Monday, 22/9/41

Wife,Footnote ¹ Helen,Footnote ² Don,Footnote ³ Anthony,Footnote ⁴ MurphyFootnote ⁵ and boys saw me off at Rose Bay. Movie taken of party, Geoff making his first speech.Footnote ⁶ Passed over Clarence at junction of south arm and main river.

Sir Fergus McMaster,Footnote ⁷ Wilson of Calliope,Footnote ⁸ Brand,Footnote ⁹ Muir,Footnote ¹⁰ Austin,Footnote ¹¹ Curlewis,Footnote ¹² Claude Henry,Footnote ¹³ whole Low family,Footnote ¹⁴ met me at Brisbane. Flew straight over Mt Warning, Mt Lindesay in the distance and half a mile to the right of Page's Pinnacle at Nerang, with perfect view of whole three farms. Looks much cleaner from air than it ever did from the ground. Flew through Mary Valley over Maleny and Kandanga.

Met at Gladstone by Mayor, President of Harbour Board, Manager of meat works, who put up a woeful tale regarding fate of decentralization. They remembered my visit there 20 years ago when I was preaching the separation of the north and centre of Queensland.

Met at Townsville by Mayor, President of Harbour Board, and about 50 returned soldiers. Saw Mrs Claude Henry and daughter Claudia,Footnote ¹⁵ also McDonald of Country Party.Footnote ¹⁶

Tuesday, 23/9/41

Townsville to Darwin, calling at Karumba and Groote Eylandt. Came down suddenly at Groote Eylandt. Met at Darwin by Abbott,Footnote ¹⁷ went to Larrakia, to Air Force camp, hospital and 21^st Ambulance. BartonFootnote ¹⁸ of Parkes in charge of latter. JonesFootnote ¹⁹ of South Grafton on staff; Poidevin,Footnote ²⁰ contemporary of Iven's,Footnote ²¹ also there.

Dinner at Government House. Joe McElhone, ADMS and full Colonel.Footnote ²² Matron of hospital Grafton girl. McClure-Smith on way back from East 100% Pacific minded first time in life.Footnote ²³ Prepared to back my policy on mission. Say very important pay maximum courtesy to Dutch. Make suggestion of separate Pacific Empire control of war. This suggestion has merits in that it may offer a way of overcoming the Canadian and South African objection to Australian direct and sole representation on War Cabinet.

Wire from Governor of SingaporeFootnote ²⁴ and Governor-General of Dutch East IndiesFootnote ²⁵ asking to stay with them. Arranging fly Batavia direct from Sourabaya and catching Qantas plane tomorrow.

Mrs AbbottFootnote ²⁶ extended herself to be most charming.

Wednesday, 24/9/31

Left Darwin at daylight, travelled continuously all day. Arrived Bima, greatly changed since last visit. Circled over Bali and had first-class view of crater and lake. Arrived Sourabaya, met by British Consul-General,Footnote ²⁷ Lieutenant-Governor of Sourabaya,Footnote ²⁸ and Secretary for Foreign Affairs (LovinkFootnote ²⁹), East Asia. Tea and bath at home of British Consul–General.

Flew to Batavia with ColemanFootnote ³⁰ in Lockheed, met by Peterson,Footnote ³¹ KennedyFootnote ³² and British Deputy Consul.Footnote ³³ Drove to Tjipanis, mountain seat of Governor–General. Discussed Far Eastern position. Strong view put that every effort should be made to avert war with Japan, by placing strongest possible forces at Singapore – that if Japan could be kept out of war at present till Germany was defeated, she would be a very useful factor in an Asian balance of power.

Lovink felt certain that danger from Chinese infiltration and strength if Japan were completely smashed would be very great because the numbers of Chinese in NEI, Straits Settlements, Indo China, Thailand, many times greater than number of Japanese, and they were all involved in secret societies. He was all for helping the Chinese to keep going at present time though he did not wish for any one eastern nation to be dominant. Governor-General also raised question of some one authority being given power in Far East to immediately take action should any sudden occasion arise, without awaiting instructions from Europe. He felt that the economic sanctions being proposed, especially if they were tightened or even kept where they were without any weakening, would prevent Japan from coming in to the ring any further and might lead to her evacuation of Indo China. He felt that Japan's presence in Indo China was a very grave threat to British and Dutch interests, that the existence of Japanese naval base at Kamranh Bay would involve millions of pounds additional expense to Britain to adequately guard the position.

Insofar as Thailand was concerned he thought that so long as Britain once took possession of Kra Isthmus if Japan made any move in Thailand, that would be sufficient to hold position without actually going to war. He felt, however, that the surest way to prevent war was to have British naval and air force at Singapore.

Lovink sending me memo dealing with whole Japanese propaganda system. He says because of the way in which it is put and the universal distrust of Japanese methods, truculent attitude and selfishness, had practically rendered whole propaganda without result. Japanese Consular and Diplomatic service was everywhere the focus of propaganda and disaffection. He could not see how this could ever be overcome except by preventing these agencies acting in their country which was only possible during war.

Dinner at Governor-General's place 100 miles from Batavia at 11pm, talked till 12.30am.

Thursday, 25/9/41

Left Tjipanis 6.30am, beautiful drive through tea plantations and over road laid out by Dutch Governor-General in 1760 though it had been re-tarred. Stopped at Buitenzorg to renew acquaintance with Botanic Gardens there. Lovink promised me some seeds to plant on Clarence.

Joined Qantas plane at Tanjong Priok, Batavia. Flew to Singapore, saw water spout en route. Arrived Singapore 1.15pm, met by Don FoxFootnote ³⁴ ADC to Governor, (Sir Shenton Thomas) of Straits Settlements, Captain Collins,Footnote ³⁵ late of HMAS Sydney, McCauley,Footnote ³⁶ RAAF, General Gordon Bennett,Footnote ³⁷ and Wigmore,Footnote ³⁸ Department of Information. Went to Government House, others in party to Raffles. Had lunch, met Sir Josiah Crosby,Footnote ³⁹ British Minister, Bangkok, who arrived by plane, and Sir Clark Kerr,Footnote ⁴⁰ Minister for Chungking.

Friday, 26/9/41

10am Duff CooperFootnote ⁴¹ and KeswickFootnote ⁴² called to see me, discussed problem of central governmental authority co-ordinating all Far Eastern and Pacific interests with either British or Australian Minister presiding. My own view very difficult to arrange quickly. Thought that liaison officer such as had with CaseyFootnote ⁴³ and Foreign Office originally working in conjunction with one another and with their own governments would do job better. Wrote to this effect to Fadden.Footnote ⁴⁴

11.30am went out with Lieutenant WalkerFootnote ⁴⁵ of Cootamundra, Adjutant to Gordon Bennett. Inspected several camps in morning, saw cook house, meals, menu, to headquarters, lunch, inspected more camps, food good, health, layout of camps also good, keenness of officers and men very high.

Met StahleFootnote ⁴⁶ at Johore, saw International Club, met Kent Hughes of Victoria,Footnote ⁴⁷ says father had job on transport – second wife Dr Mary ThorntonFootnote ⁴⁸ had just gone through on way home.

Met Colonel WhiteFootnote ⁴⁹ in charge of hospital at Malacca who asked me to take surgical job when I threw political one in. Dinner with Duff Cooper, Lady Diana,Footnote ⁵⁰ Sir John Bagnall and wife,Footnote ⁵¹ Jordon and wife,Footnote ⁵² Brooke-Popham,Footnote ⁵³ Admiral Layton,Footnote ⁵⁴ Percival,Footnote ⁵⁵ Army Commander, Collins and others – arranged to go to naval base Monday and have conference with all Chiefs of Staff.

Sunday, 28/9/41

Dictated answer for Monday's conference with Chiefs of Staff. Saw hospital at Alexandra, Tiger Balm House, also called Anzac Hostel, saw Mrs Howell, daughter of Innes Noad of Sydney.Footnote ⁵⁶

Monday, 29/9/41

Prepared notes for conference, emphasizing importance of battle fleet at Singapore. Went to naval base with Governor, to conference called by C-in-C, at which were present Duff Cooper, Clark Kerr, Ambassador to China, Sir Josiah Crosby, Minister Bangkok, Brooke-Popham, Admiral Layton.

Unanimous decisions were made to ask for battle fleet, and wire was sent to UK Government indicating this.

Lunch with Admiral Layton, at which Captain Collins of Sydney and Gordon Bennett were present. Shown over dockyard and saw all permanent buildings.

Tuesday, 30/9/41

Went to Mersing camp with General Gordon Bennett. Saw various Australian battle stations. Troops, health, very good, also food. Mostly using Dutch method of bath.

Dined with Brooke-Popham and had old-time punka worked by native sitting outside.

Wednesday, 1/10/41

Inspection of coastal defences. Saw 15″ gun work. Saw Duff Cooper, made suggestion about other Governments coming to Australia. Saw BowdenFootnote ⁵⁷ and Wigmore.

Thursday, 2/10/41

Went to RAAF camp at Sembawang. McCauley in charge […]. Men splendidly housed in buildings going to be used by Fleet Air Arm. Very pleased with their new Buffalo Brewsters [sic]Footnote ⁵⁸ which took up for trial flight and piloted an upward roll at about 3,000 feet. Hudson Lockheed [sic]Footnote ⁵⁹ bombers in hanger acquiring reputation all over Middle East for bomber reconnaissance work. Accommodation for 6, including one lying down. Gun able to shoot all round circle automatically cutting off as came opposite the wing. Air ambulance DH 86 carries 7 lying down, 2 sitting up – very good arrangement.Footnote ⁶⁰

At mess saw Crace,Footnote ⁶¹ bomber with English experience, who suggested that shortage of aircraft in Australia and Middle East might be due to fact that BeaverbrookFootnote ⁶² had ordered complete planes and no spare parts, and if anything happened they had to get a new plane. He thought I ought to look into this when I got home.

To Duff Cooper's for dinner, where had long talk with Admiral Layton who said I should raise question of repairs of battleships at Singapore with British Admiralty.

Crosby left. Suggested he would be very keen to come to a Government Australian conference.

Wired Casey asking arrange train travelling across America.

Friday, 3/10/41

Went to Malacca with WL and MR,Footnote ⁶³ Coleman being too sick. Beautiful drive with Gordon Bennett, stopping at Batu Bahat 2/30^th AIF camp. MR only woman to visit officers’ mess so far. Malacca 10^th AGH under Colonel White, Cotter HarveyFootnote ⁶⁴ of Prince Alfred[,] Chief Physician, Marsden,Footnote ⁶⁵ Major with Iven, there also. Matron PaschkeFootnote ⁶⁶ in charge, very good show. Very well equipped especially with X-ray. Interesting mess – men keen.

Heard news of Government's defeat, cabled to Fadden saying thought I should carry on.Footnote ⁶⁷ Terrific downpour, most uncomfortable Rest House.

Saturday, 4/10/41

Inspected Malacca fort and church. Drove home through centre of Malay Peninsular. Saw 4^th Anti-Tank Regiment.

Cable from CurtinFootnote ⁶⁸ asking [me to] continue.

Gave Gordon Bennett scrip (note find out effect).

Sunday, 5/10/41

Went for drive, lunch with General Percival, GOC Malaya Brigadier-General TorranceFootnote ⁶⁹ at his own house – very spacious. Long talk with press 7pm, with Bostock,Footnote ⁷⁰ Deputy Chief RAAF 7.30pm, sent him to Coleman to give him exact details of changes.

Had final dinner with Governor Thomas and his wife […] just by ourselves, most interesting talk about many problems. Thomas promised to come to Australia if he possibly could.

Monday, 6/10/41

Clipper to Manila, arrived Cavite 6.30pm after beautiful trip over Philippine Islands, cultivation. Met by Whittall,Footnote ⁷¹ Consular Agent, on behalf of Wyatt-Smith,Footnote ⁷² and Captain Priestley, ADC to American High Commissioner.Footnote ⁷³ Had puncture, arrived Manila Hotel, saw press. Wyatt-Smith and wife called. Dinner with Sayre,Footnote ⁷⁴ US High Commissioner and wife. Met General MacArthur,Footnote ⁷⁵ had very interesting talk with Vice President of Philippine Commonwealth,Footnote ⁷⁶ Speaker of Parliament,Footnote ⁷⁷ Admiral Hart in charge of fleet,Footnote ⁷⁸ General Grunert,Footnote ⁷⁹ Wyatt-Smith and wife. Most interesting talk with Sayre on international situation and also with Admiral Hart on position of Navy and relative strength of Japanese and Americans in their air force.

Tuesday, 7/10/41

Saw General MacArthur who set out background behind American attitude towards Philippines. Said that unfortunately in early days Philippines had been looked on as a liability rather than an asset. They were very costly, occasional risings meant substantial expenditure on army, navy and air. Because they were a very far-flung salient of [the] American Navy, they came to be regarded as indefensible except the forces were materially increased. After a time people forgot the proviso ‘except the forces were materially increased’ and it became the custom to think of these islands as being indefensible simply because of their distance. This in its turn led to the idea of cutting their losses from every point of view, with the result that they offered them their independence. When a date was fixed for the consummation of that, the American Government was loath to spend any more money. However, the growth of Japan and especially her aggressive attitude to her neighbours in the last few years has caused reconsideration of the whole position.

The Philippine Government itself asked for General MacArthur to come along and rebuild the Philippine army. This he has now accomplished and at the present time he has roughly 160,000 under arms on a conscript basis and hopes by next July to have 200,000. These are officered by 3 or 4 thousand Americans.

The submarine forces have been built up to a number of practically 20, half modern and half belong to last war, but all are efficient.

The air force has been considerably strengthened also and now contains quite a number of most modern flying boats as well as land planes. The flying boats operate in conjunction with the Eastern Asiatic fleet which has also been improved to some degree.

Today the Philippines feel that they could put up a very substantial and long resistance to the Japanese, long enough to be reinforced from America or Singapore. While the resistance of the Philippines continues, Japan's striking power to the south is strictly limited because of the force on its flank.

The Dutch as well have 15 submarines and there is no doubt that these, if reinforced by substantial air forces, could hold the narrow seas that are to the south of Indo China.

There is no question that General MacArthur was firmly convinced that war with Japan was inevitable sooner or later. His own view was that it was much better later – to defer it until such time as there was overwhelming superiority of British and American forces. He was sure that the presence of [a] battleship squadron at Singapore, combined with adequate air reinforcements, would be sufficient to defer it until such time as we had disposed of the major difficulty in Europe and he thought it was imperative that the Pacific and Indian Oceans should be kept free for reinforcements, material and men from America, the Indies and Australia and NZ, to the Middle East, to Russia through the Persian Gulf and Vladivostok. He was 100% for my idea of reinforcing the battleships and especially for the determination to do so to be made known.

Insofar as the time Japan would strike south was concerned, he thought this would be determined by the position vis-à-vis of Russia in the north. He did not at all subscribe to the idea that the next few months would be necessarily unfavourable for a Japanese venture south. The rainy season was almost over in certain places and in any case the bad visibility in the rainy season might be an advantage to an attacking fleet and their air force. His view was that we should press as hard as we can for more naval and air strength and trained local men to make an army, though he felt sure that when the air force was adequate many army reinforcements could be spared from other theatres of war.

He said that in the Philippines the only limitation so far on the getting of reinforcements of aeroplanes was the lack of shipping, and this was to some extent being overcome by the flying boats and bombers being flown right across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

(At Singapore I had learnt that there was a possibility of getting 30 or 40 Hudsons and CatalinasFootnote ⁸⁰ by shipping as far as Singapore which has been ordered for Australia. The question arose as to whether it would be better to leave these at Singapore or fly them to Australia as shipping would not be available to take them further).

MacArthur's general attitude was that the British had been very dilatory in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, that contrary to our understanding the Americans had advised aggressive naval action and the British had rather advised against it, though the Americans felt that Britain, while willing to defend her trade routes, was not willing to put in more ships to take the offensive. He felt that enough ships to take the offensive would defer the fight for 6 or 12 months. He did not think that Japan would settle down till either she was beaten very badly, not merely economically but militarily, or else had gained considerable successes which would be left in her hands. Such action, however, as the latter contemplates would completely destroy British and American prestige in the Far East, as China, Siam and Holland would never trust us again. He advised me very strongly to put this point of view to RooseveltFootnote ⁸¹ and the army chiefs if I could get at them in Washington – that the further away the problem was, the less it was understood.

I subsequently saw President QuezonFootnote ⁸² with Wyatt-Smith, the British Consul-General. An extremely able politician who is distrustful both of Japanese and Chinese. Japanese propaganda they have done their best to counteract. Chinese he finds do most of their damage through extensive bribery and corruption. Japanese very small in number, not more than 10 or 12 thousand. Chinese would run to 750,000. Japanese had never colonized, but Chinese had intermarried very freely and were carrying on local businesses as well as representing Chinese industries in same way as Japanese merchants were representing Chinese industries.

He believed that after the war there was going to be a very great problem if China were made too strong, and it might be more a menace than Japan because of the tremendous number of Chinese that were in existence at Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Siam, Cochin China and the Philippines, and especially as the Chinese had a flair for running secret societies.

He pointed out that the Philippines, after the Japanese had acquired 40,000 acres of public land on an island to grow tobacco and coconuts, had now passed a law forbidding the passing of public lands to Japanese. At the same time immigration law had been brought in limiting number of immigrants who could come in to Philippine Commonwealth of any nation to 500 a year. He was taking the most effective control of this immigration law by having a thumbprint taken of every immigrant. The effect of this was that he really limited the number of Japanese and Chinese who were almost the only races that desired to come in in numbers. 500 is quite ample for English, Americans, Dutch and so on, and he was able to say bluntly that there was no discrimination.

He said the Philippines were determined to resist the Japanese. He realized, however, during the 400 years of the Spanish occupation, and the 40 years of the American occupation, that the Filipino had rather acquiesced in the idea that the dominant race should defend them, but when independence was mooted and actually granted for 1946, Quezon realized the very great difficulties that would [develop] in the Philippines if they had no local force, and got MacArthur out to build up the Philippine army. Having very little money he had conscripted young men between 20 and 25 at somewhere near their ordinary rates of pay. They were now getting on to 200,000 of them who were fairly well trained, as keen as mustard, led by American officers, and felt sure they would give an account of themselves if the call came.

As well, aerodromes were being placed at strategic points and would not only serve as a base for the Philippine planes but could be used by allied Dutch, British and American air forces. Americans, to make certain that they would control the whole situation when war broke out, had already incorporated this growing Philippine army under the control of the American Commander-in-Chief.

His reaction to Communists was that nothing was to be gained by attempts to prevent them getting some of their propaganda out. He thought it was good policy to intern the leaders, and in order to get some estimate of the total number of Communists which he thought was much lower than the noise they made would indicate, he was going to let them run an electoral ticket at the next general election even though the law provided that only those parties which had had candidates at previous elections could do so. He thought that action in this regard would be the best corrective to the Communist propaganda. He did not think they had been so active since Russia came into the field.

Generally his people would do almost anything to remain at peace. They wished to cultivate their land and sell their products but they felt that whatever America did they must do also.

He discussed the system of Parliamentary Government as practised in America and the Philippines and Australia and other British countries. He had come to the conclusion that if some means could be obtained to prevent frequent elections, the British system of direct Cabinet representation to the Parliament was the best. He himself had, of course, been the President with widest executive powers but he did feel that public opinion was very slow in being heard under the existing system.

Had two interviews with Francis B. Sayre, US High Commissioner, who emphasized importance of joint action in Far East. His naval advisers said that US Fleet Air Arm had been very much strengthened and could give much more assistance than 6 months ago.

Sayre raised question of international trade agreements, and after hearing my views said he felt sure that if they were put up to the President and Cordell HullFootnote ⁸³ in Washington they would […] materially assist him in bringing about much more close military co-operation in the Pacific than we had had up to the present and that Australia might very well be the means of bringing into being very much more collaboration between the British Empire and the US than had previously been the case.

He said they were very sympathetic with us, appreciated our problems and the way in which we were standing up to them. He said that our attitude towards such items as the international wheat agreement and the regulation of control and marketing of surpluses of livestock and agricultural products generally would have an appeal to the middle western farmer that the actual war would not have.

The Navy in the Philippines consisted of two Echelons, one of which would be peculiar to the defence of the Philippines and will act in co-operation with the NEI, and the other would be associated with the British fleet and probably under its orders, or if not would swing out to Guam. The important thing that they emphasized was that they had spent many millions of pounds in the last two or three years in naval works in the Philippines and in these Pacific islands and they were not likely to let them go without fighting for them.

Wednesday, 8/10/41

Left Manila Hotel 12.30am for Pan American Airways, arrived Cavite 1.30am, boarded plane at 3am – most unsatisfactory arrangements.

Flew from Manila to Guam, tooth aching. Colonel MacNultyFootnote ⁸⁴ took us to capital of the island and Dr MacNulty pulled out bicuspid beside left upper canine. Guam very pleasant place. Meals good.

Thursday, 9/10/41

Left Guam twice and had to come back because of leaking oil tube. On each occasion lost about 2,000 gallons of oil from the plane so that it could land. Report to Dr MacNulty, dentist, who says infection not very severe.

Friday, 10/10/41

Unable leave Guam owing to typhoon near Wake Island.

Saturday, 11/10/41

Still unable leave Guam owing to typhoon.

Sunday, 12/10/41

Left Guam 6am, arrived Wake Island that night. Birds flying overhead in millions, making intolerable noise all night. Millions of Polynesian rats which they said had come from wrecked Chinese ship many years before, now had overrun everything. No fresh water. Went to pictures, played bridge, wandered from room to room trying to get sleep.

Sunday, 12/10/41 – again (crossing date line).

Flew to Midway, flight without incident. Rest house replica of Wake without the rats and birds. Said we were a week too soon for the birds, for which I was thankful. Food much better. Able to eat the fruit.

Monday, 13/10/41

Flew to Honolulu. Everybody slept all day because did not sleep previous night. Arrived Honolulu 5.00pm, met by Colonel Bicknell,Footnote ⁸⁵ Consul-General Wallis,Footnote ⁸⁶ Lieutenant Black, Adjutant to the Admiral, and Commander Parry,Footnote ⁸⁷ British Liaison Officer attached to the American Fleet […] Naval Commandant offered his car for the evening. Went to Royal Hawaiian Hotel. Enjoyed Hawaiian dancing on verandah of hotel alongside Waikiki Beach. Had enjoyable dinner after much ‘plane’ food. Went for drive around Hawaii, terribly tired. Cables from McCarthy,Footnote ⁸⁸ Curtin, Fadden, Casey, regarding American programme. Cable sent at long last. Arrangements made speak McCarthy in morning. Staggered when learnt that would have to rewrite whole broadcast speech for Washington Friday.

Tuesday, 14/10/41

Learnt by telephone at 6.15am regarding McCarthy's call, spoke 7.30am, found Casey's recall to Australia cancelled. Arranged McCarthy future programme and revision booking arrangements. Saw Doug Williams,Footnote ⁸⁹ late of Daily Telegraph [UK] who stayed at Heifer Station with me in 1933 and took pioneering pictures of place. He said that American people 80% against going to war with Germany, 100% for going to war with Japan.

Saw Commander Parry, British Naval Liaison Attaché, who discussed Pacific naval position.

Visited Governor of HawaiiFootnote ⁹⁰ who discussed position of Japanese territory. He thought that of the native-born Japanese the great bulk were loyal to the United States though the older Japanese, especially those born in Japan, were undoubtedly Japanese in their sympathies. He said, however, that the younger Japanese who made the trip to Japan came back impressed with the great superiority of their condition and way of life in Hawaii as compared with the position in Japan.

Then went to General in charge of the army in Honolulu, roughly 70 or 80 thousand strong, fortified the island very well. Very anxious to make certain that American-Australian bases that would carry the big fortress bombers through the Pacific had been satisfactorily and mutually arranged. He had a map, in which he showed us all the various points and asked our intervention in making certain that the whole agreement was fixed up at the earliest possible moment.

Saw Admiral Kimmel,Footnote ⁹¹ who had his Sub-Admirals with him at Pearl Harbour. Enormous improvements had been made to the naval base, the dock now being able to take and handle 3 battleships at once. Provision made for both land and seaplanes and the fleet had only been depleted by 3 battleships from its original strength. Bad luck in getting there a bit late, as this prevented a private conversation with him.

Caught plane at 1.30pm to ’Frisco, travelling all night.

Wednesday, 15/10/41

Landed in morning after decent sleep and met at San Francisco by McCarthy, O'ConnorFootnote ⁹² and Fisher,Footnote ⁹³ Consul-General, who had previously looked after us at Los Angeles and Naples. Gave a number of press interviews in which the comments were extraordinarily rude – they pointed out that I was ruddy faced and did not look like a British Knight.

McCarthy gave me his story about the general American position and put in most of day getting broadcast ready for Friday night. He dealt at length with the shipping position, stressing need for insulated space in new construction and detailed exact position of trade negotiations.

Thursday, 16/10/41

Brought ScottFootnote ⁹⁴ along next day to lunch to clear up any shipping difficulties. Put the story about Macgregor'sFootnote ⁹⁵ relations with ClappFootnote ⁹⁶ and Casey's views. Had pleasant day. Saw Californian redgums. Plane Los Angeles, thence Washington sleeper, very good attention in plane. Left rug in plane after carrying through the tropics.

Friday, 17/10/41

Arrived Washington, met by Casey and his staff and Mrs McCarthy.Footnote ⁹⁷ Stayed Australian Legation, gave long interviews to Australian Press and to American photographers. Digested all the recent cables regarding international position, received cable from Curtin re McCarthy's […] visit to London. Had long discussion with Casey over whole position of wheat, Lease-Lend, trade, position of Macgregor, McCarthy and Clapp. Spoke Glasgow,Footnote ⁹⁸ arranged itinerary in Canada. Long interview with Macgregor. Arranged position New York. Reviewed Canadian trade in New York office. Gave it as his opinion that Trade Commissioner's job was really a whole man's job and that if it used his energies too much, would simply go to pieces.

Met Bull Tart,Footnote ⁹⁹ told him of grandson.

Saturday, 18/10/41

Interview Cordell Hull with Casey. Russo-Jap position discussed and its seriousness stressed. Question arose as to whether it was to be treated as an isolated incident or as part of the whole international political situation. Cordell Hull's view was that it was to be considered as part of the whole. The question, however, as to when action would be taken would be largely determined by march of events.

EP detailed position in Indian and Pacific, improvements in defence that had taken place in last 6 months especially in American points. He stressed the need for more defences, and especially for speed in putting them into position and the fullest co-ordination of the ABCD Front.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

Cordell Hull said there was no question of USA's determination to see matter right through, though considering question as to what was Japanese policy and action – they thought it most probable that if there was substantial air and naval reinforcement at Singapore, Japan might go through Thailand into Burma, Rangoon and behind India and join up [with] the Germans coming across from Europe. The policy was to postpone the day at which the actual open conflict took place so that we could be more ready. Economic pressure had had the effect of giving us at any rate 2 or 3 months’ grace.

KonoyeFootnote ¹⁰¹ had been ready to listen to reason and probably that was one reason why he had been wiped out. The military faction had got control and the question was as to whether passion would outrun reason. He detailed the position of the Russian and Japanese forces. The estimates were from 450,000 to 700,000 men with about 800 to 1,000 planes, against which the Japanese probably had 750,000 men to put in and probably 3,000 planes for use both in the south and the north. He thought as regards quality of planes and troops that the comparison possibly favoured the Russians. His view was that if Japan moved she would probably move simultaneously to the north and south. He would be glad to see the fullest British support in Singapore at earliest possible moment if possible to go out. They all felt in America that Britain must be guarded, no matter what else happened. He saw no way of avoiding involvement in war with Japan if Japan moved. Where and how the next few days will determine.

Saw film ‘40,000 Horsemen’.Footnote ¹⁰² Played tennis with McCarthy, received mail from home. In afternoon at cocktail party had long talk with Admiral Danckwerts,Footnote ¹⁰³ principal British Naval Adviser, who gave general approval to Australia's point of view as regards our policy. Saw Dr Noel Hall,Footnote ¹⁰⁴ who gave me lectures in England in 1937 and who is now running British Ministry of Economic Warfare. Hornbeck,Footnote ¹⁰⁵ one of the principal Under Secretaries of Navy, also very helpful. His wife newspaper writer, a bit catty. Forrestal,Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Assistant Secretary to Navy, who has come from outside, doing wonderful job of work, keen as mustard, his wife very bright. Dening,Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Australian-born, who is now one of the principal Economic Advisers to British people here, Sir Clive Baillieu,Footnote ¹⁰⁸ who is now British representative on Purchasing Commission, with wife and daughter, anxious to talk to me over whole position. South African MinisterFootnote ¹⁰⁹ there also […] who recalled practically the whole of my efforts in Australia to get decent prices and organization for our primary products, awfully decent chap.

Dinner at Casey's, thrashed out Australian political position, talked to Curtin on phone 5.30pm.

Sunday, 19/10/41

Played tennis with Henry Wallace, Vice President,Footnote ¹¹⁰ Casey and Heydon.Footnote ¹¹¹ Discussed Japanese position between games and told Wallace that Australia had been heartened by the sanctions put on by America on Japan. Wallace asked me to put up very strongly to Roosevelt. He thought that there was quite a long way to go before American people would be brought to being ready to fight with Germany, but they were ready to fight Japan.

Discussed use of surplus products in building up health and nutrition of the people, and he made very apt remark that though they had 50% rejectees for service, probably the best way to make these healthy and fit was to make them serve in the army with regular hours, discipline, physical exercise which would soon bring them up again.

Discussed post-war reconstruction based on international collaboration with regard to surpluses of both primary and secondary industries. He realized that we must get together now to have any plan that would be workable, and it was just as important to make certain that there was proper collaboration of secondary industries.

Lunch with Lord HalifaxFootnote ¹¹² at British Embassy. Sat next to Stettinius,Footnote ¹¹³ who is in control of Lease-Lend. Discussed with Stettinius position of ships and shipping to Australia and especially the building of certain proportion of insulated ships in the total. Said Britain was building 60 and paying for them herself and USA building 200 and giving them through Lease-Lend. He told me to see Admiral Land,Footnote ¹¹⁴ Chairman of American Maritime Commission, and Sir Arthur Salter.Footnote ¹¹⁵ Halifax very friendly, had long personal chat on our ideals and wished me good luck in my venture and thought I would be pushing an open door.

Jesse Jones,Footnote ¹¹⁶ Minister of Commerce was there. He was intensely interested in way we were handling our surplus products and begged me to see him next day and have further chat. He was also very interested in question of price fixing and very anxious to know exactly what Australia had done.

Appleby,Footnote ¹¹⁷ one of the heads of their Department of Agriculture, and President of the International Wheat Conference, was there also and had an interesting chat, also Angus McDonnellFootnote ¹¹⁸ of Vancouver whom I had met previously in Britain.

In afternoon went to National Gallery, Mellon's building, saw Gainsboroughs and Titians, one Raphael and Rembrandts, not as good as those at The Hague and Amsterdam. A few Rubens and some of Velasquez, but mostly men and none of his famous women portraits.

Went on to Arlington Cemetery. MR to Niagara.

At 6pm Admiral Stark,Footnote ¹¹⁹ Chief United States Naval authority came down to Casey's and made an exhaustive statement of the whole US naval position. Dealt with the USS Kearny which was torpedoed.Footnote ¹²⁰ Gave us dispositions of Atlantic and Pacific battle fleets. Said that 3 battleships had been sent to Atlantic, leaving 9 at Pearl Harbour, replacing the old submarines at Manila with modern ones; improvements to Pearl Harbour would make it impregnable. They were not going to do much in the way of naval base making at Cavite but were going to do a great deal at Guam, Wake and Midway, which would make them impregnable naval, seaplane and land bases. He said that at Singapore the dock was either not much good or at any rate was not used, that they had taken HMS Warspite right past Singapore to Pearl Harbour to dock. He was satisfied that the British must do their part to supplement the American activity so that we are able to take the offensive by reinforcements of planes and battleships. He queried how many could be spared. He was not in a position to judge because of Mediterranean activity and what they were doing in the north but they were actually convoying with destroyers and battleships to Ireland and almost to England – extraordinary activity all round by the Americans.

Commander Harries,Footnote ¹²¹ Naval Attaché, was there and he said he felt sure that the Warspite had gone further than Singapore because it was not a safe dock because of lack of defences, which reinforces my argument.

Dinner – went to Mrs Evalyn Walsh McLean'sFootnote ¹²² house called ‘Friendship’ which is a huge estate about as big as Heifer Station in the middle of Washington – about 300 guests sitting at tables of about 7 or 10 each. The Caseys did not know her. For about quarter hour talked [to] all sorts of ladies thinking they were our hostess. She had queer collection of paper weights and China elephants. Sat between Mrs StettiniusFootnote ¹²³ and Elsa Maxwell,Footnote ¹²⁴ the columnist. Former very nice woman who confessed to being a farmer in Virginia, 700 acre farm, raised hogs and Herefords, helps her husband with Lease-Lend, she introduced me to Mrs Land when I told her my troubles – we bailed Admiral Land in a corner till he promised he would give us refrigerated ships if McCarthy saw his technical adviser who would also see Sir Arthur Salter on the British side.

Miss Elsa Maxwell is doing a very shrewd bit of propaganda being paid by the Isolationist paper for a column and subtly working in British propaganda – the three of us had a heated moment with Senator Taft,Footnote ¹²⁵ son of former President.

Monday, 20/10/41

D'EgvilleFootnote ¹²⁶ called regarding Empire Parliamentary delegation from US Congress. I urged him to make sure they were hand-picked or else it would lead to disaster.

Saw General Marshall,Footnote ¹²⁷ head of US Army which handles land planes (navy handles seaplanes, there being no separate Air Department in USA) Casey and Coleman accompanied me. Had in readiness map showing landing places through Canton Islands, Samoa, Suva, New Caledonia, Rockhampton, Townsville, Rabaul, Port Moresby and Philippines. Said needed at least 1500 yards runway for flying fortresses to take off, and would be better pleased if they could have a mile. They were willing to build these aerodromes themselves if we would garrison them and especially if we would store for them 100% octane gas which was necessary to be stored in drums so that it could be handled and which they would supply. He had circles drawn on the map of the Pacific and Indian Oceans showing how the Americans could deal from Luzon as a centre with the bombers to smash the Japanese fleet but we would still need Singapore ships and we must have Vladivostok as well as a base for our seaplanes to fight from the north.

Saw Jesse Jones again, interested in Australia's position in Pacific and also produced a map to find exactly what we are doing to defend ourselves and surrounding countries. Very interested in disposal of our surplus products in shipping. Said he would help to get ordinary and refrigerated ships for us.

I arranged conference with ClaytonFootnote ¹²⁸ and McCarthy to deal with lead concentrates. He was 100% with us but not ready to come out publicly and say so. He was handling buying of overseas products especially from the Argentine and South American countries.

Lunch with McCarthy as host with CarlillFootnote ¹²⁹ who used to be senior man in Board of Trade in England, Hawkins, head of State Department,Footnote ¹³⁰ Dr Wheeler, Under Secretary of Agriculture,Footnote ¹³¹ Macgregor, […] Dr ViljoenFootnote ¹³² […] of South Africa, and Clapp.

2.15pm read a paper on wheat industry in Australia setting out story of growth of the industry, history of wheat stabilization etc. Told them what I thought should be done with regard to wheat agreement (should not be too low in its export surplus at beginning). Far better to get an agreement that people could operate for first two or three years even if it had to be tightened up later on. Pointed out as well value in post-war reconstruction.

3.30pm saw Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture,Footnote ¹³³ with Dr Wheeler, who went over all aspects of primary production and commerce generally, especially question of price fixing and diversification of production. (Note: Get Canadian story in Monday's paper Winnipeg Free Press).

4.30pm saw H.A. Wallace, Vice President, discussed international situation. He was broken hearted because my early departure on Tuesday would prevent my seeing the President who had to meet Congress leaders on account of sinking of the USS Kearny. He drove me home and gave me the feeling in the States generally re intervention, gave me also the President's view.

Saw [representative of] the Murdoch press, who had travelled to Holland with me when we started off KLM service, also film star of ‘40,000 Horsemen’Footnote ¹³⁴ and her husband. Bull and Coleman vetted Canadian publicity in which went off deep end re Japan.

8pm Casey gave me full dress dinner at which, beside our own people, there were present Lord Halifax, Dean Acheson,Footnote ¹³⁵ Morgan Jnr,Footnote ¹³⁶ who discussed question of money and investment, Wickard, Captain Balfour,Footnote ¹³⁷ Under Secretary for Air in Britain who had that day flown back from Moscow with HarrimanFootnote ¹³⁸ and Beaverbrook, told me interesting story of Moscow position, said that they had still ample aircraft factories behind Moscow defences, Sir Arthur Salter, with whom discussed refrigerated ships, and he promised to go immediately into question and fix it up if he could.

Tuesday, 21/10/41

Fixed up servants, wrote Halifax, Wallace and Casey. Flew to Ottawa via Montreal, met by Glasgow at 7pm, Goble,Footnote ¹³⁹ Kellway,Footnote ¹⁴⁰ [and] Deschamps,Footnote ¹⁴¹ […] Had tête-a-tête dinner with Mackenzie KingFootnote ¹⁴² at Laurier House, he remarked again on my similarity to his brother but said that as I had grown older I had become the facsimile of his grandfather and showed me his painting. Discussed strategic position and Empire war effort. I put Australian, and Pacific position as we saw it. He recognized Australian position as a special one and said Canada prepared to do everything to help get proper Australian recognition and representation in London. An Empire War Cabinet was out of the question. It was first of all too unwieldy, secondly it tied up Dominions like Canada and South Africa too much, and thirdly the methods of communication and information were much better and greater than in the last war. He had a talk with Churchill,Footnote ¹⁴³ whom he knew very well, on the question since it was mooted that I was going. He felt sure I would get a warm welcome and assistance and help. The other Dominions were quite ready to appreciate special case for Australia and to say so publicly. He felt sure that MenziesFootnote ¹⁴⁴ had queered his own pitch and for a time Australia's in London, first by criticizing openly friends of the Prime Minister and the Government, the British Prime Minister and Ministers in London. He had also done this freely in Canada before the Canadian Cabinet and even before a mixed gathering. Menzies had allowed himself to be run by the Times and other newspapers who really wanted a say in Cabinet policy which they were not getting, and when he left London he was thoroughly mistrusted.

