggestions for the identification of pseudoscience in a 2018 article that doesn’t specifically deal with Islam but discusses the scientific status of economics. “How far should analyses of pseudoscience extend?” asks Edis. He states that “We do not have a ‘scientific method’ with more substance than generalities that amount to saying that it is good to have some reality testing and that we regularly need to refine our understanding by subjecting claims to criticism,” and adds, “Pseudosciences fail to be science, but that is not because they do not conform to a set of rules that are etched in stone” (Edis Reference Edis2018: 141). Taking creationism as an example, Edis lists shortcomings that qualify it as pseudoscience: It is “bad science” since “our geology is not shaped by Noah’s Flood, fossils are not hydrodynamically sorted, and evolutionary biologists are not concealing a crisis brought on by a lack of transitional forms” (142). Edis emphasizes that “[the creationists’] mistake … is not a violation of any rules that dictate methodological naturalism. … Instead, it is how they are not able to recognize the failures of their preferred approach” (142). Additionally, he points out that pseudoscience can be detected by the way in which an institution promotes certain concepts and ways of thinking:
The label pseudoscience … does not just stand for scientific failure. Failure is common, and it is very much part of the processes of science. Properly used, pseudoscience applies to institutions more than ideas. Pseudosciences institutionalize intellectual pathologies, which systematically mislead their communities about the world. They are typically protective and apologetic, rather than structured to advance learning. Very often, pseudoscientific institutions are set apart from established scholarly and academic institutions, existing in parallel while harboring ambitions to supplant what they perceive as a corrupt mainstream. (143)
Edis concludes, “we still have much work to do to understand pseudoscience in a wider context of possible institutional failings. Without such an understanding, outside of conversations about paranormal beliefs, accusations of ‘pseudoscience’ will risk becoming an empty rhetorical device” (147).
1.5 Nidhal Guessoum
The Algerian astrophysicist Nidhal Guessoum (b. 1960) articulates a rich approach to Islam and modern science for which he claims inspiration from Ibn Rushd (1126–1198). He emphasizes that the scientific method is universally and objectively defined and that it yields the best explanations for the physical world. Guessoum specifies that he subscribes to “methodological naturalism”: Science should only resort to hypotheses, descriptions, and explanations based on natural causes and effects. He is careful to distinguish this position from “ontological naturalism,” a philosophical position according to which natural causes and effects are all there is (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2008: 861–863).
Guessoum, who has extensive experience as a university professor in the Arab/Muslim world, wants to avoid conveying to Muslim students a perception of science as a “cold endeavor” at best or as intrinsically materialistic/atheistic at worst (314). He acknowledges that Muslim students have expectations and ideas about the overlap of Islam and science; this, he writes, manifests the Muslims’ tendency to regard Islam as a “complete system” (322). As things stand, Guessoum prescribes treating Islam and science as SOMA or “softly overlapping magisteria,” carefully unpacking problems and items at their interface (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2012a). In some cases, science can profitably work with/for Islam – for example, in establishing the exact start of Ramadan (Cartilidge Reference Cartilidge2011). Other times, correct knowledge and appreciation of science inspire the rejection of some approaches (for an overview of Guessoum’s ideas, see Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 151–177).
Guessoum’s first general-public book in English, Islam’s Quantum Question: Reconciling Muslim Tradition and Modern Science, dates to 2010. Here Guessoum uses the adjective “pseudo-scientific” once (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010a: 218). He does so in passing, while referring to cosmologies that dubiously blend religion and science: either by embracing a cosmological theory because it seems to support theological views or by injecting theological concepts into cosmology (Guessoum has in mind Muslim cosmologies but also Christian ones; see 213–214). In the same book, however, he criticizes other approaches including iʿjāz (chapter 5, 141–172), Islamic creationism (314–324), and, briefly, “Qur’anic healing” (5–7).
In the 2010 book, Guessoum advances a detailed criticism of iʿjāz, remarking that, despite the methodological proclamations of some of its representatives, such an approach never became rigorous and credible. Guessoum points out the following flaws: (i) iʿjāz representatives elevate some scientific models (including erroneous ones) over other ones due to their alleged harmony with the Qur’an (157); (ii) they rely on a supposedly neat (but scientifically untenable) distinction between “fact” and “theory” (159); (iii) they assign to the Qur’an “precedence and veto power over scientific discoveries and truths” (159); (iv) they take the fact that a phenomenon hasn’t been explained by science as a sign that the phenomenon in question has divine origin (161); (v) they propagate the idea that in some areas, no matter how much scientific evidence is accumulated, knowledge remains conjectural (162); (vi) they misunderstand scientific information (162); (vii) they do not rely on scientific literature (162–163); (viii) they collect pieces of “scientific” information, pair it with Qur’anic verses, and hastily suggest that the Qur’an foretold them (163). Notably, Guessoum also drew support for his criticism of iʿjāz from an article by Saud bin Abdelaziz Al-‘Arifi, a religious scholar (Al-‘Arifi Reference Al-‘Arifi2007) (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010a: 159–160).
Guessoum has confirmed his position through a steady production of academic and general-public articles as well as YouTube videos. His YouTube channel, created in December 2015, is in Arabic; it often addresses topics relevant to Islam and the Islamic culture. Currently, it has more than 500,000 subscribers and contains more than 300 videos.Footnote 10 In the 2017 book The Young Muslim’s Guide to Modern Science, Guessoum states that the “scientifically literate person” should possess the ability to “distinguish science from pseudo-science such as astrology, quackery, and schemes that aim to fleece people by taking advantage of their ignorance, their fears, and needs in their lives” (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2017: 12). One of the crucial developments marking the birth of modern science, he writes, is “the emergence of a ‘philosophy of science’ that attempts to put science and its methodology on firm grounds and filter out ‘pseudo-science’ and ‘non-science’” (37; see also 38). Guessoum includes in the book a list of “mental checks … to apply whenever we come across some ‘scientific’ information, to make sure we are not fooled (or fooling ourselves) or simply mistaken” (157–158).
Guessoum is also critical toward health-related approaches that are popular among Muslims, including cupping (a form of bloodletting) and herbal medicine. Muslims who appreciate such techniques are inspired by the Prophet’s implementation or praise. However, Guessoum identifies a fundamental mistake between the Prophet’s reference to practices common in his times and the universal validity of such practices. Muslims also extol the benefits of foods mentioned in the Qur’an and in the traditions. Guessoum points out that enthusiasts exaggerate the benefits or ignore the negative side effects of such practices and foods that haven’t been subjected to rigorous testing. To be sure, some practices may seem to work, but Guessoum remarks that one should consider the placebo effect in which the patient feels better (for a while) upon being administered a fake treatment or inactive substance. He additionally points out that Muslims who are fond of the approaches in question are convinced that they are reverting to their original identity or to nature, thus breaking away from the “West.” Guessoum suggests that this way of thinking is based on erroneous dichotomies: Often, modern medicine stands in continuity with ancient ones – for example, scientifically identifying and distilling the active ingredients from herbs. Finally, Guessoum deplores that roqyia (i.e., allegedly therapeutic Qur’anic recitation) turned into a massive scam, with charlatans selling expensive services through “clinics” (including in Europe), TV stations, and pay-per-call phone numbers (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2011a; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2012b).
Analyzing the landscape of Islam and science after the COVID-19 pandemic, Guessoum writes that pseudoscience has become “a regular fixture of the Islamic discourse” (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2021: 1).Footnote 11 Guessoum mentions a definition of pseudoscience by philosophers Caleb W. Lack and Jacques Rousseau: “Any claim, hypothesis, or theory that is presented in the language and manner typical of scientific claims, but that fails to conform to accepted standards in science regarding openness to peer review, replicability, transparent methodology, and the potential for falsifiability is highly likely to be a pseudoscientific claim, hypothesis, or theory” (Lack & Rousseau Reference Lack and Rousseau2016: 39, cit. in Guessoum Reference Guessoum2021: 5). To this, Guessoum adds a description of pseudoscience by psychology professor Scott Lilienfeld, according to whom pseudoscience “comprise[s] an absence of self-correction, overuse of ad hoc maneuvers to immunize claims from refutation, use of scientific-sounding but vacuous language, extraordinary claims in the absence of compelling evidence, overreliance on anecdotal and testimonial assertions, avoidance of peer review, and the like” (Lilienfeld Reference Lilienfeld, Kaufman and Kaufman2018: xiv, cit. in Guessoum Reference Guessoum2021: 6).
During prior epidemics, notes Guessoum, the secretary-general of the International Commission for Scientific Miracles of the Qur’an and Sunnah issued recommendations blending religious and health-related acts (e.g., ablutions) and included dietary prescriptions (e.g., consuming honey twice daily) that he presented as derived from the Qur’an and aligning with scientific information (adding, however, that one should always refer to medical specialists). During the COVID-19 pandemic, such a trend resurfaced, with pseudoscience being relied on “to promote Islamic rituals (ablution, fasting, etc.) or traditions (e.g., eating seven dates) as having great value in the prevention or the treatment of COVID-19” (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2021: 9).
Guessoum also points out that pseudoscientific literature often resorts to anecdotes, the argument from authority, the usage of scientific jargon, and the cherry-picking of cases (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2021: 7); additionally, he emphasizes the significance of social media in its diffusion (9). Finally, Guessoum understands that some may consider pseudoscience harmless (provided that practices like bloodletting are performed with care), or even beneficial due to the placebo effect, and preferable because of its low costs, yet he states, “Those of us who understand science and why modern medicinal treatment can be trusted much more than those traditional methods … know that the real harm of those pseudoscientific practices lies in the fact that they keep the patients from real, effective treatments (leaving aside intellectual pollution and confusion)” (7).
1.6 Mohammed Basil Altaie
In a 2014 interview, the Iraqi physicist Mohammed Basil Altaie (b. 1952) states that pseudoscience is “the biggest problem” in the debate on Islam and modern science. He takes issue with authors who claim they derive scientific data from the Qur’an (e.g., the speed of light) and remarks that the advocates of such an approach are not specialized in the fields they make statements about. Other examples of pseudoscience he criticizes include confusing the phenomenon of Mars’ retrograde motion (Mars seemingly moving away from earth) with a hadith,Footnote 12 according to which, on doomsday, the sun will rise on the West;Footnote 13 and the alleged discovery, supported with photoshopped pictures, of a giant human skeleton confirming the hadith in which Adam stood sixty cubits tall (around thirty meters).Footnote 14 (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 90–91; it should also be remarked that the very existence of “human giants” of that size is a biological impossibility – see Ross Reference Ross2023).
Interviewed at the time of writing this Element, Altaie specified,
The Qur’ān contains signs pointing to verifiable facts about nature. I believe that these signs are there as evidence for vindicating that the Qur’ān is revealed from a divine source rather than being an authored book. Such signs in the Qur’ān can be seen by people who know Arabic very well and who are well-informed. … This is the reason for having some verses stressing that people of knowledge recognize that it is the truth. … We should be critical about using the term “pseudoscience” when discussing the claims of iʿjāz ʿilmī in the Qur’ān since not all such claims can be classified as pseudoscience but might be exaggerations. However, some of those who adopt the dogma of iʿjāz ʿilmī go beyond the signs to claim incorrect pseudoscience. This may also include those who claim that the Qur’ān stipulates that the Earth is flat and is stationary. …
Pseudoscience is a term commonly used to describe beliefs or practices that claim to be scientific but lack the evidence or methodology to be considered valid. In other words, it refers to ideas or theories that are presented as scientific, but actually lack proper scientific reasoning or support. However, the domination of scientism caused many people to think that whatever science and scientific methodologies do not endorse can be considered a pseudoscience. This is not acceptable since the laws of nature cannot be justified ultimately through scientific methodology. After all, all physicists agree that the initial conditions for the creation of the universe are unknown. I have rarely used the term pseudoscience in order to avoid confusion. Instead, I use terms like unjustified, lacking vindication, or false.
Altaie also published a book in Arabic refuting the views of an author who used pseudoscience to claim that the Qur’an contains notions related to particle physics (Altaie Reference Altaie2019) (Altaie, personal communication, January 10, 2024).
Altaie’s statements warrant some discussion. To begin with, he does qualify as a critic of iʿjāz, but the criticism he expresses is rather moderate and diplomatic: He doesn’t perceive all of iʿjāz as wrong, but only what he regards as exaggerations. Second, he points out that the advocates of iʿjāz lack specialization in relevant fields. However, this isn’t always the case since several authors do in fact have credentials in the fields they elaborate on. Moreover, one should be careful not to slip into an appeal to authority; in principle, anyone who abides by a rigorous and scientific methodology may significantly contribute to a field. Finally, Altaie is reluctant to adopt the term “pseudoscience”; he fears that it ends up being applied indiscriminately, including to metaphysical or methodological principles that govern science without being the object of science. In sum, Altaie does not want to be mistaken for a representative of scientism, the idea that only science is the key to the truth of reality.
1.7 Stefano Bigliardi
I have been studying Islam and modern science since the late 2000s when I was a postdoctoral researcher. At first, I explored the debate guided by colleagues who embraced a historiographic or ethnographic approach, so I tried to map out the discussions as a neutral, external observer. However, my observations ended up incorporating critical evaluations, including the use of the term “pseudoscience.” Generally, I was inclined to formulate critical assessments of ideas (as opposed to mere reconstructions thereof) due to my philosophical education. However, despite having specialized in the philosophy of science, I had not focused on the problem of pseudoscience. I was influenced by authors like Hoodbhoy and Edis, as well as by the public criticism of pseudoscience in Italy, my native country, offered by the Italian Committee for the Investigation of Claims of the Pseudosciences (CICAP), a widely known skeptical association that later I would work with. I used the term “pseudoscience” in exchanges with Muslim interlocutors while collecting the conversations published as Islam and the Quest for Modern Science (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014). Notably, as we have seen, interviewees like Altaie and Guessoum embraced the term while articulating their own assessments of certain approaches. In the book’s concluding thoughts, I used the adjective “pseudoscientific” in reference to iʿjāz and creationism (180 185). Currently, I consider the analysis of creationism and iʿjāz offered in that book (see, in particular, 185–186, 192–193) overall convoluted and, in some regards, far-fetched. This Element clarifies and rectifies my prior position.
Eventually, having moved to a teaching position in Morocco, I became increasingly focused on such approaches both in my scholarship and in my pedagogy. I frequently encountered iʿjāz and creationism while interacting with students (and colleagues) who appreciated them. I came to the realization that such approaches rely on and convey to young students oversimplified or even fully wrong ideas about science, fostering a mindset that I consider at odds with critical thinking.