My own case was different, he said – I was well known, universally trusted. Menzies told King as he went through Canada that he was going back to London straight away to go into the War Cabinet. King warned him from his past experience, which extended over 20 years’ leadership and 15 years’ Prime Ministership, of the certain political disaster to himself if he stayed for long intervals out of his own country. King said that in a discussion in London he had told Churchill and the British War Cabinet that Canada was ready for an Imperial War Cabinet if it met in the different Dominions regularly where the local Ministers would have the benefit of their own highest expert advice, that otherwise they were at a helpless disadvantage in talking to the British Cabinet which was always equipped with this advice and had as well the advantage of immediate consultation with their colleagues. Of course the British Government, would not listen to this proposition for a moment. They thought it was all right for us to come over but not much good for them to go away. He felt sure that my suggestion of procedure was the best and again assured me he would back it. Said American position difficult – if Japan attacked Russia, felt sure both Britain and America must attack her. He agreed with me that we could not wipe out the psychology of assisting Russia that had been created and that it would be politically disastrous in US, Canada, Great Britain and Australia.

Said worried about position of American infiltration into Newfoundland. This had become serious matter. Americans putting their bases there, Newfoundland was bankrupt and might pass out of British control if we did not take steps. Urged me to talk [about] this in Britain.

The loss of Singapore means the loss of the war because of its resources and strategic position.

Wednesday, 22/10/41

Saw Canadian press. Had lunch with Glasgow, Howe, Minister of Munitions,Footnote ¹⁴⁵ Crerar, Minister of Resources,Footnote ¹⁴⁶ McLarty, Minister for Price Fixing,Footnote ¹⁴⁷ who had just put a ceiling on process, Clark, Finance Minister,Footnote ¹⁴⁸ Malcolm MacDonaldFootnote ¹⁴⁹ and HankinsonFootnote ¹⁵⁰ from Britain, Moffatt,Footnote ¹⁵¹ American Minister who had been in Australia, the Dutch Minister,Footnote ¹⁵² and the South African Minister.Footnote ¹⁵³

Had long talk with Dutch and Americans as to what was being done, they were very grateful. Heart-to-heart talk with Malcolm MacDonald regarding Menzies and Australian Position.

Afternoon tea with Lady Glasgow,Footnote ¹⁵⁴ flew to NY. On arrival […] had arranged details of press publicity.

Thursday, 23/10/41

Saw Clapp who set out whole of his story in graph form. He favoured suggestion of permanent chairman of Supply Council who would be a senior civil servant and who would not be Casey. Besse,Footnote ¹⁵⁵ Chairman Wool Manufacturer's Association of America, called, had discussion re position of wool after the war and chances of a reasonable price. I detailed Australian activities to help position, told him what we had done last time to overcome difficulties, and that danger of American purchases of huge quantities would only come if they flung it recklessly on to the market.

Lunch with J.P. Morgan, LamontFootnote ¹⁵⁶ came specially, Leffingwell,Footnote ¹⁵⁷ Junius Morgan,Footnote ¹⁵⁸ Bartow,Footnote ¹⁵⁹ […] and BurgessFootnote ¹⁶⁰ of National City Bank. Remembered my stay in 1924, warm welcome. Interesting discussion re strategic American position, Lamont being specially interesting with his view of Jap position – had visited Japan on several occasions. Leffingwell's advice practically coincided with what I had been saying – that we should put reinforcements in the day before to stop the war rather than 10 times as much after. They were very frank about Lease-Lend, practically expected to get nothing back, thought it was a good thing that there was mental confusion about whole business so that there should not be too much inquiry, and showed themselves 100% British.

2.30pm with Al SmithFootnote ¹⁶¹ at Empire State Building, 1250 feet high and stayed with us half hour to see view.

4pm, interview with Sir Ashley Sparks,Footnote ¹⁶² driving down street with policemen and sirens. Discussed question of tinplate shipping in Pacific, refrigerated shipping, assistance Singapore. He was Chairman of Cunard line and told me not to despair, that the whole of their influence was behind me in what I was trying to get, and was very friendly indeed.

Friday, 24/10/41

Discussed position of North American governmental activities with McCarthy and Macgregor and agreed that I should send a cable on Monday through Casey to Australia setting out method of re-organizing representation. Suggested Casey should cease to be Chairman of Australian Supply Council; that a permanent civil servant, preferably McCarthy, for the 3 or 4 months that he would stay in America, should become Chairman; that Clapp should be Director of Purchasing Supplies and that Macgregor should remain on the Board. The Board to have a civil servant Secretary, probably able to be drawn from Customs personnel already in America. Should carry on its own cable and accounts service and that Treasury officer should be appointed to make a liaison between Lease-Lend system and Trade Commissioner's office which should be the banker for the whole system. Macgregor, Clapp and McCarthy all agreed, and a cable was drawn up and agreed on Sunday morning by McCarthy and Macgregor who were submitting cable to Clapp and Casey, sent Monday.

Visited National City bank of NY, met Sheperd,Footnote ¹⁶³ […] and whole of Vice Presidents. Interesting talk on financing of Lease-Lend where they supported the Morgan Group's view as set out in previous day's diary.

Drove to see Mayor La GuardiaFootnote ¹⁶⁴ at City Hall where had most interesting talk re American assistance to Britain, Mayor's and President's attitude towards further assistance. Interesting description of methods whereby NY Mayors and officials elected.

Lunch with Californian Oil Company in Chrysler building, all Vice Presidents present together with Singleton,Footnote ¹⁶⁵ member of British Petroleum Committee. Attacked manner in which oil companies as a whole had treated Australia and said could not believe that tankers unavailable when India and South Africa able to get much more than their proportion. Singleton hotly contested this and said that these had received extra supplies purely by chance owing to fact that tankers were on their way to Britain from Indian Ocean, which I frankly disbelieved because why should they not go on with the oil to Britain if she was so short rather than dump it in South Africa and then send tanker on to America to get fresh cargo. At any rate he asked me to go into question with British Petroleum Committee and British Ministry of Shipping. He felt sure that now would get more tankers. As soon as I arrive in London will get Bruce'sFootnote ¹⁶⁶ opinion of actual position as it now stands and will send cable to Curtin.

2.30pm had symposium with press, gave them £4 worth of drinks and a lot of excellent dope, and the next morning not an item appeared anywhere so far as I could find out.

Theatre party, very much enjoyed Gertrude LawrenceFootnote ¹⁶⁷ in ‘Lady in the Dark’. Duke and Duchess of Windsor there.Footnote ¹⁶⁸

Sunday, 26/10/41

Left by Atlantic Clipper for Europe 9am. Arrived Bermuda 2.30pm, went to Governor's house for afternoon tea, beautiful island, ideal spot to rest on pension at 96. Saw HMS Indomitable, latest British aircraft carrier and big American aircraft carrier also. Rest of party held up in compound. Met Garfield Weston, MP,Footnote ¹⁶⁹ who gave us invitation to stay week-end in London.

Monday, 27/10/41

Arrived Horta, had hurried walk in town which was dirty and miserable. Flew to Lisbon, arriving 11pm, met by Balfour, British Minister, and Garran.Footnote ¹⁷⁰ Arrived hotel Aviz 1pm, makeshift arrangements, finally fixed.

Tuesday, 28/10/41

Very pleasant drive to Church San Geronimo with chauffeur of French family Paige. Then to palace which is like a petit Versailles. Beautiful garden with begonias in flower and privet hedges cut. Interesting rooms and furniture of different periods. Saw museum of coaches, genesis of lady's sidesaddle and American cowhide saddle, going back 500 years.

Saw tombs of Vasco de Gama, Camoens, in San Geronimo church.

Interesting ceiling in palace, history of Don Quixote.

Lunch British Embassy with Sir Ronald [H.] CampbellFootnote ¹⁷¹ and Lady CampbellFootnote ¹⁷² who lorded it over me because they had 3 grandsons, though I put up a stout resistance on behalf of my granddaughters. Embassy very good, put car at my disposal all day. Garran's work beyond praise.

Herbert arranged press conference 4pm at which gave press background and asked them not to publish. Saw Salazar [handwritten].Footnote ¹⁷³

Pleasant dinner with Lady Bevan,Footnote ¹⁷⁴ Garran, MR, WL and self.

Wednesday, 29/10/41

Left by KLM plane 7am and arrived Bristol 4pm. Met by Hyland,Footnote ¹⁷⁵ had look at damage done by blitz, then went by train to London, met 9pm by Lord Cranborne,Footnote ¹⁷⁶ Bruce, Sir William BromleyFootnote ¹⁷⁷ and most of Australia House Staff. Arrived Dorchester Hotel, gave press interview.

Thursday, 30/10/41

Invited to attend War Cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street at noon and to call on Lord Cranborne at 11.45am, both of which did. Churchill very friendly and asked if I had received word from Mackenzie King as to his personal message to me. Welcomed me to War Cabinet, at which discussed various matters. Churchill arranged to have me there when matters of common interest to Australia and general war strategy were discussed.

Question of shipping brought up and intimation given as to where we stood in our relationship between amount sunk and amount in new construction. I at once swung in with the story of refrigeration in ships that were being built and the matter was to be taken up by appropriate authorities.

Arrangements made for me to get story of Australia's position and bring a story down to a special meeting to be held on following Thursday.

Had lunch with Bruce at Savoy, Anthony Eden,Footnote ¹⁷⁸ Lord KindersleyFootnote ¹⁷⁹ who was a member of the Dawes Commission, Alexander, First Lord of Admiralty,Footnote ¹⁸⁰ and Lord HankeyFootnote ¹⁸¹ who invited me to play tennis on first week-end available, Professor Madsen of Sydney University,Footnote ¹⁸² Morrison,Footnote ¹⁸³ Sir John DillFootnote ¹⁸⁴ and Lord Cranborne, also present. Had good talk on Australian political position with Alexander, and strategical position with Hankey and Dill, and international position with Morrison and Eden, and German financial position with Kindersley.

Saw Cranborne later and saw various cablegrams re Tobruk and heard latest news where losses of cruisers had made it impossible to carry out their full task.

Around city, had look at old haunts and blitzed places. Surprised to see many landmarks still there though many historic places have gone.

Friday, 31/10/41

Saw Australian press at Australia House, arranged regular meetings. Talk with Bruce re post-war reconstruction, Bruce to work out number of items on which we will have full talk. Told me of American idea […] of Anglo-American co-operation, in which, with American money, we really put the rest of the world in a prosperous condition after making ourselves prosperous first. Too many gaps in process for me to be quite sure it was sound.

Lunch with Bruce, Lord Leathers,Footnote ¹⁸⁵ Minister of Shipping, Lord Woolton,Footnote ¹⁸⁶ Minister of Food, Shakespeare,Footnote ¹⁸⁷ Morrison, McGibbon of Western Australia,Footnote ¹⁸⁸ Moore Brabazon,Footnote ¹⁸⁹ Dr Hugh Dalton,Footnote ¹⁹⁰ R.S. Hudson, Minister for Agriculture.Footnote ¹⁹¹ Found Leathers very bright brain, man after my own heart, got down immediately to question of how to provide shipping, where to provide it, how much refrigeration should be put into various ships, where they should be sent, what tankers ought to be obtained. He told me many interesting things as to reasons for disposition of refrigerated space. Ships which they were using for carrying troops because of their speed were much faster than the average cargo boat and it was the cause of heartbreak to him that they could not be used for carrying refrigerated cargo.

Woolton joined in and supported my view very strongly that a couple of extra boats should be found if they really wished to, to pick up our eggs in Australia and our meat. They both agreed I should put up to War Cabinet as something that shipping industry should do, the building of cool storage spaces in strategic position in Bombay, Suez, Haifa, etc. We all agreed we could go so far as to give the Army control [of] the opportunity of paying for these structures even [if] they had nothing to do with building them, as they could get away with the money easiest.

After lunch outlined at request of both Hudson and Dalton Australian position – how British had penalized us over other Dominions. They agreed we had been shamefully treated though not with the same sorrow that I felt. I put the story for Singapore and for action there as strongly as I could; they were all very impressed and insisted that I should have at least 3 hours with each of them while they explained what they were doing to win the war.

Woolton thought it would be a lot better if [he] came down with me to see Lord Leathers to make sure I got my ships and he got his food, especially his eggs. Bruce said afterwards that he thought it was a useful and successful gathering.

Had 2 hours’ talk with Bruce who thought we should use opportunity presented to us of making it a winner. Suggested that from Foreign Secretary we should insist on story of British foreign policy ever since Roosevelt's and Churchill's meeting, the substance of American talks with Japan, at which I told him attitude of Dutch Governor-General in Java, and see how far Foreign Office had receded from its old position of a few months ago being ready to abandon Far East. Ascertain exactly what has been done about Russians when they said we should give a warning to Japan; where is that, and what is our attitude, first of all if America comes in, and if America is not coming in and if Britain is on her own, what would be our reaction? If there is a Japanese attack on Dutch East Indies or on Russia, or on China by cutting the Burma Road, or on Thailand? We must have regard to four public opinions – Russian, Chinese, American, and our own people's.

Saturday, 1/11/41

Stayed in bed in morning. Afternoon had 2 hours with StirlingFootnote ¹⁹² who gave me points outstanding. Had ElliotFootnote ¹⁹³ to dinner, told me what had happened in Russia.

Sunday, 2/11/41

Had delightful drive Hampton Court, Windsor, Oxford. Dinner with Elliot, McAlpine of Daily Telegraph,Footnote ¹⁹⁴ and Wilson,Footnote ¹⁹⁵ head of Public Relations Branch of Department of Supply, formerly Managing Editor of Daily Express. All very despondent re balance of the team after Churchill and Beaverbrook and thinking war would be long time being won. McAlpine thought it must be by victory on land but had not the faintest idea where such a victory could be achieved.

Monday, 3/11/41

Saw Sir John Madsen, advised him [to] fly back over same route as we had come and see American and British Commanders-in-Chief re his radio direction inventions. Saw Lord Leathers, Minister for War Transport, who discussed whole political situation very fully and frankly and then position of oil supplies for Australia. He said that tankers by December would have given us 43 weeks’ supply of aviation spirit and 23 weeks’ supply of motor spirit. I pointed out this was on a severely rationed basis, that it would only amount to about 65 million gallons as compared with 100 million gallons we had last December, but we must have at least 2 more tankers if there is going to be any trouble in the Pacific by January. Discussion interrupted to go to Ministry of Information where BrackenFootnote ¹⁹⁶ received me. Had talk with about 50 British and Dominion press, of whom about 10 women. Good statement prepared by Bill [Lowe] which apparently satisfied them as there were not many questions and those I answered satisfactorily.

At Australia House met W.S. RobinsonFootnote ¹⁹⁷ who detailed position of our base metal industries and what he had been able to do in America to carry out wishes of our Government. Was anxious to know what I thought his position would be with the new government and gave him my impressions, said he would do anything possible to make sure Anglo-Australian interest in London got behind me.

Lunch given by Dominion Secretary to me, at which Sir Dudley Pound,Footnote ¹⁹⁸ First Sea Lord, Sir [Andrew] Duncan, President Board of Trade,Footnote ¹⁹⁹ Bracken and practically all Chiefs of Staff were present. Discussed position of war with Duncan and other Ministers who took a fairly gloomy view of the future and thought it would take several years at any rate before a win would come. But where or how they seemed to be quite unaware.

To the Foreign Office where cross-questioned Anthony Eden as to story of British foreign policy since meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill. Tried to get from him substance of America's talks with Japan which he admitted he was not very well versed in. He assured me that though he had no documentary evidence that the American positions had definitely shifted from being ready to evacuate the Philippines and Singapore, he was not sure when that decision had been reached or of it was a formal decision.

As to the Russians, he said that Britain would have to wait upon America making up her mind, and if America did not make up her mind she would then have to consider the position by herself. He agreed with me that not to back Russia would raise a very difficult political problem though it seemed almost impossible to help Russia militarily.

He did not seem inclined to back up any support for attack on Japan in the south even though they made a point of attacking very fiercely the Burma Road and he had not been able to get from America any expression of view with regard to their attitude in such an event even though the international flying organization which is operating in China was practically an American organization.

As to Thailand he said the Cabinet had not committed itself. As to the Dutch East Indies he said he was prepared to recommend a definite undertaking, was prepared to make it public, though Bruce and I both suggested that it would be better to be private, and I was quite satisfied that a private and secret understanding would be sufficient for the Dutch. He admitted that British public opinion would force them into war with Japan, he thought, if Japan attacked Russia.

On the question of the strengthening of Singapore he was very woolly and did not seem to realize its importance until I explained to him the effect it was having on Australian public opinion and might have on Australian Government action. He thought everything had been done when the arrangements were made for 6 battleships to go to Singapore, but the HMS Prince of Wales he said might be brought back from the Cape. I told him this would be very deeply resented in Australia and in Singapore and might be the cause of war with Japan which otherwise would be avoided. He was inclined ultimately to agree with my point of view though he did not know whether he could get it through the War Cabinet. He would not, however, block me as I tried to do it. He seemed to think that Japan would not run into war with ABCD powers unless or until Russia was definitely broken, but he could give no assurance of America's position, which of course lessened the strength of this combination woefully. I can see I will have to push very hard to get immediate action.

In my files will be found copy of a speech I made at luncheon and telegram from Prime Minister to Prime Minister re battleships.

Tuesday, 4/11/41

Discussed method of putting up story re necessities of Australia with Bruce, and agreed the general lines. Made ineffectual attempts to pin down Chiefs of Staff and Director of Planning and finally had to get hold of Sir [Edward] Bridges, Churchill's secretary,Footnote ²⁰⁰ to get any satisfaction. Fixed meeting at 6pm Wednesday.

Went to Lord Mayor's luncheon with Bruce to King of Hellenes,Footnote ²⁰¹ sat alongside Montague Norman,Footnote ²⁰² Governor of the Bank of England, who raised question of inflationary tendency of new Federal Budget and expressed his deep concern. Said related to Macarthur OnslowsFootnote ²⁰³ and wished for news of family and estate. Tried him out on question of defence of Singapore and attitude to Japanese and found him 100% on our side and threatened to take him to Churchill. I think he will help in his own circle. On opposite side was His Grace the Metropolitan Thyateria, Dr Germanos,Footnote ²⁰⁴ head of the Greek Church of the whole of Europe, who told me interesting story of sufferings of Greeks in Germany and Occupied France. Exchanged cards. Saw Lord Leathers and had another talk about shipping.

Saw press at Dorchester, told them [a] few stories. Contacted Bridges who suggested should go to War Cabinet and put story up. Got letter ready for Churchill putting myself on safe side if any trouble ultimately arose and we were not defended.

Wednesday, 5/11/41

Bruce came along with Chiang Kai-shek'sFootnote ²⁰⁵ wire, approved of letter sent to Prime Minister. Arranged to go to Cabinet. Saw King [George VI] and chatted about Australia and Britain for half hour.

Then to War Cabinet, Prime Minister read reply to Chiang Kai-shek's and President's cable and argued question of increased reinforcement at Singapore. Fierce argument over possibility of help there and pretty adamant opposition but think that fierce fight and plenty of help will wear it down in time.

To lunch to King of Hellenes where they suggested I should be speaker at their next lunch in 3 weeks’ time. Met Countess of LyttonFootnote ²⁰⁶ who travelled home with me in 1936, Garfield Weston and his wife, Hore Belisha,Footnote ²⁰⁷ Viscount Bennett,Footnote ²⁰⁸ and about ten others with all of whom I have promised to lunch. Lord NathanFootnote ²⁰⁹ presided and General BuchananFootnote ²¹⁰ was secretary.

Cable from Curtin expressing Australian view about war participation if Japanese attack on Russia. Wire from Macgregor setting out Brooke-Popham's views. Wire from ElizabethFootnote ²¹¹ saying coming over on Sunday.

Left at night in special train with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Sir Andrew Duncan, General Ismay,Footnote ²¹² Major John Churchill, Prime Minister's brother, his Aide.Footnote ²¹³ Sleeping compartment was arranged for the guests immediately behind the Prime Minister's own car and they had given me a middle berth with a fair bit of room – to sleep almost as soon as boarded train.

Thursday, 6/11/41

Had breakfast with Sir Andrew Duncan, President of the Board of Trade, and discussed question of British–Australian trade relations setting out means by which I thought some permanently satisfactory arrangement could be made and instancing what I had done in 1936 about Australian-British electrical development. Duncan was very interested because he controls the British Iron & Steel Federation and was terribly keen on doing a similar work in regard to iron and steel. We traversed the whole ground and he has arranged to bring Professor Clay,Footnote ²¹⁴ borrowed from the Bank of England, of which he was a Director till he joined the Government, to discuss with me the steps that we should take now to make certain that the post-war condition will be satisfactory. I pointed out to him that this was the psychological moment to do it; while all the industries were working overtime in the factories, they would be prepared to give away minor points which in periods of slackness they would steadily resist. He agreed and said he felt sure we had to straighten up the Empire first before we started to talk with the USA.

The Prime Minister got up about 9.15am, told us roughly what was in his mind – we were going to inspect a device which he had discussed about 18 months ago before collapse of France as a means of enabling a frontal attack to be made on the Siegfried line, and Mr HopkinsFootnote ²¹⁵ of the Naval Construction Department (whose gloves I had borrowed the previous night to see me through the journey) was designing and perfecting the arrangement.

We left the train at Retford and went to a place called Clumber where they had two 66-horse power diesels put in a series behind one another in a huge caterpillar-like arrangement, in front of which was a huge plough about 7 feet in width and below which was placed a huge contrivance something like a rotary hoe. The object of this was to make a trench 7 feet deep and about 7 or 8 feet wide, which it could do at the rate of about a mile an hour.

They had a mine field on the way and barbed wire obstructions and it turned out the mines without setting them off and went through obstructions well enough but got into a terrible mess when it lobbed in a wide deep trench because it was so rigid and so long that it could not cut away the other side of the trench till it got on to the level again. These disadvantages had been noted by the inventor and he was shortening the thing and widening it.

From there we drove back to the train and went north as far as Hammersley [Helmsley] where we took the car again on to a very high boggy Yorkshire heath on which wind about 50 miles an hour was blowing. Arrangements had been made for an ‘attack’ on one armoured regiment by two others and the whole was carried out most realistically with dive bombers, the bombs being illustrated by mines in the ground which blew off and made a huge crater, with anti-aircraft guns which fired even after the crew had been ‘killed’ according to all the rules of warfare. Despite orders from the operational centre they were resolved to fire the last round they had in their possession.

The best machine was called Matilda because it had a skirt, the others were not protected as regards their lower limbs.

From there we went along and saw another lot of engines at work, mining the road and blowing up trees and generally blocking all traffic and numerous ‘dead’ lying along the roadside and 12 ‘prisoners’ with their hands above their heads.

Then to Helmsley with the Prime Minister where we inspected the whole armoured division. The General in charge of the Northern Command, Packenham,Footnote ²¹⁶ one of the original instructors at Duntroon, had tried to fight with the Australians in the last war, had not been successful (had been kept with the British), had been in Northern Ireland and seen Iven several times.

The OC of the Armoured Division was named Hobart,Footnote ²¹⁷ familiarly called Mother Hubbard by the Prime Minister who reckoned he was the best officer they had for that work though quite unable to get along with most other people because he was a bit brittle in the temper.

Had most interesting talk with several Brigadiers who had served in France in this war in the retreat and they gave a most awful account of the way in which the French had deceived them with regard to their forces and the troops they had at their disposal.

Back to train where had dinner with Prime Minister and Duncan, long talk over whole international position and especially American and Japanese crisis, of which more anon.

Friday, 7/11/41

Up betimes, breakfast on train. Arrived Newcastle on Tyne from which drove to Northern Command Operations Centre which works from middle of Scotland right down to middle of England and handles a great deal of the western part as well. This is well underground and they gave us a good illustration of the way they worked as they were actually plotting the passage of a convoy with all the planes that were out looking after it. Prime Minister says Germans not nearly as well advanced as regards RDF work.

Drove from operational centre to Newcastle with Mr. Lawson, MP Labour Member for that district,Footnote ²¹⁸ who proved most interesting companion. Had done wonderful job as Deputy Commissioner for whole of north. We went to the school where the head offices of their air raid centres were, showed us how over a radius of about 60 or 70 miles they had plotted exactly the number of people who were working at each of the sub-centres, the number of men available on the spot for fire-fighting and for assisting in the various air raid precaution work, the number still available, where they could be got and altogether an extraordinarily efficient job of work. They had a blackboard showing the figures, work done by girls on alternate day shifts, 8 hours one day, ready to be called if there was anything to be done in that 24 hours – the next 24 hours off.

Extraordinary system of food relief, controlling water supplies, helping people into air raid shelters. People as a whole awfully good in following orders, especially since they had had some very heavy raids.

From there went down through docks on the Tyne, through works there, where in S & J's worksFootnote ²¹⁹ there are 11 docks that can take ships as well as 3 other places where they can be managed – the biggest ship repairing establishment in the world. These had not been hit at all by the bombs, despite fact that they had an enormous number of raids.

All the men and women gave Churchill a wonderful reception throughout. Health and general conditions and cleanliness of workers awfully good.

At South and North Shields drove around devastated areas. They caught most of the bombs meant for the docks and a lot of their houses had been smashed, but despite that the people were standing 15 and 20 deep in front of the houses cheering, their eyes and faces full of confidence in Churchill's ability to pull them out [of] the mess. He told me the balloons had been of great value in forcing the bombers to keep high and that it helped to prevent them from rather getting the docks or any other part of the shipping in the Tyne Valley – in fact the [battleship] King George V Footnote ²²⁰ had been under repairs for 3 or 4 months and had not been touched.

Back to the station after civic reception, and then on to Hull where we arrived in time to be just at the end of the 400^th anniversary celebrations of Hull being established as a shrievalty. Sat down alongside Archbishop of York and Lady Mayoress, picture in the Yorkshire Post. Churchill made very good speech. Streets packed, Churchill riding in back seat instead of standing on top where everyone could see him. Lady Mayoress and Lord Mayor in dicky seats in front. Devastation of city, though docks themselves right along the Humber had been damaged very little, in fact no gate which would have prevented the use of the Lock had been damaged.

600 alerts during the last 18 months, over 200 actual raids. 115,000 houses bombed though there were only about 100,000 houses in the city, reason for this disparity being due to fact that some houses had been rebuilt several times and bombed out again. One big timber works, largest in England, had been destroyed and then rebuilt again 6 months again and destroyed a second time. Bombing was continuous – there had been a fairly substantial blitz 3 weeks before we were at Hull. Bombing so persistent that they had made up minds not to rebuild till war over. They had got about 10,000 kiddies away to school but found it difficult to keep them away in other parts of the country as the kiddies and parents desired to be together despite actual air-raiding.

Every night 120,000 sleeping in shelters, so frequent were night alarms. Despite this, streets thronged with eager people cheering Churchill to the echo, everyone confident of ultimate victory and absolutely determined that they would not yield.

Health of people marvellously good despite tremendous makeshift that the shelters forced upon them and despite fact that many still living in houses into which rain came because roofs not yet fixed. Did not have enough labor in Hull to fix houses and repair work, and had to bring in 2,000 from outside.

Back to train where we went on to our ‘stable’. Rest and dinner 8.30pm, long talk with Prime Minister […] I tried hard to put Singapore case again to Churchill, but he is older in the political head even than I am myself and I did not make such wonderful progress, so thought had better attack from the flank by getting General Ismay, Secretary of the War Cabinet, on my side. He gave me very wise advice, and I think, if it does not interfere with his policy, he will help me.

Saturday, 8/11/41

Arrived at Sheffield in morning, driven through town by Lord Mayor and Master Cutler. Sheffield badly damaged in business section, one blitz in December lasting 9 hours with waves of raiders coming across. Fortunately missed major industries though they got Neill's razor blade factoryFootnote ²²¹ – awfully pleased to see me, remembered my stories and gave me a razor. Over 800 men and girls working there, saw all sorts of magnetic devices used to sabotage the enemy. Neill's working hard as ever on precision tools, making extraordinarily variety, as well as old work of special saws, blades and handles.

On to heavy steel industry place, where saw 300-ton fiery cauldron emptied of steel and the whole thing picked up by a magnetic chuck and carried along and emptied. To our amazement the men were handling the outside of the cauldron of molten metal as if it were cool. Saw tremendous forgings, in fact all the main propeller shafts, torpedo tubes, shell cases etc, are prepared [at] this place.

Then along the streets to the Town Hall, where Churchill made a speech. There must have been at least 25,000 in the crowd alone that he spoke to, all of them wildly cheering at every reference to victory, though he promised nothing except blood and sweat and tears till they got there. A section of the crowd applauded reference to Russia.

Then around city in a car in which we passed all the blitzed areas, every street packed with people, despite fact that only at half past 9 had police cars announced the route on which he was to travel.

Back to train after reception at Town Hall – beautifully carved and not damaged at all up to present. (No heavy industry had been damaged at Sheffield, only business and residential areas).

On train Duncan […] and self, discussed general question first of all how to secure best co-operation for victory, and second how to make certain that the people who were standing up to hardships and privations at present time would really get something worthwhile out of the war. His view was that the wartime organization should be maintained for at least 2 or 3 years after the war and instead of just using our efforts and energies and money for making materials of building up the conditions and lives of the people. I told him what we had been trying to do in different parts of Australia and what our discussions with America were, but expressed the opinion that it must be the Empire which had a definite plan and was prepared to act, and if that was done and America would collaborate, we could really pull the world out of its slough of despond. Anyhow if America did not collaborate the Empire itself was still sufficiently full of resources and virility to enable us to lift the standard of living throughout all humanity. I think if Churchill can last 2 or 3 years after the war is finished, he will really get something worthwhile done, if he can get the man [sic] to back him in a practical concrete manner because he is generous, and general ideas in the right direction.

Long discussion with Duncan on question of future Australian and British relationships, and an agreement that we should get together and see if we could not draft a plan before I actually went away from Britain.

To Wendover on train – staff on platform. Drove back to London.

Sunday, 9/11/41

Went to Garfield Weston's place, ‘Whittington’, on the Upper Thames. Formerly the home of Lord Devonport,Footnote ²²² who was Food Controller in Lloyd George's administration – in fact most of their food policies were finally decided in the sitting room. Accompanied by Major Coleman, MR, had restful day – changing leaves, flowing stream. Weston very interested in Empire story, especially that part which produces the greatest wealth, and had interesting half-hour on map learning something about Canada and teaching him more about Australia.

Home in blackout, to meet Elizabeth, Iven's wife.

Monday, 10/11/41

Discussion with Bruce, agreement on a line of presentation at War Cabinet.

To Lord Mayor's Banquet, where Churchill practically pledged British Government to all the policies that we had been advocating with regard to Singapore, to China, battleships, not yet sure about air, about America, and gave very definite warning which might almost be called a threat to Japan.

Bruce and I very pleased. Bruce agreed two things had settled the Singapore assistance – political turmoil in Australia and the wire sent from the Chiefs of Staff, Singapore, as a result of conference.

Tuesday, 11/11/41

Laid Australian wreath on Cenotaph in morning in company with Bruce. No ceremony, though many thousands of people standing by.

Saw McGibbon of Perth [Australia], who told me his trouble about getting anything settled insofar as arrangements for the pay of the Army were concerned. They had been over here 7 or 8 months.

Saw press and gave them background of Churchill's speech off the record so that they could make their point as to the value of the battle fleet at Singapore and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Lunch with Lord Leathers […] and Bruce and another of the heads of his Department of War Transport there with him. Discussed whole question of shipping to Australia. I urged that in the construction of the 260 vessels in America and in the construction of the million tons in Canada and of the 1,100,000 tons being constructed in Britain, at any rate 20% of the total should be refrigerated, that this would not take very much longer to construct, that in any case the savings to the regimen of the people of England would make it well worthwhile and the difference that it would make to the Australian and NZ livestock industries would be almost inconceivable.

I raised question of Shipping Ministry and Food Control Ministry having the power to erect outside of England in such places as Bombay and Suez the requisite cold stores. Sir [Cyril] HurcombFootnote ²²³ admitted that at both Freetown and Singapore and for a long time at Haifa a really good refrigerated boat had been stationed and was being used as a refrigerated store. He admitted that in the two latter cases this was indefensible though at Freetown the excuse was made that they frequently had to go out and victual ships and consequently the refrigerated store ought to be moving. He agreed with my suggestion which Bruce backed very strongly, that there should be a conference of the Treasury, War Transport, Food Control and possibly Department [of] Agriculture, but at any rate the first 3, who would agree on the basis of payment and the type of contracts for a definite period for the Australian products. I pointed out that unless this were done no real progress could be made in the collection of surpluses which were going to be so useful in helping the position after the war. It was agreed that we should have a discussion. The discussion lasted till 3 o'clock and we have arranged to meet as soon as we have got rid of the war strategy argument with the War Cabinet.

Went to Bruce and had good look at Australia House with view to conversion as first-class canteen for troops. Examined plans and thought first-class job if it were done. Bruce said that what had hindered him in the past was that if there were daylight raids and 400 men or so were there, a bomb might come down and kill the lot. But now that daylight raids were not so frequent it was all right – at night there are ample shelters.

Long conference with Bruce on question of presentation of their case. He thought that we had to tie them down very definitely to a statement of policy of what they would do if America did not come in, and after discussion he agreed to rough out for me the actual lines along which he thought a discussion would best proceed. This was done and then we came home in his car, ran into another car, stayed in dark about ¾ hour which seemed like 10 hours. […] [H]ad pleasant evening at Dorchester with EP, MR & Bill, danced – not nearly as bad as I seemed 20 years ago.

Wednesday, 12/11/41

To House of Lords to see King and Queen read Address-in-Reply. Got lost in Parliament fortunately as it gave me an opportunity of seeing Lord Hankey who said he had pretty well cleared his mind with regard to the constitutional procedure that should be followed for representation of the Dominions in London. His view was that there should be an Imperial War Cabinet quite separate from British War Cabinet and probably only having the same number of representatives from each part of the Empire meeting on quite separate days to the British War Cabinet and dealing with matters specifically delegated to it by the various Empire Government Cabinets. He was quite careless as to whether the Prime Minister or any other Minister was the representative, in fact in his view it would be quite all right in such an Imperial War Cabinet for a time at least to have the High Commissioner representing his Government so long as there was sufficiently intimate association with the homeland to keep the representative up to date.

Saw Lord De La Warr.Footnote ²²⁴ Ran into Lord and Lady Gifford,Footnote ²²⁵ who was Miss Allen – told me, strange to say, all the recent news of Australia since I left.

To House of Commons where ran into Hudson who told me Churchill was going to speak at 12.45pm. Churchill dealt with improved shipping position in most humorous speech. The attitude of the House of Commons was really that of a conquering nation instead of one fighting for its life.

Got ready the brief for the War Cabinet. Final discussion with Bruce, then on to special War Cabinet 5.30pm to 7.30pm where they gave me the whole run of the time and enabled me to put the Australian case. I emphasized the difficulties that our geographical position and lack of communications made for us, and quite apart from that the special problems of the Pacific demanded special representation. I was leaving the question of the form of permanent representation for future discussion.

Undoubtedly I brought a new vision of the Empire to the whole of the War Cabinet, especially as behind us there was a map with big splotches of red in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic which emphasised the points I made. Churchill said that they were seized with the position in the Far East and had always been ready to desert every other scene if we were in danger. I pointed out that we were advocating that we should prevent trouble rather than cure it after it arose. I likened the position to fire breaks in Australia. The extra strength we needed at Singapore for this purpose was indispensable. He [Churchill] argued that everything had to take its right place in the proper perspective but I pointed out that no country would be prepared to keep on in the war if it did not feel its own defence was adequate, and in fact that was the underlying policy of Britain. Though he was adamant on the question of extra reinforcements he consented to further discuss the question with the Chiefs of Staff.

After meeting spent half-hour with Sir Archibald Sinclair,Footnote ²²⁶ Director of Planning Operations, and put up a fairly stout story without really eroding much of the Scotch granite of Sinclair's mind. They had very much increased their reinforcement possibilities from India by means of better aerodromes and more petrol and I was able to completely demolish the argument on which they have been relying that the difficulty of Gibraltar was a determining factor against us. I pointed out that was all the more reason to get them out if there was trouble.

In the War Cabinet, on the question of always following the lead of America, Churchill admitted that they had been practically forced to do that by reason of their own relative weakness against so many antagonists and that if they could get America to take the lead in the offensive it was all to the good. But he admitted the force of my contention that though we would be forced to take action ourselves whether America acted or not, the later we did this the better, and the more chance there would be of bringing America in. He said a very significant thing, that when they pushed Roosevelt too hard suddenly a wall of silence would descend on the whole proceedings for several weeks. As an instance of that he gave me a formal reply they had received from America re Chiang Kai-shek's telegram. He said their mind was really moving in the direction that ours did, but that they were, like us, the victim of circumstances.

What he did emphasize all the time was that though we often looked like getting badly knocked, we fortunately had been able to get along until our position had been much better than it had ever been with regard to standing up to the eastern complications. The same arguments applied 2 years ago as to the necessity for strengthening Singapore, but I pointed out that the position was quite different in two respects – first that the Far Eastern position had definitely deteriorated, and secondly that the equipment position of Britain had immensely improved. If it was all right before Russia came in to be relying for the defence of Britain on a smaller number of planes than they had now, it must be still possible to hold the enemy off if a few were sent to the Far East. They then shifted their ground and said if it were only a matter of taking from Great Britain that could be done, but because of the difficulty of the channel of communication to the Middle East through Gibraltar and Malta which were under very heavy enemy fire, in effect if we reinforce Singapore it must be at the expense of the Middle East. That might interfere with victory, and a victory in the Middle East would have a big effect in keeping Japan back, but I said what if we don't have a victory? We would be in a worse mess than we were before. No planes in Singapore would mean lessened prestige because we had unfortunately fallen down.

It was a very satisfactory meeting, and they agreed they would think over the whole question before coming to a final decision, even though they had been fairly positive in their statements during the discussion.

Thursday, 13/11/41

Saw HowardFootnote ²²⁷ of General Motors from NY. He put up the proposal that if America guaranteed Britain for 50 years a negotiated peace could be attempted with Germany. This guarantee, he said, would just about equalize the existing strength of the two opposing forces and enable us to insist on a peace being made which would do justice to the conquered peoples. His reason for making the suggestion was that he could not see where, when or how victory could be attained in the immediate future nor for many years, that there was no immediate spot at which Britain or America either for that matter could make a direct attack on land, and that he was satisfied that neither bombing from the air nor the blockade of itself would be sufficient to bring the war to an end.

He said this view was very widely shared by the biggest business men in America, and he thought had fairly substantial support from certain sections of the administration in Washington.

My reply was that even to speak of negotiated peace at the present time would be to cause dismay in the ranks of our friends and supporters everywhere, to lessen the war effort of every one of the allied countries and make it appear that the Germans were people whose word could be trusted even though they had repeatedly shown that they were capable of breaking it almost as soon as they had made a compact. Anyhow their mentality had indicated they were insane beasts, and all the fellows I had seen in the last war and this who had fairly kindly feelings towards the rank and file of Germans in the last war now felt that the only hope of enjoying peace in Europe was to exterminate these men whose lives had been poisoned by propaganda and there was no hope of reforming them. At any rate without decisive defeat there was no chance of peace at all. If America would not come in to this fight Britain would have to wage it alone because everything we stood for was at stake. He said if that was so the best way to proceed was to try and remove the centres of production as far as possible to the USA where mass methods could be adopted and not the small shop or contracting out methods that characterized English production. (Whether this is a part of organized drive on the part of American big business to ensure that Britain is always at the mercy of America is worth investigating, especially in view of the discussion I had later in the day with Lord Kemsley).Footnote ²²⁸

I questioned him closely about possibility of extension of these production plants to Australia. He said the difficulty in regard to that was that they were very short of skilled technicians there and did not see how they could possibly get them out, quite apart from the plant and raising the capital.

I asked him whether he thought America would work better if she were in the war, and he said he felt certain that she would, there would be very much greater total effort, and that their production was capable of being increased enormously if the people really had the will to work and labor troubles could be overcome. At any rate so far as Australia is concerned General Motors were prepared to keep on improving and extending their facilities to do the maximum they could. We agreed that we would try and meet again and have a decent talk. (Claridge's).

Sir Louis Bussau, Agent-General for Victoria, called.Footnote ²²⁹ Anxious to get information about Australian political position and especially attitude of Victorian Country Party and of Wilson.Footnote ²³⁰ He was very pleased at progress I was able to make re stabilization of wheat and other industries, many of which he had fought for when he was in politics in Australia. He told me, as did Bruce when I asked him subsequently about the question, of the very grave difficulties that had arisen between the Agents-General especially between Troy of Western AustraliaFootnote ²³¹ and McCannFootnote ²³² and Pike,Footnote ²³³ that they had almost come to an open rupture, and in fact Pike and McCann stayed away from one monthly meeting of the Agents-General which Bruce holds and had made a statement which had caused a bit of trouble in Australia. Bruce was, however, hopeful that they would be able to settle their trouble without going to law in the matter. He urged me to be circumspect in speaking to them as the position was extremely delicate.

Talked with Bruce re meeting with Cabinet previous day and told him of Eden's reaction which very much disappointed him though he expected the worst.Footnote ²³⁴ He agreed that though Churchill's reply was very unsatisfactory, we should cable the story in full, which we have proceeded to do over Thursday, Friday and Saturday.

At lunch met Garfield Weston, who had Viscount Bennett, the [former] Prime Minister of Canada, to a private luncheon. Discussion whole British political situation, gave me relative values of various personalities in War Cabinet, exactly what had been the repercussions of elimination of certain elements from the Government, who were the men doing the major work at present time, attitude of Canada and Mackenzie King to disposition of Canadian soldiers, the trouble that the inaction of the Canadian soldiers was causing among rank and file in many centres where they have been stationed, the necessity for very strong speaking on part of Australia, and his conviction that I would get no help from either South Africa or Canada with regard to special representation or the creation of special machinery to have a point of view put, and yet that I must fight for it and even if no-one else was represented, Australia must be.

He felt it would be a mistake if I went back too quickly as my contacts with the British Ministers were very favourable ones, much more, in his view, than Menzies, who he thought had well out-stayed his welcome and whose criticism had not been confined to policies but had gone on to persons – that I had better make the earliest possible contact with Beaverbrook and get him on my side, and that if I pushed hard enough I would get the military, naval and air support at Singapore and in the Far East that he regarded with me as being indispensable; that he was always at my service at any time to consult.

Dinner with Lord Kemsley, owner of Sunday Times and his wife, who after dinner raised question of post-war labor conditions and especially the post-war Empire and American trading conditions. Kemsley took the view that if we were not careful we would as a nation go into complete bondage with the USA through the Lease-Lend arrangements, that they were certain to ask for their pound of flesh with regard to accommodation they were giving us, and that we had to be careful lest we were not completely sold down the river by wartime arrangements that would defeat us in peacetime development.

When I put my view that what was necessary with regard to where we stood insofar as post-war trade was concerned was that we should talk as a nation to America and make an agreement with her under those conditions, he was 100% in sympathy and thought it shed a new ray of light on the position. I told him I discussed this with Sir Andrew Duncan and was going to develop it more fully with Professor Clay and Duncan together. He asked that I should see him again when I had made any progress. He pointed out one of the difficulties under which they labored, that in his own industry when they had introduced labor-saving machinery, the unions insisted that though the work could be done by 3 men instead of 5, they should keep the extra two men on the pay-roll even though they had nothing to do, and this more or less demoralized the working of the whole place. Now that the war was on it had been agreed that these two men should be taken away to other work on the understanding that as soon as the war was over the existing conditions should be reverted to. If this were done when there had been such a tremendous eating away of capital in the meantime, we would be unable really to carry out anything like a reconstruction programme that would be worthwhile and give the people what they deserved, because the only way that could be done was by the fullest co-operation and whole-hearted work of everybody in the community. I thought that the conditions that would obtain after the war would force our people to work 100% and indicated Churchill's view that there should be an organization maintained practically on army lines for a couple of years to bring about this reconstruction. He was doubtful whether, if the soldiers were in England, for instance, they could be held together as in the last war they were in France for 7 or 8 months and that had prevented them from deserting and going to their own homes out of the proper divisions and army organizations. At any rate we are to discuss this further.

Friday, 14/11/41

9am Bruce came to discuss question of cables with me and our general attitude towards the Government. Had long talk, as result of which we determined to send practically the whole of what we had prepared and a summary of Churchill's reply. Saw Stirling who managed to get away on Friday night my own statement to Curtin as well as the letter I had sent on the previous Wednesday week which brought about the double War Cabinet meeting.

Saw Admiral ColvinFootnote ²³⁵ during the afternoon, told him whole story and especially recommendation of Naval COS re Australian cruisers being used in and about Singapore to back up battle fleet. Received his view on that point. His opinion was that the most that could be spared from the Australian battle fleet in the way of cruisers was one 6″ cruiser and that similar vessels could be probably released from the NZ fleet together with perhaps 2 or possibly 4 destroyers out of the Tasman area. He would only endorse this suggestion if [and] when the British battle fleet was actually in position in Singapore. I cabled out this view to Curtin.

Saturday, 15/11/41

Saw Stirling, gave him further instructions re cables. Received cable from Curtin asking me to fix up wine business in London in consultation with Bruce. Have got Low getting data. Very much handicapped by absence of Commerce staff from America, as this was one of the things I wished McCarthy to deal with. Have made tentative suggestions to Woolton and Lord Leathers that we should exchange a cargo of whiskey from England for wine from Australia.

To Davies where ordered a suit, then to Lord Hankey's where had game of tennis with Elizabeth. At night discussed diplomatic position and representation with Hankey who had been Secretary of the Cabinet for the last 35 years and Secretary of the Imperial War Cabinet during the last war and the Supreme War Council both during the war and the Peace Conference after the war. After discussing my views at length he agreed with them and said in 1934 before I joined the Lyons GovernmentFootnote ²³⁶ he had gone on a special mission to try and induce Australia, NZ, Canada, South Africa and India to make a gift of a battleship to the British Government, to stir the apathy that had overcome their defence measures here. He gave me the reasons for Chatfield's supersession and said he felt sure that Chatfield could give me enormous help now. Though out of office he still had a lot of influence and weight.

On question of representation he was quite satisfied that in his own mind there was only one policy that would ever be satisfactory, and that was that there should be an Imperial War Cabinet which was quite distinct from the British War Cabinet and on which the British War Cabinet could have representation in the same way as the Dominions. It might possibly, because of its contribution to the total Imperial war effort, have 2 or 3 representatives to every one of the Dominion representatives, and that would not be difficult to get because it would meet in London. The British War Cabinet should meet quite independently of the Imperial War Cabinet and the IWC should discuss all those matters which had any reference or relevance to the general Imperial policy as distinct from that which appertained entirely to Britain or the House of Commons. This would obviate the difficulties that Mackenzie King envisaged of over-powering domination of the British Ministers of the situation when general questions of policy were being discussed.

Hankey thought representation of Dominions could be by the Prime Minister or any other resident Minister or by a special representative as in my own case, or for short intervals when there was a change taking place in the Ministerial representation, the High Commissioner could sit in the Imperial War Cabinet, especially if he had standing such as Bruce had.

He thought the best way to deal with the matter was to have two Ministerial representatives, each appointed for consecutive 6 months, so that one would be in Australia for 6 months while the other was in England so that the man speaking at the Imperial War Cabinet would be always au fait with the local position in the Dominion from which he came.

I indicated in my view the problems of strategy of the peace were going to be just as difficult as those of war and that especially in the first 2 or 3 years of the peace and in the last year or two of the war, those problems might be overwhelming in their importance and could only be solved by common action along the lines that I have indicated in my conversation with Duncan and Kemsley. He agreed, and thought it would be a wise thing if I had a word on that, which I intend to do on Thursday week.

Monday, 17/11/41

Bought gloves and dressing gown with EP.

Discussed with Bruce representation in London. I told him of Hankey's views but said myself that I thought it would be very unwise to call anything we brought into being a Cabinet or even a Committee if that could be avoided – in fact if Australia alone was going to be represented there was no reason to call it anything at all but simply go ahead with the job.

Bruce, who had an intimate knowledge of the Imperial Defence Committee, thought its machinery could be utilized for this purpose. We worked out the idea that what was needed was a Minister coming over at regular intervals for 2 or 3 months at the outside, with complete access to all documents and materials, that he should go back and the High Commissioner should then have exactly the same access as he had had and should be there when the new Envoy came along to show him the ropes and give him the weight of the different people who were in England.

Later in the day, after thinking the thing out and having a long talk himself with Hankey and discussing the machinery that we ourselves had brought into being in the Foreign Office of liaison in 1924 when Casey was the first beginner in the liaison, he realized that Stirling, our man there, was in the Cabinet Office itself, that under those circumstances it was the easiest thing in the world that all the Cabinet documents could be placed in his possession, for the Australian representative, whether he be a special Minister or the High Commissioner, to see, and that without any formal machinery of any sort or without any song and dance that would upset the other Dominions we could make our own special arrangements with the British Government that would enable us to be represented and fully informed and to get our stuff to the Government at the appropriate time. We discussed its pros and cons, difficulties, security of continuity in representation and thought, and as a result Bruce promised to bring down a memo setting out the whole problem which we could thrash out and finalize ourselves.

The question of wine arose and the possibility of securing the lifting of the complete ban on the importation of wine from Australia which I believe applies to other countries. This raised the question of the disposal of surpluses, and I pointed out how stupid I thought were the arrangements suggested by the British Government with regard to meat, in that they only took care of a portion of the total export surpluses and really would force production to be restricted and limited during the war, prevent the accumulation of surpluses that would be available immediately after the war to restore international trade and transport activity and to feed the destitute people of the world. Instead of the British Government trying to cut us right down to the bone so far as industries were concerned, it should take the bigger view that was envisaged in the White Paper that we agreed to in April of this year which contemplated that we should use these surpluses in this international way with a definite policy of restoring world trade and especially lifting the nutrition of the peoples of the world.Footnote ²³⁷ I felt sure that if we did this, the amount of money necessary to enable us to do it with assistance from the British Government because we were willing to put up half the cost ourselves, would be so small as to scarcely represent the cost of a squadron of aeroplanes which might be shot down in a night – and it was a ‘penny wise, pound foolish’ policy that enabled these major industries to be destroyed when so little relatively could keep not only the machinery of production going but develop a war psychology which would be of great assistance in the war effort.

As well I pointed out that this was the only way in which we could secure the whole-hearted assistance of the USA, and I was satisfied that if we did lay down a plan of this sort we would get much more sympathy and assistance from America than we would get any other way.

Bruce said he agreed, that he and McDougallFootnote ²³⁸ had been following out a plan something along the same lines, that MacDougall had discussed it in America with some of the leaders of agricultural thought there.

I pointed out that Henry Wallace, the Vice President, was prepared to deal with all surpluses both primary and secondary in this way, and Bruce then pointed out the effect on nutrition throughout the whole world would be different.

I then told him Churchill's idea of a better and brighter world for everyone after the war, that the people had earned it. I was satisfied we could sell Churchill the idea 100% and if we could do that Bruce thought the thing was as good as completed. It was a wonderful election policy, and in fact a wonderful talking point from now on, and would knock on the head the ideas that the long term planners were working out which practically killed initiative whereas what we were suggesting could be worked out by the industries themselves and not necessarily by the Governments.

After a long discussion I told him I was to see Woolton on Thursday afternoon at 5.45pm and he said that by Wednesday he would try and rough out a plan of campaign that we would jointly put up to Woolton and we could have an hour or two on it. I said then we could put both the food plan and the representation plan to the British Government, that that would give us a good claim on shipping for handling our produce that no-one else would have, and we would be able to see a comprehensive solution of many of our problems and possible termination of my visit.

Bruce thought it might be wise not to stay more than 2 or 3 months at the outside, and that if I were all the time hammering on these practical things people would regret my going instead of regretting my not going.

To dinner with Lord Beaverbrook at which Winant,Footnote ²³⁹ American Ambassador to Britain, Westerbrook,Footnote ²⁴⁰ Efficiency Expert, Ministry of Supply, Bracken, Minister for Information, Llewellin,Footnote ²⁴¹ Deputy Minister of Supply, Beaverbrook and myself were present.

Beaverbrook raised question of Australian political position which [was] discussed at some length and then raised with Winant position of labor union in America. Winant says that LewisFootnote ²⁴² is definitely a pacifist, a personal enemy of the President, and is guided much more in his actions by this personal resentment than by any other issue. He had timed the strike with the miners to coincide with the passage of the Neutrality Act to try and complicate the issue and possibly defeat it on local grounds. He thought Roosevelt ultimately would win because Murray,Footnote ²⁴³ the head of the Lewis’ organization [is] 100% for the war effort. As soon as they went into the war that would be the position. He discussed as well the position of international trading especially after the war, was very intrigued with what we are doing in Australia, and insistent that we should have a talk on the matter.

Bracken told me a story re Churchill's accession to the Prime Ministership which indicated he was prepared to serve under Halifax in the Lords rather than go in with Chamberlain, and it had only been by pressure and the use of outside politicians’ brains that Churchill had the wit to keep silent when the proposition was brought up.

Tuesday, 18/11/41

Discussion with Bruce re general position. Long talk with Sir Charles PortalFootnote ²⁴⁴ on the air position. He admitted that Singapore was inadequately defended but said it was a political question, not a military one, and that he could, if necessary, get 6 BlenheimFootnote ²⁴⁵ Squadrons if he were pushed from the Middle East without completely damaging their prospects. He thought it was quite hopeless to try and get stuff from America as they were hypothecating it all for their own army equipment though they were building up much more quickly than he had known when I had spoken at the War Cabinet on the previous Wednesday.

Rather staggered me by indicating that if Singapore were lost we would pick it up again and they might not fight if the Dutch East Indies were invaded. I told him we could not contemplate even those possibilities and that if Britain did they were quite unconscious of the feeling of Australia and NZ and it would break the Empire if they did nothing about it. He admitted that there was no argument against it being done once the vital importance of Singapore [was] granted.

Surprised at their attitude towards the outer Empire as to the ending of the war. He thought in 18 months’ time would have overwhelming air strength to bomb wherever and whenever we liked and destroy morale and material. He admitted taking away the few bombers we needed for Singapore would not greatly hamper the immediate result or delay the immediate result. Whole interview very depressing.

Dinner with Sir Donald Banks,Footnote ²⁴⁶ Sir Horace Wilson,Footnote ²⁴⁷ Sir Henry Pownall,Footnote ²⁴⁸ […] who were all interested in the development of the aircraft industry in Australia. Pownall new C-in-C of the Far East. They were very pleased with what had been done in Australia, very appreciative of the hospitality being given, the readiness with which we had accepted their plans, and said they were willing to help in every possible way to bring the Australian projects to fruition. (Portal had admitted that the best way we could help in aircraft construction in Australia is to push ahead with the Beaufort bombersFootnote ²⁴⁹ which were able to attack ships without very much risk to themselves, being in quite a different position from the dive bombers, where the mortality was up to 30%).

Horace Wilson said he would give us any help we would like in the Treasury to try and straighten out the food difficulties.

Wednesday, 19/11/41

Saw Ronald VesteyFootnote ²⁵⁰ […] Most disturbed as to what might be Labor Party's attitude towards development of Northern Territory. Said Vestey [conglomerate] ready to spend several million pounds in extra development on condition received some security of tenure, thought it pity [that] this should be prevented as it would be if they could not get some definite period of certainty.

Thursday, 20/11/41

Lunch, Bank [of] Australasia, with Bruce, discussed question of finance and inflation with the Board and promised to return some day and talk to them about whole question of saving of the primary industries and what we are really doing in Australia and what they could do to help here to push the British Government over the top.

Then went with Bruce to discuss with Lord Woolton question of food reserves. He said that though in favour of reasonable price for our produce he was against the idea of holding surpluses. After I had spoken about 20 minutes and put down the arguments (notes in full), Woolton said he was completely convinced that these food reserves would be an asset and not a liability, would get hold of GreenwoodFootnote ²⁵¹ straight away, convert him, and we would have a talk with all the export officers of the Ministry of Economic Warfare and get the whole thing put into decent shape before submission to the British Government.

To Bank of NSW cocktail party where met practically all senior air force men and several ladies and Keith Murdoch.Footnote ²⁵²

Curtin wired me to get number of machines indispensable for carrying on of Beaufort production and get in touch with Hyland, and Ministry of Supply.

Friday, 21/11/41

Saw Keith Murdoch 9am, told me latest news of Australia – he had flown over and left early in November, said that Menzies had behaved very badly in connection with the defeat of the Government as he had tried to smash the arrangement between the UAP and UCP, had tried to become Leader of the Opposition, and when that failed refused to become Leader of the UAP and had done his best to try and put in MacDonald.Footnote ²⁵³ Made some vicious speeches on his own people and seemed terribly sour.

Hyland called to see me and arranged after discussion that we should send cable to Curtin saying that he was actively pursuing the question of supplies for aircraft with the Ministry of Supply […] I pointed out it was no good dealing with the matter with kid gloves any longer – it was quite impossible that the British Government should refuse to give us aeroplanes and then refuse machines to build our own, especially when they said they could not fly the Beauforts we were building, to the Far East, and those were the torpedo bombers especially needed there.

W.S. Robinson saw me, told me he had been in close contact with Beaverbrook, who suggested I should not be in a hurry to go back as I had shifted the Government more in a month than they had been shifted before in about 12, and that everybody was amazed at my pertinacity, and he felt sure I would get everything I wanted if I only stuck to it. Beaverbrook willing to help but would be much more use if specific request could be made rather than his hand forced on general policy. He said going to America and I urged him to try and get machine tools for us in the States.

Thence to Gloucester […] where arrived rather late and terribly tired.

Saturday, 22/11/41

To River Wye with […] EP and MR. Had look at Gloucester Cathedral, old Saxon Kings 700 years, Chepstow Castle, Tintern Abbey ruins. Beautiful run down Severn through Monmouth, Ross, Gloucester, Birdlip, home. Party at night – did not sleep, worrying about speech.

Sunday, 23/11/41

From Gloucester to Hatfield, across middle of England through Cotswolds and Aylesbury, saw John Hampton's [sic] statueFootnote ²⁵⁴ with Elizabeth. Lunched with Marquis of Salisbury and his wife,Footnote ²⁵⁵ also Cranborne, into old palace in which Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary were both imprisoned when they were young. Into Yew Walk and vineyard on River Lee. Trees at least 500 years old. Saw oak tree under which Queen Elizabeth sat awaiting news of her sister Queen Mary's death when they announced she had become Queen of England.

Monday, 24/11/41

Lunch with AmeryFootnote ²⁵⁶ who had General de Gaulle,Footnote ²⁵⁷ Gunther, author of Inside Europe,Footnote ²⁵⁸ […] Lord Greenwood, Mrs AmeryFootnote ²⁵⁹ – interesting talk re position in French North Africa and position that would arise now that WeygandFootnote ²⁶⁰ had been removed.

Received cable from Curtin stating conditions under which they would consent to allow Australian troops to be used in Turkey, and had an hour's interview with Sir John Dill who explained the position as he saw it, but it is obvious nothing definite can be done until the Libyan campaign concluded one way or the other.

Discussion with Bruce re international position and question of pay to Britain from Australian troops. Whole system appears to be completely wrong and he thinks I could practically destroy the present suggested basis as soon as I get back to Australia.

Arranged to discuss reserve stocks with Greenwood and Woolton on Thursday night.

To War Cabinet where discussed Middle East campaign – given exact picture of position. Early in meeting First Lord of Admiralty [Alexander] told story of two big Italian boats sighted by Fleet Air Arm which were being shadowed with intention of sinking them (carrying oil and supplies to the Germans in Libya) and about 20 minutes before the meeting broke up word came through to say they were actually sunk.

Discussed Far East position and telegram to America, putting my view very strongly re clause re possible concessions – put my objections very strongly to the way in which it was being put up, arranged to send telegram to Australia setting out my views.

Tuesday, 25/11/41

Discussed with Bruce question of cablegram to Australia. He also sending one and I concurred in his general attitude though expressing my additional objections.

To Overseas Club Luncheon where spoke on defence of Singapore, Lady WillingdonFootnote ²⁶¹ presiding.

Discussion with Bruce, Hyland, DuffyFootnote ²⁶² and Coleman re aircraft planes, and arranged to wait till Thursday to see what TimmsFootnote ²⁶³ had brought from America and then to send stiff cable setting out my views and action proposed to take to secure action with Ministry of Supply.

Wednesday, 26/11/41

Speech National Defence Public Interest Luncheon Committee at Dorchester [Hotel] dealing with position of Empire as whole, necessity of defence Singapore and Pacific, imperative necessity and value of food reserves both during and after war, and effect on peace.

Thursday, 27/11/41

Went to see RAAF Fighter Squadron of Spitfires at Red Hill, where met all the pilots in their mess and spoke to them all. Flight Lieutenant TruscottFootnote ²⁶⁴ in charge, came from Melbourne, got DFC. Number of Northern Rivers and Queensland boys there, though every State represented with exception of Western Australia. Among them Sergeant Pilot RobertsFootnote ²⁶⁵ who came down on an enemy aerodrome in Occupied France and then managed to escape after 3 months wandering through France and Spain to England. Comes from Lismore, and promised to see his mother, Mrs [W.C.] Roberts, when go back. He told me surprised at good condition of French especially in country districts in both Occupied and Unoccupied France – farmers getting plenty of food to keep families and themselves in good condition, and it was only the markets and cities and big towns that were controlled by Germans. Farmers only sending in to the markets what they did not consume themselves on the farms. He said in contrast to this that the destitution and hunger in Spain were very acute as it never seemed to have recovered from the Civil War.

They demonstrated to me against a target how the machine gun and canon worked from the wing of a plane and they put me into a Spitfire and let me work all the controls. Went to operational centre.

Lunch with Metropolitan Vickers, at which Sir Felix PoleFootnote ²⁶⁶ presided. Said practically no rabbits left in England. Discussed question of electrical development in Australia and what they are prepared to do in extending their own works there. Talked to me about machine tools. They thought, despite American report, that there were not nearly as many idle machine tools in this country as the Americans had said. First of all the men had not been practical engineers but just business executives and secondly because of the way in which the tools were used on account of the type of shop. Anyhow Beaverbrook had grabbed everything there was.

He told me YoungFootnote ²⁶⁷ was alive and of great service to BevinFootnote ²⁶⁸ in negotiating labor settlement, and then grabbed [by] Beaverbrook for aircraft production and RDF work. Now running Rugby show again. All their organization was at my disposal and promised to go to Trafford and Rugby.

To Palladium Theatre. AWA [Amalgamated Wireless (Australasia)] put wireless in sitting room.

Friday, 28/11/41

Sent cable to Curtin asking for McCarthy to come to England. Sent cable telling position of machine tools for aircraft production.

Stirling showed me cables relative to Far East and America's participation talks.

Lunch with Overseas Farmers, all of whose Directors are working for Ministry of Food, each handling a different speciality […] Very interested in food development and raised point that after the war food prices would soar to 3 times what they were now if not controlled. […] [Was given a] number of interesting points on the reasons for the inevitable changes in Australian relationships with Britain.

To conference with Greenwood, minister in charge of post-war reconstruction, and Lord Woolton, and Bruce. Finally got them to agree first that the reserve stocks were an asset and not a liability, secondly the only way they could be secured was by keeping the Australian herds and flocks at their maximum number and in full capacity for production, and this could only be done by giving a reasonable price for canned meat. What I asked for was a firm offer for 160,000 tons of refrigerated meat and as much canned as we could make. Woolton baulked a bit at the fixed amount that he could lift so I said we would be satisfied if the Ministry of Food would buy that amount even if they could not lift it, but share with us the cost of storage, and if impossible to make a better price for canned meat than they were giving the Argentine, that the British Government should join with us in a subsidy.

Greenwood and he both accepted this and are going to see Kingsley Wood,Footnote ²⁶⁹ Chancellor of the Exchequer. Bruce and I insisted matter of high policy should be determined by the Government and officials should be asked to make their arrangements on that basis and not on the basis that they had been trying to fix a price just to keep the industry staggering along.

Saturday, 29/11/41

To Cabinet Office where examined various cables re Far East. Sent cable to Australia in collaboration with Bruce.

Stayed with Halliday SutherlandFootnote ²⁷⁰ who entertained me with stories of what had happened in Australia and many other parts of the world – 5 boys and girl, very pleasant wife.

Had look at cable from America to British Foreign Office and cable from Australia directed to Chinese minister from AustraliaFootnote ²⁷¹ setting out position, which had transmitted to America as well.

Sunday, 30/11/41

Arranged [to] send cable in reply Australian message in collaboration with Bruce pointing out difficulties that had arisen as result of failure to take our advice in War Cabinet on Monday and especially the easing down of the American position.

11pm, cable from Australia urging immediately contact Churchill to secure definite undertaking and understanding re British attitude if Kra Isthmus attacked or North Borneo and setting out cables that they had received from America and Britain in which American naval reconnaissance was ascertaining whereabouts and objectives of Jap Fleet.

Monday, 1/12/41

At meeting with Churchill pointed out that wanted an answer to the 4 questions raised by me at War Cabinet, that we felt there should be no delay in the decision, that we had hoped for an understanding to be arrived at when there was no crisis, but a crisis had now come and there had been no clarification and their terms of cable to America were indefinite.

Churchill, to my horror, was able to define the position of Britain which was that she did not desire to fight unless America did, and that the terms of the telegram had been deliberately left vague because in between Empire Government they were prepared to go much further in their statement which was that till America came in they were not prepared to act.

I pointed out this was in direct defiance of all the advice of Staff Talks, and he admitted that action had been taken on world political and not on local strategical lines. However he modified his original statement by saying that if America did not come in at the beginning, the position would be reviewed in the course of one or two days and that he had made direct representations to America which he hoped would be replied to that day.

Set this out in telegram to Australia pointing out that southern dominions supported Australian view of immediate action and others like the British Government were prepared to wait.

Cable from Australia on War Cabinet very stout and very helpful.

Lunch with Sir Charles McCannFootnote ²⁷² who discussed possibilities of doing something worthwhile re canning of meat in Australia. Recounted what had been done in Argentine and Australia in last war in improvements in processes and made suggestion that it would be invaluable to Australia for me to go home through Argentine and make certain as to what their exact meat position was and the prospects they had of continuing their present output. His own view was that with the extraordinary demand that had been made upon them for war rations they had fairly seriously depleted their herds and thought it might be 2 or 3 years before they could build up if the drain on them did not keep going. He said that if I went it might be possible for him to go himself as representing South Australia. He did not think it would take very much more time to get home that way than the other. I promised to have another talk with him and meantime contact Lord LukeFootnote ²⁷³ […] who was Chairman of Bovril Estates. He thought that we might fly to NY and go by boat or fly to Buenos Aires and get boat across from Valparaiso by going across the Andes up to Panama and then either fly to Los Angeles and catch Pacific Clipper or by boat to NZ and Australia. He said he would work out an itinerary.

Dinner with [J.S.] DuncanFootnote ²⁷⁴ and his wife who I found to be sister of S.D. ChalmersFootnote ²⁷⁵ who had died just at the end of the last war after doing most brilliant work in mathematical optics for the Navy and Air Force.

Tuesday, 2/12/41

With press who discussed Sydney, then with Lord Hirst,Footnote ²⁷⁶ terribly crippled with rheumatoid arthritis having to be taken to the Savoy in a wheel chair. Bemoaned the fact that in this war he was unable to take the active interest he had in the last war, but his son-in-law GamageFootnote ²⁷⁷ took me to Wembley [to] the [GEC] research laboratories and showed me extraordinary work that had been done to help our men fight especially in the realm of radio, RDF and submarine detectors, searchlight and lighting effects, the manner on the blackest nights of aeroplanes throwing a light on to towns, and the extraordinary development of certain heavy alloys which are almost as heavy as gold. Showed me the principle of boring through diamonds through which the tungsten wire for the radio valves was drawn, and the various glass working that was done by means of girls who 6 or 8 months ago were just doing ordinary shop work.

Half the work was being done under microscopes, and great progress had been made in rendering innocuous the bombs before delayed discharge which were dropped by Germans. There is no question that they are a couple of years ahead of the Germans and Americans in their research work, as they tended to standardize.

Saw Cyril PageFootnote ²⁷⁸ from Grafton.

To Overseas Club cocktail party where saw Lord Simon,Footnote ²⁷⁹ Leslie Burgin, Minister of Overseas Trade,Footnote ²⁸⁰ Sir Henry Brittain,Footnote ²⁸¹ whom I promised to contact. Dr CampbellFootnote ²⁸² of NZ, […] Lord Nathan,Footnote ²⁸³ Lady Willingdon, […] and Colonel WardellFootnote ²⁸⁴ (trip to see Forestry men).

Reply from Halifax arrived setting out conversation with President and saying definitely that USA expected Britain to fight for its own possessions, the Dutch, the Kra Peninsula, whatever came or went, and asked questions re further invasion of Indo China and any attack on remaining part of Thailand. They said they were prepared to put it up straight to the Japs and if necessary to start a shooting war if their fleet came down to what could be regarded as a war area.

Discussed telegram with Bruce and rang Eden to make appointments without being able to get him.

Wednesday, 3/12/41

Rang Eden again, who said could not see me before noon. Pointed out absolutely imperative Australian Cabinet should have telegram to enable him to give me instructions before they went to bed at night, that the latest time I could possibly do any good was 2 pm, which meant 12 o'clock there, and if the telegram was not finished we were to go down and help draft it, in fact considering the importance the question was to us we must insist on seeing cable before it went. He replied could not let us determine form unless had direct orders from Prime Minister and suggested I should ring Cranborne, Dominions Secretary, and put it to him to see Churchill and make the arrangements.

Bruce and I saw Cranborne immediately and put position to him – said he would immediately see Churchill and before I got back to Australia House the message had come saying Eden would see us at 3.30pm.

Subsequently Eden said making much slower progress than anticipated and Cranborne would have it ready by about 5pm after the Dominions High Commissioners’ meeting with him. Later said they had come to conclusion that the best procedure was for me to attend the Imperial Defence Committee meeting at 5.30pm, almost impossible get it ready before then.

I went to Defence Committee meeting and pointed out that the telegram from Halifax was satisfactory. Put up general argument.

The point I made was that we should accept American assurance on the 3 main points of immediate action which she took for granted that Australia had really been asking for this all the time, and that with regard to the other matters, Indo China and Thailand, we should draw a line in our warning beyond which the Japs should not go. In Cabinet I had hard fight to get recognition of our imperative obligation to aid Dutch if they were attacked, their view being that we should dribble in behind the USA. I pointed out this was quite contrary to the Australian view, that the Dutch East Indies was regarded as practically an indissoluble piece of Australia, and quoted telegram received that day from Curtin pointing out the importance that they attached to it. Ultimately I was able to secure insertion of a couple of sentences which committed in my view everybody – USA, Britain and ourselves.

Had discussion on position in Libya which had undoubtedly gone to the pack and it became evident it would be a long stern battle, that we would have to send big reinforcements, both in equipment and men, and Churchill asked what he thought the Australians would be prepared to do in regard to the use of our men even if they were not used as a corps. I said they had never been asked for. He admitted they were entitled to the rest they had been getting, and I said that if the COS had a plan with regard to their use and any possible action they could take, I would examine it and submit it to my own Government. An arrangement is being made along these lines.

Long discussion took place re assistance to Russia, from which it became evident that the recent events in southern Russia make an attack on the Caucasus and the oil fields improbable. The opinion of the COS was that the sending of any considerable body of troops by the back door to Russia would practically overwhelm the existing transport arrangements & prevent any equipment or supplies being taken to Russia from America and Australia. Eden was going to Russia to see if he could not get some agreement with StalinFootnote ²⁸⁵ that would obviate them being done.

Churchill said that even if one division of our men went into Cyprus or Persia, that would relieve a body of troops that could go into the fighting – that was felt to be better than fighting themselves.

Saw Cranborne, who promised to let me have amended copy at earliest opportunity, which turned up at midnight. Also saw Beaverbrook for few moments and put it to him very straight that if we could not be given aeroplanes we should be given machine tools – could not have it both ways.

Thursday, 4/12/41

Prepared cable to Curtin re Defence Committee's action and attitude of War Cabinet re 5 eventualities.Footnote ²⁸⁶ Discussed position of war expenditure and accounts with Great Britain with MacGibbon who is to give me memorandum.

Lunch with Directors and staff of London Times at Printing House Square. Colonel AstorFootnote ²⁸⁷ sick, so grandson in chair. Chief of Staff, Mr. Leonard Hartley,Footnote ²⁸⁸ Campbell StuartFootnote ²⁸⁹ […] amongst guests.

Bruce and I had discussion with General Ismay and COS re Libyan position which was set out very fully. Discussed terms of use of Australians and I pointed out that I thought they should first of all have sufficient air support and secondly they should be kept together. COS to communicate with C-in-C, Middle East, get him to discuss it with Australian C-in-C and application then to come through British Prime Minister to Australian Prime Minister.

Saw Elliot, examined leg – a possible dislocation of semi lunar cartilage of left knee, gave him liniment and rubber bandage. Discussed with him machine tools, pointed out necessity of review of whole Empire position in regard to manufacture and he promised to take it up with Beaverbrook.

Friday, 5/12/41

Finalized representation cable to Curtin, gave to Bruce to think over during weekend, discussed with Stirling who did not suggest any additions. Prepared joint cable with Bruce to send to Australia re North African campaign.

Lunch with overseas diggers, […] Circulation Manager of London Times presiding. Middleton, international rugby,Footnote ²⁹⁰ Percival, originator of Percival flying machineFootnote ²⁹¹ – very cordial.

Interview with Gunther, author of Inside Europe – discussed Pacific position. He gave me some insight into Russian and Polish position and discussed possibility of going to Australia. Gave me interesting details of German losses.

Word received of Iven's landing at Greenock on Sunday.

Saturday, 6/12/41

Worked on cables from Australia and America re USA position in which they had definitely accepted idea I put forward in Defence Committee on the Wednesday re attack on Dutch East Indies as a casus belli and both Halifax & Roosevelt picked this out and fastened on to it. Went further as regards Thailand as well though Roosevelt said he would make a last appeal to the Emperor.

Discussion with Bruce, Hyland, Duncan, Duffy & Coleman re aircraft manufacture and arranged to see Beaverbrook Monday or Tuesday to get matter finalized.

To theatre with Coleman. Bruce came down at 6pm with most recent cables and discussed position until dinner, when his wife came – pleasant meal.

Sunday, 7/12/41

Rested. Bruce came 6pm. 9pm announcement on wireless that Japanese had attacked America. Listened to further accounts till 12am. Bruce to Foreign Office to get information.

Monday, 8/12/41

To War Cabinet, Prime Minister told us what had happened vis-à-vis Roosevelt. Had spoken to him on telephone. War declared by Japan, he anticipated Germany & Italy would declare war on USA within day or so. Churchill had sent Chiang Kai-shek telegram of goodwill had sent De ValeraFootnote ²⁹² a wire to meet him at Holyhead or Anglesey, to discuss Ireland coming into line with other democracies, that the Foreign Secretary had gone to Russia, Winston […] thinking of going to USA to concert war on highest plane, that the damage to American fleet at Honolulu necessitated recall of 3 battleships from Atlantic and patrol planes, that Beaverbrook would go with him to make certain we got our full share of equipment being made.

As regards Libya, felt not necessary to use Australians. BrookeFootnote ²⁹³ said there had been definite turn in last 48 hours. Described strength of American fleet, detailed position in various theatres of war.