In this spirit, in a 2017 article for the journal Zygon, I describe iʿjāz as largely incorporating pseudoscience, emphasizing its similarities and intersections with conspiracy thinking. In a nutshell, conspiracy thinking, as opposed to the genuine analysis of real/historical conspiracies, is a flawed style of thought and argumentation that explains some events or phenomena in reference to a plan designed, carried out, and sustained by an occult agent. The events or phenomena in question are usually the source of pain, preoccupation, and frustration for those who discuss them through conspiracy thinking; such a style of thought is a way to mitigate or rationalize the negative feelings that said events and phenomena elicit, while suggesting simplistic solutions to the problems they pose. Representatives of conspiracy thinking are usually nonexperts in the field they discuss; they overinterpret real facts or make up factoids to allegedly demonstrate the existence of conspiracies; yet even the absence of proof is taken by them as suggesting a cover-up. To use a recent example, the COVID-19 pandemic was the object of conspiracy thinking, with myriad commentators from all kinds of background denying the very existence of the virus, or describing it as scientifically engineered and artificially spread, and as a tool of mass manipulation by the powers that be (or of occult ones). (Scholars intensely scrutinize and debate conspiracy thinking; for an introduction, see Byford Reference Byford2011. For a collection representing the diversity within the academic debate, see Dentith Reference Dentith2018).
Similarly, advocates of iʿjāz are often nonexperts in the fields they make statements about (e.g., scientists stepping outside of their field but also scientific amateurs); they overinterpret certain facts (e.g., that Qur’anic verses refer to natural phenomena) and make up other ones (e.g., stories about Western scientists converting after appreciating iʿjāz); their theories fulfill the psychological need to bridge a (perceived) gap between Islam and science (or, more generally, between the Muslim world and the West); finally, they may resort to conspiracy theories to explain why iʿjāz isn’t widely accepted by the global scientific community (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2017a: 159–162). Incidentally, conspiracy thinking is also used by creationists to denigrate evolution (see Section 2.2.1 in this Element). I also suggest that iʿjāz be critically tackled by educators and science writers; the latter could create encyclopedic websites with entries dedicated to the debunking of single cases of alleged “miraculous scientific content” (while de-emphasizing specific advocates of this approach) (Bigliardi 2017: 165).
Finally, I discuss Islam and pseudoscience in a 2018 general-public book in Italian whose title translated into English reads: The Crescent and the Splitting Moon: Islam, Pseudoscience, and the Paranormal (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2018). The book was published by the aforementioned skeptical organization CICAP; it followed a 2016 general-public lecture in Italian on the same topic, organized by CICAP in Turin, as well as the publication of a collection of articles on Islam and pseudoscience in a 2017 issue of CICAP’s magazine. The title alludes to a widespread narrative according to which the Qur’an (54:1) refers to a miraculous splitting of the moon that occurred in the Prophet’s time and that NASA astronauts found evidence for. The book tackles iʿjāz, Islamic creationism, Qur’anic healing, and Prophetic medicine, but it also takes a broader look, covering the intersections between Islam and “fringe sciences” such as “ancient aliens” theories (according to which Earth was anciently visited by extraterrestrials who affected human development and history), contemporary Islamic geocentrism, and other topics. One idea I defend in the book is that, if one looks at the logical structure (broadly conceived, i.e., including fallacies) of Islam-related pseudoscientific views, one notices a strong resemblance with Western pseudoscientific narratives and myths. In some cases, pseudoscience has demonstrably been imported from the West. Being written in Italian, the book had no impact internationally and, as far as I know, it engaged non-Muslim Italian skeptics more than any other readership.
1.8 The Iranian Scene: Mohammad Reza Tavakoli Saberi versus Mehdi Golshani
Although I have no direct access to literature in Farsi and I need to rely on direct communication with authors, I elaborate on the Iranian arena not only because of the quality of the publications produced but also considering the importance of Iran in science and technology.
Mohammad Reza Tavakoli Saberi (b. 1947) graduated in pharmacy from Tehran University and obtained a doctoral degree in medicinal chemistry from De Montfort University, as well as a postdoctoral degree from Exeter University. He has been active in writing books and articles as well as translating scientific books for fifty years. He defines pseudoscience as “a claim without logical base or experimental evidence” and describes the Iranian situation as follows:
In Iran most philosophers have no clue about modern science (like in other Islamic countries) since the word elm, which is used in Persian and Arabic, is equivalent to knowledge and also means science, theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, hadith, etc. A clergy or a linguist is considered an alem or scientist. … Iran is very advanced in certain areas of science (due to heavy investment by the Shah’s regime), such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, rocket science, nuclear energy, genetics; it publishes more than 100,000 books/year (80,000 new titles) which is more than the whole Arab world or the rest of Middle East countries. However, due to interference of religious authority, Iran has a big problem regarding pseudoscience. Religious schools and Ulama [Islamic scholars, broadly defined] promote pseudoscience since they have not been familiarized with modern science in religious schools.
Tavakoli Saberi continues,
I consider homeopathy, chiropractic, acupuncture, telepathy, traditional medicine, cupping, and bleeding (hejamat) as pseudoscience. I consider what is called science in the Qur’an, creationism, Qur’anic healing, prophetic medicine as pseudoscience, since they do not rely on experimental testing, but on quotes from religious authorities.
He further explains that, in Iran,
As the government gets more radical, pseudoscience becomes more widespread and supported. The government at first refused to recognize the COVID-19 pandemic, then promoted pseudoscientific methods (i.e., using Islamic and Prophetic medicine to treat the virus). The media was full of this sort of recommendation. There is a section in the Ministry of Health called Iranian Medicine which is basically traditional medicine; it promotes cupping, hejamat (bleeding), leech therapy and many pseudoscientific treatments. There are lots of hakims or herbal practitioners, and herbal medicine shops which sell this kind of medicine all around Iran, which was absent before the Islamic revolution. There are many sites and channels in Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp which promote and sell this kind of medicine.
Tavakoli Saberi published three books in Farsi, the titles of which respectively translate to Supernatural World (Tavakoli Saberi Reference Tavakoli Saberi2017; two more editions followed in 2023 and 2024), What Is Science? (Tavakoli Saberi Reference Tavakoli Saberi2019), and What Is Pseudoscience? (Tavakoli Saberi Reference Tavakoli Saberi2023). While he doesn’t engage with the latest philosophical discussions in these books, he is aware of the demarcation problem and suggests that the line between science and pseudoscience is represented by falsifiability, testability, reproducibility, and predictability (Tavakoli Saberi, personal communication, June 8, 2024).
Tavakoli Saberi contends that the Islamic world needs a new, specific word for modern natural science to replace elm (in Arabic ʿilm), similarly to what happened in Europe when “science” replaced “natural philosophy.” His own proposal for Farsi is the term daneshvarzi, which he explains as follows:
Danesh also means any knowledge in Persian; it has been used for more than a millennium in Persian language and it is the equivalent of elm that comes from Arabic. Both words are used in Persian meaning science and knowledge. By adding the suffix -varzi, I coined a different term with no moral and ethical connotations, which are carried by danesh and elm. I define daneshvarzi as experimental, evidence-based knowledge, which was initiated by the great Italian scientist Galileo Galilei, which excludes philosophy, theology, literature. Elm and danesh include all these latter activities besides science.
He specifies,
-varz is a suffix referring to a doer of something like -smith in English (e.g., “blacksmith,” “ironsmith”). So daneshvarz means somebody who is engaged in doing science. The suffix -varzi turns it into a noun referring to a daneshvarz’s activity. For instance, you have keshavarz (“farmer”) and keshavarzi (“farming”), which have been used for more than 1,200 years in the Persian language. I have used daneshvarzi in a half a dozen books I translated and in many of my articles and lectures. Some people have started to use it, but it is not widespread.
An important participant in the debate on Islam and modern science is the Iranian physicist Mehdi Golshani (b. 1939). He articulates, in a rich scholarship, a constructive stance on Islam and science. Briefly put, he points out that science is governed by metaphysical principles and that such principles can be taken from religion – and from the Qur’an in particular. In other words, Golshani emphasizes that science cannot be separated from metaphysics; it has to rely on concepts that do not derive from experience and on principles that are not the facts that science itself studies. In the Qur’an, one finds emphasis on sensory knowledge, intellect (transcending the senses), causality, and unchangeable patterns underlying natural phenomena. (For an overview of Golshani’s ideas, see Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 53–70).
Golshani is critical toward iʿjāz, especially if someone argues that scientific information can be derived from the Qur’an: “The Qur’an,” he points out, “has ordered us explicitly that we should explore nature through experimentation and intellectual work” (Golshani, personal communication, February 29, 2024). Golshani also warns that science changes so that comparison with scriptural passages is risky; however, he makes cautious iʿjāzi statements – for example, pointing out that Q 51:49 reads, “We created everything in dual form” and that “at the present stage of physics we think that everything appears in nature in the form of pairs. We have electrons and we have protons. We have man and we have woman. … Once you see this, you become overwhelmed and it can give some impetus to scientists to look more for this kind of property in nature” (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 56).
In 2020 Golshani published a book on pseudoscience with two colleagues (Golshani, Jamali and Khatiri Reference Golshani, Jamali and Khatiri2020). Its title, translated into English, reads Science and Pseudoscience, and it contains three chapters. The first one surveys the positions on science and pseudoscience advanced by authors like Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul Feyerabend, Larry Laudan, and Carol Tavris; Golshani and his coauthors emphasize that such positions show no consensus. The second chapter discusses metaphysics and moral values in science. The third chapter covers traditional medicine, recommending “that the proponents of modern medicine should have interactions with proponents of traditional medicine to enrich their own science as has been done, e.g., in China” (Golshani, personal communication, December 25, 2023).
Examples of techniques that Golshani regards favorably include acupuncture and cupping to treat COVID-19, Iranian traditional massage or the Fateh Method to treat chronic low back pain, Persian herbal medicine to treat COVID-19, date palm pollen to treat male sexual dysfunction after coronary artery bypass graft, as well as bloodletting and cupping to treat severe acute urticaria and angioedema. Prompted to provide examples, Golshani consulted Dr. Mehrdad Karimi, an expert in both modern and traditional medicine at Tehran University of Medical Sciences. Dr. Karimi sent him articles describing how he successfully used traditional medicine alone or with a combination of modern and traditional medicine (Golshani, personal communication, March 17, 2024). I infer the list of techniques from such articles. They were published in journals such as Integrative Medicine Research, Advances in Traditional Medicine, Journal of Acupuncture and Meridian Studies, Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine, and Journal of Pharmacopuncture.
Golshani “consider[s] traditional medicine as science (in its premodern view), not as pseudoscience. Because [he has] witnessed personally that many of its prescriptions are effective.” He adds, “If modern physicians do not understand its theories, it does not mean that it is pseudoscience. At the present time, the standard quantum theory in physics agrees with all present experiments. But, although many eminent physicists of our time confess that they do not understand this theory, they don’t call it pseudoscience.” In sum, Golshani suggests that “it is the duty of the modern physicians to see, by experimentation, why the prescriptions of traditional medicine are effective” (Golshani, personal communication, February 29, 2024). It must be remarked, however, that what is presented as “research” on traditional medicine is often methodologically flawed; additionally, an illusion of effectiveness may be created by the placebo effect (all this is discussed in Section 2.3.2). In his books, Tavakoli Saberi is critical both of Golshani’s religious metaphysics for science (that he thinks should be abandoned), and of Golshani’s support for traditional medicine that, he claims, “caused a burden for the medical system” (Tavakoli Saberi, personal communication, January 10, 2025).
1.9 Other Critics and Definitions of Pseudoscience
In this section, I mention definitions of pseudoscience advanced by some participants in the debate on Islam and modern science who have interesting contributions but haven’t dedicated extensive publications to pseudoscience specifically.
The Algerian astrophysicist Jamal Mimouni (b. 1956) offers this (admittedly informal) definition of pseudoscience:
the use of established science facts, concepts, and theories in an attempt to legitimize some pet theory or a specific vision or belief that one is holding. It is offensive to the regular normative practice of science because the practitioner of pseudoscience is already holding a specific view on a topic that he does not intend to deviate from, and he is using/abusing/distorting science if needed for the purpose of “validating” it. He also applies a fair amount of cherry picking and a complete disregard to any consensual viewpoints on the topic under consideration if they don’t align with his a priori views. There is no genuine interest in science per se, be it its results or methodology, just the need of its endorsement when it suits its practitioner.
The American (based in Saudi Arabia) David Solomon Jalajel (b. 1970), a scholar and lecturer in Islamic theology and law, who, regarding evolution, articulates a position called “Adamic exceptionalism” (see Section 2.2.5), defines pseudoscience as follows:
any attempt to associate empirical, natural science with supernatural or metaphysical concerns, all of which are, by definition, outside of its scope. This would include using science to try to prove or disprove supernatural entities beyond the physical world (including attempts to use science to prove or disprove the existence of God), or to engage with purely metaphysical questions (like invoking various interpretations of quantum physics to establish God’s intervention in nature). Any attempt to use science to engage with non-natural causality (in short, a violation of methodological naturalism) would be pseudoscience.
Regarding examples of pseudoscience, Jalajel states,
The Intelligent Design advocate[d] within Islamic circles is one form of pseudoscience. Creation science in general and anti-evolution polemics is another. The scientific miracles movement is another, especially when it tries to favor one scientific hypothesis over another, whether done so to achieve scriptural validation of science or scientific validation of scripture. A fourth example would include attempts to harness quantum physics to resolve theological questions or to account for divine action.
In the monograph Islam and Evolution: Al-Ghazālī and the Modern Evolutionary Paradigm, a Pakistani scholar in science and religion, Shoaib Ahmed Malik (b. 1988), briefly touches on pseudoscience. Malik, who holds a PhD in chemistry and chemical engineering, emphasizes that, although the demarcation problem is a vexing one, this “should [not] be taken to mean that everything goes in science. Currently, no one treats astrology – the study of horoscopes – as a science because it lacks scientific appeal. It doesn’t give us specified predictive power, simplicity, an explanatory or research scope, and falsification criterion among others.” Malik concludes, “Prudentially, all this indicates is that each discipline is assessed on a case-by-case basis before it is welcomed under the umbrella of science” (Malik 2021: 220).
Finally, I am aware of one scholarly article in Indonesian that criticizes the presence of pseudoscience in the discourse on Islam and science (Muslih Reference Muslih2014). A book on pseudoscience exists in Turkish (Tutar Reference Tutar2014). The author is a university professor specializing in management. There is a translation into Arabic of an English book whose title is the Arabic term for “pseudoscience” but whose original title reads Bad Science (Goldacre 2008; the author is a physician and science writer). Such books, however, do not focus on the combination of pseudoscience and religion. Notably, a Google search for “Islam and pseudoscience” (including variants and translations) yields very few results, and even fewer are found in Google Scholar.
1.10 Web Pages, YouTubers, and Skeptical Organizations
Most authors surveyed so far are academic specialists (in different fields) who debate pseudoscience both in scholarly publications and in general-public work, including articles, conferences, and videos. Ideas and approaches to Islam and science, including pseudoscientific ones, are widely propagated and consumed at a popular level, and those authors are aware of the importance of reaching audiences beyond their academic peers. In this section, I look at other general-public-oriented online resources criticizing pseudoscience, including web pages and videos. Such items can be produced and widely disseminated relatively rapidly, but they can also be substantially modified or even vanish in a click. All this admittedly makes for a certain amount of volatility. However, the items in question are important in that they can reach very wide audiences. I focus on a selection of such media.
Wikipedia entries on “pseudoscience” currently exist in the languages of Muslim countries, including Arabic, Farsi, Indonesian, Kurdish, Malay, Moroccan colloquial Arabic, Turkish, and Urdu. Such pages, however, mostly exemplify pseudoscience with homeopathy and astrology; the closest they come to criticizing the combination of pseudoscience and religion is occasional mention of intelligent design.
An important website in Arabic is Anā uṣaddiqu l-ʿilm (I Believe in Science), created by the Iraqi/Turkish Ahmet Alrayyis (b. 1992), who has a master’s degree in geology.Footnote 15 I Believe in Science was launched as a Facebook page in 2011; it became an independent page in 2013. Throughout the years, it has relied on more than 1,000 volunteers (250 at the time of writing this) to translate and adapt scientific articles from English into Arabic. So far, around 30,000 articles have been published, including those translated, with permission, from the American Skeptical Inquirer (published by the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry [CSI], prior to 2006 known as the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal [CSICOP]). The pages that scrutinize pseudoscience do so in reference to ideas, not to specific authors, and include pieces critiquing cupping, the use of camel urine for medical purposes, the alleged discovery of Adam’s giant skeleton, the iʿjāzi interpretation of a Qur’anic verse mentioning two “barriers” in the sea (Q 25:53) as referring to specific marine phenomena, the narrative according to which NASA confirmed the splitting of the moon, and the idea that Mekkah is the center of the universe (Alrayyis, personal communication, January 21, 2024).
Another interesting website is Al-ʿulūm al-ḥaqīqiyya (The Real Sciences), which since 2014 has been managed by the Iraqi Omar Meriwani (b. 1989) (other original founders are no longer part of the enterprise).Footnote 16 Meriwani is by education a data engineer. Al-ʿulūm al-ḥaqīqiyya is rooted in Meriwani’s (and the other founders’) experience with internet forums between 2006 and 2011. One of the authors who influenced Meriwani is the Egyptian Khaled Mountasar, who offered arguments against iʿjāz (Mountasar Reference Mountasar2005) (Meriwani, personal communication, January 24, 2024). This website relies on a net of volunteers (more than 170 between 2012 and 2024, with most being engaged between a few weeks and a few months), and a small group of more active members (Meriwani, personal communication, March 16, 2024). Pieces published include translations and original texts; they criticize iʿjāzi claims, as well as Qur’anic healing, Prophetic medicine, beliefs about magic and evil-eye, but also Western approaches and beliefs including those advanced by the so-called anti-vaxxers. Meriwani feels that creationism does not call for urgent debunking because it does not affect daily life and requires an educational background that not all people have (Meriwani, personal communication, January 24, 2024).
Several YouTubers contribute to popularizing science and debunking pseudoscientific ideas. An interesting example is the Indian Pranav Radhakrishnan (b. 1991), who launched his YouTube channel Science Is Dope in 2017. Radhakrishnan has an engineering degree. His videos include criticism of Islamic creationism advocated by the popular Indian “televangelist” Zakir Naik (b. 1965). Currently, Radhakrishnan’s video criticizing Naik’s arguments (Radhakrishnan Reference Radhakrishnan2021) has more than 306,000 hits. (For a discussion of Naik’s impact on creationist views among Muslims, see Moran Reference Moran2019).
Another science popularizer and “myth buster” is the Moroccan Najib El Mokhtari (b. 1981), a telecommunication engineer by education. He launched his YouTube channel (named after him) in 2015. His videos are in Moroccan colloquial Arabic and include science-based criticism of traditional sorcery (El Mokhtari Reference El Mokhtari2017b), as well as of geostationary views argued on a religious basis (El Mokhtari Reference El Mokhtari2015). El Mokhtari also elaborates on the differences between natural science and other forms of knowledge including religious ones (El Mokhtari Reference El Mokhtari2017a). He chose Moroccan colloquial Arabic, feeling “it had the least frictions or barriers for the audience.” He specifically set out to target the general public, including people untrained in French and classical Arabic, but he also assumed that most of the audience in Morocco would instinctively associate French and classical Arabic with the school system – that is, with an environment they feel uncomfortable with (El Mokhtari, personal communication, April 25, 2024).
In Malaysia, pseudoscience is criticized over Facebook pages in Malay such as Medical Mythbusters Malaysia (created in 2016)Footnote 17 and Ini Sains Beb (“This is Science, Baby,” created in 2017).Footnote 18 Medical Mythbusters Malaysia is registered as a nongovernmental organization (NGO), founded with the objective of countering medical misinformation and run by medical doctors. Erroneous beliefs it rectifies range from simple ones, such as that taking a bath at night will cause pleural effusion, to major ones such as vaccine misinformation. Other topics Medical Mythbusters Malaysia focuses on include safe birth practice, the dangers of unregistered supplements, vaping and tobacco control, and vaccine hesitancy. Over time, their modus operandi shifted from online dissemination to more groundwork, be it public (community outreach) or behind the scenes (policymaking and policy communication) (Dr. Amirul Amzar Bin Megat Hashim, Deputy President of Medical Mythbusters Malaysia, personal communication, May 9, 2024). Ini Sains Beb has also been registered as an NGO since 2020; it is composed of academicians and professionals, including university lecturers, engineers, medical doctors, a dietitian, an architect, and a plant physiologist. Its members appear in mass media and debunk myths and misconceptions focusing on the ideas, not on those who propagate them; the fields they cover include architecture, biochemistry, chemistry, molecular biology, health sciences, engineering (electrical, mechanical, and aeronautical), natural product chemistry, entomology, genomics, and cancer therapeutics (Ini Sains Beb member Dr. Che Puteh Osman, personal communication, May 17, 2024; see also Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2025b).
Additionally, atheist/ex-Muslim YouTubers strongly defend evolution and criticize iʿjāz and superstitions (e.g., about jinn). An example is the Egyptian Sherif Gaber (b. 1992/1993), whose videos (in Egyptian Arabic) receive hundreds of thousands of views (Bigliardi et al. Reference Bigliardi, Chouhbi, Ghafil, Sounani and Tikrout2024). Currently, each one of Gaber’s videos criticizing iʿjāz (Gaber Reference Gaber2016a; Gaber Reference Gaber2016b; Gaber Reference Gaber2022a; Gaber Reference Gaber2022b) has between 1.4 million and 757 K hits. A video discussing jinn (Gaber Reference Gaber2021) has 976,000 hits. (For a discussion of Arab freethinkers on YouTube and their focus on science, see Elsässer Reference Elsässer2021).
Finally, it is interesting to look at skeptical/pro-science/rationalist associations the world over. I ran searches for the terms “Islam,” “Islamic,” “Muslim,” “Qur’an,” “Qur’anic” (and their equivalents in other languages) in the web sites of such organizations (including online archives of their respective publications). For the US, I obtained thirty-nine results for the Skeptical Inquirer (CSI/CSICOP’s magazine), including articles on Islamic creationism, faith healing, medical notions in the Qur’an, and bad scientific/scholarly practice in Muslim countries. For Italy, I obtained three results in Query (the magazine of CICAP), including an article on the creationist Harun Yahya (translated from the Skeptical Inquirer) and comprehensive coverage of pseudoscience in the Muslim world. The magazine exists in a paper version and online (Query Online), run by different teams.Footnote 19 However, the articles on Islam and pseudoscience were published on both. In the interest of transparency, I must add that I am the author of a cover article (on Harun Yahya) in the Skeptical Inquirer and of all the articles in Query: I originally approached both magazines with proposals for such articles. Similar searches in the web pages of publications and organizations in other countries, as well as email exchanges with organization representatives in major countries, including those hosting significant Muslim communities, yielded fewer results or even no results.
1.11 The Perception of “Pseudoscience” by Advocates of Creationism and Iʿjāz ʿIlmī
“Pseudoscience” is also used as a term of reproach by the advocates of positions that the critics I have so far discussed regard as pseudoscientific. In The Evolution Deceit, the Turkish creationist Harun Yahya (pen name of Adnan Oktar, b. 1956) writes, “The book will help you realise that Darwinism is not a scientific theory but a pseudo-scientific dogma upheld in the name of materialist philosophy, despite counter evidence and outright refutation” (Yahya n.d.: 29).Footnote 20 The Jordanian pharmacologist Eyad Qunaibi (b. 1975), who is professionally active as a university professor and runs a YouTube channel in which he systematically discredits evolution, refers to popular atheists like ethologist and author Richard Dawkins (b. 1941), or physicist and cosmologist Lawrence M. Krauss (b. 1954), as “priests of pseudoscience,” claiming that, in order to earn money and fame, they falsify science, take advantage of people’s ignorance, and sell lies and superstitions (Qunaibi Reference Qunaibi2019a). Yahya and Qunaibi do not argue that if an author promotes a materialist worldview/philosophy based on evolution and presents all of such a worldview/philosophy as “science,” the author in question is promoting a form of pseudoscience. Yahya and Qunaibi rather suggest that evolution per se is pseudoscience (more on their arguments in Section 2.2.1).
I once brought up the concept of “pseudoscience” in conversation with the Egyptian geologist Zaghloul El-Naggar (b. 1933), one of the most popular producers and propagators of iʿjāz (which he calls “scientific precision”; Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 118), but also a creationist. I pointed out that Muslim critics of his approach label it as bad science as well as pseudoscientific. In regard to bad science, I mentioned that El-Naggar is blamed for exceeding his area of competence. He responded that overspecialization is detrimental to a religious comprehension of the world (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 114). When I mentioned ideas that were criticized as pseudoscientific, such as the proposal to use jinns to produce energy (see Hoodbhoy Reference Hoodbhoy1991: 144), he replied, “in any human society you are bound to find deviations, in any human community. I have met people in the West who believe in many funny ideas – this is not only in our community. And you can never ever group people into one area of conviction” (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2014: 115).
2 An Analytical Look at Three “Usual Suspects”
Section 1 documents that most authors who criticize Islam-related pseudoscience tend to label as “pseudoscientific” three approaches in particular: iʿjāz, Islamic creationism, and Prophetic medicine and Qur’anic healing. In this section, I discuss such approaches systematically and analytically. To be sure, tracing a comprehensive history for each one goes beyond the scope of this Element (fortunately, other scholars conducted historiographic research). My goal here is to break down each approach into basic ideas and to clarify what makes them specifically pseudoscientific or flawed/misleading in other respects.
2.1 Science and the Qur’an
Nidhal Guessoum produced an extensive review and critique of iʿjāzi literature (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2008; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010a). The historian Majid Daneshgar inspected more than a 100 works belonging to the genre (Danehsgar Reference Daneshgar2023a; Danehsgar Reference Daneshgar2023b; Danehsgar Reference Daneshgar2023c). Both show that the idea that the Qur’an predicted modern scientific notions stemmed from an earlier interpretive approach relying on modern science while explaining Qur’anic verses. In other words, a historical shift occurred from tafsir ʿilmī (“scientific interpretation”) to iʿjāz ʿilmī. Tafsir ʿilmī had important medieval precedents (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023a: 8–13) but flourished in the nineteenth century while Muslim readers of the Qur’an fascinated by science took a modernizing turn. Iʿjāz ʿilmī started emerging when Qur’anic interpreters began feeling the need not only to catch up to, but also to compete with Western science while emphasizing the miraculous origin of the Qur’an (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023b). In the last quarter of the twentieth century iʿjāz became globally visible (and remunerative); apologists used it to promote Islamic theism and creationism, or to show that the Qur’an is superior to other sacred scriptures (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023c). Interpreters also found support in the Qur’an’s numerous references to ʿilm, a term that can be interpreted as referring to “knowledge” but also “science” in a narrower sense (see Guessoum & Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023: 7–9), and also in the idea that the Qur’an contains everything, suggested by a verse like Q 6:38, “We have not neglected anything in the Book.”
Seemingly, however, tafsir ʿilmī and iʿjāz ʿilmī are joined at the hip. Daneshgar describes them as “twin trends” and “dual trends” (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023a: 1, 4). It is not a coincidence that the two approaches are merged, indeed confounded, in crucial work like Bucaille’s (see Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023c: 10; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010a: 150nv, 154). Ultimately, the “miraculous scientific content of the Qur’an” triumphed globally. Daneshgar observes that this is the trend the vast public is familiar with, and that “the distinction between the two [approaches] is subtle” (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023c: 19).
In addition to criticizing iʿjāz, Guessoum prescribes a multilayered reading of the Qur’an; modern science can be mustered to bring forth the meaning of certain verses, provided that one relies on accurate information and is familiar with the philosophy of science (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010a: 166–172). These views influenced authors such as Hamza Andreas Tzortzis (b. 1980), who retracted his previous appreciation for iʿjāz (Tzortzis Reference Tzortzis2019a).
2.1.1 The Flaws of Iʿjāz ʿIlmī
In the long run, iʿjāz may be replaced by more balanced approaches like the one suggested by Guessoum. In the meantime, however, it calls for critical scrutiny. As we have seen in Section 1, several authors point out its flaws. I propose to group such flaws under five overarching types. In what follows, I list the general categories and offer for each one a few significant examples of flaws that fall under it.Footnote 21
1. Epistemological flaws are associated with a confused perception of the relation between natural science and scripture and/or to a poor conceptualization of science.
(i) Deriving scientific information from the Qur’an.
(ii) Using the Qur’an to confirm scientific information (variant: using the Qur’an to arbitrate between competing scientific models).Footnote 22
(iii) Treating science as a mere collection of “facts” (thus ignoring the method of science).
2. Information-related flaws concern the specific (allegedly) scientific notions that are referenced by the advocates of iʿjāz.
(i) Relying on scientifically inaccurate information (inaccuracy comes in several variants – for example, the information can be exaggerated,Footnote 23 distorted,Footnote 24 or plainly falseFootnote 25).
(ii) Pairing scriptural verses with “fringe” science presented as science proper.Footnote 26
(iii) Overstating the novelty of a piece of information at the time of revelation.Footnote 27
3. Interpretive flaws are related to the method used to read the Qur’an.
(i) Overstating the precision of a term, verse, or passage.
(ii) Downplaying the possibility of reading a term, verse, or passage in several ways (a flaw that can be described as complementary to the previous one).
(iii) Translating incorrectly.
(iv) Ignoring that scriptural references can be time-bound (i.e., contain concepts that were apt to be understood by humans at the time of revelation).
(v) Designing exegesis in such a way that it never can be falsified (e.g., claiming that if a verse, term, etc. aligns with science, then such harmony should be emphasized; if it seems to contradict science, then one should just “wait and see”).
4. Competence-related and institutional flaws concern the background of the authors who produce iʿjāz and how they organize their work and interactions.
(i) Engaging in this approach without necessary credentials and competence (in science generally; in a specific scientific field; in Arabic language and Qur’anic exegesis).
(ii) Developing the field without relying on a system of mutual criticism and peer review.
5. Theological flaw.
(i) By deriving science from the Qur’an, one goes against Qur’anic teachings (see Golshani’s criticism in Section 1.8). This category, however, practically overlaps with epistemological flaw 1–i.