Afternoon argued with Beaverbrook about aircraft.

Dinner with Lord RiverdaleFootnote ²⁹⁴ who has been doing wonderful work re steel and alloys during war. Detailed his conversations before war with Hitler when he had made his attempts to try and convince him that Britain would fight. Met HoldenFootnote ²⁹⁵ […] interested in shipping problem, working with Leathers. Abraham, civil head of Air Force,Footnote ²⁹⁶ […] all terribly bucked at Japan having made faux pas.

Tuesday, 9/12/41

Spoke to General Hood.Footnote ²⁹⁷ Iven fixed up at Watford hospital.

Discussed with Bruce question of procedure to see if could not build up proper liaison with general staff and Defence Committee.

Lunch [at] House of Lords with Elizabeth where Lord Chancellor [Lord Simon] showed us the great seal, and Sir H[enry] StrakoschFootnote ²⁹⁸ and Lord Tyrrell,Footnote ²⁹⁹ the latter of whom had sat by me 5 years ago at Dominions luncheon. Lady SimonFootnote ³⁰⁰ Irishwoman, got on very well with Elizabeth. Lady Caldecott,Footnote ³⁰¹ wife of Lord Chief Justice,Footnote ³⁰² who had come to speak at my luncheon speech. Pleasant party and taught me many things about House of Lords.

Tried without success to find out details of battle going on in Far East.

Wednesday 10/12/41

Learned in morning that Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk near Singapore – went to Map Room and got details – obviously due [to] lack of fighter support. Talk with Admiral Colvin & Colonel Wardell, then to War Cabinet where, after Churchill had told the general story, I raised question as to manner in which resources at disposal of democratic powers could be fully utilized. Suggested Russia should be induced to declare war on Japan to make available her submarines and Vladivostok as a place for bombing Tokyo, that Russia and ourselves should help China with aeroplanes through either Turkestan Road or Vladivostok, that Australia should be assisted to produce planes by having machine tools and equipment sent out from Britain, and promised by Sinclair and Beaverbrook this would be done, with combination of aeroplane and submarine activity to keep Japan bottled up in the China Sea and out of Indian Ocean by interposing in the American barrier. Urged them to get America into line by closest consultation between our own Naval COS and American and that we should fortify all the islands on the alternative Pacific route.

Lunch with Bank of Australasia directors, Lord MiddletonFootnote ³⁰³ in chair, and had discussion with them over question of financing farmers in Australia in dealing with food reserve stocks, secured their promise they would stand behind the individual farmers and various industries. Explained idea re food reserves as a whole.

Sent wire to Curtin setting out views.

Thursday, 11/12/41

To Map Room with Iven. Lunch with Sir Alfred Webb JohnsonFootnote ³⁰⁴ and Court of Examiners of RCS into hall which had only been damaged in rear though many specimens were spoilt. Met Charles Kellaway,Footnote ³⁰⁵ who was with me in Third General Hospital in Egypt last war, and Cuthbert Wallace.Footnote ³⁰⁶ Surgeons proud and pleased I should come. Said to Webb Johnson that did not seem to be using senior men for consulting surgeons as last time, and he said of course they were using us 25 years ago. Promised to look after Iven.

Friday, 12/12/41

Cable from Australia demanding return of SunderlandFootnote ³⁰⁷ and Middle East Squadron or in their place equivalent Catalinas and long distance bombers. Accordingly saw Sinclair, told him position, said they were practically making it impossible for me to help them by their delay in giving me access to Chiefs of Staff, that if my proposals of yesterday morning had been accepted and wired to Australia, this cable would never have come, and urged immediate decision –

(1) as to shifting of machinery to Australia from an existing aeroplane factory in Britain to enable the Beaufort bomber programme to be accelerated as quickly as possible

and

(2) to shift over at earliest moment aeroplanes from Libya to Far East and to say that the general position was being considered.

He promised to do this and was going to meeting with Beaverbrook and Brabazon that afternoon when he would put up as strongly as possible and get both to supply tools and equipment necessary from their respective Departments.

As result of talk with Bridges yesterday found had issued instructions for Sir Charles CravenFootnote ³⁰⁸ to talk with Duncan & Coleman on question of aircraft production and told Duncan exactly what the position was and asked him to fight with both hands and get decision. In meantime discussed matter with Bruce and sent joint wire urging them to use every machine and raw material in Australia to quicken up the production of bombers and saying we were moving heaven and earth to get the extra equipment to double their production.

Further discussion with Bruce on general question of supreme control of war, quite obvious that Chiefs of Staff, instead of concentrating on questions of higher strategy, were being diverted by the temporary and immediate and in many cases very small needs of this and that field of operations.

What was obvious to both of us was that there was urgent need for a co-ordinating authority on policy which was quite above the Chiefs of Staff though even much of their work could be done by their juniors to leave them freer and each would consider the best plans of securing this and discuss it with the object of inspiring our own Government to send a telegram putting a constructive means of dealing with the whole position before them.

I pointed out the Empire was in rather a weak position to suggest a Supreme War Council for the whole of the combining forces when we had not been able to secure a Supreme War Council for the Empire. Instance the absolute block (since Wednesday when my 7 suggestions had been put up to War Cabinet and were now being considered by the Chiefs of Staff) on all access to them. It was a good point in my fight for proper system of representation.

Lunch with Lady Colefax,Footnote ³⁰⁹ Sinclair, Sir Phillip Chetwood,Footnote ³¹⁰ Vincent Massey.Footnote ³¹¹

Saturday, 13/12/41

Sent two cables to Australia setting out views on general position of co-ordination amongst Allies, leadership and strategic position.Footnote ³¹²

Discussed aircraft position with people in Australia House who saw Sir Charles Craven of the Aircraft Ministry and made substantial progress. Spoke to Sir Archibald Sinclair re wire for Australia which later received about 11pm and threw out.

Monday, 15/12/41

Cable from Curtin re continuation of stay in London, also cable he sent to Churchill defining my position which practically gave me a free hand to do anything or see anything that I wished.

Saw Sir Archibald Sinclair with Bruce, induced him get ready a much more definite and effective telegram, amongst which was statement that had actually started aeroplanes to reinforce Far East.

Prepared story for War Cabinet, went to War Cabinet 5pm and found that Chiang Kai-shek had wired Washington and Britain asking for some representation at joint Allied conferences of strategy with resultant reply that they intended to have one in Washington, in Britain, in Singapore and in Chungking, to which 5 nations – Russia, Britain, America and China and Holland – would be represented.

Churchill already gone to America, expected Friday NY. I put up story that British Empire should take initiative and leadership in whole of war strategy should make up their own minds first and try and push their point of view over with the others, and I based my arguments on the grounds that the British Empire was a world-wide organization as compared with the localized national organization of China and Russia, which were both all in one piece, and the USA, which was practically all together. We had an interest that nobody else had in all the varying theatres of war and we were responsible for more people's victory, comfort and health than everybody else. We had more to defend.

Bevin raised point after I had finished as to whether there could not be something done to secure better Imperial action, as did also Amery and Alexander. Amery and Bevin very keen on the 300 million of India being used to produce munitions at top speed. Argued as well for China to be backed and for her to keep the offensive. Argued for plenty of reinforcements into Malaya, pointed out what a terrible mess we would be in if we lost it. Got definite undertaking from Sinclair that the reinforcements would be sent out as hard as they could get them.

Greenwood told me that he would have a talk with Lord Woolton and Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer tomorrow. He hoped to finalize all arrangements re payment for food reserves and it was quite obvious that the position in Australia and New Zealand, because of the entry of Japan into the war, was going to be very difficult and they felt they should do everything they possibly could to get the stores in position. He felt sure he would be able to report something worthwhile to me by Wednesday.

Got Air matter fixed and got half-way towards Empire consultation. Re Curtin's wire, notice what he does is to establish my position without really doing anything for Bruce.

Tuesday, 16/12/41

With Bruce discussed terms of cable to go to Australia re aircraft production and War Cabinet, which sent.

Saw […] mother of Senator MacDonald, who gave me ring to take back which was made 85 years ago out of Australian gold. Gave it to Bill Low to put in safe till ready to go, also £2 in envelope for present for grandchildren – promised to see the old man if at all possible.

Long discussion with Admiral Colvin and Colonel Wardell on strategic position in Far East, all agreed must get planes out there or absolutely done. In contact with Dominions Office and Sinclair and finally best could do was anaemic telegram only saying half what we desired, in fact such a mess that we left the aircraft part out to send a stiffer telegram as soon as [we] get some information.

Discussed aircraft construction position with Mills,Footnote ³¹³ Machine Tool Controller, who in private life runs a big steel business and is one of Directors of Electricity Manufacturing Company of Australia. Told him story, found that Beaverbrook had really done substantial amount towards getting these from America before Jap war broke out but the real hold-up was in the Aircraft Production Ministry where 2 days ago he had sent a letter refusing to let the plant go for the extended programme.

At last Mills promised to see Sir Charles Craven straight away, put position as I had seen it to him, try and force his hand to give us the tools that we needed at once, and get in touch with Clapp in America to see exactly what had gone forward and see if they could not supply the rest from England.

Saw SowerbyFootnote ³¹⁴ of Petroleum Committee with Bruce – had about a thousand reasons why Australia had been let down with the petrol imports during the last 6 months of this year, none of them convincing, and the figures simply made one weep as our stocks had gone down from 322,000 tons to 140,000 tons while we were rationed. He said it was no good now that the Japs had come into the picture crying over spilt milk, but what were they prepared to do in the next month, which seemed to me the only chance we would have of getting petrol into Australia. He said that the Petroleum Committee, had at least wakened up, realized they had given us a bad deal, they had been able to get some tankers from Abadan as well as from the Dutch East Indies and said we had better see Faulkner,Footnote ³¹⁵ secretary of the whole show, to make sure the few days of grace left to us were properly used. He had a wild story about putting more petrol storage with concrete instead of steel and using the concrete ones to put the black oil in and the steel ones that now have the black oil, to carry the petrol. I asked him to get us the plans of these and send them to Australia from America. I pointed out we were more concerned in getting the storage we already had in existence full. He said one of the reasons the Americans had given was that the amount we asked for was so small and would only keep us going for 2 or 3 months. I said surely we were entitled to live that long even if [we] were condemned to destruction.

Bruce is arranging for us to see Faulkner at once.

Then to News Chronicle lunch with Sir Keith Murdoch, Sir Walter Layton of Economist in chair.Footnote ³¹⁶ Lord Woolton confirmed what Greenwood told me, that they had practically agreed to go on with the canning programme for Australia, as one of the least things they could do to compensate us for the difficult position we were in and the extraordinary exertions we had made for the Empire. He was seeing the Chancellor of the Exchequer today and hoped to have the whole thing cleared up this week. I told him that a statement this week was worth 10 times the same statement next week in settling the Australian public mind, which felt that it had been badly sold down the river in every direction.

Dr GallupFootnote ³¹⁷ spoke from America on broadcasting set, proposing Murdoch's health, and Murdoch spoke over a network which embraced England, America and Australia, very good speech. Had dinner with him, discussed his own movements as to where he could be of most use. I said he would do 20 times as much good at home than here, they needed some stabilizing influence who had some knowledge of the British and international position amongst the newspapers of Australia, it was no good just losing their block – what was necessary was some action that would force the pace of Britain's assistance to be accelerated. I thought strong newspaper pressure from the other end might help as much as anything.

Received news had been elected Honorary Fellow Royal College of Surgeons, much to surprise and gratification.

Wednesday, 17/12/41

Letter received from Mills, had it examined by Duncan, Hyland and Coleman. Coleman spoke to Clapp on telephone in NY and sent cable to Australia asking for the whole story so that there could be no more argument regarding it.

Lunch with Lord Camrose of Daily Telegraph Footnote ³¹⁸ – present Lord Greenwood, Lord McGowan,Footnote ³¹⁹ the Editor,Footnote ³²⁰ Sir Andrew Duncan, Lord Kindersley – interesting discussion re handling of money during war, in which Kindersley pointed out that the effect of the present treasury method was that 20% of the war savings funds was paid in by the taxpayer owing to the way in which the employer increased the wages, and that 100% would have to be paid out by the Government after the war, which did not seem a very good way of doing the job.

Thursday, 18/12/41

Wrote AttleeFootnote ³²¹ asking for discussion re reinforcements for Australia, and finally agreed I should see Chiefs of Staff that were available in London with Attlee at 5.45pm. I asked that they should give us a general appreciation of whole position; said they were not ready for this, preparing it for tomorrow night when they would deal with matter as a whole. Meantime they told story of what reinforcements they are getting ready to send, that the Revenge and the Royal Sovereign were already in the Indian Ocean, the Ramillies at the Cape, the Resolution on the way, and the Indomitable aircraft carrier was at Durban ready to go with them. By March they expected to have 5 additional battleships in the Indian Ocean, and 4 aircraft carriers.

2 functions – covering communications and proceed assistance of Australia if there was any trouble in Pacific & Indian Oceans. They may have to take these battleships out of the Mediterranean if the others are not finished.

Said there were 39 American submarines in Philippines and 15 Dutch, all operating, good co-ordination with Dutch, not so good with American, though the American depot ships and crews were proceeding to use Darwin as a base.

Army position not very good – 4 Jap divisions and 150 tanks in position in Northern Malaya, and with forces available on land or ships they could bring it up to 10 divisions. To meet this they [the British Army] were bringing one brigade already on the way from India and the second was being got ready. Both would be there inside 2 weeks. Strengthening anti-aircraft guns, being diverted from Middle East, 130 light A/A, 48 heavy, and 96 anti-tank guns. Full load of ammunition on its way and 50 light tanks being brought from Middle East earliest possible moment and whatever was in India was being sent over straight away.

Air – 12 M[anchester] V[icker]sFootnote ³²² in Middle East already gone and they thought 6 were already there. Able to get them down by flying over Sumatra. 52 Hudsons from UK already started and 8 Catalinas, 4 from England and 4 from America already on their way. 4 fighter squadrons on high seas, diverted from their other destinations to get there – one had everything ready to hop straight off inside 2 days after they landed. Preparing 6 Blenheim Squadrons and 2 B[omber] Squadrons re-arming with Wellingtons.Footnote ³²³ They had ground equipment. If they were really pushed they could fix them up at Sumatra.

On the American boat there are 54 fighters, 38 bombers and 2,000 American personnel. Practically the whole Australian order are going to arrive in their proper time from America.

Reinforcements – 51 going forward to replace what was damaged and 10 new squadrons actually in sight and 4 on the move. Immediately serviceable 63 F[ighters], 50 B[ombers], 33 T[orpedo] B[ombers], and 16 G[eneral] R[econnaissance].

They reckon Japs have 250 to 300 planes, of which 60% are fighters. Chinese have come forward very handsomely, have offered to put in 3 armies behind Japs where they are attacking Kowloon and swing a substantial force into Burma.

Had discussion on general policy, but that is to be handled in full detail tomorrow night.

Friday, 19/12/41

Long talk with Geoffrey LloydFootnote ³²⁴ and Sir [A.E.] Faulkner, head of Oil Petroleum department, on question of petroleum supplies. They showed us exactly the position on a very ingenious system of charts and said they would give me the story of the position in Australia up to the end of December at the earliest possible moment. The charts with regard to South Africa and India bore out the justice of our contention with regard to the treatment of Australia.

Showed us as well the disposition of the tankers in the whole world and told us some of the reasons why there were hold-ups in convoys, and so on.

Meeting of Defence Committee in War Room which lasted until 12.30am. Argued whole case for extra reinforcements. Documents produced which were to go to America as considered views of War Cabinet for Churchill's information and discussion with President. This was amended in certain ways and a summary of it and my comments are contained in cables on file.

There was a great tendency to emphasize the importance of the Libyan campaign to the detriment of reinforcements to Far East. Had very spirited encounter with everybody in this matter, especially the Air people, in securing an extra bomber squadron to leave the next day for Middle East as well as that actually on the way. Assured me that the Hudsons were ready to start and that the American convoy should go into Singapore or Sourabaya rather than to the Philippines.

Saturday, 20/12/41

Wires from Duff Cooper and Curtin setting out inadequacy of position and what they regarded as the minimum.

Sent long summary to Curtin of general position.Footnote ³²⁵

Sunday, 21/12/41

Got broadcast speech ready for recording on Monday to Australia. Went with Bull Tart to Halliday Sutherland's, who gave me his type script to read. Found several places where I was put hopelessly in the cart, and altered 2 pages.

Monday, 22/12/41

Recorded for BBC. Argued with […] the tailor, who decided to alter the coat.

In afternoon discussed manufacture of aircraft with Duncan, got facts ready.

War Cabinet, at which tried to raise question of reinforcements to Singapore. Received promise from Attlee that a Defence Committee meeting would be held on the Tuesday.

Tuesday, 23/12/41

Ismay confirmed above, but next day found that wires had gone forward which could not get possession of, setting out whole position to Australia. Finally when got the wire, it was the wrong one and quotation to Curtin was a wrong number.

To Belfast via Stranraer, got seasick on crossing.

Wednesday, 24/12/41

Iven missed train. Arrived Belfast, MR following with taxi and luggage. Mrs CraigFootnote ³²⁶ surprised to see us and not quite clear who we were. Colonel GordonFootnote ³²⁷ saw us and arranged police car through Government. Drove around Belfast. […] Relations started to pour in at Craig's.

Thursday, 25/12/41

Xmas morning in bed, carved turkey in great style at dinner. Went to top of Cave Hill and saw scenery round about.

Friday, 26/12/41

Long drive, interesting talk with Dean of Cathedral at Londonderry,Footnote ³²⁸ saw ancient wall with records of siege, pleasant morning tea at local inn, then to Portrush where had lunch with […] officers of Middlesex Regiment. [All] very sick about Hong Kong, [and] said division at Kowloon would have saved the whole position.

To Giant's Causeway, very cold, pleasant walk, then through Coast Road to Larne, beautiful view Scotland and Donegal on way.

To theatre, ‘When Knights were Bold’. Bad news from Australia and London.

Saturday, 27/12/41

Morning went straight to Stormont Castle, saw Kelly, Andrews, Prime Minister,Footnote ³²⁹ Colonel Gordon, spoke to Bill Low and arranged flight back to London next day by Air Force plane.

To Delamont where stayed with Colonel and Mrs [Dorothea] Gordon, to whom gave one of snaps of station. Saw Captain Eyre's flag and promised to take it home. Interesting talk on Irish situation. Colonel Gordon's knowledge up to date re Australian events.

Sunday, 28/12/41

Drove 30 miles to Belfast; accompanied by retinue of Craig relatives to Sydenham airport, flew to Speke over Isle of Man and thence to London over beautiful countryside scarcely damaged at all. Snow on hills, very cold in plane, met at Hendon by Bill Low.

Bruce came at 6.30pm, very worried, showed me cables.

Monday, 29/12/41

Cabinet deferred, finally meeting arranged between Attlee, Cranborne, Bruce and self, at which whole position discussed and definite start made towards satisfactory arrangements for securing essential knowledge at the time we require it to be of any use. Attlee agreed (1) to make all Foreign Office cables available, (2) to let us in on Defence Committee's deliberations quite early (3) the question of rooms in Cabinet Offices, (4) immediate air reinforcements to Far East.

Saw telegram re President Roosevelt's suggestion about control of Pacific and then saw Sir Wilfred FreemanFootnote ³³⁰ who on a blackboard showed us how the aircraft, bombers and fighters, were going out.

Tuesday, 30/12/41

Saw Moore Brabazon, Minister for Aircraft Production, re sending out of machinery and machine tools for Australian aircraft manufacture. Just missed Bruce at lift, but discussed with him and Sir Charles Craven the general picture, Coleman with me.

Saw Lord Cranborne and had about an hour's talk re general position of Australian and British consultation and put story up from point of view of its value to Britain as well as Australia, paramount necessity to be fixed before Allied negotiation were opened up to settle position.

Prepared cable for Curtin on question of Empire consultation.Footnote ³³¹

Wednesday, 31/12/41

Brought together various heads of services to form Chiefs of Staff organization with Coleman as secretary. Discussed Curtin's wire with them.

To discussion with Colvin and COS and then to Defence Committee meeting where put story up re use of concentration of British and American naval forces to defeat Japs. Promised to send wire to Churchill. Story of reinforcements to Malaya most encouraging yet, to get final figures in morning. Arranged to have talk with Bridges re details of British-Australian consultation, who took me to new rooms, very comfortable – room for self, for secretary and one other.

Enjoyable New Year's Eve dinner with Duncan and Mrs, Miss Ross, Major Coleman and Iven, at Dorchester.

Thursday, 1/1/42

Cable prepared for Australia setting out method of representation, machinery of operating it in Britain, and my own personal recommendation. War Cabinet, at which Anthony Eden discussed his trip to Russia, said they usually started their banquet at 10pm and finished at 5am and nobody got up after that until midday. He seemed to think that they had only 25 dead there, no more prisoners. Said Russia not yet ready to fight Japan, might be by spring.

Hour's talk with Ismay and Bridges re method of operating some definite system of liaison, said that it depended entirely on the personnel who, if they were acceptable, could get an immense amount of information and could influence the form of cables and the actual direction of policy. Key men were 4 or 5 down on list, everybody above that had it served up on a plate.

Saw Cranborne about joint declaration re objects of the fight.

Friday, 2/1/42

Finalized remaining cables. Discussion with Cranborne in Foreign Office re position in Portuguese Timor when set out Australian viewpoint re their relinquishing the control of the island through their Australian and Dutch Forces. My view was that we could not leave unconditionally. It was finally agreed that Bruce should send cable to Australia roughly setting out position asking for their instructions. Cranborne said Campbell coming over from Portugal and would be able to talk to us Sunday or Monday.

Monday, 5/1/42

To Dominions Office, where met Sir Ronald Campbell, Foreign Office men, Cranborne and Bruce at 11 o'clock and had 2 hours argument on Portuguese position. Campbell most interesting on character of Salazar whose history he told. Born a peasant, studied hard, became professor of university, definite ideas of lifting the people of his country and his country as far as possible back to its pristine grandeur, had become Dictator with the aid of the Nationalists who were Nazi in their outlook and sympathies. He still retained his peasant's suspicious mind, but still was very straight and honest to a fault, subject to periodical fits of passion in which he would do things that he could not subsequently undo. In this matter he felt that he had been let down by the British and Dutch in not helping him more to maintain his neutrality. He himself was inclined to despair of ever being able to get out of the coil in which Portugal found itself in the European maelstrom, and was inclined to throw in his hand. Felt that the democratic tide, especially now that America had come into the war in the post-war settlement, would be so high as to sweep him out of office. Had no sympathy much with the Germans, but his main support came from the people with German sympathies, whereas the actual populace of Portugal [was] at least 80% pro-British in their sympathies and had a veneration for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance which had now been going some 270 years. They regarded this as the real security behind which they held their decisions and the only anchor they could ever look to restore the ancient glories of Portugal.

At the present time he felt that neutrality was the only path he could tread; that neutrality was a benevolent neutrality, as he used the Azores to refuel our ships as well as to handle the flying clippers, and they were supplying substantial amounts of wolfram which was indispensable to our munitions making.

The Germans every now and again sank a ship with a submarine just to make him keep in mind that he was in danger. His feeling now was that if the Australians and Dutch did not go out of Timor when his own troops arrived there, he would have lost any claim to being neutral, that Germany would attack him, his people would make him maintain the alliance, and he himself under those circumstances might throw it in and it was hard to see what would come out of the chaos.

After a long discussion Bruce and I agreed that the best course to pursue if we could get our Governments to accept it, was that we should allow him to make a public statement that our troops would be withdrawn as soon as his 800 men arrived there which would take about 3 or 4 weeks. During that period we should have an understanding that staff talks would progress so far as to enable us to immediately reinforce Timor should there be the slightest suggestion of a Jap attack, and possibly during these talks, without the matter coming to Salazar at all, they might agree to regard the threat of an attack as sufficient reason for us to put our men in. This would enable him to save his face and thus to save our position.

After lunch had ¾ hour's talk with Attlee over question of representation in Great Britain. Explained position to him, he cross-questioned me closely about its implications, and then put up the position vis-à-vis Bruce being the envoy. Attlee very impressed by the story but felt it was so good that the other Dominions would want to come in on it and that we would have to really have an Empire arrangement. I said we were quite prepared for that, and in fact our proposals made a place for the other Dominions to come in, and he said that he felt our proposal was so far-reaching that it would have to be considered at length by the British Cabinet and possibly submitted to the other Dominions as well before finally accepted. He thought I should prepare a written statement that he would be able to submit to his colleagues. On position of Bruce he did not express an opinion one way or the other, admitted his great qualities; when I raised the question of his not being an elected member of any Parliament, admitted that that undoubtedly would raise very substantial difficulties. Anyhow he was pleased that I had discussed the matter with him and as soon as I left rang to see if I would have dinner with him.

Apropos of this, at conclusion of War Cabinet, had talk with Lord Leathers, to whom I told whole story. Leathers, who is a very practical-minded man with a brain like a rapier, at once said he thought the scheme was excellent, that I had pretty well made it copper-bottomed, but he was afraid that no-one else except myself could really successfully launch it. I told him the story about Bruce before we discussed this aspect, and his view was that I had acquired such a reputation for being a tiger to fight that there was no question that I could get away with almost anything I put so long as I maintained that attitude, and I had the additional qualification of being new to Britain, they had not got used to me or led me up too many garden paths, and especially I was a representative of the Parliament and the people of Australia and regarded as distinctively such; that Bruce, for whom he had a great admiration, had been many years in Britain, and they had become more or less used to him – in his position of High Commissioner he had frequently to give way, that he had not been able to speak up to the British Government as a Minister of another Dominion could and did, and he doubted whether he had the last ounce of fighting quality that they all realized was in me. He said he had often seen good propositions founder because they were not followed up by their founder.

At any rate he begged me not to commit myself too deeply so that I could not carry on in London. I told him my position in Australia, how much I would like to get to Singapore, but he kept on coming back to the point that I had a great job of work to do in London which would outweigh anything I could do in the outposts.

He agreed with me re necessity of balanced view of Empire needs and strategy and potential, that there should be an Empire arrangement at earliest possible date, and he thought after I put proposition up that events might follow so quickly that it might be necessary for me to be here to direct the storm.

He promised that refrigerated boats would be on hand and said I was a silly ass to be waiting on Sir Cyril Hurcomb – that I should come along and see him.

5pm, War Cabinet, at which most interesting discussion re alleviation of blockade for Greece, where over 2,000 people are dying of starvation every day. Eden and Amery put up case very strongly but practically everybody else said that if relief were granted in this instance Germany would treat all the occupied countries much more harshly, feeling that would force Britain and America to feed them, which would destroy the blockade. Ultimately Eden and Dalton told to get together.

Interesting discussion on provision of aircraft carriers. Stout fight ensued between Alexander as First Lord of Admiralty, who desired refrigerated ships which were fastest, and Leathers, who desired maintain beef ration in Britain from the southern Dominions without which Churchill said no British soldier could really fight – that was left in abeyance and sent back to Defence Committee to report on every aspect both food and possibility of increasing striking capacity of our fleet.

Interesting picture given of position in Far East, where undoubtedly our people are holding up to the present. Feeling very badly the lack of air support but by today our two fresh brigades of infantry have got right into Singapore. By next Saturday the fighters will be there too. I feel now we will be able to hang out long enough to get our reinforcements and hold Singapore.

Had stiff wire from Curtin to Churchill re position of fleet in Pacific and Indian Oceans and question of a command sent from Casey and a very stark reply from Churchill.

Tuesday, 6/1/42

Visited Elizabeth at Watford, in comfortable quarters but with bad cold. Returned to London, discussed political repercussions of acceptance or non-acceptance of our plan with Bruce. He was opposed to inclusion of any of the machinery of the scheme in the speech until had some reply from Australia as he thought would be embarrassed by press inquiries which we could not answer in full. Finally decided to send wire to Curtin setting out why I thought a statement absolutely necessary and gave it to Duffy but asked him to hold until morning and let Bruce see.

Wednesday, 7/1/42

Made speech to Second Wednesday Club, very good reception, representatives of all ABC Powers present, Sir Ronald CharlesFootnote ³³² in chair. The Times gave good report and wrote leading article backing up my view.

Discussion with Woolton and Greenwood re meat and butter contracts. In the end they agreed to take equivalent of 281,000 tons of meat, of which the equivalent of 171,000 tons would be canned and 110,000 would be frozen. Prices were fixed on very satisfactory basis.

Had argument about butter because, though the meat purchase was outright the butter was to be under the White Paper agreement, and despite this, under which Australian Government took half liability, the British Government was fixing a target. Fought hard against double penalty, would be satisfied to accept Australian Government responsibility for there was no limitation on production. Pointed out that arguments used by Food Ministry were completely fallacious, no chance of anything being done at this stage stimulating production as the cows were all in milk – it would take 3 or 4 years to build up herds to any great extent.

Sent wire to Australia to get Plunkett'sFootnote ³³³ and Sheehy'sFootnote ³³⁴ estimate as to amount of butter from all sources, all kinds, Australia is prepared export to all places.

Webb Johnson telephoned, inviting Iven to investiture, so contacted his Colonel at Watford, who arranged to let Iven off.

Thursday, 8/1/42

Iven and Elizabeth came up, honorary FRCS invested by Sir Alfred Webb Johnson, President. Present also were representatives of all English-speaking countries in the medical profession. Speeches. Iven present at ‘rag and famish’ lunch and met every one of Court of Examiners for his Fellowship. Very nice spirit.

Wire from Curtin negating Bruce as special representative. Sent reply asking for his reactions to my detailed plans.

To Morning Star, with EP and MR – pleasant dinner and dance. Efforts by whole company to cheer. Bruce very down-hearted.

Friday, 9/1/42

11am, long talk with Ince, Departmental head of Department of Labour and Industry,Footnote ³³⁵ Bruce and Bill Low, on whole labor position and method of handling women as well as men in army in Britain. Got dossier. Ince very cordial, suggested failure of National Insurance in Australia was due to fact we had not tackled employment side first. He agreed with me we had tried to get away with too much. I had always thought if we just took the medical treatment side we could have done it, but he thought unemployment would have a bigger trade union attraction.

Talk with our own COS on military situation, Wardell being specially informative.

Talk with Colonel Llewellin re ammunition and guns for Air Force, pushed back to Defence Committee, so wrote Attlee asking him to fix it up.

Pleasant lunch, despite my pessimism, with […] EP and MR.

Back to Cabinet Room where discussed whole future with Bruce, who set out his own views at length and clarified his mind, my own being quite clear already.

1¼ hours talk with Leathers re shipping. He looked forward to not more than a 15% cut in refrigerated space this year and possibly a 30% cut off the present basis next year.

Dinner with Attlee at Oxford & Cambridge Club, argument re form of Empire consultation. He is satisfied with the lower plane arrangement but thought possibly there would have to be an Empire Defence Committee rather than an interference with the British Defence Committee.

Saturday, 10/1/42

Lunch with Lord InverforthFootnote ³³⁶ who dealt very fully with acquisition of Australian wool. He showed me telegrams and letters which indicated that if we had pressed for 14d sterling for wool at the beginning of the war while the actual transactions were going on, we might have obtained it. He had been in control of the Supply Department in the previous war and was satisfied that if we did not get an increase the cost of production would rise to such a degree that the 10¾d sterling that had been obtained would be insufficient for the pastoralists to carry on, and he urged that it was not yet too late to press heavily for this.

He had had very substantial support from Macgregor, the wool buyer in Australia, but said he could not get any backing from Bruce or Sanderson,Footnote ³³⁷ and especially at the time when pressure could have done good. He was very disturbed over the possible sales to America at a lower price than she could buy in auction sales and also by the fact that she had not been fed at anything like the rate that she could have absorbed early.

He was disturbed also at the prospect now of America acquiring the wool at very low terms in great quantity especially as she was also acquiring practically the whole of the South American clip. He feared that unless she paid the market world price for what she bought from Australia and the British Empire, she might be tempted to sell out in a panic at calamitously low prices when war over.

I told him that I feared the acquisition by America or even by Anglo-American control was a most dangerous thing – I had had a long talk already with Murphy in Australia, with Yeo,Footnote ³³⁸ the Executive of the Central Wool Committee, and with L.R. Macgregor, the Australian Trade Commissioner in NY, on this point – that remembering the experience after the last war and the absolute slump in prices and values that took place before the creation of BAWRA, I was satisfied that if the clip was not in British Empire hands and even then if there were not some very definite Australian control, the whole might be flung upon the market and the price destroyed for years.

He said even if the war stopped inside a year he thought there would be the normal clip of 3,500,000 bales to dispose of, plus at least 3 to 4 million bales of surplus, making 7 million bales in all, and that if the war prolonged and the shorter use was made of wool than we had been accustomed to, the reserves might be very much greater than this.

I agreed that his figures were if anything on the low side and felt sure we would all be sold down the river if we did not have control. I told him I would get the latest figures from America as to what they had actually purchased, what they were using, what they were doing insofar as the price they were paying was concerned, and what grip we were really keeping on the position, and would see him inside a fortnight.

His feeling was that Shackleton,Footnote ³³⁹ who was quite a good manufacturer but had no knowledge of the world marketing and distribution of wool, who was now in control of the British Wool Control Board was quite unfitted for this job, that it was necessary somebody who knew the thing from A to Z should be in charge of it, that Sir Arthur GoldfinchFootnote ³⁴⁰ was past it, he himself, though 76, was prepared to come in and give a hand, but we must have some actual individual who had been closely associated with marketing & production.

He was disturbed, though he had always had a great admiration for Bruce, that he had not backed him in this fight but he felt that even though things did look black for the Empire at the present time, there was no reason why Australia should not be getting a pound's value for every pound's worth of stuff it sold because after all it was the sales to other countries that would make the money available, not sales to Britain.

He also raised question of unified control of cables and wireless. He pointed out that as things were drifting, America was practically getting control of the whole systems of Oceanic communication, that the last concession that had been given by Australia to America gave them a leg in, that the Australian Government had a very big stake in the Cable & Wireless Company, that it was a most profitable well-run show and ought to be given complete control of the whole wireless organization inside the Empire to present a common front to America and other nations which were taking the same steps with regard to our own position. I told him of the difficulties we had had between AWA and our own Post Office ever since 1922, when the most unfortunate agreement had been made by HughesFootnote ³⁴¹ re wireless which had tied our hands ever since, that Bruce and I thought we had this matter straightened out in 1928 whereby the Post Office took over the communications and AWA remained a manufacturing company, to which we were prepared to give substantial Government preferences and in which we were quite prepared to maintain an interest.

This fight between FiskFootnote ³⁴² and Brown,Footnote ³⁴³ which had not even yet been settled, had more or less hamstrung us in our efforts to secure improvement of communications to other countries or unified control. I would try and [find] out how far we had got, but did not see what I could do before I went back to Australia to straighten out the tangle. I felt, however, that both in regard to wireless and air travel, we were steadily selling the pass for the Empire simply by reason of the absence of vision and a comprehensive grasp of the whole position.

NZ had sold us down the drain when it gave the landing facilities to Pan American Airways without securing similar concessions for British Airways in Honolulu and we had been forced recently to make our connections with them to get any fresh mail services established. War conditions were now placing more powers in the hands of the Pan American Airways because they alone had long-range flying boats which it was contemplated to put on the new service across the Atlantic through Africa and the Indian Ocean to Australia, but if Cable & Wireless would help us from this end to fight both battles we might still be able to keep the Empire end up, and I felt sure that if we did, the future of the Empire would be safe. If we did not, then the world leadership would pass to America, with all the difficulties and hesitations that were inherent in leadership from Washington.

Received wire from Australia asking for Coleman to be sent back as early as possible because of Australia's complications, and received also detailed story of machine tool position from Australia.

Sunday, 11/1/42

Wired to Curtin saying had taken up whole position of guns and ammunition with Attlee, was pushing as far in every direction as possible, and immediately getting in touch with the people insofar as machine tools and aircraft manufacturing concerned, to get immediate results.

Discussed Coleman's position with himself. He is very distressed at being asked to go home before we had got our scheme established, but I pointed out that the experience would be of great value in Australia in getting the opposite numbers established there, and determined to send a cable to Australia, setting out the difficulties that would arise both in Australia and here if he went immediately, but at any rate he was not likely to be able to get a means of conveyance for a month. I was pushing on with my own organization, subject to their objection, and that he ought to be allowed to run it to the last minute that he was available here.

[…] with Iven and Elizabeth, met number of men actively associated with British war effort though on active service with British Army. General feeling was that there was urgent need for much more co-ordination of all wartime services whether they were directly fighting services or associated with wartime conditions such as food control. I was surprised to find that there was general condemnation of the Government for not having had their forces in Singapore, that the outside appreciation of its value was greater than that in the actual Government itself, and that they were watching with a great deal of interest everything I was doing and wished me luck.

[Met someone who …] had been to Norway in charge of a Commando after the actual evacuation from Norway, said they had not seen an English aircraft in the sky all the while they were fighting there, that the British stupidly had allowed the Germans to get possession of all the Southern Norway aerodromes and had given practically no support. He had been there with Major Kermit Roosevelt,Footnote ³⁴⁴ whom he described as a born leader of men with very great capacity. They had had a bad time by reason of the fact that in the mid summer when they were there the daylight extended practically the whole 24 hours and all that time they were exposed to bombing. They had not merely no aircraft protection but had no news and were ignorant of the fall of France and of the change of Government in Great Britain and were very lucky to escape with their lives.

Monday, 12/1/42

Prepared speech on general proposal for broadcasting and recorded it to go to Australia. Discussed speech with Duncan, TrittonFootnote ³⁴⁵ and Bruce. Bruce thought it could do no harm and might do good, the others thought it would do good. My own view was that it was the only way to bring about finality with regard to the question of proper representation here.

Received cable from Curtin enclosing Winston's telegram setting out the view with regard to representation with appropriate joint body in Washington, on which Australia, NZ and Holland would have representation as well as Britain and America, or an arrangement whereby the Empire spoke through British representatives with its headquarters in London and giving the order conjointly with the President. Winston put in 3 pages of argument for this method as against 3 lines of statement about the American method.

It looked to me that if this were properly launched on the world it would overlay my statement and would prevent it being discussed on its merits and we would finish up with having decent representation neither in London nor in Washington. At any rate determined to make my statement tomorrow and be done with it.

Cable from Australia setting out attitude towards proposed American alternative flying route to Australia. Had long consultation with Captain Balfour, Under Secretary for Air, Sir Phillip Street,Footnote ³⁴⁶ his Chief of Staff, Bruce, and self, as to what attitude we should take towards it, and drafted cable in which we took view that if the line were regarded as supplementary and did not interfere with the existing route from Britain to Rangoon, we would welcome it.

To War Cabinet where had long argument about reinforcements to Malaya and it looks as if they will get there in time. The Russian position is steadily improving. Long argument about Greece, starving people there, and about foreign policy vis-à-vis the Jugoslavs and the Free French.

Do not see myself how can possibly stay if they do not accept my recommendations.

Tuesday, 13/1/42

Broadcast speech, 9.30am to Australia, on Empire consultation.

To Cabinet Offices where first of all discussed proposition with BoneFootnote ³⁴⁷ of Manchester Guardian, Watson, Editor Daily Telegraph, with Australian pressman.

To lunch at Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, where spoke on Australia's political problems and external relations. Campbell Stuart in chair […] found house had been residence of Chatham, Derby and Gladstone, 3 Prime Ministers of Great Britain. Audience listened attentively and asked questions.

Had half hour's interview with Barrington Ward,Footnote ³⁴⁸ Editor Times, [who] seized points of view very quickly and was much interested. Talk with Christiansen,Footnote ³⁴⁹ Editor Daily Express, keen as mustard, with Mellor,Footnote ³⁵⁰ [former] Editor Daily Herald, and with Prew,Footnote ³⁵¹ Editor Daily Mail. Every one of them seemed intrigued with story, and I think we will get a fairly decent press on it tomorrow.

Interview with Wilfred Freeman on reinforcements going forward to Malaya. He showed me his story on blackboard. If we can hang out for another 6 weeks it looks as if we will be able to deal with the situation there. The Japs are steadily coming down the Malaya Peninsula – have got Port Swettenham, but we may possibly hold Malacca.

Long talk with Bruce on question of how to prevent leakage of information.

Pleasant dinner with Mr & Mrs Duncan, at Arlington House flat. Snowing in London today.

Ince, permanent head of Department of Labour & Industry and Bill Low called to see me and for couple of hours discussed question of supply and labor. Ince said supply position completely un-coordinated in Britain, Defence Committee (Supply) did not operate, there was no provision on it for Bevin, who was chairman of the Production Executive, that there was continual clash between Beaverbrook and Bevin as Beaverbrook wished to stunt in his production rather than go in for steady methods, threw out of his office anyone who mentioned the word ‘co-operation’, and having Winston's ear was frequently able to block any other projects getting priority over his own. He instanced one case in which Beaverbrook had complained most bitterly of being unable to carry out filling factory operations because there were no women available, needed 700, and the labor people got busy and got 700 from all sorts of work they were doing about 3 or 4 months ago and 500 of them were still unemployed and waiting to go into the job.

He thought it imperative I should talk with Bevin on whole question and felt sure my ideas of bringing Dominion representation on to the Supply Committee [was] absolutely essential to British production as well as to Empire supply and allied co-operation. He felt satisfied that the whole Defence Committee (Supply) should be revised and that it should be placed under some Minister other than the Prime Minister as chairman who would have executive authority and power of final decision because it is quite obvious that the Prime Minister was too overworked to be able to give proper attention to this important aspect of the business.

Wednesday, 14/1/42

Woke to mantle of snow over London. Went for walk and snowballed. Earle's anniversary.

All the English papers had full statement of my broadcast and most of them had leading articles approving of it.

Saw Sir Alexander Roger,Footnote ³⁵² head of the Supply Delegation sent to the Pacific & Indian area, who told me he had been unable to even see the Minister since he came back despite the fact that he had taken 20 of the leading industrialists out with him, presented a comprehensive report, and had really given up the control of his own businesses which employed something like 3 or 400,000 men for 8 or 9 months, and that when he had spoken to Cranborne he asked him if he had ever read the report and he said no. Gave me a copy and we arranged to have a talk. He says it is almost impossible to get any co-ordination here or any realization of what can be done.

Lunch with Lord ElibankFootnote ³⁵³ who had Lord Reay,Footnote ³⁵⁴ head of the Mackay clan, and the Norwegian MinisterFootnote ³⁵⁵ and his wife there, […] Norwegian Minister very keen on Norwegian migration to Australia after the war and promised to try and discuss matter with him before I went. His wife tells me they have similar customs in Norway to Denmark on Midsummer's Day, burning the witch to make the crops good.

Thursday, 15/1/42

Discussed my proposal with Lionel Curtis,Footnote ³⁵⁶ founder of the Round Table and author of Empire on the Anvil which really drove me into politics 25 years ago. He was 100% behind me, had heard me speak at Chatham House, and wondered if they would fit in with his own ideas for during the war and post-war action.

When I told him what I had in mind he said he was delighted because he was getting a very old man and I might carry the torch for him. Anxious I should come to All Souls, Oxford, and spend the night, he would get 20 of the best minds of the time to thrash out the best way of making real progress. I said I thought his ideas of a kind of super international state were too grandiose to be accepted and would frighten the people from thinking of their real substance, that my policy was not to identify myself with any such long-distance plan publicly though I was prepared to discuss them privately. Publicly I would simply proceed one step at a time and lead them gently by the hand until they were so thoroughly committed that they would not be able to go back.

Told him of my talks with Henry Wallace and Nicholas Murray ButlerFootnote ³⁵⁷ and how far we had progressed here. He felt certain that the work he had done would be able to be closely interlocked with it.

Then to see Major-General Watson,Footnote ³⁵⁸ to whom had been sent by Margesson,Footnote ³⁵⁹ Ministry for Air, with whom discussed manpower for the army. They told us the ceiling set for them by Cabinet, number of divisions available in Britain, Middle East, India, Far East. They rather disconcerted me by saying the normal wastage without actual fighting roughly corresponded to the number called up in each age class as it came forward and that with any heavy fighting they would have to cannibalize various divisions. Roughly 190,000. The problem we are up against is how to keep the manpower up at the same time as one keeps up the equipment, because what is subtracted from the making of equipment for active forces lessens the amount of equipment going. Position has been that they have to bring their own forces to the stage of perfection even for training that they would desire.

Questions engaging their attention – the man in the rear, the corps troops, lines of communication, whether they could be older than the others. The only trouble is that if they have to go abroad they do not stand up to the hardships of service. I pointed out it seemed ridiculous that when we had 4/5ths of the world on our side and huge reservoirs in Russia, America, China and India of manpower, we should allow this to be a problem with the Allies – there must be some way of planning the use of these men, most of whom would be all the better for constant and remunerative work to raise their standard of living. If we did that during wartime we might be able to create an organization that would enable the submerged people in China and India to step on to a higher plane of living and comfort as soon as the war was over – our organization should be directed towards that end as quickly as possible.

He said the responses in India for fighting men was good and had already produced about 27 divisions but these did not reckon as big in numerical strength as those from white countries as they stiffened them up 1 battalion to 3 of white troops, so that of that number ¼ would need to be Britishers. That itself imposed a toll on British manpower. He said if they could get America to do this line of communication stuff it would be all to the good. He gave wastage roughly as 10%, but I pointed out wastage we were allowing for in Australia was between 30 and 40%. He said of course one reason was that we were drawing our lines of communication (our corps troops on the whole) from British sources.

He said Americans could be used for mechanical work behind the lines which became greater as the mechanization of the army increased.

Lunch with Sir [Edward] WilshawFootnote ³⁶⁰ of Cable & Wireless, who told me their woes about action of Australian Government in setting up independent radio communications with America, India and other centres. They said this was a direct blow to the Empire principle of communications, it must have a detrimental effect ultimately on the whole system which had been designed to ensure that the cables, which were the only way of getting satisfactory war instructions from different parts of the Empire, should be maintained intact against competition of wireless, and said the Advisory Committee which had been set up by the various Governments had not been consulted at all, but they were asking for a conference. I said it was reasonable, that I would urge it myself but would get in touch with Bruce first. He said Bruce had not been wonderfully sympathetic with them on the whole business. Bailleau, who was the Australian representative on the Advisory Committee, was in Washington and was not much at hand. They urged that the Government representative to the conference would be a technical man who would argue the thing out on its merits.

Long talk with RickardsFootnote ³⁶¹ who said he had been unable to unearth ammunition for our aircraft and anti-aircraft activities and had sent cable to Australian Government.

Talk with Bridges, pointed out question of getting satisfactory system of Australian-British Cabinet consultation had now become much more a British interest than Australian because of development of Allied War Council. He agreed, and after discussion it was arranged that he should draft for me a satisfactory system of liaison officers who would be approved by British Government and which I could wire to Australia saying that if we put this up it would be acceptable and we could put it into operation immediately.

Cranborne also called, discussed general position. He said realized what we were doing was absolutely sound and would give us all help possible and asked to see cables sent to our own Government, which he is prepared to help to draft by reason of his experience in Dominions and Foreign Office. Most useful and helpful attitude I have been able to build up here, largely by seeking their assistance rather than stuffing my advice down their throats.

Bruce worried about his own position and status and opposed to my general ideas of securing some complete Empire system of consultation. I pointed out there was no reason for us to break our partnership because my method of getting it was step by step and he was 100% insofar as the first step was concerned. He agreed that afterwards we had to get the rest and I said all there was between us was a question of very slight degree of acceleration and very slight difference in regard to method, but because of his jumpiness I think he magnified it into serious obstacles. He sent his wire after modifying it at my suggestion.

Dinner with Elliot and Chapman,Footnote ³⁶² Deputy Post Master General, and saw Kirby,Footnote ³⁶³ Food Controller of London. All worried about Malaya – Elliot and Chapman thought if we lost Singapore the Government would be smashed.

Friday, 16/1/42

Pike saw me re Australian chaps wanting to return home. Quite obvious aviators cannot fly back until trained because they would be of no use and no planes to teach them on in Australia. It should be made possible, however, for them to see active service in theatres where their own men are fighting. Worthwhile seeing what can be done so far as Army is concerned, but possibly there may be so much shipping needed to send out men that nothing can be done about it.

Colonel Garsia,Footnote ³⁶⁴ GSO to AllenbyFootnote ³⁶⁵ in Palestine campaign in last war, has been obsessed with idea that we must have some definite plan to work on to get anywhere both in war and peace, and he wants a Royal Commission of 3 to go into question to see if cannot produce master plan for whole situation.

I told him my experience led me to think the Commission was more slow than any other way but I was quite willing if it would help so long as they did not wait until the Commission was finished before doing anything at all.

Met Bruce who said Dominions Office sending cable asking for conference along lines Wilshaw wished.

To Bevin, Minister for Labour, with whom stayed 2 hours. He told me story of development of supply, said he had always advocated a Ministry of Munitions to handle activities at present under 4 Departments – Supply, Aircraft, Ship Building and Labour – and that that would have had the whole control in a vertical line right through. Defence Committee (Supply) he said did not function because Beaverbrook was a lone wolf and wished to work entirely on his own. To overcome difficulties, they had a production executive which consisted of the present Board of Trade, Ministers of War Transport, Supply, Aircraft Production & Economic Warfare. These men, determined imports of raw materials though they tried to make the sky their limit but if any difficulty they allotted priorities in various goods. Their object was to secure at least 26 weeks’ supply in this country. Then there was a body which allocated these materials to the various factories and stirred them up to try and produce the result. He said most of their difficulty was due to the fact that there were 52,000 manufacturers in Great Britain all of whom wanted to see the Minister of Supply re contracts and this made a tremendous number of bottlenecks. He thought the big national industries that could deal with their problem of production right from the ground to the top in a vertical way were really about 300, that they should be handled by the Minister of Supply direct, but the others should be organized into districts under which there should be a Director of Munitions who would handle all their problems and he felt sure if this were done all the machine tools would be used 100% and there would not be anything like the difficulty of shifting people about to work and they would be able to use much more in part time the married women, who it was impossible to take any distance from their homes if they had youngsters to look after.

He admitted that there was no method of contacting the Dominions that was satisfactory, had raised question repeatedly and agreed with me that unless we had some Empire arrangement re supply, we would get into a mess with regard to America, and the Americans would gain control practically of the whole of our production which they were trying to do.

We then entered into question of what could be done to put the thing right and to make certain we had a united Empire front. He said he would back my ideas, with which he thoroughly agreed, and said you had to get in low down as I suggested with key men as well as high up, and he had told Menzies he was making a complete mistake by trying to make the War Cabinet the fulcrum on which the leverage should be applied.

He agreed with me that by that time policy was crystallized and unable to be altered.

He raised question whether we would be prepared to make Empire contribution to defence, and I pointed out that if my scheme were brought in we would actually establish a system whereby an Empire Defence Committee would come into existence which would have control of strategy and of supply and would enable the position to be developed that would ensure both the Navy and the Air to be made an Empire responsibility rather than British. I said I was discussing with the army people yesterday the question of manpower, that it was to me a scandal that with 500 million people in the Empire we should be falling back in Malaya because we were out-numbered in the field, and that we should have to go with this huge reservoir of manpower and resources cap in hand to America to get our equipment.

He agreed with me and he had been trying to drive it down the throats of the British people and the British Government that they should look to India rather than America as their main standby, and with 300 million people there, if they were trained to industry they could very rapidly overtake any production that any other nation could possibly develop and it would be all inside the Empire.

To further this end he had had two lots over to Great Britain of 300 each Indians, whom he had taken around the various factories and had trained in the technical devices with the avowed object of trying to plant in India many industries of which we needed huge quantities.

There had been opposition by British manufacturers against this policy but he agreed with me that if we raised the standard of living and production and wealth in India, we would have in India a bigger market than we had ever been able to tap. My view was that in China and India, which comprise roughly 800 million people, we could find an outlet for every bit of extra production that the increased looms and machines of the world could bring into being and it would be productive and they would become markets for all sorts of other goods that at present time they could not look at. This would be a new world and a better one. He said his scheme had been received with enthusiasm in India, that leading Indian Statesmen had appreciated it very highly in their public utterances. He had insisted on bringing down all castes, living and working together and having meals together, to break down the caste system. By the inception of factory life and bringing into being of trade unions, they would be able to break down this stupid caste system in India which had prevented progress.

He was keen as well that we had to maintain to the full an Empire system of communications especially shipping, wireless and so on. I was agreeably surprised to find that his ideas were identical with my own re stabilization of prices and all the necessaries of life and those things like electricity which brought the amenities of life into being.

He had found from his experience as a trade union representative sitting alongside the millers’ representative on the flour millers’ organization that when the price of wheat fluctuated, if the price of bread were kept at the steady level of say 8d or 8½d for a 4lb loaf, there was a continuous rise in the consumption progressively no matter what came or went. When the price went up to 10d there was a fall in consumption which was not taken up for many months even after the price came down to 7d. As a result the millers themselves had brought into being a system of mutual insurance in England whereby in their own interests they had established a big international insurance fund which got its money out of the price of wheat when it was low to stabilize the price of bread, and there had been a continuous increase in consumption.

I told him of butter equalization in Australia, where we had found that so long as we kept price below 1/9, we could maintain consumption per head at an optimum rate and that when we went to 2/- they started to eat jam and all sorts of other substitutes, and he said he thoroughly agreed.

I told him also of what I had done re flat rate in electricity in the Nymboida scheme, how it had brought about an increase in consumption of electricity, a reduction in the rate charged, the best average annual load factor, and he said he had always advocated that the price of these commodities should be in Great Britain, no matter where they came from, just on the same basis as postage was, that the differences in freight and so on should really be handled by a big internal budget arrangement by the Governments, that it could easily recoup itself by, where freights were low, saving money to pay for the food of the people where it was far away. He would apply this almost universally and was satisfied that as a result not only would the standard of living be steadily improved but that wage conditions would cease to be a matter of agitation, that the workman's wife would be able to budget for the expenditure of her husband's money in definite quantities of food, and that the whole social structure would be stabilized to a degree that we have never been able to get before.

He felt with me that the only political organization in the world that could really give the lead in this was the British Empire. He shared my view that the USA as a political organization was most inefficient and terribly slow in getting started and even slower in getting results, and that naturally followed on its federal system and its queer racial makeup.

On question of common defence policy he agreed with what I was trying to do, that if we could get the men in low and the Dominions gradually on to the Defence Committee so that it became an Empire defence organization, we would practically solve nearly all the difficulties confronting us re Empire co-ordination. He felt with me that unless we settled this question straight away we would find ourselves in an awful mess when we came to talk with America and would be sold down the river all the time.

He had been trying for some time to push these ideas down Churchill's throat but without much success and he had a horrid feeling that Churchill might have some arrangements in America that would cut across these lines but he was prepared to fight with him in War Cabinet to try and make certain that the real leadership of the whole war strategy and economic policy and production really rested in Empire hands.

Altogether the most stimulating and satisfactory talk I have had with any Empire Statesman since coming to Britain in the last 20 years.

Bevin suggested that the Foreign Office should include the Dominions Office and that being the second office in the Government would enable the work to be done. I said he could scarcely use the term ‘Foreign Office’ and suggested it should be called the Minister for State just as in America the Secretary for State handled foreign and other important activities. He would have a status practically equal to that of the Prime Minister.

Saturday, 17/1/42

Saw Yorkshire Post reporter.

In afternoon with Coleman, Low and MR to International Soccer Match between England and Scotland played in snow. Very fine spectacle at Wembley, nearly sat in Royal Box. After match spoke to head of ShellFootnote ³⁶⁶ and Lord EssendonFootnote ³⁶⁷ who was anxious to talk to me about wool. Met Bevin and Leathers.

Sunday, 18/1/42

Rested and wrote speech.

Monday, 19/1/42

Cabinet meeting, Churchill reported back from America looking very well and at once went into strategical position on all fronts. On Malayan position very angry with Navy for permitting Japs to get small boats on western side of Malaya and said he could not understand any service permitting unarmed boats to be coming down and landing behind our troops and destroying their positions, that the Navy had to take some risks in the matter, even if they lost a destroyer or a submarine, that it could all be settled with gunfire and that would improve our chances of holding the position enormously. He said instructions had to go forward to this effect.

I raised question of failure of demolition of oil tanks at Port Swettenham and Penang, they all agreed it was stupid.

Question raised of retention of Singapore and he asked how was it that they did not have a completely separate water supply for the island itself as the whole of the water came down from Johore. If they smashed the embankment it ruined the water supply. If Singapore has to be evacuated he said we would have to make sure everything is blown up and it is not able to be made into a fortress.

I urged him to put every reinforcement possible into the place. I said the Australians would hold it if they had adequate support. Told us they had got Japanese submarine south of Java – they came up to the surface and fought well.

I raised question of American Admiral being in charge of south western Pacific especially when they were drawing all the American ships to Darwin. I said cannot we do something about a British Admiral there and Churchill said they had to give America something. They recognized Hart had to be gingered up and were trying to get a younger man. The Dutch AdmiralFootnote ³⁶⁸ is really going to ‘carry the baby’.

They are going to bring the Australians on to Sumatra and fly those planes off the aeroplane carrier before coming down to the Sunda Straits so that the aircraft carrier could go back and bring some more planes from Middle East and would not run so much risk.

On Timor, I said it was imperative the words not merely ‘an attack’ but ‘threat of an attack’ or an ‘attack being imminent’ should be in the understanding with [the] Portuguese so that there could be no doubt that our Australians could get right into the ring even if the Japs were not actually in possession. I said nothing short of that would satisfy the Australian Government.

Discussion of statements re co-ordination of allied war effort which had been agreed between Roosevelt and Churchill. Prefaced by a statement that the 3 documents had been initialled, would be put into operation at once and would see how they would work before making any public announcement.

I raised question [of] Dominion representation and especially machinery necessary to implement various agreements.

On shipping side in which agreement was between British control of Shipping and the Americans, Leathers said he would take into consultation all the Dominion authorities, that was the practice now and they would continue it and that would obviate Dominion shipping being thrown into the pool. That suits us because we have been trying to eke out what they have been giving us generally.

On question of strategy I pointed out we might be able to work arrangement from top to a large extent, but on raw materials and munitions it was absolutely imperative to work from bottom up. There were thousands of organizations handling this practical matter and unless there were some means of co-ordinating activities in each part of the Empire and of Empire as a whole before we talked to America, we would get into an awful mess. Strategy really was determined by supply and we could not allow it to pass out of our hands. He agreed that machinery to implement it on lower plane would be discussed with Dominions before publication in a joint memo, that there would be a supplementary arrangement with Dominions that would give them definite voice in allocation of raw materials.

Re munitions assignments, Attlee pointed out it would be completely separate from question of manufacture. The production Executive would work out method of ensuring consultation between different parts of Empire to cover question of manufacture of different articles and this body would really only be associated with actual assignment to different fields of warfare. That after all was a matter that would be determined by COS and because of that the local arrangements being made for south west Pacific would enable this to be safeguarded from point of view of Dominions.

Had interesting discussion at end that he should broadcast his speech from House of Commons by electrical record. Some fought against it being done, but I said I thought a speech broadcast from the House would have a very great appeal.

Tuesday, 20/1/42

Sent cable to Curtin re Cabinet discussion.

Addressed Royal Empire Society, Geoffrey Shakespeare, Under Secretary for Dominions, in chair. Pointed out necessity for proper co-ordination in each part of Empire, Empire as whole and in Allied War Council, and urged leadership of Britain in whole matter. Present were Prof Hancock,Footnote ³⁶⁹ […] Lady SykesFootnote ³⁷⁰ gave me nice message from her husband, Air Marshal in last war; Sir Alex GodleyFootnote ³⁷¹ sent me nice note.

Discussion with our own Defence Committee, very informative.

Dinner with Lady Swaythling.Footnote ³⁷² She had Lord Samuel,Footnote ³⁷³ late leader of Liberal Party, Wellington Koo,Footnote ³⁷⁴ Chinese Ambassador, […] Interesting discussion with Wellington Koo on Chinese position. Brazilian AmbassadorFootnote ³⁷⁵ told me that though there is a dictator in control, all the constitutional reforms are preserved insofar as State Government concerned, the Government of the States had been appointed by the dictator for 15 years, at end of which there will be a plebiscite as to whether they will go back to legislatures or elected Governments who will have complete control. Progress of Brazil last 10 years outstanding. Feeling Britain more friendly than towards America though politically they stood by America. He explained that in Argentine the pro-Nazi champion was the Vice President who was only able to get away with it against the general wish of the people. The President, who was pro-British, was very sick and had lost much of his force.

Wednesday, 21/1/42

Spoke at Empire Parliamentary Association on consultation. Cranborne in chair, about 200 present. Asked me lot of questions and then gave me luncheon at which Amery presided. Kingsley Wood, Cranborne, Dalton, Walter Elliot, Pethick Lawrence,Footnote ³⁷⁶ Llewellin, and lot of others came.

I drove home point that loss of Singapore irretrievable and everything had to be sacrificed to retain it. Got general approval. Kingsley Wood begged me to stay on, had beneficial influence here, thought constructive way of putting up proposals had impressed them, I was a real help to the Cabinet quite apart from Australian point view. Told him position very difficult in Australia, I was stabilizing influence there, and at the moment they were swinging towards America; quite apart from it being a dangerous spot it was in the best interests of everyone for me to go back at once. He said he thought the influence of the work I was doing here would radiate back there if I stopped. I said it would be settled by the Government's answer to my own views. If my advice not taken, I could not try and operate something I did not believe in.

Dinner at Devonshire Club, at which inaugurating system whereby club open to overseas servicemen and officers. Made short speech, left 9pm to go to Defence Committee meeting called on account of bad wire from WavellFootnote ³⁷⁷ about Singapore position. Defeatist note by Churchill which indicated that Singapore should be sacrificed [as opposed] to the Burma Road. Before going down had talk with Bruce and Wardell, Low and Coleman. Bruce had convinced Wardell and more or less Coleman that the best thing to do was to get the men out but they had no answer to my argument what were they to do with the men when they got them out, because of lack of air support. I pointed out the 3 aerodromes on Singapore could be dominated by enemy artillery on the Johore side and that if we did do this all we would do would be to put 5 divisions of Japanese into Burma and instead of saving Burma we would lose Singapore and Burma.

To Cabinet meeting where Churchill began proceedings by reading cable from FraserFootnote ³⁷⁸ objecting on general grounds to nearly everything put up in his grey telegram. He said had not been able to get an answer from Australia, to which I said I did not think it had got to Australia yet. It should have been sent 10 days ago. It was only handed to me on Monday night after War Cabinet meeting although dated 1.30pm that day. He demanded to see the telegram and swore blind that it was not his draft – it contained all sorts of things he did not mean to put in. I pointed out that no-one could understand what it did mean and said if they wanted to get any results they should let me help in drafting cables so that the Australians would know exactly what was meant (as I knew what they were thinking).

Went on to discuss Singapore position and he put up story as to unwisdom of letting further reinforcements go on. I said I did not see how that could possibly be done as the Australians had first of all been sent there on definite promise of reinforcements, secondly that the 2 Australian divisions being shipped from the Middle East were being sent down as reinforcements, and that Australia would never stand our men being deserted, and thirdly the course he proposed would be more fatal and injurious to the lives and fortunes of the army and the war than standing and fighting at Johore on the line that was there.

In my view whatever men were in Singapore should be flung into the fight, with the addition of one extra British brigade from Singapore which could be got there in 4 or 5 hours with the train service they had, it was only about 60 miles to the danger spot, we could re-form our line and hold the position there. If the men are to die, it would be better to die fighting facing the foe than die like rats in a trap when they would not have any chance for reprisals at all. He said he was all for the battle of Johore. I said it was no good saying that in one breath and then saying they were going to pull out. One had to have a very definite objective, a determination to win, and 300 men might as well die in Singapore or Johore as the Greeks had done at Thermopylae.

He said the Australians and the Dutch had not been consulted, but I said of course it was their lives at stake and it was a reasonable thing to ask. I said we depended on the courage of the Dutch to get us out of the mess and surely they were entitled to some information. Churchill then raised question as to what should go to Australia, he felt his mind was fluid on many of these matters and it would be unfair to send word as if that word were his final view. I said I had not done that and was glad to know that his views on the matter were not final.

Amery then said that though he had been convinced it was better to abandon Singapore and stick to the Burma Road, he felt we would get the worst of both worlds if we did so. Churchill then said ‘Didn't you give me a memorandum yesterday recommending abandoning Singapore in favour of Burma’, and Amery said I had convinced him he was wrong.

We got to stage where wire to Wavell was to be held up for 2 days pending developments and matters were more or less proceeding on fairly amicable footing when messenger arrived with wire from Australia completely rejecting the suggestion of the south west control, demanding permanent seat in War Cabinet, in Washington Cabinet, and pretty well a place in the sun everywhere. Churchill slammed it down on the table and said he had said his last word, they could go to Washington if they liked. Meeting broke up but he waited for me to walk with him along passage, and I said I was satisfied if they would let me get on to a constructive solution with Ismay and Bridges – but ‘take it or leave it’ tactics would infuriate Australia and this was a bad moment for putting across the abandoning of Singapore.

Thursday, 22/1/42

Sent wire to Curtin setting out discussion on Defence Committee and strongly recommending that Gordon Bennett's opinion should be obtained. Pointed out as well advantages of Eastern Group Council, how if we had that in existence Australia, NZ and the Dutch East Indies would have been 3 out of the 4 signatories to the Council, would have acted as Defence Committee and given instructions to Wavell so far as Eastern strategy was concerned, that they would be 100% for fighting in Singapore to the death and that would help us enormously.Footnote ³⁷⁹

Saw Cranborne, pointed out how stupid wire was dealing with Eastern Group Council, with result that he got together for me much fuller explanatory note which I sent to Australia with my comments on the same night. He told me a Sub Committee of the War Cabinet had been appointed which was examining the question of representation and would give me the result at the earliest possible moment. He also showed me the wire to Australia which was being sent saying that we are given complete Cabinet representation, that they were prepared either to put up for Australia or let Australia put up to America the question of a Pacific Council, and pointed out also that Australia misunderstood the purport of the Far Eastern Council's activities.

Had strategic discussion with Chiefs of Staff and finally swung them to the idea that we had to fight Singapore to the end, that the Burma Road support was not an alternative but they were both absolutely indispensable.

Friday, 23/1/42

Had further talk with Cranborne on receipt of wire from Casey setting out difficulties of getting American stuff, pointed out to him that they must take action straight away to get these things done, and that they must let me have a look at what was being done with regard to this Sub-Committee or else they would land us in a mess if we had to reject it or even if we had to ask for modification. He said he would do what he could.

In afternoon had long discussion with Amery who frightened life out of me by telling me that general conception that was inherent in the Sub-Committee's recommendations was that they should appoint the liaison officer whom we could contact and save us having to go to all the other people that we had to at the present time. I pointed out this was not what we wanted, it would be useful if we had everything else, but by itself it was worse than useless and was a retrogressive step.

When I convinced him that what we wanted was a vertical liaison system, he said he would see what he could do to get the thing right in the Sub-Committee's report and secondly to get the report into my hands before it was considered by Cabinet.

Saw Sir Andrew Duncan, who told me insofar as Board of Trade was concerned they were prepared to make room for our men in their Department, he agreed with me as regards general conception, would see Bridges in morning and see if he could not get him to show me report, at any rate if he could not do that to get the thing modified.

Interesting talk at dinner with Mr Whyte,Footnote ³⁸⁰ who was originally a Macgregor but had to change name about 5 generations ago because he was banned. Chairman of Directors, Royal Bank of Scotland. Assured me that the head of our clan was still respectable, much more so than Mary Queen of Scots. We arranged to go to lunch and to establish a new precedent with MR.

Wrote Curtin, and also Lady Page fully setting out trials and tribulations of a very lonely and dispirited envoy.

Saturday, 24/1/42

Interesting interview with Wolstencroft,Footnote ³⁸¹ Chairman of Trade Union organization of Great Britain, who told me of their activities, how they dovetailed with the Ministry of Labour. He said they had arranged a consultative council on which were an equal number of employees and employers who met regularly with Ministry of Labour and these straightened out all questions of wages, hours, conditions generally. They had received an assurance that when the war was over any concessions they made would be given back to them and that nothing that was done would be allowed to prejudice the position of the trade union movement. They had formed special sections for the unemployed and unskilled and for the women workers who were coming into industry so that the whole ambit of labor was really covered by the trade union movement and his organization then could commit the workpeople everywhere to whatever course was finally adopted. They had found the employers very reasonable, the Government anxious to help, they themselves had been conciliatory, and in 1938 had carried a resolution that every other consideration should be subordinated to the defeat of Hitler who threatened trade conditions and systems and workmen's standards more than any other menace that the world had ever seen, and accordingly they were throwing the whole of their weight into the fight. After the discussion they had adopted the essential work regulations whereby the employee should not leave his job but must stick at it, though it did limit the movement of people yet it did have this very great advantage insofar as the working was concerned, that it stabilized their movement, for instance in his own trade of carpentry the old rule had been that you could give 2 hours’ notice on a job to dismiss a man and if the weather was bad he did not get any work at all. Under this arrangement there had to be at least a week's notice on either side. The engineers had always had 2 hours’ notice as well, though in practice it had really finished the work at the end of the day. Now it was at the end of the week and in most cases the work was continuous.

He thought this had stabilized these trades, and Bevin had told him that the adoption of this had stabilized the dockworkers’ employment completely. I told him what Bruce and I tried to do with the Transport Workers’ Act in 1928 in Australia where we had tried to secure permanent employment for the dock workers and wharf laborers instead of a casual arrangement. Just before I left Australia I tried to evolve a scheme with BeasleyFootnote ³⁸² whereby these men could be assured of constant work in that particular trade or could be swung into some associated calling having something to do with war work when they were idle. I had felt all the while that if this could be done, much of the unrest and Communism (though one hesitated to use that term now) would be wiped out.

On the question of the number of Communists, he thought 1 or 2% would cover them, but the noise they made would make you think they were 99½% – but the British laborer was a very intelligent chap.

Enjoyable afternoon at Savage Club.

Talk with Sir Edward Bridges on representation – assured me everything would be all right, I would be given more than I had asked.

Sunday, 25/1/42

Beautiful day at Weston's. Met Mr and Mrs King, Editor Daily Mirror.Footnote ³⁸³

Monday, 26/1/42

Lunch with Lord Denman,Footnote ³⁸⁴ Governor-General of Australia between 1911 and 1914, when war broke out. Was anxious to make speech re Imperial consultation. He told me the lines he was going on, and I pointed out to him the defects that existed in everything that had been suggested till quite recently. He said he would make a speech on Wednesday in the House of Lords – I said I would come if possible.

Then to Australia Day concert, which was quite a good show.

Got ready case for War Cabinet at 6pm. At once Churchill attacked me for having reported on the evacuation to Singapore, to which I retorted that there was no other way for my Government to get the impressions of what took place except by my report, and read what I had said in my cable which seemed to me a very fair statement that had not put him in the cart at all. Then pointed out that I had used that incident to try and secure their adherence to the Eastern Council idea which they were turning down in favour of the Pacific Council at Washington. Then went on to discussion of various theatres of war, Libya being in a bit of a mess, then question arose re Singapore. He assured me that instructions had gone out to Wavell to hold Johore to the last man, that they were rushing in reinforcements as fast as they could, 3,700 Australians arrived there, another brigade of the 18^th Division would arrive tomorrow, they were both being pushed into the firing line, that the aeroplane carrier with 51 new Hurricanes on was arriving off Sumatra tomorrow morning and the planes would be flown straight into the battle, that the first-class fighter pilots were in that aeroplane carrier, the reason of the non-success of the Hurricanes up to the present had been that the ‘rabbits’ who were not good enough to go to Russia had been sent on that particular transport with the Hurricanes to Singapore, and that was the cause of their bad showing up to the present. He felt sure this would make a tremendous difference from tomorrow on.

The troops themselves were holding fairly well, no more Japs had infiltrated down the coast past Batu Pahat and that it was felt sure they would hold. I asked why they did not get the 10,000 Dutchmen that Bruce had said could have been sent across in 2 days and he said they would look into it. Churchill then went off the deep end about the Australians generally, and said if they were going to squeal he would send them all home again out of the various fighting zones. I said the Australians did not want to go home, they wanted to stay where the fighting was, they were not squealing, that anyhow when everybody else was in a mess they had come out into every theatre of war and put up a good scrap, and Australia had denuded herself of aeroplanes and munitions, and that even the American planes that had landed in Australia they were urging should be sent to the Dutch East Indies. I resented very much the suggestion that we were looking after ourselves, that we had been looking after the Empire all the time, and if anybody had been looking after themselves it was the chaps this end. I said the soldiers themselves did not want to make a row, anyhow there was no reason why our Government should not make a complaint to his Government, but I agreed with him that they should not be whining in public. I said it won't do Britain any good if Port Kembla, Sydney or Newcastle where the heart of our manufacturing is, is smashed. He then said he agreed they should have the aeroplanes, that America had promised 350 at the earliest moment, that he had scarcely wasted a minute in America trying to push the claims of Australia and the Far East to proper recognition, and in fact had arranged the whole of this actual programme of aeroplanes to come through either jumping on the long bombers across the Pacific or the [intermediate] range bombers across the Atlantic, through Africa and India and down that way.

Then went on to question of Eastern Council and Pacific Council. He read speech going to make tomorrow. I said I could understand him feeling a bit sick about the whole business but we had to win the war, not just create a general row all round, and I thought it would be ill advised to bar the door on some settlement – it was obvious that Australia did not understand what was offered – the telegrams that had gone out had been so meagre that I, who was in the whole discussion, scarcely understood what they meant and I was quite sure if he read them by themselves he would not understand them – that if they would give me an opportunity of working out a practicable scheme with Ismay and Bridges, we could get them into line.

Unfortunately while I was declaiming at my best, a wire came from Curtin saying he did not merely want ordinary membership of the War Cabinet, but every other facility that British members enjoyed, such as a vote. Churchill said no – I pointed out it was no good quarrelling over a phrase or two – I understood there had never been a vote in Churchill's Cabinet and everything was settled by discussion or agreement.

I agreed with him as to control of British Empire to be in London and there should be a gathering together of the various Empire Dominions attitudes so that one voice could be presented in America. In any case I said any difference of view could be reported through the machinery that he had suggested that it had never been made clear, and that if the whole position were made clear then we could get some support.

Beaverbrook came to my defence, that there had been poorest explanations of position given and no story at all really of what Churchill had been doing. He said Churchill arranging while in America that there should be 11,000 American soldiers placed in New Caledonia. There were thousands of men in every other set of islands but nobody had been told about it. Then Churchill said he had never had a reply from Curtin to his offer of 40 or 50 thousand American soldiers in Australia. I said under those circumstances I felt sure he had never read his telegrams and I said I had read a statement saying they would accept them. He got wild and said would send back all Australians and I said ‘What will you do for a spearhead for your troops?’

Bevin joined in, did not know what we wanted. He was all for giving us a decent go. I said what was wrong with the decent go you have in your mind is that you never let us know what it is. Last Wednesday week you told me I could have Bridges the next day to work out a scheme – I have not had him yet. I understand Cabinet had been incubating on the thing like a China egg ever since and nothing has transpired and nobody knows anything about it.

Cranborne satisfied that the thing had never been properly put up. Churchill wanted to know why Cranborne had not put it up properly.

Finally agreed that he should not put up provocative speech tomorrow that would upset Curtin. I said to Churchill, ‘We must not get at loggerheads, what is necessary is that we should agree on proper method of bringing about Empire voice. Let it be a decision of Cabinet that these men should come with me tomorrow and work it out.’

When meeting ended, practically everyone said to me, ‘Thank goodness you hung on to your point, but can't you do something to strangle these boys that make such a noise in Australia.’