The attentive reader has surely noticed the overlap between the first four types and the items they comprise. For example, an author who isn’t sufficiently competent in Qur’anic exegesis and in physics (flaw 4–i) may advance a linguistically stretched interpretation of Qur’anic verses (3–i) and claim that they anticipate or even contribute to cosmology – then such a mistake is not detected by other authors in the field because they are not organized into a scientific community proper (4–ii), etcetera. With that said, we may still ask if one can identify which flaws, specifically, make iʿjāz pseudoscientific.
2.1.2 Iʿjāz ʿIlmī and Pseudoscience
In my earlier work, I suggested that the very reference to “science” in the expression iʿjāz ʿilmī is misleading (Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2017a: 160) since this genre is not a branch of the natural sciences. One should be careful, however, not to overstate this point. ʿIlmī simply means “related to science,” not “in science” or “of science,” and the very term ʿilm covers more than the natural sciences. In sum, while ambiguity may lend itself to misunderstandings, it is not the use of the adjective that makes iʿjāz pseudoscientific.
Based on the taxonomy of iʿjāz ʿilmī-related flaws, I suggest that, strictly speaking, it is the presence of flaws (i) and (ii) of the first kind (epistemological) that turn a specific expression of iʿjāz into pseudoscience. Authors who commit such mistakes fatally infringe on the scientific method and pretend to arrive at scientific results.
The flaws of the second kind (information-related) are somewhat more challenging to classify. Reference to information that is one way or another erroneous certainly results in a misapplication of the adjective “scientific,” but in some cases, one may be dealing with “bad science” (or bad scientific popularization) rather than fully fledged pseudoscience. However, it is reasonable to say that when the presence of erroneous information is systematic, the iʿjāz variant in question tends to qualify as pseudoscience rather than bad science.
As to the third flaw in the first category (epistemological, reducing science to “facts”), I contend that this results in a poor or simplistic representation of science without necessarily yielding pseudoscience; ultimately, even scientific popularization often consists of breaking science down to interesting “facts.”
The flaws of the third kind (interpretive) rather make for poor exegesis.
Finally, the flaws of the fourth kind (competence-related and institutional) are concrete factors that may contribute to the emergence (and persistence) of the previous ones. This category warrants some critical discussion. Daneshgar points out that authors of tafsir ʿilmī generally had “limited scientific backgrounds” (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023b: 3). However, this point should not be overstated. As I pointed out earlier, (Section 1.6) there are authors of iʿjāz who have scientific credentials. Moreover, it is one’s adherence to scholarly/scientific methodologies that ultimately determines whether their results are valid or not, regardless of credentials. Arguably, the challenge of incompetence is virtually in-built in both tafsir ʿilmī and iʿjāz ʿilmī insofar as they are developed by one single author; the interpretation of the Qur’an through science demands proficiency in different fields that can hardly be mastered by one individual. Then again, a possible remedy is combining teamwork and peer review. I am aware of the existence of institutions dedicated to iʿjāz (e.g., the Commission on Scientific Signs in the Quran and Sunnah) that supposedly gather and coordinate experts in different specialties.Footnote 28 Such institutions may (in principle) engage in internal debate and criticism; however, the quality of iʿjāz literature suggests that, whether such debates and criticism exist or not, scientific and scholarly methodologies are not consistently adopted.
Some critics may be unhappy with my analysis, pointing out that the advocates of iʿjāz usually subscribe to the genre wholesale, and propagate it accordingly, rather than in the form of specific narratives. Like a kaleidoscope, different combinations and configurations are obtained by different authors in texts, conferences, and videos while always rehashing the same materials, narratives, and ideas. And, similarly to kaleidoscopic images, it is ultimately difficult to completely disentangle an element from the other ones. In this sense, one may still want to call all of iʿjāz pseudoscientific.
2.2 Resisting Evolution
Over the past years, the debate on Islam and evolution has been intensifying, with explorations and contributions being offered from different angles. Solid scholarship exists reconstructing the historical reception of Charles Darwin’s (1809–1882) theory among Muslims (e.g., Ziadat Reference Ziadat1986; Howard Reference Howard2011; Elshakry Reference Elshakri2013; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2016) and studies on evolution education in Muslim countries (e.g., Aroua et al. Reference Aroua, Coquidé and Abbes2009; BouJaoude et al. Reference BouJaoude, Asghar, Wiles, Jaber, Sarieddine, Alters, Tasar and Cakmakci2009; Burton Reference Burton2010; Peker et al. Reference Peker, Comert and Kence2010; Yassin & Bastide Reference Yassin, Bastide, Portier, Veuille and Willaime2011; Clément Reference Clément2015; Muğaloğlu Reference Muğaloğlu, Deniz and Borgerding2018). Muslim scientists have been elaborating on the importance of teaching evolution (e.g., Dajani Reference Dajani2015; Guessoum Reference Guessoum2017: 113–120). Shoaib Ahmed Malik has produced a detailed analysis and theological assessment of Muslim stances on evolution (Malik Reference Malik2021a).
In this section, I first identify the objections routinely used by Islamic opponents of evolution and then briefly respond to them. Eventually, I discuss three intertwined questions. Is it accurate to label the positions articulated through such objections as creationism? What makes creationist positions specifically Islamic? Which creationist arguments technically qualify as pseudoscientific? Finally, drawing on the answers, I critically elaborate on “Adamic exceptionalism,” a recently advanced position.
2.2.1 (Fallacious) Arguments against Evolution and (Brief) Rebuttals
Muslim authors have historically raised numerous objections to evolution. Here, I offer a general typology including significant examples. In reality, types and objections overlap and manifest themselves in different combinations. To each type I add brief rebuttals. (Readers interested in detailed ones can find a plethora of resources; I can at least mention Alters & Alters Reference Alters and Alters2001 and Allmon Reference Allmon2009.)
1. Epistemological Minimizations. Their goal is to weaken the credibility of evolution in reference to its method and scientific status.
(i) Evolution is “only a theory” as opposed to “fact” or “law.”Footnote 29
(ii) Evolution is based on unreliable/unwarranted induction (generalization) from known to unknown cases (i.e., ultimately one cannot “go back and check” what happened long ago).Footnote 30 Variants: observable “microevolution” (i.e., variations within species) is not evidence for “macroevolution” or speciation; one does not observe a species turning into another one.Footnote 31
(iii) Evolution is unfalsifiable.Footnote 32
(iv) Evolution “only” provides the best working model.Footnote 33
(v) Evolution is controversial even among experts.Footnote 34
(i) Evolution is a scientific theory: a model that explains and unifies natural phenomena supported by convergent evidence from different areas (e.g., paleontology, anatomy, genetics). Evolutionary models can allow predictions and be formulated mathematically. (For a brief discussion of the predictive power of evolutionary biology see Braude Reference Braude1997; for a discussion of mathematical models in evolutionary biology see Servedio et al. 2014).
(ii) Inductive reasoning is warranted if based on empirical evidence (see previous point). It is true that, in the case of evolution (and in other “historical sciences”), one cannot “rewind the tape.” However, geological and fossil records offer strong evidence as to what happened in the past. (Additionally, all sciences have inductive/historical aspects to them; in fact, abandoning induction would result in undermining even basic, everyday reasoning). One does not “observe” species turning into other ones because this is not what evolution is about – “macro” changes result from the accumulation of “micro” ones over extremely long periods (i.e., “deep time”).
(iii) In principle, evolution could be falsified upon finding evidence that, for example, species were artificially created. With that said, Popper’s falsificationism was introduced to discriminate science from pseudoscience, but other philosophers have long come to reconsider it, observing that some pseudoscientific notions are falsifiable, while some scientific ones are unfalsifiable (Gordin Reference Gordin2023: 6–12; Pigliucci Reference Pigliucci2023).
(iv) Here opponents of evolution cynically exploit an otherwise acceptable statement. Evolutionary scientists do agree that evolution is not the “truth”: Scientific models never are. However, this statement is used to suggest (or pander to the audience’s assumption) that scriptures convey an “explanation” for biodiversity that at some point may turn out to be “scientifically” true and currently is just the weakest of two competing explanations. Here lies a confusion between scientific investigation (and evidence) and scriptural narrative.
(v) Experts debate the details of evolution (e.g., prompted by new discoveries that “upset” the fossil record), or which evolutionary processes should be considered fundamental, not the very concept of evolution (for an overview of this debate, see Laland et al., Reference Laland, Uller, Feldman, Sterelny, Müller, Moczek, Jablonka, Odling-Smee, Wray, Hoekstra, Futuyma, Lenski, Mackay, Schluter and Strassmann2014).
2. Misrepresentation of extant evidence for evolution.
(i) No fossils of “transitional” forms between species were discovered (i.e., “missing links”).Footnote 35
(ii) Fossil remains show that evolution did not occur.Footnote 36
(iii) The only observable mutations are harmful.Footnote 37
Rebuttals
(i) Fossils of beings in between species are known (e.g., Tiktaalik, in between fish and four-legged vertebrates, and the Archaeopteryx, in between reptiles and birds), including fossils of hominids (in between apelike ancestors and modern humans). The very concept of “species,” however, is a simplification; in reality, no “discrete” stages exist (thus, the “missing-link objection” is potentially inexhaustible: for any two similar beings, someone can always claim that something “in between” is “missing”). (For a highly readable rejection of the “gaps”/“missing links” argument, see Eldredge Reference Eldredge1981).
(ii) Not all beings evolve at the same rate; those popularly known as “living fossils” (e.g., the mammal Okapi and the plant Ginkgo biloba) bear resemblance in shape to ancient, fossilized forms, but genetic comparisons show that they evolved. (For a discussion of “living fossils,” see Werth & Shear Reference Werth and Shear2014).
(iii) We do observe some harmful mutations (e.g., radiation-induced), but single beneficial mutations have been observed as well. However, it is misleading to think of beneficial mutations like “superpowers” suddenly emerging in an individual. Genetic mutations occur all the time, and they are filtered through natural selection. Most lethal mutations do not manifest (cells carrying them do not even multiply). The remaining mutations are simply neutral. Additionally, genes interact: Most of the time, a “single” trait (e.g., eye color) is, in fact, influenced by multiple genes. The fact that living beings exist indicates that they are comprised of (accumulations and interactions of) mutations that proved beneficial in a specific niche. In sum, it is more accurate to speak of neutral mutations that survive selection. (For a simple discussion of mutations, see Understanding Evolution 2025).
3. Overinterpretations of natural phenomena as evidence of creation (as opposed to evolution).
(i) Design. Nature exhibits patterns showing purposeful and/or “human-friendly” design (as opposed to blind evolution) that suggest the existence of a (benevolent) creator (who did not reach such results through evolution).Footnote 38
(ii) “Irreducible complexity.” Some natural items cannot be explained through evolution since their constitutive parts could not have existed on their own and are thus evidence of (direct) creation (as opposed to evolution).Footnote 39
Rebuttals
(i) The idea of a “design” detectable in nature is based on weak analogies between natural phenomena and human-made artifacts. (A good article debunking similar arguments used by Harun Yahya – and Yahya’s arguments in general – is Dargan Reference Dargan2013).
(ii) There are evolutionary explanations for the (few) natural phenomena described by evolution opponents as “irreducibly complexity” (e.g., the bacterial flagellum; see Baker & Matzke Reference Baker and Matzke2019).
4. Moral objections. They associate evolution with heinous theories, ideologies, and phenomena.
(i) Evolution is tantamount/leads to atheism (regarded as heinous by evolution opponents).Footnote 40
(ii) Evolution is the ideological source of terrorism and totalitarianism.Footnote 41
(iii) Evolution is essentially related to racism.Footnote 42
Rebuttals
(i) Many theologians and religious leaders (including Muslim ones) embrace evolution and interpret it religiously. (See, for example, Hasan Reference Hasan2022).
(ii) Darwin surely entertained various ideas about society, including (by modern standards) archaic ones and progressive ones; his theory was used to promote ideological views (“social Darwinism”). However, evolution explains natural phenomena: Darwin did not suggest that it should translate into a social model. (For Darwin’s views on human races and slavery, see Desmond & Moore Reference Desmond and Moore2011).
(iii) Darwin realized that humans neither included separate “species” nor could be classified into different “subspecies.”Footnote 43 Genetics eventually confirmed that the concept of human “races” is scientifically untenable. (On human “races,” modern genetics, and racism, see Cavalli-Sforza & Cavalli-Sforza Reference Cavalli-Sforza1995).
5. Objections based on conspiracy thinking. They present evolution as a myth or ideology maintained by a global “Darwinist lobby” whose status depends on belief in evolution.
(i) The “lobby” represses criticism of evolution.Footnote 44
(ii) The “lobby” fabricates evidence for evolution – for example, fossils and textbook illustrations.Footnote 45
Rebuttals
I explained in Section 1.7 that conspiracy thinking is a fallacious argumentative style. Specific responses:
(i) Darwin’s theory, which contradicted popular, deeply rooted ideas of his times, was gradually accepted by scientists from the most diverse geographical, cultural, and religious backgrounds due to massive scientific confirmation. In other words, evolution affirmed itself because it proved able to withstand scientific criticism – the opposite of a conspiracy.
(ii) Historians do record examples of mistakes and fraud by evolutionary scientists (like in any other scientific area); however, such episodes are cherry-picked and exaggerated by evolution opponents (On the infamous case of the “Piltdown Man” see Russell Reference Russell2003).
6. Metaphysical objections. These are rare arguments used by the Iranian-American philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933) and his followers.
(i) Species are fixed archetypes. Life-forms cannot turn into other life-forms, like geometric figures that are what they are and not other ones (Nasr Reference Nasr2006: 182–183).
(ii) Something greater cannot come from something lesser (Nasr Reference Nasr2006: 185–186).
Rebuttals
(i) This is a false (and bizarre) analogy between species and other entities (see also the Rebuttal of 2–i).
(ii) This objection is even stranger: In fact, it is dubious how to interpret the concept of “greater” and “lesser.” However, if it refers to actual size, it is easily refuted by looking at seeds and plants.
2.2.2 Defining Creationism
We saw in Section 1 that the critics of Islam-related pseudoscience usually refer to the positions articulated through the aforementioned objections as “creationism.” So far, I adopted the same usage for simplicity’s sake. However, “creationism” is regarded by some authors as an imprecise term. Let us now consider this concern.
Arguably, every believer ascribes creative power to the deity (or deities) she or he believes in, finding a creation narrative in her or his scriptures. In this sense, “religious” and “creationist” can be perceived as overlapping terms; even someone embracing evolution as God-created may be labeled, in a broad sense, “creationist.” I am aware that at least one Muslim scientist who embraces evolution (including human evolution), Rana Dajani (b. 1969), sees the term “creationism” as unnecessarily confusing (Dajani, personal communication, May 6, 2024).
With that said, I think one should appreciate that the meaning of “creationism” is widely understood as opposition to evolution, its goal being the protection and promotion of a scriptural creation narrative referring to real-yet-non-evolutionary events. (This somewhat convoluted specification is needed since some authors may see Adam and Eve as real individuals who were naturally born of humans who had evolved and were special and unique in some other respect, e.g., spiritually).