Bruce meantime had sent to Australia strongly worded case in favour of Eastern Council. No sooner despatched than there arrived, ostensibly from Curtin but really from Evatt,Footnote ³⁸⁵ a most damning indictment of Far Eastern Council in which there was a fierce argument against practically every point Bruce had put up.

Churchill said quite easy, they could have either what we or they suggested if present would permit it. There was something to be said insofar as apparent symmetry or arrangement they suggested, but of course nothing to be said for it from point view of practical working, they would not have slightest control of planning or strategy, they would simply be isolated like Robinson Crusoe, still if they wanted it they could have it. I said that was not [the] way to look at it – they desire something that would give voice in conduct of war. He said ‘I will not plead with them anymore – I have never been so insulted in my life before as I have been in these cables, and I cannot stand these public attacks by these Ministers on my conduct of the war’.

Churchill threatened to read Australian Government's cable of congratulation to Brooke-Popham in the House. I said ‘It's no good making bad worse – to read that in the face of their wishes to the contrary would simply destroy any chance of satisfactory relations between the two Governments. The best way to make Brooke-Popham's position better is to say that his retirement had been planned before the Jap attack had taken place, and because it was realized that a greater part of the operations would be [by] land and not sea’.

Meeting ended on good note, Churchill recognizing I was doing my best to hold show together.

After dinner, discussion with Captain Balfour and his MyrmidonsFootnote ³⁸⁶ on one side and Bruce, Coleman and self on other, on American control of new ferry service. Only bright spot was my suggestion that we had all misunderstood earlier telegrams, that what was really suggested was that there should be two dogs and only one tail, the tail being the Qantas service from Java to Australia, which was to operate 3 times a week instead of twice and to link up with existing service and new American ferry service. This tail would be half as big again as original tail. This seemed to bring new light on proceedings and to direct our minds towards possible practical solution by endeavouring find exactly what Americans meant. It transpired that there had never been any communications with American and British Government, that all the information up to present had come from Australian Government and it was decided Coleman and heads of Air Ministry should draft telegram to be submitted to Balfour, Bruce and self tomorrow, for Australia, asking question that would set matter at rest and at same time sent to Casey so that he could ascertain what American view was as well.

Tuesday, 27/1/42

Saw Elibank, very keen on getting some basis for Empire consultation, told him my ideas, he said they were excellent but unfortunately not spectacular and consequently though they would do the job one ran the risk of never being thanked at all.

Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, told me terribly disturbed over position, realized job I had done would be complete success but also I must get thing finalized from British Government at once or they might miss psychological moment to put it across in Australia. He said would see Cranborne and Churchill and Beaverbrook that night and urge on them necessity for giving me satisfactory answer before night was out to enable me to get cable to Australia to keep them on our side.

Heard Churchill's speech in House, pulled out all the rotten things he was going to say about Australia on my recommendation. Dealt with liaison but made it clear that would be general.

Wednesday, 28/1/42

Saw Lynch,Footnote ³⁸⁷ discussed butter with him and put into his head the way in which he should put up our case to Food Ministry to ensure dairy farmers of Australia would be able to keep solvent and the two Governments would pay the cost of storage and depreciation. He said had no idea I would be prepared to back him in that direction, that that would completely solve all his difficulties and he felt sure we could get away with the solution that would put dairy farmers right for rest of war.

Lunch with Sir Andrew Duncan, Sir Arnold Overton,Footnote ³⁸⁸ and Professor Laby [at] Bank of England,Footnote ³⁸⁹ discussed Empire industrial relationships found Duncan absolutely saturated with Country Party ideas I had been preaching in Australia re stabilization of prices and necessity for giving industry statutory power to organize itself and force the blackleg into minority for the general good. He said he was satisfied with the 6 big industries I named – steel, electricity, chemicals, pottery, glass and textiles. He said if I could get a first-class industrialist who was willing to serve here on Board of Trade without any reward, an economist, we could plan a parallel system of industrialization during war that would ensure that after the war was over there would be no competition but complete co-operation between two countries industrially.

He told me of manner in which they were equalizing prices of their products in steel industry by means of internal insurance fund, identical in its method with butter equalization fund I established 20 years ago in Australia. He was prepared to back me on food reserves plan and said Overton of Board of Trade prepared to come miles closer to us than he was in 1938, and that if I wanted, he was willing to put into the Department an actual customs man to get thoroughly au fait with all their methods and help change their outlook.

Telephoned Cranborne, told him imperative I should have Sub-Committee's report, it was silly holding it up as I knew it was finished – finally at 3.30pm got it from MachtigFootnote ³⁹⁰ who admitted had cabled it to other Dominions. None of the others would touch it with a 40-foot pole, and we had to implement it and pioneer the whole job. When I got it, found they had incorporated on defence, foreign policy, supply, raw materials, shipping, and production, the ideas I had set out in my cablegrams of December and January to Australian Government, so I sent copies of their statements to Curtin with my comments on everything except question of production which I said I would deal with later, pointing out that we really had at last a scheme, the symmetry of which was perfect and which would provide an insoluble bond of unity between Empire for good.

Am getting ready a statement dealing with production and supplies on an Empire basis, linking it up with Empire Council, the way in which the Defence Committee works, and my only fear is that they may be so stupid as not to be able to understand without the actual practical operation of the system that I have had, how indispensable this system is and how permanent and indissoluble it will make the union.

Bridges relieved I was willing to accept gratefully as much as I had got, agreed that I might get away with the production scheme side of it after a few days, agreed to help me by trying to secure immediate decision from Admiralty that Australia should be able to lift at once all the excavating and road-making material and the gear that could be spared from Singapore for purpose of helping our defence work in Australia – agreed to make certain that HartnettFootnote ³⁹¹ would be received with open arms when he arrived in Singapore and given every facility that could be given by Government and Chief of Navy.

Cable to Curtin re Cabinet meeting Monday – assured him that in Defence Committee, had decided Johore battle and defence of Singapore would have highest priority, that every reinforcement was being sent forward that could possibly be shifted by any physical means available, and those reinforcements, in personnel and equipment, were arriving to schedule.

Feel I have really done this job finally that puts the seal on Empire unity for another hundred years.

Dinner with Crawford GreeneFootnote ³⁹² who owns Iandra – couple of other MPs and House Lords and some colonels to meet me. Found they were all behind Australia though upset at squealing of politicians, but knew it was not the people of Australia who were making the noise.

Thursday, 29/1/42

Lunch with Lord Essendon, Wool Controller – put up to him proposal that America should not be allowed to buy more wool than she actually could use for current manufacture or at any rate not enough to cause existence of huge surplus which she might fling on to market after war and smash the market.

One of conditions of Australian sale to Britain that was actually in everyone's mind, though it might not have been stipulated in exact terms, was that the excess after the war was over would remain in British and Australian hands and could be dealt with in same way as BAWRA dealt with surplus clip in last war, in which wool fed on to market over 4 or 5 years and thereby a collapse in price prevented.

I told him of Macgregor's wire, in which he said that whole American negotiations for purchase of South American clip had fallen through and there was practically an open market still for Australian wool in America. Essendon said not clear about use that could be made of the burry wools in America, that I had better see Sir [Henry] Shackleton at Bradford.

I raised point that Macgregor raised as to whether possible for British machinery for carbonizing to be sent to USA to ensure use of burry wool, and if that not possible they should consider question of greatly enlarging amount of wool made available to Australia to carbonize, in fact in any event that should be done because it would give employment to many thousands of men and the wool would be in very much better shape at end of war and bring better price.

Interesting discussion on financial situation with whole of his Board of Directors and with Lord Mayor of London, who was also there. They felt certain that unless some general plan along the lines I was working on was brought into being, we would not be able to get decent conditions after the war.

Talk on political and strategic position with Bruce and COS, who tried to get me to send cable to Australia on reports coming from Australia re our squealing. Said would like night to think it out.

Heard Churchill make reply in debate, vote 464–1 in his favour but thought he devoted too much attention to trying to justify himself as regards Malaya and explanation weak in this regard.

3 months’ anniversary of arrival, thanked staff.

Elibank saw me, saw Cranborne made good speech, pointing out liaison had been offered to various Governments and he was sure scheme I had brought down would prove real cement that would bind Empire together.

Friday, 30/1/42

Discussed military situation with Wardell and means of securing proper liaison. He had definite views and is to put them down in writing for me tomorrow. If get slightest chance will appoint him straight away and start good job going.

Lunch with Cleveland Fyfe,Footnote ³⁹³ Drew, MP,Footnote ³⁹⁴ Peacock,Footnote ³⁹⁵ President National Farmers’ Union of England, at RAC. They were interested in my work in Australia in stabilizing primary production and in my views re collaboration between all the industries, especially primary industries during war and post-war. I pointed out that the pass had really been sold by Government in the £100 million subsidy given by British Government to stabilize price of food at reasonable level and yet enable farmer to get a reasonable price. That really was the public recognition by Great Britain of stabilization principle introduced into Australia in dried fruits and meat and butter and wheat.

Necessary not that we should get in every part of Empire and if we can in every part of producing world, same organization of producers that we had been able to get in Australia, there must be 3 different planes of activity, a Ministerial plane in which the Ministers of Commerce or Agriculture should devote themselves to a general review of whole position and a determination of what was best kinds [of] primary products grown in each country to ensure ample supplies for industry and people and reasonable prices for producers. There should be departmental organization to secure continuous contacts in regard to political policies and outlooks and Government enactments that might be necessary and there should be organization, industry by industry, of the producers themselves with an over-riding comprehensive organization that drew them all together. If we had these three things I was satisfied, after my conversations with Henry Wallace in America and with Greenwood and Woolton here, we would be able to make certain that the land industries in every country were properly rewarded and maintained.

In Britain the amount invested in agriculture greater than amount invested even in Australia, Canada or India, and though the numbers relatively were small compared with those in industrial pursuits, the quality of the food they produced such as raw milk, was so vital to health that they had a great case to put up on point of making it cheap enough for consumption to be high and the benefit in health would save enough to give reasonable subsidy to farmers to meet their costs of production.

They admitted my proposals re food reserves could be used for propaganda and might possibly help to bring war to an end much quicker. They also said they would at once try to get together an Empire organization of producers that would be able to have a very definite policy backed by Empire Governments that could be set up against suggestions made by USA who might outbid us or undercut us in competition if we could not force them into some form of co-operation.

They asked whether I was prepared to go to South Africa for some producers’ conference there, but I suggested difficulties of travel so great in wartime that it would be better in England. Cleveland Fyfe said would get on to the job and try and have lunch with me again in 3 or 4 weeks’ time.

Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador called. Interested in possibility of China being admitted into Eastern Council – was quite easy whether it meant Washington or London. I told him my reasons for wishing it in London, that urgency of Singapore and Burma Road positions so great that we could not wait on formation of a Council in 6 or 8 weeks’ time. We had the organization here in the British Military COS and planning organizations and whatever was done about Pacific Council as a placard, we should get on with the job here.

I explained what I had done about Empire organization and Koo, who has a very alert mind, at once said I had put my finger on the fundamental point of the whole problem and had found the solution. I said we were going to proceed by slow degrees and that was one of the reasons I thought we might get results in London immediately. He said, though his own Government was in favour of Washington because of the United States attitude towards China, after listening to me he said he felt sure if they came into the organization they would be much better with us here in London than anywhere else.

If China had not been consulted up to present, in my view it was because neither Churchill nor Roosevelt had cleared their minds, it had not been due to any intention of showing disrespect or neglect of China's position but due to the fact that action and planning was not needed immediately. He said I had enlightened him on many points and he felt certain I had hit on the real solution, that China might be able to come into the ring on the general question of post-war improvement of conditions.

Saw Cranborne re supplies to Australia, and Empire consultation. He said he was 100% with my idea that we should allow Australian Government if they wished to form Pacific Council in Washington but that we, without giving the organization a name, should really bring into being what was Far Eastern Council that had been suggested, make it work here, and show that Pacific Council was a futility. I said that was the reason I had been dogging them all day to give me answer to Curtin's request for 250 planes, tanks, bombs and other munitions – absolutely imperative to send reply to-night, every hour demonstrated efficiency of London organization and tended to make Australians doubt wisdom of going to Washington. Under pressure he said Colonel JacobFootnote ³⁹⁶ could bring document to me direct from Defence Committee, that they should send wire, that I should see it and make comments.

10pm Jacob produced story, which was that he could give 250 planes, 435 tanks immediately, substantial amount of guns, fair bit of ammunition and all other things the Defence Committee was really on. Sent wire to Australia in joint names of Bruce & self. Found Elliot had seen Beaverbrook and secured promise that he would take out of existing stock in Britain everything that could possibly be spared to enable Australia's defence to be secured, that Beaverbrook was thoroughly alive to point of view I was putting up, that we had to make certain that the centre of Far Eastern Council was in London, and right thing to do was not to talk about it but get results.

Talk with Bruce, seems to have settled down to decision of Government that they will not accept him as their accredited representative and to my view that we must make the show 100% efficient in its working before I leave.

Saturday, 31/1/42

To Oxford with Stirling to be guest of Lionel Curtis of Round Table at All Souls College.

All Souls College very interesting, founded 500 years ago by donations from Cardinal WolseyFootnote ³⁹⁷ not an Undergraduates College, but its Fellows frequently teach and lecture. In old days fellowships numbered 50 and for 7 years each, given at rate of 2 a year, held in hands of many ruling families and Lord Salisbury, who was Premier of England for some time, was a Fellow of All Souls.

During last 50 or 60 years a new system has grown up whereby Fellowship is given on highest competitive examination held in Oxford and 2 each year on this basis. Others are awarded as vacancies occur by death, to distinguished scientists such as in history, natural science. This was the way Lionel Curtis came in. Immense sums at their disposal, are the main backers of the Bodleian library. Amongst their recent members have been Amery and Sir Edward Bridges, both of whom are very distinguished Oxford Grads.

The College, while full of learning, is also full of discomfort, the stone buildings being as cold as charity, modern conveniences of central heating and so on that have been taken as second nature have been conspicuous by their absence, it evidently being the rule to encourage plain living and high thinking.

Interesting men at dinner – Swinton,Footnote ³⁹⁸ who invented tanks in last war; Geoffrey Dawson,Footnote ³⁹⁹ Editor Times for many years; […] Librarian in charge of Bodleian;Footnote ⁴⁰⁰ Adams,Footnote ⁴⁰¹ Warden, authority on international social history, had been member of Overseas Settlement Committee which interviewed me in 1936.Footnote ⁴⁰²

Lionel Curtis showed me Magdalen tower, built same year as Columbus discovered America, 1493 [sic], showed me Queens and University College and exam hall. Then to Addison's walk which had been built by Royalists to connect the two branches of the Cherwell by means of a wide ditch and had thrown up the soil which had really made the straight walk. Now planted with trees – AddisonFootnote ⁴⁰³ used to walk along as Fellow of All Souls when writing for Spectator. Royalists had fought with this as their front line trench, had put their artillery on it. Told me sad story of two Fellows of All Souls at this time. Royalists were using certain of the country houses outside Oxford to billet their men and one of the younger officers, a Fellow, married, was allowed by King Charles to live in one of these houses. Having wedding breakfast with number of guests in house when suddenly a Parliamentarian officer, a close friend of this man, also a Fellow of All Souls, sent word to say that he had behind him substantial forces of artillery, they were prepared, if they evacuated the house without fighting, to give them safe conduct into Oxford, otherwise they would be compelled to blow it up with all occupants. Royalist officer, because of presence of women guests, acceded to request and got safe conduct to Oxford, and only then learned that this had been a bluff on part of Parliamentary officer who only had his own men to surround this place and had put up story to secure possession without a fight. Result was that King Charles had officer court martialled and shot for giving up place without a fight, and his friend in Parliamentary army at once gave up fighting for the Parliament and took no further part in the war. The place where he was shot was a continuation of these earth works, now called Dead Man's Walk.

At night learned of retreat to Singapore and unutterable shame to British and white races of retreat before not greatly superior coloured enemy.

Sunday, 1/2/42

Returned to London in morning and had sleep.

Monday, 2/2/42

War Cabinet, future of Singapore discussed. Attitude of COS towards Singapore position appalled me, as they did not seem to attach much importance to the retreat and when they stated they were only leaving 16 fighters on the island, of which 8 were [Brewster] Buffaloes, everybody in Cabinet was aghast. I asked what explanation there could be as they admitted having 4 British, Indian and Australian Divisions opposing 5 Jap Divisions at the most, and at the last stages of the 50 miles of fighting the Japs had been without tanks that surely the brigades in Singapore could have gone up the west coast and stopped infiltration on that side, and that they might at least have tried to keep the last aerodrome to give the people in Singapore a chance. Churchill said fighters to be shifted to Sumatra, 250 miles away, and he was horrified to hear it himself, he had learned since there were 2 small aerodromes in between that could possibly be used to let them get closer. I asked him why all this machinery that we are trying to get to Australia for shifting earth could not be used to make an aerodrome on one of adjacent islands, he said would go into it. I asked whether there could be inquiry into general conduct of the campaign so that we would get out of the Generals’ heads that a successful retreat was what they were there for, instead of fighting.

Discussed way in which control of this area could be secured to try and make certain the strategy adopted would be satisfactory to Australia and that immediate steps could be taken to help the position within next few days. Churchill showed me wire from Roosevelt setting out view that he would not have a council on a Ministerial plane in Washington but prepared to allow a military mission to sit there and keep in close contact with combined COS. Roosevelt said in his view the Council on the Ministerial plane should be in London.

Eden produced letter from Dutch Prime MinisterFootnote ⁴⁰⁴ saying they desired it in London, and that it would be very inconvenient and difficult, in fact practically impossible, for them to be represented in Washington.

Churchill agreed under my pressure that he would be prepared to give both, the Ministerial Council in London and the military mission in Washington, and accordingly I sent cable in that direction to Curtin as soon as meeting was over.

Tuesday, 3/2/42

I sent cable saying appointing Wardell as it was impossible for us to do this job without getting more information than we were and hopeless for me to go around chasing it. Bridges gave me some extra stuff to put in cable.

Lunch with McColl,Footnote ⁴⁰⁵ Vacuum Oil representative on Main Petroleum Board that handles whole of petroleum bases between America and England, and Elliott,Footnote ⁴⁰⁶ Vacuum Oil man controlling Far East and especially Australia, at Hungarian café. They told me how Australia came to be pooled last year so far as its petrol supplies were concerned and it would have been pooled much worse if they had not fought to retain their own tankers for Australian use when British threatened to commandeer them and use them for Britain.

They admitted no justification for preferential discrimination in favour of South Africa and India that was shown and that any explanations that had been given were only thought of after the event and not before. There was no question, they said, that the supply of petrol followed the rationing down and for this there was no justification because it was obvious that what did happen would happen, that is that the stocks in Australia would diminish instead of increase. During the last 3 or 4 months everybody had realized what a stupid policy it was and we were fortunate in being more or less put back in the position we were 12 months ago as regards total stocks. I pointed out this was not sufficient if Australia was to be used as a base of supplies for America, would involve an increase in 100 octane, and also in ordinary petrol and lubricating oils too, and what seemed a fairly safe position of 20 weeks in thinking of the pre-Jap war consumption would be nothing like the same relative stock under the new conditions. As well as that, the sources of supply were much further away, and though Elliott assured me they were using every tanker and every possible means to get as much petrol out of the Dutch East Indies into Australia before the Japs could get it, he said he would like to keep in touch with me regularly to let me know how things were going.

Discussion with Duncan, Hyland, Coleman and Low re machine tools. Duncan pointed out Australian Government had been very unfair both to British Government and to Australia House in the disorderly way in which they had put up their story and in suddenly swinging into the ring a number of fresh demands that nobody could catalogue or relate to previous orders. After having a good look at the whole thing we agreed that the best thing to do was not to try and get an itemized list to Beaverbrook, but for me to write him a stout letter throwing ourselves on his mercy and seeing if that would not bring the result, praising Craven and Mills for what they had done.

Communication also made to Macgregor to try and bring list of items into line.

Wednesday, 4/2/42

Wrote letter mentioned above to Beaverbrook.

Had QuigleyFootnote ⁴⁰⁷ to lunch – told me of his troubles with Sir Archibald PageFootnote ⁴⁰⁸ and his efforts to get the generation of electricity decentralized in Britain into 400 different units. Also gave me story re his view of what should happen in Australia after the war and how we should push our proposals now, which had merit. He told me frankly his opinion of the Government and governing classes in Britain.

At Cabinet Offices saw Ismay and told him what I wanted in way of information. He did not quite see who really could give me the information I wanted, no-one had a very clear picture of the position, what practically everyone was doing was stopping up the gaps while waiting till we were strong enough to crack the Japs. The best he thought to help me would be to give me Wavell's daily cables to the War Office, which must be regarded as very secret as they were not distributed even to the War Cabinet. He would send them down every day if I did not mind him taking them back after I had a look at them. He said the only way to get satisfaction and a general plan worked out was to push on with the Far Eastern Council on the ministerial plane in London which would have the COS organization attached to it, and this would give us a Far Eastern Defence Committee, as I have already pointed out, and that body would be informed of what was going on, would really be the driving and initiating force in regard to policy for the COS in Washington, that the organization in Washington was obviously a façade, the real work was being done here, and in fact when they went across and showed them exactly what they were doing here, the Americans said they wanted a machine like that, as if they could buy it out of a shop. Said we had to do everything in our power to get the Far Eastern Council established here, at present at any rate. Said would have a talk with him every third or fourth day as nobody else could give proper outline of position.

Thursday, 5/2/42

Interesting talk with Liaison Committee, where Colonel Wardell, Colvin and McNamaraFootnote ⁴⁰⁹ each tried to excel one another in the results they were bringing to the common pool. The results were really dismaying from point of view of what we were getting at, though interesting from point of view of information supplied.

Talk with Wardell who had followed my instructions yesterday to establish himself as Liaison Officer without any instructions from Australia. Said he had a good talk with Director of Planning, Brigadier Stewart,Footnote ⁴¹⁰ and after an argument and discussion they had agreed that he should come in just below the Planning Committee the results that had been achieved. Stewart said there will not be many things that directly affect Australia that he would be interested in, but Wardell had the wit to say straight away it was essential for him to see the whole picture and asked what was the immediate problem being put before the Planning Committee. Stewart said the problem of reinforcements to the Middle East, and Wardell at once said that was exactly where he must come in because what was done for the Middle East may interfere with what was done for the Far East and consequently he must have some say.

Bruce is pleased with that start.

Lunch with Society of Apothecaries in their original hall that had not been destroyed by the blitz and had only been partly destroyed by the fire of London in 1666. Hall first of all built in 1606, part of it being connecting link between the Bridewell Palace and Priory in Blackfriars both of which were used for the court by Henry VIII and the passage along which Catherine of Aragon walked to her trial was part of their actual building. Immediately above it was the room in which the Master slept and had his meals, and in the gallery garret slept the apprentices in the old days.

They had lots of rights and privileges which they could not exercise. One was to drive down the streets of London on the wrong side of the road, which had never been taken away from them. Another was right to vote for the Sheriffs and Lord Mayor of London.

Society began by De Laune in 1606 and their coat of arms, instead of having a unicorn, had a rhinoceros with a single horn. Dr WallFootnote ⁴¹¹ an authority on old London, who was a past Master of the Society and knew the whole history, said that at that time the real search was for insoluble carbonites like lime because of their value in indigestion, that so many people in those days were poisoned that whenever they felt a pain in their stomachs a couple of hours after meals they would at once think they were poisoned, so ground unicorn's or rhinoceros’ horn would be given for that purpose.

Showed me original documents in minute books from first day the Society was founded which they had managed to save out of the fire. Bill was for the present wainscoting and panelling of the hall when it was put back just after the fire. Pictures of all the masters, most of them stowed away.

All had a desire to see Australia. There is no doubt that Australia more than any other country has captured the imagination of the people here. It is bad luck that public statements might destroy the effect of the wonderful readiness of our lads to fight for the Empire.

Saturday, 7/2/42

Cable from Australia agreeing to Pacific War Council and appointing me representative and giving me authority to delegate power to anybody I liked.Footnote ⁴¹²

Monday, 9/2/42

Discussion with McNamara re return of experienced personnel for teaching Australian flying chaps.

Report from Wardell that Japanese landed on Singapore on a three-mile front.

War Cabinet, Churchill disturbed first by persistent American rumours and stories that Britain let everybody else do the fighting, and secondly by Jap success on Singapore, which had penetrated some 5 miles and captured Tenda aerodrome.

Stout wire to Percival and Wavell urging fight to last. Wire to Curtin advising him to be pretty stout about Singapore and saying sending production stuff along tomorrow.

Mr and Mrs Duncan to dinner. Discussed way in which liaison would be worked. Ministry of Production White Paper to be issued tomorrow, when will be able to work out whole system.

Tuesday, 10/2/42

Sent cable re War Cabinet to Curtin. Met intelligence Committee, found it was a wash-out as they were only concerned with working out the way Japan would attack us and not how we would resist. After 20 minutes’ discussion we said would find out who knew something about it.

Pacific War Council 6pm, present were Dutch, NZ, and Amery and other British Ministers.

Discussion on methods of procedure, set out in cable to Curtin. Had definite undertaking that [Far Eastern] Council would be able to deal with whole war with Japan. Cable from Wavell asking that method to ultimately defeat Japan should be planned. I urged they should at once get on with [the] job so that we should concentrate our strength on those key points that would be essential for the offensive and let the others go while we had no actual strength available to resist in all quarters.

Question of Dilli [Dili, capital of East Timor, now Timor Leste] raised, held up for day or two to see effects of Staff talks.

Interview with Beaverbrook, said would do everything to help. Called in Sir Walter Layton and said he would deal with general question of survey. Got in touch with Mills and told him to get busy with machine tools. Got Mills in afternoon and had talk with him […] as a result of which sent long cable on machine tools to Australia.

Wednesday, 11/2/42

Drive to Tower and South London.

Saw Sir Walter Layton with Bruce, got very little satisfaction as he had not developed any organization and was evidently in a dither.

Discussion on cable sending to Australia, got Ismay and his men to alter general set-up.

Thursday, 12/2/42

Lunch with Royal College of Surgeons, Princess Mary,Footnote ⁴¹³ only lady Honorary Fellow, sat alongside me. Pleasant talk about Sir Thomas DunhillFootnote ⁴¹⁴ who had taken her goitre out – she had been a donor of blood to Blood Bank, so quite a number of soldiers had royal blood in their veins. Said had met Iven at Watford. Had done a number of nursing courses. Said in her speech that her father, when the Royal College of Surgeons suggested she should become an Honorary Fellow, said he was quite willing on one condition – that she was never [to be] allowed to practise on him.

Professor Durasj,Footnote ⁴¹⁵ who founded a Polish academy of Medicine in Edinburgh, also presented with Honorary Fellowship. Only 50 Honorary Fellows allowed by Royal Charter.

Webb-Johnson made good speech, one of his best points being story told of one of Buckston Browne'sFootnote ⁴¹⁶ dinners, 10 courses, when chairman got up, said he was like Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms – ‘I can take no other course’.

Buckston Browne, 92, founder of luncheon which was for purpose of enabling Fellows and members to get to know one another – made 40 minutes’ speech with plenty of vigor [sic] and most forward outlook. Said all politicians had failed to realize the true nature of what their policy should be because they were not biologists – all biologists knew that in nature there was a ceaseless struggle, and consequently to outlaw war was completely impossible. Told me he was going out to see a case professionally next day – he said Sir Thomas Barlow,Footnote ⁴¹⁷ 96, regularly saw 2 or 3 cases a day.

Discussion with Bruce, Low, Coleman, Coffey,Footnote ⁴¹⁸ RoweFootnote ⁴¹⁹ & Duncan as to best way to secure satisfactory action re supply.

To Air picture with Coleman. Dinner with Lord & Lady Kemsley, Oliver Stanley,Footnote ⁴²⁰ previous Minister Board of Trade, Lord Victor Warrender,Footnote ⁴²¹ who looks after conditions of ATS, […]

Friday, 13/2/42

Called to see Dutch Minister and Dutch Prime Minister with Bruce. Found Dutch Minister 100% for our ideas and anxious to work them to full.

Hour's talk with Churchill between 1 & 2pm as result of cables I received from Australia. Churchill upset because an attack made on him by Senator Cameron, Minister of Aircraft Production,Footnote ⁴²² which seemed to me pretty dirty. Churchill said prepared to let Australian troops go back any way they liked – realized difficulties we were in and thanked me for what I had done to keep ship on an even keel.

Caught train to Bradford by ¾ second. […] Arrived Bradford midnight, frozen stiff […]

Saturday, 14/2/42

Visited Titus Salt works at Saltaire, established 100 years ago, original building still standing, one weaving room 200 yards long by about 20 yards across in which there were 16,500 looms. Shortage of labor causing certain amount of inability to work all looms 100%. Saw some beautiful fabrics.

To Torridon, experimental wool research place, saw how much had been done re unshrinkable fabrics, especially socks and army materials, what had been done by injection of carbon into cloth to make it absorb gas and used as surgical dressings, fine cellulose undergarments, stockings, dress pieces, all sorts of dyes.

Lunch with Chamber [of] Commerce and used ‘Think Quicker’ speech – most representative gathering.

To Wool Control at Benridding and saw Sir Henry Shackleton.

Drove over Ilkley Moor, beautiful scene.

Cocktails with […] heads of Wool Control. Back to Midland Hotel, given dinner by Cooks Club, half ladies, interesting evening.

Sunday, 15/2/42

Saw resuscitation unit, Dr HughesFootnote ⁴²³ at Bradford Civic Hospital. […] Dr Hughes had same idea as myself to have a colour on his operating theatre that would make you see better when you looked back at the patient. Where I had mine chocolate brown, he has his green and finds it so restful to the eye that he himself dresses in green and his nurses as well.

Speech to Legion, made honorary member.

Bad cable from Curtin, saying what he wanted in certain eventualities.Footnote ⁴²⁴

Listened to broadcast from Churchill who said Singapore [had] fallen.

Arranged to get train to come down through Leeds.

Monday, 16/2/42

Arrived London, terribly cold. Wires from Curtin demanding whole strategy of war to be defined and Australian soldiers brought home only in a co-operative spirit.

Coleman had had argument with War Cabinet Secretariat who tried to make us go through DO. Bruce agreed with me that these wires only being sent to me because of ill feeling that had grown up between Churchill and Curtin and the proper channel for them to be dealt with was through COS and not DO, and I should insist on dealing with them direct.

Wire from Wavell who said if bases in south of Sumatra lost he did not see how he could possibly hold Java and would have to fall back on Australia and Darwin would go. Curtin raised question as to whether troops should land in Dutch East Indies or go home and Wavell said matter acute. Pointed out they would only have by end of 3 weeks 171 aeroplanes in Far East. He expected heavy wastage which would reduce these and more than compensate for any reinforcements, and asked for instructions as to whether he should desert Dutch East Indies or not.

McNamara had fantastic letter from America saying they were going to give that area 1142 planes but did not say when, but at same time said they refused to give us the 125 Kitty HawksFootnote ⁴²⁵ that Churchill and I wired about 10 days ago.

To War Cabinet, where Churchill told us they had no news since surrender – he had urged them to fight to the last – that Percival had said the last British division was disintegrating and the Australians were half-hearted in their fighting, that the civilian population was in an awful mess – they had taken one of the reservoirs and could not hold it in face of all the trouble.

Japs claim 55,000 fit prisoners.

Raised question as to whether we should give publicity to Jap atrocities.

Put up to Cabinet constructive method of dealing with strategical problems by having Deputy COS as COS of Pacific War Council and give their whole time to working out methods of holding the Japs. This would enable us to deal with urgent questions quickly. I pointed out that there had never been a real appreciation of position – I realized that was not due to any lack of goodwill by COS themselves but when they had to bear the burden of the whole world war they could not give the time or thought to such a huge expanse of trouble.

Churchill said the COS had concentrated during last 3 or 4 days on this particular problem and tomorrow night we will have to make decision as to whether will pull our soldiers out of Dutch East Indies. His own view was that Australians should go back to Australia as he thought now there was certain to be an invasion though before he thought it very unlikely. I said we had to make up our minds very quickly as to what were the key positions we should concentrate on holding that would be necessary for our own offensive – it was no use dissipating our energies everywhere.

Word brought in that Palembang in Dutch Sumatra taken by Japs and £20 million of oil and equipment and our most important provisions of octane had gone by the board.

Pointed out that most of harbours of Java were on the northern coast and it looked as if we would lose control of the Sunda Straits and unable to get reinforcements anyhow to Dutch because harbours on southern part of Java would be poor.

To Defence Committee meeting 10pm, shipping position discussed with view to extraordinary action being taken to change ordinary schedule of shipping to enable reinforcements to stabilize military situation in Far East, Middle East and security of India and Australia.

It was pointed out that if the bread position in Britain were altered so that nothing but Government bread was actually available, between 400 and 600 thousand tons of shipping would thereby become available during this year.

They set out that their requirements were to maintain for as long as possible a front eastwards of the Indian Ocean, that is in the outer islands of the East Indies basin especially Timor, Java and Sumatra and at all costs to hold Burma and Australia as bases from which we can later launch an offensive against Japan. The Americans must hold Hawaii and those Pacific Islands necessary to their air reinforcement routes. The Japs have already 24 divisions and strong naval and air forces in the ABDA area. The Allies had only 24 divisions, of which 5 were in Singapore but have now surrendered and 1 in the Philippines. We are inferior at sea and in the air, so obviously considerable reinforcements are essential. In the Middle East, if the 3 Australian divisions are to go back home they will have to be replaced and this can only be done around the Cape. India – there must be some white divisions because Jap successes will put it into a ferment. As well as that, the American forces have to be moved across the Atlantic to garrison the British Isles and let the British Divisions get elsewhere to fight.

100,000 extra men are needed from Middle East to Far East, 100,000 from India to Middle East and Far East, and 500,000 from UK to Middle East and Far East, and their replacement by American[s]. The problem is not merely one of getting reinforcements there, though that involves a very difficult problem on two sides, on question of shifting personnel, and [second], of cargo shipping to shift equipment. But when that is finished there is a maintenance of ½ ton a man a month necessary to keep them going. So if you have 700,000, you would really need at least 3½ to 4 million gross registered tons a year for that purpose.

First priority was for the Naval personnel and A/A and Civil Defence units for Indian Ocean bases, RAF personnel for aircraft, Middle and Far East, and [second] priority was movement of new formations to these areas.

Leathers said he thought he could see his way clear to lift the number of personnel from 100,000 to 160,000 in first 6 months and possibly to 180,000.

Churchill raised question as to whether army was not being over-mechanized and hampered with mechanical gear. Percival's report on Malaya fighting said Jap success due to fact that they have made themselves independent of motor transport. Japs are not merely imitators – they realized that object of an army is to fight, that underlies all training, they have led the world in development of landing operations including design of special landing craft carriers and landing craft. Jap army has always been to the fore in the primary infantry virtues of marching and fighting while placing minimum reliance on MT. Japs have adopted foreign technique to their own requirements and Asiatic conditions. In Malaya they had close co-ordination between supporting arms, mortar, army, air, using wireless telegraphy. The use of noise as a weapon of war, such as [fire]crackers, loud mortar bombs, especially effective in jungle country where visibility poor. Quick and effective air support assisted by possession by the army of its own air arm, use of trees as fire positions, giving advantage over ground-bound opponents. Exploitation of our road boundness by encircling movement and continual blocking of road behind our troops, resulting often in loss of guns and transport.

These tactics evidence pre-thought and training, skill shown in repairing demolished barriers by use of local materials and overcoming obstacles particularly for the passage of tanks – can only have resulted from thorough and sound training of engineering units.

Impression of ineffectiveness of Jap army in China resulted from accounts of uninformed ringside observers of second-rate Jap troops Shanghai. Although Jap external discipline such as details of dress and carriage appears sloppy, a high standard of internal discipline is maintained. Strong army tradition based on loyalty to Emperor and offensive spirit exists and is basis of morale. Feeling is that it is a privilege to belong to army, no inducements such as good pay and food are offered. On contrary hard living enforced as good for morale and discipline. These factors made Jap army formidable fighting force, able to adapt modern technique to variety of conditions at short notice. Air superiority, tanks, though contributing to success, were not determining factors. Standard of toughness in Jap divisions in Malaya probably above that of rest of Jap army and approximate to that of Commandos which are only small proportion [of] our army.

In face of such organized discipline, tough troops of high morale, troops whose discipline is anything less than high class, training incomplete and so morale unsound – tend to disintegrate rapidly.

In order to take on Jap army with any hope of success forces must be trained to high standard of toughness, fighting efficiency, adaptability, discipline and morale. British army standard equipment generally too heavy and cumbersome for work off roads. Personal equipment should be light. Transport must be reduced to minimum though artillery had proved its value continually and much feared by Japs.

Defence Committee then discussed strategical position in Far East. Question had arisen now that Palembang has fallen whether anything of Sumatra at all can be held. If southern Sumatra cannot be held it appears impossible to hold Java for any length of time as Japs would control the Sunda Straits and they already have taken the islands at the other end of Java. This makes difficult the getting into Java of any reinforcements as the transports are very open to attack. Amount of air bases that would be available are not nearly as good as what is available to the Japs. In addition, inside next 3 weeks there could only be in position in whole of this area 171 aircraft to fight what was estimated to be at least 1,000 Jap planes.

Question arose as to what was to be done – was Java to be abandoned and was the soundest view to concentrate the Australian troops and all reinforcements on Australia, using it as a base from which ultimately the offensive could begin. The Australian Government had set out 2 suggestions – the 1^st was that the whole of their troops should be used in Pacific area, and 2^nd that if it were not possible to be certain of saving Java, the troops should not be wasted as had been done in fighting up to present, in which a kind of rearguard action had been fought instead of standing at the key points. Apparently the possibility of getting reinforcements sufficiently early to these key points had been missed. Question that had to be decided was what was soundest policy now, and the matter was very urgent as [one] Australian Division was actually due to land in Dutch East Indies within 48 hours. If decision was to take them to Australia they should not be put into any unnecessary danger zone but go straight on to Australia to disembark. Question was whether this should be done, and to which point they would go.