As I also experienced in my own interaction with creationists, one tactic they sometimes employ is to claim that the protection of scriptural creation narratives (as real-yet-non-evolutionary) is not their motive or goal. Instead, they claim to reject evolution independently of religious concerns (differently put: for them, scripture doesn’t need to be “protected” from evolution; before they even collide, evolution collapses on its own). However, the context in which they advance their positions strongly suggests the opposite is the case: Religious concerns inspire their resistance. Even when creationists claim no religious grounds or purposes, the defense of scriptural creation seen as referring to real-yet-non-evolutionary events is manifestly what they drive at, or, de facto, it is presented as deriving from/being implied by their arguments. Incidentally, the advocates of “ancient aliens” narratives (see Section 1.7) may seem to be nonreligious creationists; however, their objections are borrowed from religious authors and they defend scriptural creation (although they replace God with extraterrestrials). Such motive or intended aim (or de facto consequence) should be considered in defining a set of arguments as creationist.Footnote 46
It is, however, good to be reminded that, depending on the scriptures at stake, the combination of the arguments, and the emphasis put on one or another objection, creationism comes in myriad configurations (even including overtures to “micro-evolution” although, as we saw, the concept is spurious). Thus, while one should not reinvent the wheel – that is, radically redefine or renounce the term “creationism,” it may be useful to speak of “creationisms” in plural. Significantly, Ronald L. Numbers titled his monumental study The Creationists (Numbers Reference Numbers2006).
2.2.3 Christian and Islamic Creationism
Rana Dajani suggests that Islamic opposition to evolution historically comes from the association of “Darwin’s ideas … with colonialism, imperialism, the West, atheism, materialism and racism” together with the adoption by Muslim scholars of Christian creationist arguments (Dajani Reference Dajani2015). Academic historians observe that some elements of creationism were imported from the West. R. L. Numbers writes that, in the mid 1980s, the Turkish minister of education sought collaboration with the American Institute for Creation Research; creationist books “stripped of references to the Bible … were translated into Turkish” and in 1992, prominent creationists from the US were invited as keynote speakers to a major creationist conference in Istanbul (Numbers Reference Numbers2006: 421–422).
Some commentators emphasize the identity of the arguments used by Christian and Muslim creationists. For instance, Anne Ross Solberg observes, “Yahya employs many of the strategies and arguments of the Christian creationist movement” (Ross Solberg Reference Ross Solberg2013: 107). Taner Edis writes, “In content, there is nothing new in the Yahya material: scientifically negligible arguments and outright distortions often copied from Christian anti-evolution literature, presented with a conservative Muslim emphasis” (Edis Reference Edis2008).
With all that said, the fact that American arguments and sources were demonstrably used does not imply that creationism was just imported to the Muslim world – that is, that creationism, or at least some ideas that form it, were not there before.
Muslim opponents of evolution advancing arguments related to the so-called irreducible complexity (see Section 2.2.1, 3–ii) are reproducing an idea typical of an approach known as intelligent design (or ID), which historically is a late twentieth-century development of American creationism (see Numbers Reference Numbers2006: 373–398). However, one should distinguish between ID and its “intellectual roots” that “go back centuries” (Numbers Reference Numbers2006: 373). In particular, ID can be regarded as the twentieth-century version of the design argument – that is, the idea that nature (or the whole universe) exhibits signs of an executed plan, suggestive of a “designer” (see Section 2.2.1, 3–i). While this argument is frequently mobilized against Darwinian evolution, it in fact predates Darwin’s theory. For example, it was promoted by William Paley (1745–1805), an author that Darwin was familiar with as a student at Cambridge,Footnote 47 but precedents exist in the Middle Ages as well as in antiquity. In the Muslim world, the Qur’an is the ultimate source of or reference for such an argument, with its emphasis on natural phenomena as the “signs” of God (e.g., Q 45:13) that were elaborated on by theologians (and ancient theologians could be exposed to non-Islamic arguments of this kind too).
Along with historical continuity and analogies, one can also see differences. “Young earth” creationists (who read the days of creation as literal periods of twenty-four hours) are hard to find among Muslims. Islamic creationists are far less preoccupied with “flood geology” than Christian ones. Muslim creationists, however, as mentioned in Section 1.6, have a specific concern about the stature of Adam mentioned in the hadith. In the latter case, the difference is dictated by a scriptural element that has no analog in the Bible. The former two differences are trickier to explain. One may argue that Muslim creationists find it easier to consider the “days” of creation as very long periods because the story of creation in the Qur’an is far less structured and detailed than the one found in the book of Genesis. One could also argue the Qur’anic term for “day” has a greater semantic spectrum. Noah’s story in the Qur’an may be more fragmentary than the biblical one, or Noah may be comparatively marginal in Islamic theology. Then again, not all Christian creationists believe in a “young earth” or engage in “flood geology.”
Perhaps differences can be explained as historical accidents or as practically motivated, rather than rooted in semantics or theology. For instance, Islamic creationism may have drawn inspiration from its Christian counterpart at a time when “flood geology” was giving way to other variants of creationism, perceived as more advanced. Additionally, avoiding “young earth” arguments may be a tactic to circumvent (some) challenges with science while at the same time assuming a distinct position.
“Positioning” tactics can be clearly detected in Muslims authors referring to “irreducible complexity.” As I observed, this argument was originally advanced in the context of Christian ID. However, Muslim authors who use it state that they do not subscribe to ID, emphasizing that the very concept of “design” is a human one – that is, it misleads from the concept of divine creation (Qunaibi Reference Qunaibi2019b; Yahya Reference Yahya2018).
2.2.4 Pseudoscientific Creationism
We come to a crucial question. Which creationist arguments can be specifically labeled as pseudoscientific? Let me start by offering three overarching observations. First, every expression of resistance to evolution argued on a religious basis, in principle, commits the epistemological/methodological mistake of treating scripture as a source of information about biological phenomena. Second, the very fact that the authors or publications in question talk about evolution creates, in an uneducated audience, the impression that what is being offered is “science.” Third, Islamic creationism usually manifests itself as a cluster of mixed objections to evolution (jointly offered in the same book, video, etc.). With this in mind, one may deem all creationism, generically and pragmatically, pseudoscientific.
One may also, however, attempt a more analytical approach. Strictly speaking, it is the arguments of the third kind that qualify as pseudoscientific, since they present as a scientific conclusion what is in fact a (dubious) theological interpretation of nature (See Section 2.2.1, 3–i); and misinform about the viability of evolutionary explanations for specific phenomena adding that alleged unviability is evidence for non-evolutionary creation (See Section 2.2.1, 3–ii). In other words, such arguments pose as scientific demonstrations.
The objections of the first kind (epistemological) qualify as poor philosophy of science. The objections of the second kind are misrepresentations of scientific information (if they were true, they would just “poke holes” in the theory of evolution). Those of the fourth kind (ethical) and of the fifth kind (based on conspiracy thinking) are auxiliary ones used to strengthen the discredit of evolution. The arguments of the sixth kind (metaphysical) qualify as poor analogies.
2.2.5 Adamic Exceptionalism
David Solomon Jalajel proposes a position that has been called Adamic exceptionalism (henceforth AE) and that has been promoted by Shoaib Ahmed Malik. According to Jalajel, since the scriptures are silent over pre-Adamic humans, their existence or nonexistence are, theologically speaking, equally valid possibilities. Thus, Adam and Eve can be thought of as miraculously created, yet in such a way that their makeup and appearance did not differ from humans who had hitherto evolved (Jalajel Reference Jalajel2009). Adamic exceptionalism is not equal to human exceptionalism, according to which humanity began with the miraculous creation of Adam. Guessoum calls Jalajel’s position creationism (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2011b). Malik insists that it should not be labeled as such since AE accommodates evolutionary concepts (Malik Reference Malik2021b).
I offer an integration of Guessoum’s critique. At first blush, Adam’s creation and existence, from Jalajel’s perspective, seem to be insulated from scientific investigation. Indeed, scriptures offer no spatiotemporal coordinates for Adam’s life, and no Adamic remains exist that lend themselves to scientific inspection. Jalajel suggests that a scientist discussing Adam’s existence falls outside the scientific domain (Jalajel Reference Jalajel2018: 22), thus qualifying as pseudoscience as Jalajel defines it (see Section 1.9). However, if we posit the existence of any historical and material being (including one for which no remains exist), its conceptualization is still subject to the constraints of scientific thinking, including methodological consistency. In this sense, Jalajel’s understanding of Adam challenges a uniform application of methodological naturalism. Malik appreciates Jalajel’s position through Ashʿarite ideas, including a defense of miracles for which he draws inspiration from Al-Ghazālī (1058–1111) (Malik Reference Malik2021a: 267–295). Adamic exceptionalism surely sidesteps the gross distortions of evolution that generally characterize creationism as it is widely known; indeed, Jalajel takes issue with forms of creationism that he calls pseudoscientific (see Section 1.9); Malik criticizes creationist misconceptions about evolution (Malik Reference Malik2021a: 47–59).
When Malik states that AE isn’t creationism, he is identifying creationism with specific objections to evolution. However, objections are a means; creationism, as we have seen, is identified by its motive, aim, and consequence – that is, defending a scriptural creation narrative seen as referring to real-yet-non-evolutionary events. This is, ultimately, what AE does. Within AE as it is articulated by Jalajel and defended by Malik, evolution is not discredited wholesale along usual polemics, but it surely is resisted in relation to the highly specific case of the creation of Adam. Following the analytical approach offered in Section 2.2.4, AE is not, strictly speaking, pseudoscientific. Nonetheless, it qualifies as a variant of creationism within which occurs a tension with evolution at the level of epistemology and methodology. Adamic exceptionaliam is, in fact, utterly problematic in many respects, epistemological as well as theological (for a thorough discussion, see Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2025a).
2.3 Hygiene-, Nutrition-, Health-, and Illness-Related Approaches
2.3.1 Classifying the Approaches
As we have seen in Section 1, some critics of Islam-related pseudoscience point out that the Muslim world is home to questionable notions and practices regarding hygiene, nutrition, health, and illness (henceforth HNHI). These can be grouped into the following categories (keeping in mind that the amount of material that falls under them is in fact enormous):
(i) Prophetic medicine. The use of food, herbs, products, and treatments that are mentioned in the hadith as approved, recommended or practiced by the Prophet. They include black seed (Nigella sativa),Footnote 48 camel urine and milk,Footnote 49 dates (of the ‘ajwa variety),Footnote 50 henna,Footnote 51 hijama or wet cupping,Footnote 52 honey,Footnote 53 Indian incense and sea incense,Footnote 54 cleaning teeth with a miswak (a twig from the Salvadora persica tree),Footnote 55 olive oil,Footnote 56 senna,Footnote 57 talbina (barley broth),Footnote 58 truffles,Footnote 59 and Zamzam water (from the well of the same name in Mekkah).Footnote 60
Nowadays, Prophetic medicine is widely propagated through books, videos, and web pages, and the items/practices in question are marketed in “Islamic” garb. However, Prophetic medicine as a literary genre has historical precedents dating back to (at least) the ninth century, and it became especially popular in the fourteenth century. In modern times, it has also been produced by reinterpreting old commentaries rather than by reading hadith directly. (For a brief historical discussion of the emergence of Prophetic medicine, including mention of prominent authors, see Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023a: 7–8. Ragab Reference Ragab2012 discusses a case study in which a fifteenth-century commentary was reinterpreted in the twentieth century and offers a fine-grained discussion of the complex strategies used by modern interpreters).
(ii) Medical iʿjāz ʿilmī, extolling the benefits of fruits and food mentioned in the Qur’an, including dates (e.g., Q 19:25–26), figs (surah 95 is titled after the fig), grapes (e.g., Q 16:11), honey (e.g., Q 16:69–70), olives (e.g., Q 16:11), and pomegranates (e.g., Q 55:68). This category is similar to (and usually mixed with) the previous one.
(iii) Qur’anic recitation implemented as a cure for psychological and physical illness. The recitation can be used in the form of a recording (many are available over YouTube), or it can be performed in person over a patient by a practitioner. This can be considered as a subset of category (i) but also as an intersection of categories (i) and (ii). Reciting the Qur’an as (part of) healing is a practice referred to in the hadith,Footnote 61 and a verse of the Qur’an states that there is “healing” in it (Q 17:82; in fact, “healing” can be interpreted as spiritual rather than physical). Also, both the Qur’an and ahadith mention genies, or jinn, that are regarded by the advocates of Qur’anic therapeutic recitation as causing psychological and physical affections; Qur’anic recitation is believed to expel jinn. Islamic exorcism or roqyia is widely practiced in the Muslim world. According to ethnographic observation, practitioners describe jinn as physical if ultimately elusive beings that can enter a human body like germs, be expelled through recitation and prayers (but also through mechanical action on the body, including beatings), and even affect technological devices (Mateo Dieste Reference Mateo Dieste2015).
(iv) Systems of ancient theories and practices that are preserved, institutionalized, and promoted by university departments, labeled Unani (or Yunani) medicine (or Tibb) (in South and Central AsiaFootnote 62 but also in South AfricaFootnote 63) and Persian medicine or Iranian traditional medicine (in IranFootnote 64). Such approaches are also protected by governmental offices.Footnote 65 They follow in the footsteps of scholars like al-Rāzī (865–925) and Ibn Sīnā (980–1037), who elaborated on ancient Greek medicine (unani comes from the Arabic word for Greek). The approaches in question explain health and illness in reference to concepts such as “temperaments” and “humors.”
(v) Popular “medical-sounding” discourses propagated over the web through a nebula of texts by nonspecialists in medical fields who provide vague references (or no references at all) and describe religion-related practices as bearing health-related benefits. Such practices include ablutions (e.g., IslamicFinder 2022), fasting (e.g., Al-Hossain Reference Al-Hossain2024), male circumcision (e.g., Al-Munajjid Reference Al-Munajjid2001), the prohibition of pork (e.g., Islam Question & answer 2005), praying (e.g., IslamiCity 2022), and wearing niqab (e.g., Mahila Reference Mahila2023).
At the risk of repetition, let me emphasize that, once again, reality is much fuzzier than analytical classification suggests.Footnote 66 I have already remarked that the categories overlap. Additionally, it is commonly observed that the same practitioner offers Qur’anic recitation, cupping, and herbal products. There also exist historical connections between the ideas and approaches in question and tafsir/iʿjāz ʿilmī. Physicians engaged in the “scientific interpretation of the Qur’an” during the nineteenth century (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023b: 3–7). Modern Qur’anic commentators have interpreted jinn as pathogenic agents. Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) suggested that some jinn were nothing but microbes. Rashid Rida (1865–1935) agreed, but added to such a category jinn that caused (literal) headache and those that incited people to commit evil, pointing out that science could one day identify them the same way it had with microbes-jinn; scientifically unstudied jinn, he thought, could be believed on the prophets’ authority; he stated that he had observed their effects and that they could be exorcized (Berger Reference Berger2000: 557–558). Finally, elements of Prophetic medicine can be encapsulated in “traditional” systems, and both date back to ancient, pre-Islamic concepts and systems.