I pointed out in my view for all practical purposes Darwin could be reckoned as one of the Dutch East Indies. It was so isolated from rest of Australia as to be practically as vulnerable to sea, land or air, while Japan had control of the sea, as Java or any other island. That the proper line of protection was the line New Guinea, New Caledonia, down to NZ, and if this could not be held then the line must be back in Australia. This made it very hard indeed on the Dutch who had been fighting so gallantly, and yet if we did not take the sane view with regard to this matter we would not save the Dutch but would lose our own men.

Churchill had pointed out that he had flung into Singapore the 18^th British Division within a week of the surrender, that we were short 20,000 men because of that in the attempt to save the position and there was no sense in doing the same again, as it took us at least 6 months to get 5 divisions which we had lost in Singapore out from England and we had not the equipment to spare.

I said I had always fought for the strategy in which the real battle of Malaya should have been fought from the north of Johore, that all the troops in Singapore should have been flung into that battle, if they could not win that, they should have evacuated Singapore. We were mad if we did not learn sense by our mistakes. The Dutch would possibly see it if it was put to them very straight. Churchill agreed that if one came to consider the matter, it was better for Java that it should not have Batavia, Sourabaya and its other towns wrecked in a futile fight and the lines of all the combatant units who could be of extraordinary value in the ultimate offensive because he felt sure ultimately Japan would be destroyed by a direct attack at her heart from either China or from Pacific rather than by picking up these islands piecemeal. I was in perfect agreement with that – that it was essential to maintain Australia and India as bases. The only rotten thing was that we were retaining as bases two British possessions and leaving everything else go – up to present everybody who had leant upon us had been broken to pieces.

This tentative decision was taken by Defence Committee, but before communicating it as a decision to the COS in Washington or to our own people, it was felt that an opportunity should be given for the Dutch military representative to thrash the matter out with the COS tomorrow. Churchill said to me ‘You will have to put up the case for the desertion of the Dutch.’

Tuesday, 17/2/42

To House of Commons to listen to Churchill making statement about escape of German battleships and fall of Singapore.

Discussion with Bruce on strategic position and best way to approach fight on Pacific War Council. He agreed it would be very bad if I had to open the ball re the non-reinforcement of Java when Australian troops were really the ones in question, and he was seeing Eden and would have a word with him to see if they could put Churchill on to the job.

Talk with Wardell who had been in Planning Committee and got Dutch point [of] view. Their idea was that they should carry out an offensive with the naval forces at their disposal, which would considerably hamper Japs.

Talk with Jordan,Footnote ⁴²⁶ NZ High Commissioner who sent me the letter that his own people had sent to the British Prime Minister for consideration of NZ as a big base.

5pm Bruce back to discuss proper way to put up case to Pacific War Council. Cable in from Wavell very definitely urging no more reinforcements for Java. Cable from Australia setting out views. I had sent an earlier cable dealing with War Cabinet and Defence Committee meeting.

To Pacific War Council where Churchill produced Wavell's cables. The most pathetic thing I have ever seen was the Dutch Prime Minister and his Minister begging to be allowed to fight for their country right to the death, whether they got reinforcements or not. I swung into discussion pointing out that if the Dutch were allowed to fight with all the forces already on the island it would be the best symbol of Allied cohesion that we could possibly have and would be valuable at present just after fall of Singapore.

Dutch Admiral keen on having naval offensive even if they could not get air offensive and satisfied this would hold back the Jap advance for several weeks at any rate and give us more time to get ready.

I pointed out there were 3 issues – 1^st as to whether Dutch should fight it out in Java. To that we agreed. Secondly whether we should reinforce Java with Australian troops. We all agreed this should not be done, useless waste of manpower & resources. Thirdly as to whether our reinforcements should be flung in, and I felt certain that Burma was the place and was prepared to recommend it with the qualification that they would be relieved at earliest opportunity. Churchill said prepared to accept this and to base the whole of the advice to Wavell on this foundation and asked that Ismay and I should get cable ready. Put in additional recommendation that Americans should start to bomb Tokyo with seaplane carriers as early as possible.

Cranborne came 10.30pm to look at wire, made certain suggestions for alteration which we adopted, and Ismay submitted his wire at 12.30am.

The day has been an extraordinary experience. I felt like a condemned criminal having to put the story up to the Dutch that we could not help them in their fight even though they had helped us so much, but the way the thing worked out, the Dutch were very grateful to me personally and to Australia generally for our attitude and were most expressive in their thanks. I feel we have a permanent and fast friend on the Council.

13 recommendations sent forward from Council to COS Washington, easily the most constructive suggestions made as a whole since I have been associated with War Cabinet, and I begin to feel perhaps it is wise to stop a bit longer to give the momentum to the machinery I have created for consultation before I return.

Wednesday, 18/2/42

7am contacted Sir Andrew Duncan and saw him in my dressing gown to secure from him consent to preside over the meeting of our munition men with his Directors of Production. Prepared to do this if I would come along as well so that any political issues that arose could be ironed out at once. McColl of Vacuum Oil was there, anxious to help in every way to get oil to Australia.

Suggested to Bruce he should get an appreciation of Chinese position in war and send it to our Government to help good work that I have started.

Quigley called.

Lunch Empire Parliamentary Association and heard Stafford Cripps speak on Russia – he said essential agree with Russia re its frontiers. If we could agree on the 1941 frontiers, all the other problems of world readjustment and reconstruction could be solved, Russia would begin to play definitely and lose suspicions of our attitude generally. The Russian mind was quite different from ours; in looking on the actions that seemed reprehensible to us one had always to remember they had a view half-way between the European and the Asian. They assured him they did not want the Dardanelles, would be satisfied with the warm water port on the Baltic, though no doubt they would be all the more pleased to get an outlet on the Persian Gulf. Feel satisfied that as soon as ready they will come into war with Japan as the differences between Russia and Japan could not be solved except by war.

Staggered by wire from Curtin saying inclined to turn down proposal of helping through Burma,Footnote ⁴²⁷ and found that Wavell's cable had not been sent, so roared everybody up. Got Bruce to send his away and sent my own cable asking for reconsideration.

Thursday, 19/2/42

Received positive wire from Curtin turning down proposal to send troops to Burma but admitting that LavarackFootnote ⁴²⁸ thought Australia's best interests would be served by course we suggested but COS in Australia had said he was not 100% protected. Had personal talk with Churchill and told him if he could give me certain assurances re position in Burma I thought I could get their consent. These assurances were 1^st that Australian division would have a definite chance to retrieve the position completely, 2^nd that they could be got into Rangoon in reasonable safety, and 3^rd that if Rangoon were taken they could be supplied if they fell back and operated in conjunction with Chinese. He said prepared to stand by anything Ismay said in this regard and that he would do his best to get in addition American troops. Showed me cable from America offering to send additional division to Australia if Australians lent their division for this purpose. I accordingly saw Ismay who could not give me assurance about position in Burma so sent wire to Curtin saying holding telegram secret till received further advice, that there had been no instructions to divert the course of the convoy from the NEI, that Churchill would try and expedite the arrival of the American division, and pointed out importance to Allies of China being kept in war.

During night wire from Curtin saying definitely that the division, if NEI was ruled out as agreed destination of AIF, should go back to Australia with greatest expedition.Footnote ⁴²⁹

Friday, 20/2/42

Showed cable to Churchill who told me instructions would now be given for diversion of convoy to Australia and at same time officially communicated Australian Government's decision to Pacific War Council. Tried before this to make certain that all my wires and Wavell's appreciations had been seen by Australian people before they finally committed themselves to decision.

Bull sick. With Elizabeth to ‘Merry Wives of Windsor’ – character of Falstaff best I have ever seen.

1am Colonel Jacob rang to say cables from Prime Minister he wished to see. Brought 3 cables – 1 from Churchill to Curtin, Churchill to Roosevelt and Roosevelt to Churchill for Curtin. Discussion till 3.30am.

Saturday, 21/2/42

Had to put off visit to Close Smiths on account of difficulty of getting information, finally found special meeting of Pacific Council being held 9.30pm to discuss position in Java.

Sent cables re Pacific War Council and sent cable from Wavell to Australia. Gave Pacific Council's report on cable. Council urged that flow of American heavy bombers to Java should continue, praised work done in Bali Straits in smashing Jap fleet, laid down basis on which evacuation should take place from Java and way in which ships there should be used. Also moved Burma from ABDA area and pointed out that successful naval action off Bali reinforced claim for American naval support.

Sunday, 22/2/42

Received Curtin's wire turning down suggestion to send any stuff to reinforce Burma.

Drove out with Elizabeth and Iven to Watford, picked up Bull at Ealing, and went to see Close SmithFootnote ⁴³⁰ at Boycott Manor in Buckinghamshire. Manor belongs to T. Close Smith who was born at Gordonbrook, great great grandfather came out (Palmer) with first ship that came to Australia. On the Close side his people had been there since about 1820. When 7, he was sent to England to school, when 21 given year at Gordonbrook, decided to come to England to live and practise law. Beautiful painting of Heifer Station 1880 when ringbarking was almost negligible on Towgon paddocks – pictures of Camelback and Kyogle Station.

Took us to Stowe school, founded 1922, about 600 pupils, situated in Duke of Buckingham's old palace, lovely chapel. In Stowe grounds there are host of temples built by Duke of Buckingham in 18^th century.

Received news by phone of telegram Churchill had stupidly sent to Australia. Despatched fairly reasonable telegram.

Monday, 23/2/42

Wrote Churchill asking for clarification of position to prove there had been no double dealing. Got a most penitent letter from Ismay dictated at Churchill's request which set out my position beyond any dispute, but also proved by the actual sequence of events that Churchill had simply acted inadvertently rather than deliberately in infringing the rule of prior consultation with Australia. Prepared cable setting this out.

Sir Andrew Duncan and heads of all his Production Department: Sir William RootesFootnote ⁴³¹ and Sir Harold Brown,Footnote ⁴³² TurnerFootnote ⁴³³ and Weeks,Footnote ⁴³⁴ met J.S. Duncan, Rowe and self for Australia, Du Toit for South Africa,Footnote ⁴³⁵ Dr Campbell for NZ and ChristieFootnote ⁴³⁶ for India, all accompanied by their technical officers. Bill Low accompanied me. Interesting discussion for couple of hours and unanimously agreed on point that there should be in London an organization associated with the Production Ministry which provided first for the Empire planning of production and an Empire review of whole position, and secondly what I described as a projection of the Eastern Group Council to London to be in constant communication with the British Ministry of Supply to work out their problems in exactly the same way as the COS arrangement was working between London and Washington. This would consist of technical advisers just like the COS are. Adjourned for couple of days for everybody to clear their minds as to best way it could be brought about. I took Rowe and Duncan and asked them to put down in writing their idea of the machine so that we could put up a concrete proposition to the British Government and ensure that this would be the basis of the improved machinery.

Lunch with Colonel Wallace Benson,Footnote ⁴³⁷ Elizabeth & Iven at hotel.

Discussion with Wardell re strategic importance of Ceylon, prepared for me appreciation for War Cabinet at 6pm. At War Cabinet discussed war situation, and on Far Eastern position Churchill raised question of Australian troops, thanked me for all I had done to get it right and for my general help. Discussed Ceylon, Churchill said would not make any more requests and I said if they would give me the appreciation I would make the request myself.

Tuesday, 24/2/42

Received wire from Australia insisting on evacuation of Australians from Java before everybody else.Footnote ⁴³⁸ Send wire telling them would not under any circumstances advocate this absolute preference. Showed wire to Ismay and Bridges who said they could not understand any Government making my path so hard.

To Pacific War Council meeting where question of further reinforcement of Java was considered fully and strong representation made for America to send quickly as possible bombers and fighters and naval craft. Great pride in wonderful offensive spirit shown by Dutch arms and Ministers and Admiral. Agreed passing to Australia a request that they should send on as fast as possible any American stuff that came through. After meeting sent cable to Australia.

During day had meeting under Duncan's presidency of Raw Materials Empire Committee on Ministerial plane. Present were South African, NZ, Indian and Canadian representatives as well as self and Low. Proved on discussion that none of these men had received reply to British Government's offer of this system of consultation and consequently they refused to discuss the mechanism. They all admitted the Governments were certain to accept and it was agreed that next morning a meeting of the technical officers should be held.

Sent long cable setting out need for assistance to Ceylon.Footnote ⁴³⁹

Wednesday, 25/2/42

Went with MR to Rugby and Coventry. At Rugby at British Thomson HoustonFootnote ⁴⁴⁰ [where Page was] shown around works, saw interesting RDF developments, special transformation of their works and equipment to carry out aeroplane construction, naval work and all classes of munitions. Works had grown from 2,000 to 14,000 workers. Girls looked healthy, keen and alert, most of them doing work requiring great deal of deftness in fingers and this no doubt helps to keep them keen. They said they were able to pick up the work after a fortnight's training, but the management said it took 3 months to make them actually efficient – some earning 100% bonus over their wages. Lunch with directors and chat over war production. Saw laboratory, good job on lights, saw film illustrating simply the action of the radio waves.

To Coventry where made speech to Lord Mayor. Had look around devastated city, saw St Mary's hall, spires of cathedral, and plan of reconstruction which will make it a beautiful garden city in the future.

On to Kenilworth Castle. […] At 2am Prime Minister rang wanting me to send cable to Australia about Dorman Smith'sFootnote ⁴⁴¹ request for assistance for Burma. Said I felt sure it would damage the Ceylon request I had already made.

Spoke to Coleman later in night – told me bad wire from Australia.Footnote ⁴⁴²

Thursday, 26/2/42

Drove through Warwick and Leamington to Rugby where caught the train to London.

During afternoon got ready complete answer to bad wire from Australia, which did very effectively. Colvin and Wardell helped me with preparation of answer to cable which they felt was entirely dictated by political considerations.

Quigley […] to dinner. Quigley produced plan of industrialization of Australia but did not produce any means of implementing it. I pointed out obstacles and they have gone away to think out an answer to these difficulties.

Friday, 27/2/42

Talk with press, gave them background of position, emphasizing advance made in Empire consultation.

Lunch with Lord McGowan, discussed question of paralleling UK and Australian production – I pointed out way in which I thought it should be approached.

Saw Bruce and his wire to Curtin re incident on Sunday which thought very foolish in that he mentioned Churchill and Cripps and commented on them by name, which might place them in dangerous position vis-à-vis Australian Government with these men subsequently convinced of my own wisdom in never commenting on persons in official documents.

Dinner with Whyte, General Manager of Royal Bank of Scotland, with whom were Maitland,Footnote ⁴⁴³ head of Scottish unionists, and Colonel Stevenson.Footnote ⁴⁴⁴ These men are in close touch with CrippsFootnote ⁴⁴⁵ and building him up as much as possible.

Monday, 2/3/42

Saw Harcourt Johnstone,Footnote ⁴⁴⁶ Minister for Overseas Trade, […] told me that to his surprise the exports of Britain in the last quarter were ¾ of what they were in the last quarter of 1940 in value and about ½ what they were in volume pre-war. These were the exports outside of the munitions and machine tools being exported – pretty good indication of manner in which the workmen and women of England were standing up to their job of production. Showed as well how efficiently our shipping was carried on.

To War Cabinet where discussed whole position – bad news that the Japs were very much superior naval forces, had sunk 2 Dutch, 1 British and 1 American cruiser and quite [a] number of destroyers and smaller craft and practically wiped out our fleet, that the Dutch Admiral had given up the joint command, had acquiesced in all the naval-boats going to Columbo, leaving Java wide open to the Jap to come in.

Wavell had gone to Burma where he had stimulated the defence so that they were holding Rangoon again. Saw interesting map of way into China which shows that even if Rangoon is lost they could still get stuff through from India and Assam.

Wire received from Curtin 10pm offering two brigade groups for Ceylon, in rather ungenerous terms.

Tuesday, 3/3/42

Sent wire to Curtin asking for definite answers to 3 points, what they wanted done about North Australian command, what they were doing about the Dutch planes that were arriving in Australia and thirdly how long they would let these fellows stay in Ceylon.

Received fairly satisfactory answers to wires of Monday.

To Pacific War Council meeting with Attlee in chair. Dutch very depressed over heavy losses in Java and smashing up of their fleet. Very sick about statement by First Sea Lord that all our boats had been sunk. Japs had sent 2 battle cruisers in addition to their heavy cruisers and big crowd of light cruisers and submarines. Result was that after the battle with the transports which the Allied fleets had waged fairly successfully, they could only go back to Sourabaya and Batavia for harbour, and in trying to escape from there, they were caught by the longer-range guns of the big ships and nearly all sunk. Collins got away on HMAS Burnie with 3 or 4 other minesweepers but whether he can get to Fremantle I do not know.

Dutch grateful for us sending our boats there and for our men standing with them to the death.

Pound said they would be able to do something very substantial with the 2 brigades that had been promised even though they were a bit late in coming along.

Northern Australian command placed back in hands of Australian C-in-C though still able to be used by Dutch commanders for their air base for fighting in Indian Ocean.

Wednesday, 4/3/42

Discussion with Bruce on organization of supply machinery and finally got into his head that we were in agreement on every point except the need for a great deal of strengthening of the clerical administrative staff to enable them to handle the extra work that handling Australian supplies made available thro’ America entailed. I said what I really wanted was to make certain the job was done smoothly and quickly from here so that Evatt would have no excuse for trying to shift its control to Washington.

Discussed with McNamara statement made by LeonardFootnote ⁴⁴⁷ that the RAAF being badly treated by RAF, which Bruce had also discussed with me, and I said it was the RAF's job to make inquiry into it and not the RAAF but that McNamara should stand by to make sure the RAAF point of view was always put.

Colvin said HMAS Hobart saved and in Columbo. Cocos Islands shelled and cable cut.

Saw Sir Andrew Duncan with J.S. Duncan, Rowe and Low – meeting at which were present heads of Supply Departments, Harold McMillan,Footnote ⁴⁴⁸ Under Secretary of State for Colonies, Sir William Rootes and technical experts from the various dominions. Sir A. Duncan raised questions that had been set down for consideration on 23^rd February re planning production and asked for Australia's point of view which was, as I put it, that we needed to do 2 things – one was to make certain we planned our production in such a way as to get maximum result out of every possible theatre of activity and in the quickest time to every war centre and in appropriate quantities, and we needed machinery for that; and the 2^nd was to bring into being immediately a committee of the technical staff who could make certain there was no delay in provision of necessary equipment for us to speed up without a moment's delay our production everywhere on lines agreed on. This committee having done this immediate job of work would be available as a committee to advise to the long range planning body which would be on the Ministerial plane. Duncan said prepared to give that, and the other men from the other dominions finally came down behind me solidly.

Question arose as to actual way in which Eastern Group Supply Council would function. I maintained this would be simply an extra finger, a kind of projected extension. Some of the other dominions wanted to wipe [it] out but I am satisfied the right thing to do is use it to its full capacity.

Thursday, 5/3/42

Wire from Australia setting out their new strategy. This boiled down to the new Anzac area which included Australia and 2 or 3 Dutch islands and the creation of an Anzac War Council at Washington consisting of American, British, Australian, NZ. Received also further wires re Ceylon and presented both to COS and tried to make contact with Churchill.

With Coffey, Duncan and Rowe prepared telegram to Australia setting out Supply position and pointing out what Australia had done. Discussed Production Committee with Rowe and Duncan and agreed terms of another cable to be sent Friday.

Friday, 6/3/42

Got NZ wire saying bit half-hearted about new Anzac proposals but would support them.

Saw Churchill at noon. Re. Australian reinforcements to Ceylon, he said he would arrange that the boats that brought the Australians to Ceylon and dropped them there would go straight back to Middle East and pick up the remaining Australians and take them straight to Australia and then come back and get the men who had been left in Ceylon. This would make them available roughly [in] about 2 months.Footnote ⁴⁴⁹ He said that he was pressing Roosevelt for equivalent American forces to go to Australia [in the] meantime.

On question of defence of Australia he had already directed the COS to get plan ready so I sent wire to Australia asking them to send me a service appreciation of COS for Wardell's use and to cut all the politics out of it. He had already sent copy of Australian proposal to President without any comments to avoid delay and asked for his opinion. He had asked British COS to examine it immediately. I asked him to send wire to Australia setting out approximate dates when we would be in naval superiority in Indian and Pacific Oceans, which he actually did while I was there, and he added a couple of sentences setting out that I had pretty well straightened the whole business up.

He also sent another wire that he had received from Roosevelt re naval C-in-C who was very temperamental and would not deal with what was outside his actual sphere of jurisdiction and might let Australia go hang if the thing were moved. Churchill most helpful.

Sent wire to Australia detailing result of interview and also cable setting out our views on means of consultation in London re production planning which Duncan and Rowe helped me to prepare.

Churchill said if Australia wanted to ask for America's help alone it would be a help to Britain, but they were always willing to help. Australia had asked for 25 divisions to be sent out and Churchill pointed out that the Americans had ships to carry 90,000 men in a year and Britain only had enough to carry about 3 times that amount and that had to supply the Middle East, India and everywhere else and half of that was being used to carry the Australians home.

Lunch on invitation of British Parliamentary Press Lobby, about 500 guests, about half of them MPs and Ministers and half pressmen, both from Lobby and various proprietors of the journals. Sat between Ismay and Alexander. Ismay fatalist but Alexander very depressed. Maurice WebbFootnote ⁴⁵⁰ of Daily Herald presided. Churchill spoke extempore for about half an hour detailing troubles we had been through and made very fine peroration. One striking phrase he used spoke of Roosevelt as having been sent by the ‘finger of destiny’.

Talk with Bruce and Wardell, Bruce's mind wavering on question of executive control being in Washington which was very ill based on the facts as I pointed out to him, but fear he may influence Lyttleton and may send silly wire to Australia.

Anthony [Eden] made stout speech on Australia on lines necessary re relations between Australia and Britain.

Saturday, 7/3/42

Saw telegrams from Australia that dealt with proposed Anzac areas and suggestions made with regard to them. In reply, sent wires to Australia asking first of all that COS should put up their own plan for defence of Australia and secondly that Dutch should be incorporated in the area. I pointed out that the boundary suggested by the COS now included the whole of the Dutch East Indies with exception of Sumatra, the line running up the Malacca Straits through the Sunda Straits and up the whole of Java, Celebes, New Guinea, etc, and Australia into Pacific area.

Iven and Elizabeth came in, went to see WolfitFootnote ⁴⁵¹ in Ben Jonson's ‘Volpone’, very well produced and acted.

Sunday, 8/3/42

Repetition of stupid Australian statement that they had world beating ideas for winning the war, yet received wire from them pleading for some more equipment.

Went to Great Fosters, most pleasant lunch. On [to] Watford for tea – others went to St Alban's cathedral and old Roman theatre.

At night Coleman and MR played cards with me to cheer me up.

Monday, 9/3/42

Discussed Indian and Australian position with Bruce. Discussed Indian position with Attlee, pointed out that any statement that India could secede from the Empire would provoke the most terrific division and controversy in Australia. Pointed out that Westminster Statute had never been passed in Australia, […]

To War Cabinet where most rotten story told about Burma, apparently British and Indian divisions had thrown their hand in on the road between Rangoon and Mandalay, with result that Rangoon had been evacuated because 350 Japs had come in to the delta of the Irrawaddy. There were 60,000 of our troops opposing the 350. By the grace of God[,] AlexanderFootnote ⁴⁵² was sent up there and simply drove the tanks through the Japs and got possession of the road again, but by that time Rangoon had been evacuated and the whole army was in retreat to the north.

Churchill gave me wire to read that dealt with offer that Roosevelt had made, that he was willing to send immediately a division of Americans to Australia and that if the Australian 9^th division were allowed to stay in Middle East he would send an extra American division to Australia leaving 21^st March and another extra American division to NZ if the NZ Division were left in Middle East. This was almost the only possible chance that we would have of stemming the onrush of the Germans to the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf to join the Japs. Syria was practically in open revolt, and if we would do this he would get […] 6^th Division home inside 6 or 8 weeks from Ceylon when the danger would have passed.

The Americans under these circumstances were prepared to find American shipping to tranship 2 British Divisions immediately from Britain to Middle East, getting them there inside 2 months and probably determining the future of the whole war; that 2 British aircraft carriers would be in position inside a month; that 2 of the fastest battleships and 4 of the ‘R’ class would be in the Indian Ocean with the aircraft carriers inside a month and that this would form a complete shelter for Ceylon, might enable India to be held and might prove the crisis of the war. He asked me what I was prepared to do in the matter and I said I was prepared to advocate it 100% but that I was sure to succeed if I could say from him that he was prepared to advocate that the American equipment along the lines of Curtin's cable should be immediately sent to Australia. He agreed to send tonight a cable to Roosevelt urging that this should be done but he pointed out that if this proposal of Roosevelt and his were adopted, there would be about 90,000 American troops in Australia within 6 weeks, that would be the main American overseas front of the whole war, that America could not possibly allow them to be weaponless, that they would have to reinforce them with equipment, supplies, and the extra men and would ensure that America would have to defend Australia. I agreed this was an irrefutable argument. At first he was rather inclined to say let the Americans pull their own supplies after them, but ultimately he agreed to my line of argument. He also agreed to push his COS to produce a plan of campaign.

I raised with him question that though this new organization was being brought into being to control the Anzac area and I mentioned the fact that I suggested the Dutch should be brought into it, its organization would take many weeks, it would be some time before there would be a Ministerial representative in Washington, that the safety of Australia was a matter of immediate decision now because it would take 4 or 6 weeks to get the material out, this might save our women being raped by the Japs, and that the British COS should at once produce their plan of campaign to combat any possible Jap invasion.

Ismay said they could not do much about it until the COS in Australia sent their reply back. I agreed but pointed out that I had wired the COS to this effect about 3 days ago, could not understand the delay because they must have an appreciation on tap, but what I was most concerned with was what would be the scope of the attack, and when.

Gratified to find that practically the whole Cabinet and especially Cripps and AndersonFootnote ⁴⁵³ backed my point of view and prepared to go 100% along my lines, and finally Churchill consented to do practically everything that I asked.

He read long cable from Roosevelt which showed that Roosevelt was still firmly convinced that major enemy was Germany, that major effort had to be made against Germany, but was still prepared to divert a very considerable part of his resources against fighting the Jap. Roosevelt's view still was that once Germany was defeated the Jap neck could be wrung at leisure, though he was keen that we should hold the key points that were necessary for us to ensure a successful offensive.

I pointed out fundamental difference between India and Australia, that in India it was easier for a Jap to disguise himself as an Indian than it was for him to disguise himself as an Australian in Australia. Whereas there might be plenty of 5^th columnists in India and hundreds of thousands of passive resisters, in Australia a 5^th columnist would be recognized as he was, a deadly menace to our life and liberties.

Interesting to hear military record of fight against the Jap. Where the Jap had been resisted he had curled up, as soon as they showed him a bayonet he had run – where we had run he had chased us and cut us to pieces.

Churchill said the effect of this arrangement that he had suggested would not merely be to make the Americans have a definite interest in the defence of Australia, but would bring about a great saving of shipping, in fact the saving would be so great that the British would be able to take out to the Middle East 2 divisions that would be able to garrison Syria and the Caucasus by end of May, that the Americans would find 2 divisions to come to England to take their place at the same time as they brought food to this country and munitions to enable the food and supply position to be maintained, and subsequently these Americans could be used in any theatre of war that we wished.

The importance that the Germans were attributing to the supply line we had established for Russia was evinced by the fact that the [battleship] Tirpitz, which had been in Trondjheim [sic] hiding, had come out with only 3 destroyers to attack the northern convoy that went north of Iceland. The convoy that was coming from Russia usually met the convoy going to Russia and changed escorts at this point. Unfortunately information that had been received had not been sufficiently clear and the British fleet had been diverted to Russian shipping that had been intercepted by a raider some 3 or 4 hundred miles south of where the Tirpitz had actually gone. When they recovered from this deception the Tirpitz had got into Narvick [sic], but they were waiting with a few subs for her to come back. The fact that this boat, the loss of which would mean a complete reorientation of the whole naval power of the Atlantic and would enable the British to immediately establish a naval superiority quite apart from the American fleet in the Indian ocean over the Jap fleet, ran the risks she did, indicated the importance that the Germans attributed to the lifeline we were keeping intact for Russian supplies. It also indicated clearly that Germany intended to attack Russia when the winter was over.

The important thing was to make certain that the lifeline to Russia through the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and China through India was maintained, and this gave an opportunity of it being preserved. Sent cable to Curtin stressing importance [of] this aspect.

What heartened me was the feeling that the War Cabinet was anxious to help me personally as well as to help Australia.

To dinner at which Luce,Footnote ⁴⁵⁴ owner and editor of American Time [magazine] was chief guest. Gathering consisted of newspaper magnates of England, COS, Bracken and self. Sat between Major Astor, owner of Times and Ismay. Interesting talk with Astor about way in which press should act in wartime, way in which Parliament should be controlled. Bracken made rather witty speech in which he introduced everyone who was there to Luce. Lord PortalFootnote ⁴⁵⁵ there, in private life prints notes for bank including Bank of England, though he admitted he never got paid for printing bank notes for Portugal. Luce in reply gave interesting survey of his visit to England which had lasted several weeks and during which he had visited nearly every important industrial centre in England. Came to conclusion that our production system in Britain was very good. He had had no idea till he came here that women of England were doing anything like the job of work they were doing, that the way they were standing up to their jobs in factories was beyond praise and there was nothing of the same character or type yet developed in America. Though he found throughout the whole countryside that there was an intense effort and concentration and doggedness, he found there was not much enthusiasm, or what in America they would call ‘pep’, and after being here for 3 or 4 weeks he had come to conclusion and was glad of opportunity of saying it to the right people, that he thought this was largely due to attitude of press in Britain. Not all the press, but many of them, were he thought continually nagging at the people for what they were doing – dancing, etc. He felt there was nothing wrong at all with the people, they were ready to do almost anything, in fact what they were waiting for was to be told what to do and how to be fully utilized. They did grasp the seriousness of the war but they did not believe that the issues of the war were being properly put by the press at all. It was not sufficient to say that the war was for survival. If you were just going to survive and that was all, that was scarcely worth fighting for. What you had to fight for was something which had a larger meaning. The Hun and the Jap had really given a challenge to western civilization. You had to convince the people of this country and America that there was something worth fighting for, that you had to make the whole war a real crusade. The Hun was making it a crusade for loot, the Jap for some world salvation mission. We had to make it clear that we had in our fight a faith increasing and greater purpose; and he found here no real nobility of expression of the cause for which we were fighting. They in America had found in Churchill somebody who really seemed to have an echo of Shakespeare in the magnificent appeal he made to the deepest instincts of man, and, after all if we were going to win the war and stir the people to endure hardships before we could look for victory, the press had to be able to express the ways of God to man – their job was to be an honest broker between the great spokesmen of civilization like Churchill and Roosevelt and the public, instead of being critics of every failure to be 100%. He felt sure if the press carried out this function there would be a complete change.

Interesting to note that at War Cabinet had discussion on this very question of press censorship, and when Minister of Information said to me that when he had hauled the Australian journalists up and questioned them as to decency they were showing, BaumeFootnote ⁴⁵⁶ had pulled out of his pocket a wire of congratulations from Evatt on what he was sending. I said the stuff on which Baume had got the congratulations was rotten and ought to have been censored, in which case he would not have received the congratulations.

Herbert Morrison pointed out that some of the Australian newspapers had wired their stuff across and apparently it had the right to be published however bad it was. I said if censorship was worth anything at all it should be able to prevent two-way traffic, both what was damaging to the war effort going out or coming in. I instanced FO cable from Mexico where there had been aspersions on Churchill, and that these statements had been published on the day Churchill had a vote of confidence 464-1. I said it was unwise that the censorship should be brought in after a prolonged debate in the House – experience in Australia had shown that the right way was to bring in the Security Regulations and discuss it weeks afterwards, as the press was sufficiently powerful to knock it on the head.

Tuesday, 10/3/42

Talks with COS who gave me some reasons for and against why line should be shifted to where the Australian Government said, to 110° east longitude. Disadvantages were that British fleet would cease to look after Australia; advantages were that the Americans might come round, but their main fleet would be 6,000 miles away, so all we could hope for was some submarines.

To Pacific War Council where Churchill produced cable from Roosevelt dividing world into 3 – Pacific under control American COS, Atlantic under combined COS, Indian under British. Advisory Council would be provided in Pacific area on which various Governments could sit but policy would be completely determined by American COS and President.

Dutch entered protest that they were being cut in halves and under this arrangement seemed to have no permanent home.

Chinese wanted to know where they got to as regards Burma.

I raised question as to whether a complicated problem like this of handling the war over the whole world could not be over-simplified by what was being suggested, that the Pacific area, which included America, included about two-thirds of the water and half the land of the world, and how that was going to be handled from one centre and by COS who had had no actual war experience passed my comprehension. I said Australia had a vital interest in its British connections, and if it would be completely looked after by the USA, would lose many of its bonds. Anyhow the USA might not be worrying about the bonds or the protection. Though it could be defended by a battle that smashed the Jap fleet over Honolulu, it would be bad luck if the Jap fleet was near Sydney and there was no American fleet there. Anyhow in the gradual process of establishing the position it was obvious that 400 miles to Timor, 300 miles to Ambon, easy stages to conquer piece by piece. It seemed to me a calamity that the 2½ years of war experience that the British COS had should not be available for defence of Australia.

Churchill said it was bad luck, that the Australian Government had brought the thing on itself, it was not satisfied with what he had arranged for them, and they were always talking about America in their speeches and America would look after them – but if they really got in a bad jam Britain would of course have to swing in as she always did.

Amery took the view that we should keep the Empire together if we could and that if we made good progress from the Indian side and not too much from the American side the boundary could be elastic and could be extended. Everything I said pointed to the necessity for the maintenance of the Pacific Council to hold the Empire interest.

Churchill said quite willing to keep Pacific War Council together, and it was finally decided that we would not send anything to the Government until we had a look at the political implications I had raised. Churchill did not think that the president would vary from the attitude he had adopted.

Sent wire to Australia asking to be relieved and also asked for some more money to carry on.

Churchill's wire to Curtin brought to me about 11pm setting out in greater detail the points I had already set out in my cable immediately after the British War Cabinet on Monday.

Wednesday, 11/3/42

Received cable from Roosevelt setting out his ideas re distribution of control over whole world.Footnote ⁴⁵⁷ His view was that so far as Britain and America were concerned the war area should be divided into 3 compartments – the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific. These practically dealt with the 3 ocean areas and the contiguous lands. In addition China under its own Generalissimo and Russia under Stalin formed separate entities and provision was made to ensure that there would be co-operation with regard to these theatres. Of importance to Australia especially was the boundary of the Pacific and Indian Ocean zones. Australia had asked for an alteration of this zone to give itself sea room west of the western coast of West Australia and the Council saw no objection to this.

Saw Sir A. Duncan to discuss the set-up he had in his mind with regard to control of supply. Obvious from our previous discussion amongst 20 or 30 present that with such a huge gathering it would be quite impossible ever to get any satisfactory decisions. I found he had practically made up his mind as to manner in which we are to act and on the production planning side he thought there should be contact on 3 planes. The first plane, the lowest, would be contacts between the technical officers such as Colonel Rowe in our case & Turner in theirs, in order to provide Departmental machinery that would follow up the Eastern Group Supply schemes that had been already agreed on or were to be agreed on. This Committee would be a body which would determine priorities in regard to the allocation of machine tools and though they might put up proposals for new productions they would not be the determining body to deal with it.

On the top plane there would be an Empire Supply or Production Board which would be on the Ministerial plane. It would consist of Ministers or High Commissioners, Oliver Lyttelton,Footnote ⁴⁵⁸ Minister of Production, would take the chair, and this body would be the final authority on all matters which affect general planning and programme of Empire production. From consideration of this body there would be no question excluded, even question of the dispersal of machinery.

In between these two bodies there would be machinery at the departmental level; Sir William Rootes is the Chairman of their Supply Council, and J.S. Duncan, Official Secretary, Australia House, on our side. These would be advised by their technical people but they would do the donkey work for the Ministers of State and meet requirements of the general programme, would draw it up and form working committee to get all the details ready for consideration by Ministerial Committee.

It would be only on the question of production planning that it would be necessary to have organization on these 3 planes. On the question of munitions assignment, of supply of raw materials, and on shipping and on the supply of machine tools, he thought that committees on 2 levels, on the technical side at the bottom and on the Ministerial and the High Commissioner's level at the top, would cover the whole ground. He thought that if the Empire Production Council were also at the same time the Empire Supply Council, it would be able to cover the whole field without any unnecessary circumlocution or creation of unnecessary intermediaries.

Thursday, 12/3/42

Had COS meeting, told story of Burma which seemed to be slightly better and rather better story re navy. Prince Eugene [sic] had had stern blown off by torpedo.Footnote ⁴⁵⁹

Pacific War Council meeting at which Roosevelt's proposals considered. General lines of discussion were along the lines of my telegram sent after meeting […]

Friday, 13/3/42

Sent cable to Curtin on general question of Empire production scheme, set out Duncan's conversation of few days ago. Received from Australia their appreciation on strategical position.

Received copy of Curtin's speech of appeal to America.

Saturday, 14/3/42

To Macclesfield with Garfield Weston. Lunch at Lichfield, gratified to find the 3 spires there still intact. Arrived Macclesfield, took salute from huge procession of armed forces and all their attachments down to boy scouts, in front of Town Hall.

Interesting talk with Mayor, who was a cattle dealer and auctioneer, told me of Cheshire dairying life and vicissitudes. Gave me some presents.

To huge meeting between 2 and 3,000, where Weston had arranged map of Pacific and Indian Oceans, loud speaker worn on my bosom. Weston made good speech and then I talked for half an hour, explaining points of happenings in Pacific. One old chap of 90 said he had heard everyone since DisraeliFootnote ⁴⁶⁰ speak and thought my speech was the most interesting, educational and informative he had ever heard.

To dinner where met two interesting widows, Mrs LeghFootnote ⁴⁶¹ and Mrs Sparrow,Footnote ⁴⁶² each had big house which they had turned into hospital for soldiers. Interesting outlook on life and plenty of vivacity.