A case study showing how these ideas (along with other ones such as conspiracy thinking) overlap and are constantly rehashed and recombined is that of the Moroccan influencer Mohamed Faid (b. 1955). Faid holds a PhD in agriculture, but he presents himself as a nutrition expert whose mission is to save Arabs and Muslims from diseases and modern medicine by raising their awareness of herbs, plants, and traditional foods. He started propagating his ideas in the early 2000s by giving talks at Moroccan mosques, eventually becoming a successful YouTuber whose channel, launched in 2019, currently counts 2.38 million subscribers. Faid conceptualizes nutrition as the means to cure every disease. He discredits modern medicine in favor of traditional (i.e., Arab or Muslim) medicine, which he presents as nutrition based. He refers both to Prophetic medicine and to Qur’anic verses (e.g., about honey). Faid regards nutrition- and health-related practices as religious ones, and health he sees as a divine gift. He claims that modern medicine relies on dubious experiments manipulated by “Big Pharma” and that Western universities intentionally exclude Arab and Muslim nutrition from their curricula. Faid prescribed cinnamon and cloves instead of vaccines against COVID-19; he extols the benefits of Ramadan even for seniors and patients with kidney disease or diabetes; he claims that cancer can be stopped by drinking water from wells and that camel meat has no cholesterol (in fact, it has 53% mg/100 gm). Faid’s ideas are analyzed by Chafik Graiguer, an expert in philosophy and education, who points out that “Faidism” includes fallacious appeals to “nature” (everything natural is good; diseases are human made), alarmism (there will be more and more incurable diseases), and dubious, false, or unfalsifiable statements (e.g., Zamzam water is claimed to have innumerable benefits and to serve the whole of humanity for an indefinite time; cancer and autism are caused by canned food). Faid’s followers appreciate not only his promises of health, but also his jargon-free, clear language (Graiguer Reference Graiguer2023; examples of statements by Faid provided by Graiguer, personal communication, May 29 and 30, 2024).
2.3.2 HNHI-Related Approaches, Flaws, and Pseudoscience
In what follows, I draw on extant criticism of HNHI-related approaches to compile a survey of its flaws. Many of them are shared with iʿjāz and creationism. In italics, I indicate overarching types.
1. Epistemological confusion and methodological deficiencies
(i) Deriving medical instructions from scripture betrays a fundamental (and fatal) confusion of fields and methods.
(ii) Approaches related to HNHI ignore the possible side effects of the foods and so forth they extol. For example, honey is surely nutritious but not a panacea, and in some cases (e.g., diabetic subjects), it can be detrimental to health.
(iii) Approaches related to HNHI do not rely on rigorous testing to discriminate between placebo effect and actual therapeutic effectiveness. For a thorough discussion of this effect, including the challenges of studying it and the reasons why “complementary” and “alternative” medicine shouldn’t be promoted, readers are directed to R. Barker Bausell’s Reference Barker Bausell2007 monograph Snake Oil Science: The Truth about Complementary and Alternative Medicine. One definition of placebo he offers is “any genuine psychological or physiological response to an inert or irrelevant substance or procedure” (Barker Bausell Reference Barker Bausell2007: 30).
(iv) Qur’anic healing includes the problematic reference to the supernatural (or, in any case, scientifically undefined and essentially elusive) “Qur’anic power” and/or the agency of jinn.
(v) “Traditional” approaches invoke obsolete/discredited/unscientific notions such as “temperaments” and “humors.”
2. Poor interpretation/translation/reference to scientific information
(i) Exaggerating the precision of terms.
(ii) Downplaying the possibility of various interpretations.
(iii) Overstating the modern medical relevance of certain terms and narratives (arguably, this category overlaps with/is a variant of flaw (i), type 1).Footnote 67
(iv) Relying on inaccurate scientific information.
3. Background-related/institutional flaws
(i) Multiple practitioners and advocates of HNHI-related approaches lack scientific/medical credentials. (On this recurring point, see the reflections offered in Section 1.6 and Section 2.1.2.)
(ii) Other practitioners and propagators seemingly have credentials; this happens when “traditional” systems are transmitted and promoted by organized bodies including schools incorporated in institutions such as medical faculties. However, such bodies are highly self-referential. In particular, they release their own journals that superficially resemble legitimate academic/medical ones, yet routinely publish results to the credit of the field while not abiding by rigorous scientific criteria (see Barker Bausell Reference Barker Bausell2007: 177).
4. Miscellaneous
(i) The identification of “traditional schools” of medicine relies on an utterly rigid conception of the history of science that neglects communication across (scientific) communities and cultures.Footnote 68
(ii) Medical-sounding discourses about Islamic practices (see Section 2.3.1, category v) not only tend to exaggerate medical benefits (e.g., of fasting, male circumcision, abstaining from swine meat) but also conflate such benefits with the religious significance of the practices in question.
(iii) Some HNHI-related claims are unfalsifiable.
(iv) Advocates of HNHI-related approaches frequently resort to conspiracy thinking.
While debating whether the approaches and techniques discussed so far qualify as pseudoscience, once again, one can either espouse a very analytical outlook or embrace a more comprehensive one.
According to an analytical take, pseudoscience results from the flaws of the first kind, while those of the second, third, and fourth kinds do not automatically generate pseudoscience (See Section 2.1.2). Also, there may exist examples of HNHI-related discourses that do not contain the flaws of the first kind (i.e., that, similarly to tafsir ʿilmī, simply read and explain scripture in reference to accurate medical information). And (again, in principle) there may be tafsir ʿilmī-like HNHI-related approaches that do not contain the other types of flaws. Finally, HNHI-related approaches reference so many herbs that no one can exclude that a “hidden treasure” – that is, an unacknowledged effective substance – is included in them (see Barker Bausell Reference Barker Bausell2007: 263).
Here, an important clarification regarding therapeutic effectiveness is called for. As emphasized by expert Michael D. Gordin, “sometimes even ‘false’ treatments can make the patient feel better. Efficacy provides a non-epistemological standard in medicine in a way that does not quite happen in science” (Gordin Reference Gordin2023: xx). However, subjective well-being should not be conflated with objective health and proper healing. What is tricky is that some treatments can create an illusion of healing. This can happen because of the aforementioned placebo effect (whose efficacy, however, is fleeting and never exceeds that of proper medicine). It can also happen because of the “natural history” of disease: Briefly and simply put, illness-related pain has “ups and downs,” and, in some cases, disease can spontaneously enter into remission; if any treatment happens to be applied at the “right time,” the correlation between such application and a “down” or a remission episode creates the illusion that the former has caused the latter (see Barker Bausell Reference Barker Bausell2007: 43–44, 47–51, 74–76). Then again, rigorous implementation of experimental methods can help to avoid this confusion.
With that said, however, one may formulate a more general and negative assessment arguing that all HNHI-related approaches ultimately mimic modern medical knowledge and techniques. Considering that medicine is a science, automatically any approach that encroaches on it/imitates it without fully abiding by modern scientific/medical methods and standards qualifies as pseudoscientific.
Additionally, even assuming that one takes a strictly analytical approach, identifying HNHI-related approaches that do not qualify as pseudoscientific or techniques/substances that really have therapeutic virtues seems difficult. Ultimately, this theoretical possibility does not suffice to grant scientific status to such approaches as a whole.
3 Other Erroneous Approaches Related to Science in the Muslim World
This is a survey of questionable practices and ideas that can be found in the Muslim world. Some of them are specifically and directly related to Islamic scriptures and concepts. Other ones reflect global trends, including some that, in the Muslim world, take on an “Islamic garb.” While such practices and ideas do not qualify as pseudoscience, they may favor its emergence or persistence, or, like pseudoscience, they betray an uneasy relationship with science.
3.1 Scholarly, Editorial, and Pedagogic Malpractices
In the introductory Element to this series, Nidhal Guessoum and I touch on a 2017 doctoral thesis in Tunisia proposing flat-earthist, geostationary, and geocentric (but also “young-earthist”) arguments including religious ideas (Guessoum and Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023: 1, 60n77). The doctoral candidate and her supervisor even published their alleged results in The International Journal of Science & Technoledge [sic], a predatory journal (from which it was soon withdrawn, but copies were downloaded and preserved). To be sure, this episode is not discussed here in order to suggest that geocentric and “flat-earthist” views are widespread in the Muslim world (there are no surveys to that effect). However, it is significant because it represents various malpractices.
To begin with, what happened indicates significant deterioration or neglect of established best practices for the construction and dissemination of scientific/academic knowledge. A doctoral thesis is usually written under the guidance of one academic supervisor, and it involves, at different stages, other experts in complementary but crucial roles such as providing critical reviews. In this case, senior academics or experts must have neglected correct exchange, including the very transmission of best practices to a PhD candidate.
Additionally, this episode reminds one of publication-related malpractice. It is no wonder that a predatory journal provided a venue for articles such as the one based on the Tunisian thesis. While some producers of pseudoscience create their own outlets, including journals, websites, and whole publishing companies, other ones take advantage of publications that do not abide by academic standards while looking academic. Bad science and pseudoscience sometimes land in legitimate academic journals due to occasional lack of compliance with standard peer review, but more often they exploit low-quality journals or pay-to-publish ones. Cases exist of iʿjāzi articles that fall under such categories (e.g., Al-Habbal and Al-Juwarey Reference Al-Habbal and Al-Juwarey1998; Khenenou et al. Reference Khenenou, Melizi, Bennoune, Benazaoui and Messaouda2013; Loukas et al. Reference Loukas, Saad, Tubbs and Shoja2010).
It goes beyond the scope of this Element to scrutinize all factors that negatively impact scientific research (e.g., the lack of proper scientific education in the school system, which ends up affecting university students). Suffice it to say that, in the current, largely market-driven, ranking-obsessed, and intensely competitive world of higher education, recently established universities in developing countries, including those in the Muslim world, can be especially vulnerable to such factors. Administrators and faculty under pressure may feel tempted to cut corners, but also embrace malpractice for lack of proper training.
Pervez Hoodbhoy is particularly critical of such risks, including attempts at building academic institutions without proper infrastructure and pedagogy; the creation of (international) “citation cartels” to inflate citation counts; and the adoption of rote learning for scientific subjects. Finally, Hoodbhoy criticizes universities that invite speakers (with irrelevant or nonexistent academic credentials) to elaborate on paranormal subjects or lecture against science (Hoodbhoy Reference Hoodbhoy2015; also see Bigliardi Reference Bigliardi2017b).
3.2 Islamizing Science
A sophisticated academic vogue (explored in Guessoum and Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023) is the pretense to reform science by infusing it with Islamic principles including methodological ones. This was the case of the ideas advanced by the Palestinian-American philosopher Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi (1921–1986). Other times this idea was advanced in the form of an alleged revival of ancient forms of science produced in the Muslim world; such is the position of the aforementioned Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his followers. One may certainly infuse a scientist’s worldview or ethics with religious principles; however, tampering with the scientific method will result in irremediably distorting science itself, producing bad science or pseudoscience. A specific problem with the philosophy promoted by Nasr and his followers is that the historical cosmologies that they wish to reinstate include supernatural agents and forces that are at best scientifically elusive (Guessoum and Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023: 17–20).
3.3 Resisting Vaccines
In some cases, Muslim religious authorities and other Muslim figures discouraged Muslims from using life-saving vaccines while resorting to religious concepts.
In 2008, the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the country’s top Islamic body) issued a fatwā (legal ruling) against a meningitis vaccine, declared haram because of swine-derived elements; inconsistently, two other brands were approved as halal by the same council in 2010, ignoring that experts declared that no vaccines could be pig-free (AsiaNews.it 2015). Declaring the vaccine haram also created problems for 200,000 Indonesian pilgrims who were about to travel to Mekkah since vaccination was a requisite for the Saudi visa and the Indonesian government had to procure a more expensive vaccine (Webster Reference Webster2013).
In Somalia, polio vaccines were rejected in 2013 over rumors spread by Islamic extremists, including claims that it carried AIDS, could harm female fertility, and was manufactured by “Christian countries” as part of a conspiracy (probably fearing spies disguised as humanitarian workers) (Guled Reference Guled2013).
In the Indonesian provinces of Aceh and West Sumatra (notable for the density of Muslim inhabitants), a low-level diphtheria outbreak including fatal cases occurred in 2015 after vaccination had been resisted over decades. The Indonesian Pediatric Association attributed the dramatic drop in vaccination to myths propagated in local mosques, including allegations that vaccines were used by a “Jewish conspiracy” or haram in that they contained swine-derived elements. The Indonesian Ministry of Health encouraged Muslims to prioritize safety over religious debates.
Anti-vaccine arguments were spread also by a Lebanese medical doctor, A. Majid Katme (based in the UK), who, in addition to other allegations (vaccines are toxic, the practice is unscientific and discredited, etc.) stated, “The case against vaccination is first an Islamic one, based on Islamic ethos regarding the perfection of the natural human body’s immune defence system, empowered by great and prophetic guidance to avoid most infections” (Katme Reference Katme2016).
However, examples also exist of Muslim authorities and scholars encouraging vaccination, not only reassuring Muslims that vaccines are halal but also emphasizing that protecting children’s health aligns with Islamic duties – for example, in Ethiopia (Gebreyesus Reference Gebreyesus2014) and Nigeria (Vanguard News Reference News2017).
3.4 Resisting Modern Astronomy
The Islamic calendar is based on the phases of the moon. According to Prophetic traditions, Muslims are to observe by the naked eye the new crescent that marks the beginning of the Islamic months. Naked-eye moon gazing, however, is vulnerable to human error and the whims of environmental factors. False sightings occur when gazers are convinced that they are seeing the new crescent, but it is actually not there – something else is often being sighted – for example, Venus, a plane, etcetera. Delayed sightings can occur when the new crescent is, in principle, available for observation but de facto hidden from sight because of sky brightness, adverse weather conditions, or other atmospheric factors. Other human weaknesses and power dynamics (e.g., the haste to be the first ones to spot the crescent or the leading authority who announces Ramadan) can significantly interfere with the process too (see Guessoum & Meziane Reference Guessoum and Meziane2001). Lunar motion, however, can be studied scientifically, and the moon’s position can be computed with high accuracy.
Several Muslim astronomers advocate adopting a scientific approach to the Islamic calendar, also pointing out the embarrassments and inconveniences caused by the refusal to do so. Cases have been recorded in which government announcements systematically misaligned with astronomic computation due to reliance on some traditional approach (that in fact included arbitrary criteria) (Guessoum Reference Guessoum2010b; Sheikh Reference Sheikh2010: 11–14). Countries like Morocco integrate a traditional approach with a scientific one, relying on scientific computation but waiting for naked-eye observation to confirm it. When such a mixed system is adopted, Ramadan, for instance, cannot be announced on a day when, according to astronomical computations, the new crescent is not physically available for inspection. However, astronomic computation is not deemed sufficient and must be integrated with naked-eye observation. Following this procedure, delays are always possible due to luminosity and weather conditions, leading to official announcements released at short notice.
The very fact that different Muslim countries adopt different systems causes lack of synchronization across their respective calendars, and there are even cases of Ramadan starting or ending on different days in the same Muslim country, where, astronomically, the new crescent is simultaneously visible over the whole territory (Boone Reference Boone2015; Express Tribune 2012). Scientifically detectable mistakes, delays, and short notice were of little or no importance in the ancient Muslim world. However, in a globally interconnected world (including professional interaction with non-Muslim countries), misalignments and delays do create practical problems.
It is worth mentioning, however, that the issue of Islamic calendars and astronomy also impinges on delicate jurisprudential questions. On the one hand, it can be argued that the very obligation to wait until the sighting of the new crescent is a lesson in patience, self-discipline, and submission. On the other hand, one may argue that a precise computation is essential, for instance, to avoid wasting time that can be used for expiation (Sheikh Reference Sheikh2010: 23).
3.5 History of Science and Anachronisms
The historical contribution to science by Muslim scientists was often belittled or neglected in the West; arguably, it continues to be insufficiently explored and taught even in the Muslim world. The opposite phenomenon also exists, however: the interpretation of Islamic-era science aimed at extolling it without solid historical evidence and careful analysis. A case in point is the 1001 Inventions touring exhibition (an initiative promoted by the UK-based organization of the same name, which also produced shows, films, books, and other resources). Launched in 2010, 1001 Inventions was hosted by prestigious institutions including London’s Science Museum, the New York Hall of Science, the California Science Center in Los Angeles, and the National Geographic Museum in Washington, DC. It received endorsements by figures such as Hillary Clinton and the Prince of Wales (now King Charles III).
Taner Edis and historian of science Sonja Brentjes examined 1001 Inventions and detected exaggerations and distortions, including the narrative in which a ninth-century Andalusian, Ibn Firnas, successfully designed, built, and implemented a flying machine with muscle-powered wings made of eagle feathers. In addition to being physically impossible, point out Edis and Brentjes, Ibn Firnas’s mythical flight is only succinctly narrated in a chronicle written 700 years later (Edis & Brentjes Reference Edis and Brentjes2012: 2).Footnote 69
Edis and Brentjes observe that the greatest flaw of 1001 Inventions is the neglect of “major differences between medieval and modern science.” “1001 Inventions,” they explain, “translates medieval science and technology into the scientific and technological idiom of today, suggesting closeness, similarity, or even identity between medieval scientific results and technological products and today’s sciences and technologies” (Edis & Brentjes Reference Edis and Brentjes2012: 5). “A Golden Age myth,” they continue, “suggests that instead of adopting a significantly different way of thinking about nature, Muslims need only to reinstate medieval conceptions of nature and medieval habits of thought in order to become creatively engaged in cutting edge science and technology.” “That,” they conclude, “is exactly the wrong thing to do” (Edis & Brentjes Reference Edis and Brentjes2012: 5; see also Brentjes et al. Reference Brentjes, Edis and Richter-Bernburg2016). Dr. Brentjes reported that the 2012 article and the 2016 book were responded to by the organizers and by scholars who for various reasons defended 1001 Inventions. Responses ranged from willingness to engage in a scholarly conversation (whose actual repercussions on other editions of the exhibit remained unclear) to calumny against her (Brentjes, personal communication, May 13, 2024).
3.6 Conspiracy Thinking Applied to Scientific Topics
Earlier, I defined conspiracy thinking and explained how it bears analogies to iʿjāz (Section 1.7). I listed conspiracy theories among the arguments that are invoked to oppose evolution (Section 2.2.1), and we observed that they can be used by advocates of “traditional” medicine (Section 2.3.1). While a fully fledged discussion of conspiracy thinking goes beyond the scope of this Element, I advance two suggestions regarding its relationship with Islam-related pseudoscience. First, conspiracy theories can tap into or feed on antagonism with the West, often influencing debates on Islam and science. Second, conspiracy thinking makes for an easy strategy to dismiss, by distorting it, the fact that certain ideas (e.g., evolution) are widely accepted by the scientific community, or the fact that alleged “discoveries” (e.g., the “evidence” for the splitting of the moon discovered by NASA) are not widely included in scientific conversations and publications. In sum, conspiracy thinking draws on deep-seated sentiments of cultural rivalry, and it makes for an easy caricature of scientific consensus.
4 Thinking through Islam and Pseudoscience: Questions, Reflections, and Suggestions
What follows is an agenda to promote and develop the critique and criticism of Islam-related pseudoscience, advanced in the form of overarching questions. I contribute my own answer to each question, yet I also suggest that they deserve further, collective, and interdisciplinary reflections.
Can the debate on Islam-related pseudoscience and the philosophical debate on pseudoscience profitably merge?
The debate on Islam-related pseudoscience surveyed in Section 1 is, broadly speaking, philosophical. Most critics have a scientific background and rely on their competence as to specific scientific information, but, as it is inevitable, they discuss scientific methodology and the demarcation between science and pseudoscience. Sardar and Hoodbhoy focus on Popper’s falsification; however, as I hinted earlier (Section 2.2.1), its relevance for demarcation has been reconsidered. Guessoum mentions a few definitions of pseudoscience advanced by philosophers. Tavakoli Saberi is philosophically well informed, and so is Golshani but rather in terms of “classical” philosophers of science (and Golshani does not advance a strong criticism of pseudoscience). In sum, such authors are not fully involved in or catching up with the contemporary philosophical debate on science and pseudoscience. Obviously, they are more interested in “localized interventions” on concrete cases of pseudoscience than in broader, more abstract debates. However, critics of Islam-related pseudoscience may want to catch up with/develop the philosophical analysis of pseudoscience to broaden the scope and maximize the effectiveness of their critique.
Academic philosophers who debate pseudoscience (e.g., Pigliucci & Boudry Reference Pigliucci and Boudry2013) hardly mention cases from the Muslim world in their otherwise rich discussion. This is surely because they mostly have a Western/non-Muslim background (and audience). However, pseudoscience calls for an inclusive and cross-cultural approach. First, exploring Islam-related pseudoscience can provide professional philosophers with interesting case studies that may inspire theoretical advances. Second, with an increase in globalization, the landscape of pseudoscience is bound to become more and more complex, with ramifications, entanglements, and overlaps. Already today Islam-related pseudoscience is not limited to the Muslim world geographically defined but can be found among Muslims in the “West.” Scholars, instructors, and activists who are based in the West and interested in criticizing pseudoscience should consider Islam-related forms of pseudoscience to enhance the scope of their pedagogy and initiatives.
How does the analysis advanced in this Element relate to the debate on the demarcation of science and pseudoscience?
One may decide to stick to a more generic use of the term “pseudoscience,” the one that emerges in the literature that I reconstructed in Section 1. In other words, one may consider iʿjāz, creationist arguments, and HNHI approaches, each one taken as a whole, pseudoscientific because they deal with typically scientific topics/areas and are fraught with various flaws. This interpretation is reasonable and practical.
Alternatively, one may take my analytical approach, strictly identifying specific variants of the three “usual suspects” as pseudoscientific:
(1) Iʿjāz that pretends to draw conclusions (i.e., facts or data; or a choice between scientific theories) on the basis of scripture.
(2) Creationist arguments (ID and “irreducible complexity”) that pretend to draw a scientific conclusion about the existence of a creator (as opposed to merely attempting to weaken or discredit evolution).
(3) All HNHI approaches except (rare) cases of “medical exegesis” of scripture.
The variants of the “three usual suspects” that I identify as strictly pseudoscientific have in common the combination of two elements. First, they deal with concepts and phenomena that are studied by science. Second, they all draw conclusions about such concepts and phenomena while in fact infringing on at least one basic requirement of modern science: (a) adopting an experimental approach; (b) not using scripture as a source of scientific information; (c) not invoking supernatural agents.
Admittedly, a few borderline/residual cases remain. For instance, tafsir ʿilmī based on “bad science” does not derive information from scripture but passes off inaccurate information as science; this comes very close to pseudoscience. There surely are limits to how fine-grained a classification can be or, conversely, to how specific arguments and approaches lend themselves to a fine-grained classification.
In sum, I do not contend that my analysis and definition of “strictly pseudoscientific” cases solves the problem of defining pseudoscience once and for all. Not eliminating borderline cases, however, does not mean denying the existence of pseudoscience. Most philosophers agree that pseudoscience and science are placed on a continuum. They try to chart such a continuum and disagree over boundaries or doubt we can find neat ones. However, they do think that some areas in the continuum fully qualify as pseudoscience. My own analysis of Islam-related pseudoscience confirms what the philosophers focusing on “Western” pseudoscience conclude: Pseudoscience comes in many variants, and borderline/residual cases exist. I encourage philosophers and other experts on pseudoscience to examine the approaches that I describe as pseudoscientific in a strictly analytical/technical sense and see if they do fall in the pseudoscientific area of the spectrum. It is also important to emphasize that even borderline cases, due to the presence in them of various flaws, can hardly be seen as bearing any positive promises in relation to scientific advancement, science appreciation, and the harmonization of science and religion.
One may object that the identification of pseudoscience is time-bound. Some science-related fields and notions may not be fully assessable by scientific methods today; what looks like solid science today may turn out not to be scientific tomorrow. However, the various objections that critics (including me) level at the three “usual suspects” (especially those variants that I describe as pseudoscientific), are so detailed and highlight so many deep-seated flaws that the hope of a scenario in which they are eventually salvaged seems utterly unrealistic. There is also no good reason to think that the criteria by which they are assessed may turn out to be unscientific “tomorrow,” since I refer to very basic components of the scientific method. Reconsidering such elements would result in subverting science rather than refining it.
Some authors resort to postmodernist “deconstructions” of science, claiming that science ultimately boils down to mere (cultural) presuppositions and power relations between social groups that strive to impose their respective worldviews, and thus, as a form of explanation and technique, science is equivalent to magic, ancient cosmologies, etc. (see Guessoum & Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023: 5–6). According to this approach, there is no substantial difference between science and pseudoscience; therefore, science-based criticism of pseudoscience is ineffective, or misplaced, or just a “power game” like any other.
This approach has been vigorously responded to, exposing its methodological flaws as well as the distortions and exaggerations it relies on or leads to. (A classic refutation is Sokal & Bricmont Reference Sokal and Bricmont2003, originally published in French in 1997.) In addition to embracing such a rebuttal, I emphasize that postmodernist conceptions strongly denying the existence of objective science, factual truth, etcetera, aren’t viable and useful for the advocates of Islam-related pseudoscience. For starters, some of them are unsophisticated in their conceptualization of science: They do see science as delivering (one kind of) truth and regard some passages in the scriptures as coinciding with it. But even more sophisticated authors should not be interested in radically relativizing, downplaying, or denying the idea of true and certain knowledge because this approach would have devastating consequences for the very concept of revealed truth that they want to defend.
In fact, most producers of Islam-related pseudoscience do not renounce the concept of truth; they claim that their own approach is truthful, objective, and effective as opposed to other ones that, in their opinion, are not (modern evolutionary science, modern medicine, etc.). Their strategy is to assign scripture (regarded as the ultimate source of truth in all areas) precedence over science in (some) scientific matters, or to mix theological concepts with scientific ones. Following their approach, Muslims should have their own way of looking at scientific methods, theories, and information; in fact, from their perspective, the “Muslim” way to science is the truthful and correct one that, ideally, all scientists should embrace. Then again, their systems include reference to concepts, entities, and agencies that are not objectively measurable and detectable, or that different interpreters who equally self-identify as Muslim interpret and define in different ways (e.g., jinn). Therefore, such approaches are bound to yield no constant and reliable conclusions and results; they will turn out to be inconsistent even from an “insider’s” perspective. In sum, the flaws I just pointed out condemn the approaches in question to slip into chaos, vagueness, self-contradiction, stagnancy, and self-referentiality, all colliding with a pretense to scientific rationality. To be sure, their producers and consumers may never notice the flaws in question, or they may resort to denial and conspiracy thinking as a form of self-defense. Most likely, Islam-related pseudosciences will constantly find new sympathizers and advocates, especially if they are promoted over mass media by governments and educational institutions. However, the very flaws I have discussed are also likely to generate cognitive dissonance that believers delving in science and sensitive to matters of rigor and consistency will hardly sustain over long periods.
Sometimes, the critics of pseudoscience are accused of advocating scientism – that is, of overstating the power and scope of science to the point of thinking that everything that falls outside its domain is worthless or that science is the arbiter of all truth. In fact, the accusation of scientism can often be leveled at the very advocates of pseudoscience, since many among them try, more or less overtly, to validate religion through science.
Additionally, most critics of pseudoscience define pseudoscience itself on the basis of a precise identification of the boundaries and limitations of science; finally, as we have seen in Section 1, some of their definitions of pseudoscience de facto cover scientism (e.g., Mimouni; see Section 1.9).
Are any forms of pseudoscience ultimately inextricable from core Islamic beliefs?
To answer this question, I will take an indirect road. Based on my experience as an educator, I am aware that Muslim students feel deeply challenged upon being exposed to the criticism of Islam-related pseudoscience. When such criticism comes from atheists or non-Muslim authors, students are likely to chalk it up to opposition to Islam (or ignorance thereof). When such criticism comes from Muslim scientists or authors, students often cast doubt on their orthodoxy. The criticism of iʿjāz hurts perceptions of Qur’anic perfection. Proposals advanced to foster the acceptance of human evolution within an Islamic worldview collide with the widespread understanding of Adam’s story as real-yet-not-evolutionary (see Section 2.2.2).
Sociohistorical studies of the debate on Islam and modern science interpret religious approaches to science as cultural reactions to science perceived as a powerful meaning-maker or as a competitor of religion. According to this perspective, different attempts at harmonizing Islam and science were developed by modern theologians and embraced by leaders and institutions in an attempt to strengthen the appeal of Islam by positively associating it with science or by defusing the challenge that science represents for a religious worldview. The advocates of such an approach do occasionally acknowledge that some religious doctrines seem more consistent than others, etcetera, but they are ultimately interested in describing (as opposed to criticizing) social, cultural, and political dynamics, that can vary across countries and communities, and shift over time; in sum, they do not make prescriptive statements, let alone theological ones. (An example of this approach is Stenberg Reference Stenberg1996).
Sociological and historical readings of the debate on Islam and modern science can be interesting for Muslim students, helping them understand why some ideas are more appealing or widespread than others in given epochs, areas, or social groups. However, such approaches will not satisfy Muslim students’ wish to discriminate between theologically acceptable positions and unacceptable ones.
As a non-Muslim (and as a scholar trained in philosophy), I am not entitled to define what is and is not Islamically orthodox. I only can observe how beliefs are articulated by religious people and describe what I see.
However, as I explained while tackling the second question in this section, I certainly do not embrace a postmodernist position according to which everything in the debate on science and religion boils down to power dynamics so that science and pseudoscience or truth and untruth are ultimately on a par and “anything goes.” Furthermore, I think there exist logical and objective implications and boundaries between concepts, and I care about them. Since I regard pseudoscience as harmful, I am interested in knowing whether or not it is logically, necessarily, and invariably contained in certain belief systems, including religious ones. For these reasons, while I am neither qualified to define nor religiously interested in essential Islamic beliefs, I am not satisfied either with merely sociological readings of theology (and science). In other words, the question whether Islamic beliefs necessarily support or entail pseudoscientific notions is for me an important one.
Authors like Sardar, Guessoum, and other Muslim writers who criticize pseudoscience contribute to answering such a question and provide me with interesting pedagogic examples. Such authors articulate their rejection of trends like iʿjāz and creationism not only by emphasizing their scientific flaws, but also on the basis of the Qur’an and hadith, pointing out that such approaches transgress scriptural injunctions to observe the natural world as well as values like rationality that can be read in the Qur’an. Additionally, as mentioned in Section 3.3, Islamic ethical notions can be used to argue for the importance of contrasting harmful anti-scientific practices. In sum, Islamic worldviews exist that uncouple Islam from pseudoscience; one can also find models of opposition to pseudoscience (and anti-science) that rely on Islamic ideas and values.
Does pseudoscience damage the Muslim world, and does it permeate the Muslim world more than other parts of the world?
The critics of Islam-related pseudoscience I surveyed do not provide specific suggestions as to whether pseudoscience causes more harm or is more widespread in the Muslim world than in other parts of the world. However, these two questions are too generic to allow a meaningful answer. One should refine such questions by narrowing them down to specific ideas, trends, and phenomena, and specific Muslim countries/groups, conduct research accordingly, and compare data. To the best of my knowledge, this kind of research is nascent, and, in some cases, it simply has not been conducted yet; for example, we have no surveys regarding the popularity of iʿjāz among academic faculty and scientists in the Muslim world and no data regarding the spread of hijama clinics in the Muslim world. Moreover, the concept of pseudoscience-related harm must be rigorously defined in order to conduct meaningful, comparative observations. One may investigate, for example, the amount of funds allocated by a scientific university department or ministry to iʿjāz-related activities, or the extent to which oncological patients in a Muslim country are fatally diverted to useless Islam-related pseudo-therapies while having access to proper cures (this situation is made complex by the fact that “traditional” therapies may be applied along proper ones, i.e., as “integrative”). Obviously, investigations of this kind face significant practical challenges; additionally, even solid projects may be limited to very specific areas and groups, thus yielding results that could be hard to generalize to the whole Muslim world.
Are any forms of pseudoscience exclusively Islamic/typical of Islam?
All the ideas and approaches analyzed in this Element refer to the Qur’an and the hadith. Therefore, in an obvious and general sense, they are distinctly Islamic. It is, however, doubtful that any forms of Islam-related pseudoscience are typical of Islam only. In fact, as soon as one takes a deeper, broader, and comparative look, this idea is dispelled.
Historically, one sees downright importation or “mirroring” from the West. For example, iʿjāz representatives incorporated early on non-Islamic literature in their discussions (see Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023b: 16); later, they responded to similar “scientific” appreciations of the Bible (Daneshgar Reference Daneshgar2023c). Notably, claims regarding the scientific content of the sacred scriptures are also advanced by Hindus (and they have their rationalist critics; e.g., Nanda Reference Nanda2003); most likely, such modern discourses historically derive from theological competition in the Indian subcontinent over claims of rationality, scientific compatibility, and validation. I mentioned that creationist arguments were lifted from American Christians (Section 2.2.3).
In other cases, there is a “common ancestor”: Prophetic or “traditional” medicine taps into notions and theories that predate Qur’anic revelation and go beyond Arab culture (Section 2.3.1). Such ancient notions may influence approaches that other cultures currently claim as their own (e.g., bloodletting is upheld by Chinese medicine too).
Mostly as a consequence of such ties and processes (and being an indicator thereof), the structure and content of Islamic pseudoscience is the same as Western pseudoscience.
Additionally, reasons to embrace “traditional” or “alternative” medicine, or argumentative strategies to promote or defend it, are the same for Islam-related approaches and other ones in other parts of the world, including claims of “authenticity,” appeals to personal experience (“it worked for a close friend/family member”), conspiracy theories, etcetera. In such cases, similarities may be due to (more or less conscious) “mirroring,” but also rooted in universal human tendencies and patterns in thought and behavior (e.g., feeling the need to bridge science and religion or to claim unique “identity” competing with other groups; the appeal of conspiracy thinking but also discomfort with modernity, fear of the dangers of science, and lack of familiarity with scientific methods).
Is Islam-related pseudoscience special in any other way (compared with pseudoscience not related to religion, or pseudoscience in other religions and cultures)?
One may speculate that Islam-related pseudoscience proves especially resistant to criticism in comparison with pseudoscience that is not related to religion, since believers can be extremely reluctant to question ideas that they regard as belonging to religion in an essential way – that is, to be decisive for salvation. Then again, this would also apply to pseudoscience related to other religions, and people often believe very strongly in pseudoscience not related to religion as well.
Islam-related pseudoscience may be especially difficult to resist within Muslim countries. As emphasized by Hoodbhoy (see Section 1.2) they mostly include developing ones, with all the challenges this entails in terms of scientific education and literacy. Moreover, pseudotherapies are difficult to renounce if the public, in addition to not being educated, has no access to proper medical treatments. Finally, if Muslim authorities institutionally promote Islam-related pseudoscience, critics can incur accusations of political dissent – with imaginable consequences.
Should Islam-related pseudoscience be tackled in school and university classrooms, and if so, how?
Experts debate whether topics at the interface of Islam and science should be tackled by science instructors in science courses, or in specific courses imparted by instructors trained ad hoc; there is no consensus about pedagogy (Guessoum & Bigliardi Reference Guessoum and Bigliardi2023: 53–58).
As a university teacher of philosophy, I embrace the principle that courses should explore the diversity of positions generated by given topics among experts. I apply such a principle also to my courses that focus on Islam and modern science, in which I handle the approaches identified in this Element as “usual suspects” as the subject of distinct course units. They elicit various responses, including strong support and sustained criticism by Muslim authors, thus making for ideal topics according to my pedagogy.
Discussing Islam-related pseudoscience may be a way to make courses in philosophy of science more interesting for Muslim students. Alternatively, instructors interested in imparting courses in Islam and modern science may include a unit surveying philosophical debates such as those on the definition of science and the demarcation problem. Students may be prompted to (re)assess, in the light of definition(s) of science and pseudoscience, pseudoscientific ideas and approaches (that initially shouldn’t be presented to them under the label of “pseudoscience”). They may also be provided with historiographic and sociological notions (see the third answer in this section), allowing them to reflect on the reasons why specific ideas and approaches about Islam and science enjoy wide popularity among given Muslim groups. Last but not least, they may be exposed to medical explanations of the risks represented by health-related practices.
It is difficult to find a clear response to students who persistently believe in pseudoscience despite taking this kind of course. Rana Dajani, who teaches evolution to Muslim students, does not penalize them if they stick to creationist views insofar as they are able to “show the argument they used to reach their conclusion” (Dajani Reference Dajani2015). I adopt a similar approach; however, I realize it is problematic.
Is it possible to create broad consensus among the critics of Islam-related pseudoscience?
If pseudoscience is to be deconstructed and exposed for the general public, it is desirable to rally as many experts and educators as possible under a shared anti-pseudoscience manifesto and educational program. The criteria that Muslim critics invoke to identify and oppose pseudoscience seem easy to harmonize and combine; it is also significant and encouraging that they converge in criticizing as pseudoscientific the same ideas and approaches. To be sure, they clearly advance their respective criticisms in the context of different conceptions of how science and religion should be related. However, it isn’t far-fetched to imagine most of them putting divergences aside and working toward the same goal.
Non-Muslim critics of pseudoscience, however, include those who reject all of religion as essentially irrational. A case in point is that of ex-Muslims for whom the criticism of religion-related pseudoscience is just one aspect of a wholesale rejection of Islam. Such critics will agree that not all theological concepts are pseudoscientific. However, they clearly consider religion-related pseudoscience as a subset of the set of all irrational, illogical, unwarranted, and harmful beliefs that, for them, comprises all of religion. Additionally, they are convinced that methods, values, and concepts that Muslim critics of pseudoscience want to reconcile with an Islamic worldview are in fact fatal for religious beliefs. For instance, critics of religion argue that critical thinking, consistently applied, is conducive to casting doubts on scripture. In particular, they contend that a rational, scientific, and philological investigation of hadith transmission uncovers fatal inconsistencies (e.g., Gaber Reference Gaber2017); similar ideas may apply to the Qur’an. Additionally, atheist thinkers not only rely on evolution to account for biodiversity without making reference to God, but also to explain religious belief. In particular, they argue that the very origin of religious beliefs (such as belief in supernatural agencies, or in design detectable in natural phenomena) is rooted in dispositions that were selected due to their survival value (without there being a real counterpart to such beliefs).Footnote 70
Striking a balance is challenging. CICAP, the Italian organization that promotes science and skepticism (i.e., empiricism) that has long inspired me and that I enjoy working with, draws a distinction between testable notions, including many religion-related superstitions, and untestable metaphysical ideas and systems, including theological ones; the organization is interested in challenging the former rather than faith.Footnote 71 In so doing, CICAP distinguishes itself from secularist and humanist (i.e., anti-religious) organizations that exist in the same country and avoids alienating (or triggering) religious institutions and individuals. I am aware of other organizations or of single authors who promote rationality and empiricism while adopting similar stances.
However, in practice (and in theory) things are much murkier than they may at first look. Specifically, I cannot fail to see that CICAP overlaps, as to some goals and initiatives, with UAAR (the Italian Union of Rationalist Atheists and Agnostics), the leading anti-religious organization in the country. For example, in 2009, UAAR sponsored the creation of a copy of the Shroud of Turin (largely venerated by Catholics as Jesus’s burial shroud) using the technology that was available in the fourteenth century; the “second shroud” was produced by Luigi Garlaschelli, a professor of chemistry and prominent member of CICAP, and it was first exhibited at CICAP’s conference (UAAR 2009). More generally, one cannot ignore the fact that belief in miraculous occurrences, including those that can be empirically tested or rationally assessed, is often at the core of religious doctrines as well as personal faith. Again, rationalist or scientific notions and methods can be used to challenge theological systems.
In sum, the most challenging matter isn’t the demarcation between science and pseudoscience but how to consistently and systematically conceptualize theology, science, rationality, and irrationality, including their respective overlaps and boundaries. I doubt this can be done in such a way to satisfy all parties. I see this as a major obstacle to the unification and joint action by all the critics of pseudoscience, including myself (and I make no claims to special consistency in my choice of strategies and allies so far).
Concluding Thoughts
A specter is haunting the global discourse on Islam and modern science – the specter of pseudoscience. The very fact that Islam-related pseudoscience is identified and criticized by Muslims and non-Muslims, including atheists, strongly suggests that the specter exists. Critics keep chasing and fighting its diverse, ubiquitous, interconnected, and powerful manifestations. The hunt for Islam-related pseudoscience also results in uncovering misconceptions and malpractices that, without strictly qualifying as pseudoscientific, accompany and foster pseudoscience itself. Many critics of Islam-related pseudoscience have a scientific background and are less interested in philosophical discussions; however, they may benefit from more engagement with the contemporary philosophy of science. The very differences in the critics’ backgrounds raise a whole array of challenges. It would be insincere and counterproductive to downplay all the obstacles and challenges. The hunt is frustrating and never-ending. My suggestion, however, is to keep confronting the specter instead of running away from it.
Acknowledgements
I received material, information, and advice from (in alphabetical order): Hamed Ahansazan, Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Wardah T. AlKatiri, Ahmet Alrayyis, M. Basil Altaie, Amirul Amzar Bin Megat Hashim, Paul De Belder, Sonja Brentjes, Andrea Brigaglia, Rainer Brömer, Francesco Cavalli-Sforza, Violetta Cavalli-Sforza, Gary Dargan, Sergio Della Sala, Taner Edis, Brian Eggo, Issam Fawaz, Jorge J. Frías, Maria Carla Galavotti, Kacem El Ghazzali, Mehdi Golshani, Chafik Graiguer, Usama Hasan, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Mujeeb Hoosen, David Solomon Jalajel, Catherine de Jong, Barry Karr, Kristian Leisegang, Sofia Lincos, Ali-Akbar Mahdi, Mohammad Mustaqim Malek, Shoaib Ahmed Malik, Sadia Manzoor, Alexander Maxwell, Khaled Meghnine, Tim Mendham, Omar Meriwani, Jamal Mimouni, Najib El Mokhtari, Narendra Nayak, Che Puteh Osman, Telmo Pievani, Abdul Halim Poh, Pranav Radhakrishnan, Roja Rahimi, Ziauddin Sardar, Giovanna Storti, Sakinah binti Sulong, Hasan Tutar, Hamza Andreas Tzortzis, Azari Mat Yasir, and Ahmad Faidhi Mohd Zaini.
Special thanks to my coeditor Nidhal Guessoum for his hard work, patience, and advice and to the anonymous reviewers for their comments.
Richard Newman provided meticulous copy-editing and inexhaustible patience.
The responsibility for any imprecision or mistake is mine.
I wrote this Element while on sabbatical leave (spring 2024). I thank AUI president Amine Bensaid, vice-president Chris Taylor, and SSAH Dean Asma Abbas for granting me this opportunity, as well as all the colleagues involved in the approval of my research program. I thank Professor Raffaella Campaner for making my stay as a visiting researcher at Bologna University possible.
Special thanks to my parents, Adelmo and Regina, for arranging my stay at our family home during the sabbatical leave.
I wrote this Element while keeping in mind, and being inspired by, my students at AUI. This book is dedicated to them.
Nidhal Guessoum
American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Nidhal Guessoum is Professor of Astrophysics at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Besides Astrophysics, he has made notable contributions in Science & Islam/Religion, education, and the public understanding of science; he has published books on these subjects in several languages, including The Story of the Universe (in Arabic, first edition in 1997), Islam’s Quantum Question (in English in 2010, translated into several languages), and The Young Muslim’s Guide to Modern Science (in English 2019, translated into several languages), numerous articles (academic and general-public), and vast social-media activity.
Stefano Bigliardi
Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco
Stefano Bigliardi is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He trained as a philosopher of science, has a PhD in philosophy from the University of Bologna, and has been serving in different positions at universities in Germany, Sweden, Mexico, and Switzerland. He has published a monograph and a general-public book on Islam and Science as well as dozens of articles (peer-reviewed and popular) on the subject and others. Since 2016, he has taught undergraduate courses on Islam and Science at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco.
About the Series
Elements in Islam and the Sciences is a new platform for the exploration, critical review and concise analysis of Islamic engagements with the sciences: past, present and future. The series will not only assess ideas, arguments and positions; it will also present novel views that push forward the frontiers of the field. These Elements will evince strong philosophical, theological, historical, and social dimensions as they address interactions between Islam and a wide range of scientific subjects.