Sunday, 15/3/42

Saw Mrs Legh's house, dated back from Saxon times, two of the main posts were actual trees rooted in the ground whose trunks had been roughly squared with axes in those days, some rough carvings made on the sides. They were not absolutely straight, but inclined one towards the other. The house consisted of the Saxon part, of which the great hall was still intact, though that had been done up in the Norman style when the Normans came over, it had then been done up again in the adjoining rooms in the Tudor style in the days of Henry VII & VIII and about 1749 some additions had been made of real Georgian pillars at the entrance. Paintings went back to Elizabeth's time and they had to bundle into one big room all the furniture from the rest of the house to make the great bulk of it available for the soldiers’ beds.

The doors were over 1,000 years old, and in pretty good order, the house having been lived in the whole time, and much of the panelling was 16^th century, some 17^th, some 18^th. The whole estate was 3500 acres in extent, though Mrs Legh was farming about 50 acres. Snowdrops on walk they called the Lime Walk, masses of white blossom.

Macclesfield was given its charter in 1086 though it was a town in the Saxon times as well and they have other charters given every 200 years for something extra, of which the parchment is in the hall.

In afternoon spoke at Woodville, in Bredbury, and in Romilly, about 2500 people.

Interesting talk with Weston re Beaverbrook's position and Russia. Weston had dinner with me.

Monday, 16/3/42

Weston and I saw Beaverbrook at the Savoy and I said I had come to proffer advice because I thought the destiny of the world and certainly the destiny of the British Empire was at stake and that the way in which that destiny fell might depend on his immediate action. I said I was in a peculiar position to offer him advice as I had had a very long political experience of fighting with practically no parliamentary or even constituent backing except the backing of an absolutely sound and just cause, and that I had found that one strong man in the Cabinet who had a clear mind as to where he wished to go, was persistent and pertinacious and would avoid rubbing up the fur of the other men on things that did not matter, could in 80% of the cases get his way. His personality could dominate the Cabinet, and the important thing in politics was not to get headlines in the newspapers and the acclaim of the public but one's policy accepted and carried into effect. […] There was all the difference in the world between a figurehead and spokesman and being the director of policy, and that is what I took it Beaverbrook wanted because he felt that he had the power to do the job and direct the ship of State on the very troubled seas we were on.

There should be 2 or 3 men entirely divorced from detailed administrative duties, thinking out war strategy in its largest aspects and determining the allocation of supplies to different countries and theatres of war. The fact that one pulled oneself out of competition from men who could do the detailed work was a step gained towards the sympathy and harmonious working of these lesser men and their support.

There were only a few who could see the lofty peaks of the range of human endeavour, and that those who wished to see them had to climb wearily, nearly always alone, and leave the organization to the others who had a special flair for that particular work. At present I thought Churchill and Beaverbrook were two such men – Churchill, who had a wide horizon, a sweeping imagination and gift of leadership was a very lonely man. It was essential that he should have to lean on, just like Chiefs of Staff to a Commanding army, men of imagination and decision in whom he had implicit confidence. That was Beaverbrook's special line of country, and to take himself away from Churchill's support at this time would be just like depriving a patient dying of pneumonia of the oxygen necessary to save his life. One did not wish to breathe oxygen all the time, but in times of acute crisis it was indispensable.

It might be when things become more normal and of a routine nature, Beaverbrook could be done without. He may by then even be the first man in the country if Churchill died or had to give in because of health.

At present time there were 2 great problems, and Beaverbrook by chance happened to hold the key to both. His record, knowledge and outlook and origin all made it possible for him to deal with the Russian situation and the perilous pass to which the Empire had come. So far as Russia was concerned if he were out of the Cabinet and simply hammering at his policy from his papers he might only consolidate the opposition to it instead of securing support. That after all was the inevitable effect of hammering molten or hot metal with a hammer on an anvil, and the political mind at the present time was fairly hot on this subject. If one simply welded opinions, surely the right attitude was to be in the Cabinet disintegrating the opposition by his subtle influence and propaganda and intimate approach and method of dealing with the situation rather than by hammering the people from outside who by that very means were forced to make the statements which committed them further and further against the desired policy.

Russia's continuation in the war was indispensable to victory. If all she asked was to be given the 1941 boundaries, surely as this was somebody else's land and the land of people who had never fought in the whole history of mankind for one British interest, why should we imperil the life of our Empire and ourselves for their problematical advantages. If Hitler and Stalin made a peace pact it was quite obvious these States would be either German or Russian, they would not be independent, therefore we would not help them in that way. If Russia pulled out of the war, we ourselves might not be independent and suffer defeat from Germany.

So far as Australia was concerned, by the grace of God (or the devil) we had at present a Government 100% pro-Russian. If Beaverbrook were in the War Cabinet even though Attlee and other men were opposed to it, then he ought to appeal for the Dominions to hear the case and then we would support him – at least Australia would, and I thought NZ, being controlled by a Labour Government, would. He had as well Cripps, who had definite views on this point, though Beaverbrook said they were not those that he would fight in a corner for, but I said that was inevitable in a lawyer's makeup.

I said we should get a decision of the British Cabinet to give Russia what she asked for at the present time. It might have to be a secret arrangement and not published, and it might be quite impossible to get the USA to simultaneously agree, but we could not be asked in London to settle affairs and policies of the whole world. What we had to do was assure Stalin that our bona fides were right. If Stalin pulled out of the war, Britain would get the first crack from Hitler, and the United States crack would be delayed. We had to make sure we thought of ourselves first in this matter because in doing that we were thinking of everybody. I felt certain that if this arrangement were to come between Britain and Stalin and was known in Washington, the familiarity with its existence would after a time breed tolerance and after a while acceptance of the position.

The second point I made was that Beaverbrook, because of his Canadian extraction and Empire crusade many years ago and his attitude towards the papers, was the only Empire spokesman we had in [the] British War Cabinet. That when I had been speaking in various parts of Great Britain I found if one spoke of Australia or NZ or Canada the people cheered, though they did not cheer too much about America. Beaverbrook, because of his known Canadian extraction, had a support much greater than he dreamed of, and though it might be true that the parliamentarians suspected him and disapproved of his methods, yet I felt certain that in the Dominions and Britain there was a sense of bewilderment over the last Cabinet changes.

The next point was that in my mind it was essential that he should have control of the allocation of munitions and supplies in America to make certain that the Empire channel was the first funnel through which this distribution came. He had seen the speeches of Evatt and Curtin and the wires from our Government to the British Government which indicated that all they were looking for was immediate present help and hang the ultimate consequences; that this way lay the disintegration of the Empire, whereas I was certain that if the handling of supplies, aircraft, munitions, allocation of production, were dealt with on an Empire basis with Empire Clearing Houses here of which he would be head, we would find that the mere fact that the money munitions came through this channel would, like the cat, make our heart grow warm where the food came from.

We had an Empire sentiment that we could exploit in Britain that was quite absent in Washington. We had political levers we could use here that would take many years to establish there. The tremendous strength of the different interests that insisted on being consulted before action was taken made for great delay in the States, unless there could be combined Empire pressure strong enough to overrun the pull of any sectional interest in the USA. In my view there was only one man well enough known in America with enough courage and capacity to do the job, and that was Beaverbrook himself.

The question then arose as to the status with which he should go. I knew Beaverbrook had the feeling of frustration, but that was no excuse for giving up ambitions or hopes – a determined policy to secure one's desires would ultimately override opposition if one was sufficiently powerful and pertinacious as to last the distance. Therefore what was necessary was that he should be built up as much as possible. The first was that he should not go over just as Churchill's representative but as Minister of State of the British Government with a seat on the War Cabinet – as somebody who is right on the steps of the British throne of politics. He should not have any administrative function and should have complete discretion to handle supplies from the pool to the different countries, not only the Empire, but everything that came through London, and should have in his hand the decision about Russia before he went so that he was able to show that he not merely had the semblance of power, but the power itself. Otherwise if he simply went to argue about Russia he might fail in his mission. It was essential he should have as part of his mission some factors which were certain to be successful. If he then failed about Russia so far as America was concerned, it would not matter much if Britain had already acted so far as Stalin was concerned. The public need not know anything about the reason for his going to the United States, if at the same time he was able to point out that he had there handled with efficiency and success the distribution of supplies.

I said that the attitude of pulling out of the War Cabinet had every instinct of my political life against it. If I had made any political mistake in my career it was when I gave up the leadership in 1939 – it would have been better to go back and make sure the battleships were built, and so on. We had had a couple of years’ grace to repair that error, but I felt certain that events were marching so rapidly that it might only be a matter of weeks before Stalin would conclude a peace of his own.

Beaverbrook's attitude was that he had cut himself adrift from this mob, they were certain to make a lot of bloomers – if he were out 3 or 4 months there would be a demand for him, that Cripps was an untried genius. I said that reasoning was absolutely fallacious, it was true these things might happen and the whole Empire and the world might go down the drain, but when they realized these fellows were no good the call would not be for Beaverbrook but somebody who had risen overnight who was just as much an untried genius as the others who would lead us from woe to woe. I had found that his policy of temporizing was wrong.

Left him with definite understanding that he would take no decisive step in the way of throwing away his position and he asked us to come and talk to him tomorrow. He said he thought I was a very wise man.

Weston chipped in every time he thought there was an opening and drove my point home, and he said he had never seen Beaverbrook listen so uninterruptedly to advice before. He felt certain Beaverbrook had been impressed enormously by the fact that I had nothing whatever to gain by my advocacy, and he felt he would pull around all right. He said Beaverbrook was also a lonely man, that his family had been a terrible crash and he had been looking forward to this final culmination of his career and his life's work that he would be remembered by.

Beaverbrook said he would go away and they could not blame him for the messing in the next 2 or 3 months. I said I looked on him as a stimulating drug to Churchill, that the effect of taking it away, except gradually, would be to precipitate a mental and intellectual crisis which would probably render him useless for some time, that it was almost criminal, if he were so necessary, to withdraw himself under those circumstances. I said though some thought he was like cocaine, I thought he was more like strychnine.

Had talk with Bruce re Russian situation – he agreed with me as to vital and urgent importance of getting matter settled. His attitude was like mine with regard to willingness to give away these Baltic provinces for the sake of getting firm treaty. We would have to take our chances regarding ability to hold ourselves in the world after that.

To War Cabinet where grim picture presented of war situation. In Burma we seem to be holding the position to some extent; we are getting some more troops out to Australia; no word from Australia as to what they should do; losses of shipping were terrific. German subs had increased to 260 and they expected by end of year, taking losses and new buildings into consideration, that they [the Germans] would have 430. The heaviest losses of merchant shipping have been in Caribbean Sea, unfortunately mostly tankers taking oil to refineries. The Americans up to the present had refused to convoy their ships in those waters, so I raised question as to what power the Combined COS had to direct the American Naval campaign so that they did not throw away these boats. They said the American Naval C-in-C was a law to himself, but said it would not go on – they must have some concerted plan and it was madness not to profit by the experience of Britain in the last 2 years.

Tremendous efforts being made to get more corvettes and destroyers to be able to convoy the boats.

Tuesday, 17/3/42

To Union Bank luncheon, Sir John Davidson,Footnote ⁴⁶³ Hely-Hutchinson,Footnote ⁴⁶⁴ Colin AndersonFootnote ⁴⁶⁵ and CrowtherFootnote ⁴⁶⁶ there. Interesting discussion on Australian financial position – they were relieved at the information I gave them re alteration of financial proposals and were not quite clear how any business could be run if they kept on making those extraordinary moves, even though they altered them they completely destroyed public confidence.

Wednesday, 18/3/42

Lunch with Hankey. Writes a 6-monthly history of the war comparing its progress with that of the last war. Quite certain this is going to be a much longer war, we are not nearly as far ahead as in the last, and very disturbed over happenings. Said put up proposal 6 months ago before battleships damaged in Mediterranean that they should be pulled out and sent to Far East. Because they were both hors de combat, it had been proved that they could do without them because they were not much use until they had been fixed.

Worried over esprit de corps of army and relationship of officers to men, thought this largely due to Hore Belisha's system of putting all officers through the ranks, that many of the natural leaders from the upper and middle classes who ought to be leading the men were simply peeling potatoes, that to make progress one had to practically corrupt the sergeant.

Had no confidence in Cripps, thought an untried genius, had never stuck a job for any length of time.

Long talk with Bruce about Russia, also depressing. Each of us went out to submarine wherever he could to get them around to our way of thinking.

To ‘Blossom Time’, Richard Tauber.Footnote ⁴⁶⁷ Nicest production I have ever seen on the stage.

Thursday, 19/3/42

Informal lunch with the King [George VI] and Queen [Elisabeth]. King said Churchill told him how helpful I had been, and he thanked me warmly. Queen very nice, told stories of the blitz, knew all about running a household, how to live inside the rations, what was best way of handling canteens in the women's forces. King told me good story about the consecrated and desecrated chapel.

Interesting talk about Singapore. Discussed probable way in which Australia would fight. Queen went into raptures over British countryside in spring and summer, so I stood up for Australia and told her about lyre birds. Pleasant gathering. King said to let him know before I go so that he could have another talk with me.

Dinner with Garfield Weston, told me Beaverbrook had insisted on Churchill making a much better statement. Beaverbrook rang me at 11.30pm, thanked me for what I had done, insisted on calling me Abraham Lincoln.

Friday, 20/3/42

To Foyle Literary Luncheon […] I stole the limelight with good story. Opened up story about oceans uniting rather than dividing, put in quite decent story. Sat [with] Lord FinleyFootnote ⁴⁶⁸ […] Ministry of Economic Warfare, liked my speech. [An] American Professor said [he] hoped I would develop the thought in it to drive these fellows to an appreciation of sea power.

Had 10 minutes’ talk with Maisky, Russian Ambassador,Footnote ⁴⁶⁹ arranged to see him again. Prime Minister of Holland thanked me for my reference to Dutch.

Received telegram setting out views of Pacific Council, but nothing about 9^th Division.

Saturday, 21/3/42

Received wire doubting my information about the appeal of Roosevelt for transfer of American troops with 9^th Division,Footnote ⁴⁷⁰ so thought it better to bring them down to earth by outlining position. Sent strongly worded telegram pointing out that what I said was right, that they had to preserve goodwill in Britain and America, we were completely dependent on outside shipping, and that to unnecessarily waste it was the height of madness.

Long discussion with Bruce and Wardell re tactical position.

Iven and Elizabeth came in, saw Sadler's Wells Ballet, Les Sylphides, Comus and Facade – awfully good.

Monday, 23/3/42

War Cabinet – Production Ministry.

Statement – discussion.

Very cold – had rigor – sun out for first time in months but very bitter East wind.

Tuesday, 24/3/42

Pacific War Council – much colder.

Wednesday, 25/3/42

In bed. Bruce came to see me.

Thursday, 26/3/42

In bed. Saw Wardell.

Friday, 27/3/42

Delirious.

Saturday, 28/3/42

Dr Hope Gosse,Footnote ⁴⁷¹ 119 Harley St, sent me to St Mary's Hospital, broncho pneumonia.

29/3/42 and 30/3/42 – unconscious.

Tuesday, 31/3/42

Sensible, with terrific pain left side due to pleurisy, temperature starting to fall. Many gifts of flowers. Visitors forbidden.

Friday, 3/4/42

X-rayed, left lung two-thirds solid, right lung half solid, no plural effusion.

Wednesday, 8/4/42

Saw Bruce, discussed cable to Australia and with Hope Gosse, as result of which a stout cable was sent to Australia insisting on my being sent back as soon as I got right.

Friday, 10/4/42

X-rayed, both lungs starting to resolve.

Tuesday, 14/4/42

Casey called en route from America and sent me bottle of sherry.

Wednesday, 15/4/42

Bruce called, begged him help me get Low fixed, which he promised he would do.

Friday, 17/4/42

X-rayed again, lung starting to clear steadily. Sir Andrew Duncan, Sir William DouglasFootnote ⁴⁷² called, discussed Low's position, said though they would not be able to fix him up in Department [of] Supply, they would fix him up in private show.

Saturday, 18/4/42

Webb Johnson called, Mr and Mrs Duncan gave me beautiful hydrangea.

Tuesday, 21/4/42

Saw Bruce again. Sir Alexander McCormackFootnote ⁴⁷³ had hour's talk with me. Hope Gosse promised me to go Saturday to Devon.

Wednesday, 22/4/42

Saw Garfield Weston who told me arrangements of house; Wardell who told me story of war while I was ill; Bracken, who told me of War Cabinet and said brought sympathy and regard of whole War Cabinet who said they did not think anybody else could have possibly carried through in the critical times.

Lung X-rayed again, practically clear. Evatt's wires brought to me showing progress of his education in America by Roosevelt. Ince saw me, promised cook from Hall's.

Thursday, 23/4/42

Duke of DevonshireFootnote ⁴⁷⁴ called, brought plovers’ eggs. Talk with Hope Gosse, amazed at my resiliency and progress.

Friday, 24/4/42

Saw McGibbon who told me story of his London adventure; Mrs Casey who brought me two books; McNamara who assured me he would fix passages home; Coleman who came to say goodbye; and practically whole staff of hospital who showed me extraordinary kindness. Sent cable to Curtin.

Saturday, 25/4/42

Drove to Devon with Elizabeth, nurse and Miss Ross, to ‘The Downes’, Alverdiscot, Bideford – driver staying in Bideford. Arrived in beautiful sunshine.

Sunday, 3/5/42

Letter to Eggleston.Footnote ⁴⁷⁵ Evatt arrived London.

Wednesday, 6/5/42

Evatt spoke on telephone of his mission.

Friday, 8/5/42

Spoke to Iven, bad luck his exam. Nurse Thomas left. Low arrived. Evatt made proposition I should stay permanently or join the Government; in any case make some close association with the Government.

Sunday, 10/5/42

Bull arrived. Discussed Evatt's proposition with Bill and Bull and letter sent [to] Evatt setting out my own conditions and the way in which the matter would have to be approached.

Thursday, 28/5/42

Went to London by train. On arrival saw Evatt, who immediately put up proposition that I should stay as permanent Government representative in London and if necessary give up politics completely. Could stay till election if I wished and make up my mind then. I told him that quite apart from other considerations my health would not stand staying here through the winter, that I had a very definite mission in Australia to perform that could only be done during the war. I was willing to help the Labor Party carry it out if they would give me support. I was prepared to discuss with Curtin the whole position as soon as I returned. Expressed my astonishment that he should be going back without leaving a Minister to take his place as accredited representative. He assured me he had never come with the intention of displacing me, but on looking up my cables from Curtin I find that though this is not explicitly stated, yet in the cable that mentions he is coming to act, Curtin says he will arrange for my return as soon as Evatt arrives, which can only bear one interpretation.

I pointed out that if the position was not held that we had created, all the advantages that we had obtained would be lost, that I could not tolerate that position, that I would fight it in the Parliament in Australia, and I was sure that no Government could exist that did not have a representative here. I pointed out, however, that they had never considered fully my recommendations, that they may have read them, but because they were so full they just decided against Bruce as the representative and not dealt with the others, that the piecemeal consent that I had received had made it impossible to build up a permanent and satisfactory organization, and that the result was that when Evatt came he had not been able to do anything like the work that he should have been able to do if everything had been ready for him.

I felt sure that the right thing to do was to put Bruce into the permanent job, but that he must be removed from Australia House, that his position in an Ambassadorial sense must continually grow as already he was the accredited representative to Russia and Holland; that he did not have time to do the ordinary administration of Australia House, and that his organization must be quite separate from it to canalize the cables that came in.

I gave him instances of the many ways in which cables came in and were never seen, and the way in which they went out. Evatt was able to give me a couple of instances of information that I should have had a couple of months ago, that he received only a fortnight ago, and agreed that something would have to be done about it. Begged me to stay longer in England, sufficiently long in fact to enable him to get home, for me to put up my full recommendations by cable to Curtin by the time he got back, cable my recommendations to Evatt if possible while he was on the way, and then stay till they could discuss them in Australia before I left.

I said I was prepared to wait until the 25^th June if my doctor agreed, and anyhow I would go by the date he said. I did not have any intention of taking on the accredited representative job any more, that the way it had been messed about during the last 3 months with 3 men doing it, rendered it hopeless.

Evatt agreed that what I said was right and my view was reinforced by the fact that Ismay, who came to lunch with Evatt and discussed the position with me, said that since I had been ill and Coleman had left, the liaison position had rapidly deteriorated, that they would very much like to talk the whole position over with me, that it looked as if the Defence Committee would go out of existence and that they would be loaded with a War Cabinet of about 20 members and satellites to decide every major issue, which would mean endless delay.

I promised to discuss with Bridges and Ismay for a couple of hours the position on the 10^th June, the day I am to have lunch with Churchill.

I then saw Bruce, who put in about 2½ hours discussing the position with me. He had independently come to the conclusion that his position was intolerable, that if he was to be simply a temporary in-and-out representative he would refuse to act, and in any case he would not act and still remain performing the whole of the High Commissioner's functions. He said he had already made a recommendation to Evatt that if he were to do the work Duncan should be made Deputy High Commissioner, to which Evatt demurred as it would mean an executive appointment and take a good deal of explaining to the Parliament in Australia.

I told Bruce I did not think that got over the difficulty at all, they would never settle the vexed question of cables except the organizations were separate, that the work of inter-departmental consultation must grow both during the war and after, and that it must extend into other Departments like the Board of Trade and the matters that would be dealt with were quite separate from the ordinary High Commissioner's duties. It was absolutely essential that there should be a permanent and continuous representative on the Defence Committee and on the Ministerial part of the various Empire Supply Clearing Houses.

Bruce put up a stout argument for retaining some control of Australia House, evidently thinking that after the war, if it ended suddenly, the accredited representative job would disappear, but he admitted that the thing was in a bad mess.

Ismay had said that nobody with a lower status than OfficerFootnote ⁴⁷⁶ could possibly pull the liaison side together, and my own recommendation had always been that it must be a man with status of Assistant Secretary to a Department. OldhamFootnote ⁴⁷⁷ is a hopeless failure in this particular job, does not make the contacts or get the information, does not really weigh the men.

Sent wire to Curtin saying will send him full wire in time to discuss with Evatt before I leave. I think this is the most useful thing I can do to help Australia as things are. It would be quite useless for me to go back under 2 months and that would carry me beyond the period I could get back safely.

Talk with W.S. Robinson about position in Australia. He rather terrified me by telling me of the jittery condition that Australia was in 6 or 8 weeks ago but that the arrival of the Americans had to a large extent re-established the morale of the Government as well as the people. He could not foresee the future but thought we would be lucky to get out of war with Japan under 5 years, whatever happened in Europe.

Friday, 29/5/42

Arranged with Air people to finalize passages. Arranged for recording of my broadcast which took 14 minutes 43 seconds. To be put over on 7th June. Evatt keen I should not let it go in on Sunday as he thought it would cut into his publicity.

Saw Hope Gosse who gave me thorough examination. Lung cleared, heart and aorta perfectly normal without slightest sign of atheroma, electrocardiogram normal, no bronchitis. Only thing not so good was chest capacity which was about two-thirds normal. Said I should not land in Australia in middle of winter, thought could travel in from 3 weeks on. His suggestion was that I should leave towards the end of June, have 3 or 4 weeks in the States and then fly on to Australia. Promised to see him next time I went to London and have a meal with him. Disturbed, as an outsider, over Evatt's statement to Labor Conference – felt had jeopardized his position as Australian representative and become merely a Party vehicle.

Lunch with Evatt; Kingsley Wood, Bracken, Cranborne, Lloyd George Jnr,Footnote ⁴⁷⁸ Ismay, PeckFootnote ⁴⁷⁹ and Hollis present.Footnote ⁴⁸⁰ Air Marshal Peck keen I should stay in England, that Australian-British relationship would not be maintained half as well when I went.

Bracken talked to me on telephone re future arrangements. Cranborne told me about the position of his son, whose median or musculo-spiral may have been cut by the bullet that cut his artery and he had been too anaemic with the loss of blood from his lung and arm to have an operation up to the present.

Caught train from Waterloo 2.50pm, interesting companion, Lieutenant who had been at Gibraltar last 18 months, told me about position in Spain where FrancoFootnote ⁴⁸¹ is only able to keep in power by putting in concentration camps practically half population of country who are communists, and that his check of Hitler has been that he has threatened, if Hitler marches through, to free these communists and let them start guerrilla warfare on the German flanks. Putting women into number of camp jobs to free soldiers for active service elsewhere. Cooking in men's camps done by women, most clerical work, much of semi-skilled work and greater part of driving of lorries. He thought that in the camp he was in, the proportion of women to men was about 3 to 2.

Arrived Exeter 6.45pm, drove to Bideford through charming countryside.

Thursday, 4/6/42

Cable from Curtin agreeing to my itinerary for trip home and appointing Bruce accredited representative, making Duncan Deputy High Commissioner.

In morning drove to Totnes to see Dartington Hall experimental farm, through Torrington, Hatherley, Oakhampton, Tavistock, Ashburton. Beautiful drive along basin of the Torridge as far as Hatherley, ran through delightful lanes, very old village. At Oakhampton saw hotel dating back to 1400, whole town unspoiled, skirted side of Dartmoor. Tavistock lovely town through which runs branch of Tamar; swung across the downs to Ashburton; passed Dartmoor prison at Princetown. Road from Moors on to the Dart very steep, 1 in 4½ in many places, and passed through glorious avenues of trees down to a narrow stone bridge just able to take one car across the Dart.

Then to Totnes, met Dr Slater,Footnote ⁴⁸² executor of foundation [Dartington Hall Trust], who told me genesis and history of whole organization and then took me to inspect the place. Foundation came into being through agricultural research enthusiasm of man named ElmhirstFootnote ⁴⁸³ who went to study at agricultural university in America, met Miss Whitney,Footnote ⁴⁸⁴ millionaire family, also research student, married and came over to carry out this experiment. Bought old estate which had been in possession of inter-related families since 1233 and had set down to try and find means whereby rural life could be made attractive and profitable. They set to work in 3 directions, first on the commercial side to work out most payable crops and best way to produce them, how to get constant labor and how best to market their products to get best prices. This side of it had proved to be a tremendous success – they had amalgamated 3 farms which now total 700 acres and they had a gross turnover of £20,000 a year from the products. Took another couple of hundred acres of land and turned it into orchards and employed number of families there, took another 60 or 70 acres and turned into market gardens and in each case got practically same turnover from gross expenditure. Then set to work to build up industries such as sawmilling, have about 80 men employed on very modern plant, then turned to cultural side. Established institute of arts where they taught singing, music, painting, history, literature, to give full minds especially to the women in the community as well as arts of practically technical school nature.

These were carried out in original old home of family where Richard II who owned the place at one time used to live and dine – still intact – and I had lunch in the old kitchen which is completely restored. Magnificent gardens, complete tilting yard, in wonderful state of preservation. Tilting yard much wider at the end at which the challenger comes in than at other end.

Question of labor largely solved by getting women and girls of farmers and workers to do part time work picking vegetables and so on and an organization had been built up with regard to marketing on a co-operative basis. They had learned by bitter experience exactly what products could be profitably marketed from that district.

Had set up substantial research laboratory dealing with examination of the soils not only for the actual farms but for the whole district, in fact they were working for the Department of Agriculture as one of their regional stations for the whole south of England. Working on question of disease in stock, had remarkable success in completely stopping mortality in cobalt deficiency disease which had existed for hundreds of years in certain parts of Devon, due to absence of cobalt which only exists in ordinary soils in small amounts. But they were examining the soils spectrographically and doing a good job, taking micro photographs in one-tenth second.

Had also carried out series of experiments on prolonging lactation or increasing the flow; found injection of extracts of pituitary gland had the effect of increasing amount of flow of milk and that the increase could be maintained but with the mixture of certain other internal glandular secretions especially oestrin they had actually found in milking half a dozen virgin heifers they were giving a gallon of milk a day. The importance of this was very great if England should become completely blockaded because it indicated a means whereby the milk yield could be enormously increased and possibly normal natural conditions could be tremendously hastened.

He had been asked by the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour to work out methods whereby the post-war conditions in agriculture could be so improved as to make certain of an increased production of all the vital foods and how men and women could be brought back to the land.

From there picked up by Pilot Officer [from] […] Melbourne, No. 10 Squadron [RAAF], who drove me to Plymouth, first to No. 19 [Reconnaissance Group, Coastal Command], where combined naval and air operational direction work is done. WRNS and WAAFS were doing all the manual work, the actual directions being given by fairly senior flying and naval officers, but they were able to keep track of everything going on practically as far as Gibraltar, over the whole Bay of Biscay. Showed me interesting pictures of damage done by dropping bombs and depth charges.

Group Captain D'AethFootnote ⁴⁸⁵ and Sir Charles Forbes, C-in-C of Naval StationsFootnote ⁴⁸⁶ came especially to tell me their story, which was most interesting, as to how they located and dealt with enemy subs and kept track of and safeguarded shipping. After spending an hour there, went on to No. 10 where Wing Commander RichardsFootnote ⁴⁸⁷ met me with about 80 of his officers, representing every State, a couple of Canadians, about 10 RAF. Went through men's rooms and sleeping, feeding and cooking accommodation and through hangers where they did all the work, and ran into number of Clarence River, Richmond, Tweed River men; men seemed very cheerful but reckoned they could do with an extra ration of meat in evening meal. Said they had eaten enough cheese to satisfy every rat in Australia. Saw Sunderland [Squadron] briefed to go away. Spent half hour in operational intelligence room where control is maintained.

Drove home along valley of Tamar to Tavistock, joined road that we had traversed going down.

Friday, 5/6/42

Saw LeeFootnote ⁴⁸⁸ of Bideford Gazette, who spent an hour talking about agricultural problems of Devon and England. Told me that from their own office they sent 40 or 50 papers to Australian subscribers still. Was not surprised when I told him I had seen dozens of people in Australia of every name that I had seen in Devon. Interesting to find newspaper man keen to get back on the land, reinforces the idea I have always had that many of these men in the city, especially in mechanical occupations, could easily be taken back to the land and would do very well because of their mechanical knowledge or business training.

Tuesday, 9/6/42

Pleasant drive through Exeter, Lyme Regis, Bridport, Dorset Heights, Salisbury, where had look at cathedral. Then to Winchester where saw cathedral, saw tomb of first Saxon King Kynoch.

Wednesday, 10/6/42

Interesting look through Winchester school, saw dining hall for scholars, old washing place in quadrangle, old oak benches 600 years old, square wooden platters the boys use still to eat off. Saw War memorial and playing fields. Then to Castle Hall where saw on wall Knights of Round Table set out, old stained glass windows, arms of all the early kings.

In afternoon discussion with Bridges and Ismay re best methods of liaison. They were disturbed at absence of first-class man in charge. Said I had better thrash out with Attlee distribution of cables. Ismay pointed out, however, that some cables were strictly service cables and were never sent to any British Minister because of possible leakage. These he thought could not be obtained. Felt many were only about operations in the embryo stages which never came to anything. Said they would like to use me if they could in Australia to try and overcome any difficulties that might arise. They felt sure I was entirely responsible for all the goodwill that had been growing up in last 2 or 3 months and they believed now there would not be any conflict. They feel, however, that if all the Dominions came in to the Defence Committee it would prove unwieldy and they would have to get some fresh executive control.

Talk with Bruce, finalized cable to Curtin and also broadcast.

Thursday, 11/6/42

Lunch with Mr and Mrs Churchill, Sir Ian HamiltonFootnote ⁴⁸⁹ and Lord Lamington, son of Governor of Queensland,Footnote ⁴⁹⁰ after whom plateau on which is situated Queensland National Park is named. Hamilton had given Mrs Churchill a belted Galloway cow, and now they have a herd of 6 consisting of 5 calves and the original cow which they had photographed. Ian Hamilton told me story of his life from Majuba Hill. Lamington had been in China and Burma a good deal. Told us inside story of China and then Churchill came and we had an interesting talk on whole world political and war position especially the Australian-English attitude. Churchill very grateful for my having straightened it all out. Said had laid himself out to make sure Evatt saw things in right perspective, and thought he had succeeded.

Went to see Bracken, who said they were anxious to do everything possible to get broadcast at most appropriate time and would put it on before Sunday if I wished.

Caught train to Cheshire, arrived 3 minutes early, nobody on platform to meet me. Mrs Sparrow turned up in car having been delayed in Air Force canteen. Arrived Birtles Old Hall in Chelford, lovely situation, beautiful lake about half mile long with island covered with flowering trees and rhododendrons.

Ministry of Information telephoned from London arranging that I should speak direct to Australia on Saturday from Manchester at 9.45am and they would take the recording for the home broadcast from there.

Friday, 12/6/42–Monday, 15/6/42

Visited Brocklehurst, Mrs Sparrow's brother-in-law,Footnote ⁴⁹¹ whose father had owned a station in Dubbo many years ago but who himself had always lived in England. He was a lawyer who had retired, his wife an enthusiastic gardener, and they had estate of about 5 or 600 acres with flowering trees and shrubs; had a deodar cedar planted 20 years before which had grown very well. Lake consisted of 3 parts at different levels and the top level was held at that height by a huge stone dam which some 50 years before had given way in a rainy time, with result that the waters had rushed down the valley for some 70 miles spreading destruction in its wake, right almost to the sea. The County Council had sued the owner of land and dam for damage and it had become a leading case. The land owner had won, it being regarded as an ‘act of God’, but he had to pay all his costs of defending the case right up to the House of Lords with result that he had been ruined.

Had 2 big platypus beautifully stuffed which had been there about 60 years.

Called on Sir Peter[?] Bromley[-]DavenportFootnote ⁴⁹² – they had the commission to hang master robbers at 2/- and robbers at 1/- and in their coat of arms they had a head with a rope around its neck. Wonderful house built 8 or 900 hundred years ago, lovely wrought iron gates about 150 years old. House crammed with pictures, many of them not visible on account of many of the rooms being used for hospital purposes. Beautiful copies of Mrs Davenport by Romney and of Lady Hamilton, originals of both of which had been sold for over £50,000. Had two beautiful Velasquez, 5 Giotto's, half a dozen Peter Lely's, 3 or 4 beautiful Canaletto's of Venice, and a couple of Fra Lippi.

Went to Manchester to broadcast to Australia Saturday morning, where met by FentonFootnote ⁴⁹³ who had been Australian National Travel representative before the war and director of the regional station who had been a professor at McGill University. Interesting discussion re future of British Empire, he maintaining that London was the natural geographical centre of it, and I maintaining that Australia was. He promised to send me if possible an interesting book by Taylor on Empire geography with some good maps.

Visited Mr WattsFootnote ⁴⁹⁴ house in Manchester. Huge place full of untold wealth in antiquities and rare furniture which had been collected over 3 generations and which now had practically become a museum, every room being so crowded with priceless objets d'art. Three of the earliest spinets ever made, Nelson's sea chest and articles of apparel of practically every English King and Queen from Edward I. Into this house a bomb had penetrated, clean through the billiard room, but though it had come through the roof it had not exploded, just smashed the floor up. Mrs Watts is Agatha Christie's sister,Footnote ⁴⁹⁵ and it was in this house that she disappeared.

Saw interesting books at Birtles Old Hall written by Tennyson Jesse.Footnote ⁴⁹⁶ She with her husband Dr HarewoodFootnote ⁴⁹⁷ wrote a book London Front. Wrote book on adventures of [MV] San Demetrio, an oil ship in the convoy with […] HMS Jervis Bay, had acted as the escort. The J[ervis] B[ay] was hit by a pocket battleship at the beginning of the engagement but though she was on fire and at first out of range of her own guns she steamed right up against the pocket battleship and gave her the whole broadside. That gave time for the convoy of 39 boats to scatter so that only 4 of them were actually destroyed by the pocket battleship. The San Demetrio was hit and set alight. They abandoned the ship but one boat with 15 men cruised near her and when she was still afloat though alight the next day, got aboard her, put the fire out and brought her into Rothesay on the Clyde.

Friday, 19/6/42

Lunch with Beaverbrook who discussed war position fully, told me his worries, said British strategy was torpedoed and I said it might be a good thing. British strategy in Mediterranean had really been the cause of many of our misfortunes. In my mind this gave a good chance to start afresh. Beaverbrook said this gave him the first ray of hope and wondered if I would place myself at his disposal if he could get hold of some man who could really influence Churchill's mind. He went on to compare Menzies, Bruce and self in our methods of approach to problems in the War Cabinet in our general conduct of the business. He said Menzies presented his case very ably but did it without conviction. Bruce rather prosed too much on it and lost his point, but I spoke with conviction and sincerity and backed it up with character under which they gradually fell under the influence. Said nobody else could really pull the thing out of the mess it had got into. He himself had argued with Churchill not to send dis-spirited [sic] wires back to Curtin, was very glad when I became censor of all the outgoing messages. Thought that having got everything ready here I was really needed in Australia. He was always at my disposal for advice and assistance if I sent a cable.

Dinner with Duncans, discussed position in Australia House and in London. Duncan quite satisfied that complete divorce of Australia House and accredited representative organization essential. Told me of wool purchase, necessity of keeping Australia in London funds because it was operating on open account.

Saturday, 20/6/42

Talk with Colonel Rowe re progress made in production. Found that progress of machinery of liaison had not progressed as quickly as hoped but that it now seemed to be moving better. British helping very much, America not so much. Australian production in some items making exceptional progress, in others more or less at a standstill due to labor difficulties in certain factories. Australia getting good allocations of raw materials though machine tools very difficult to come by owing to speeding up of American factory production.

To Watford where spent the night. Fixed up wedding present and many family matters.

Sunday, 21/6/42

Spent morning at Iven's, afternoon at Weston's where discussed future British and Australian industry and opportunities that we saw ahead in Australia. Very disturbed at political position.

Monday, 22/6/42

Companion of Honour announced. Visited tower with MR and WL. Lunch with MacDougall who set out fully post-war food position and gave me names of men I should see in America. He divided food problem into 3 sections – provision during war, immediate post-war relief and post-war reconstruction – and that the latter two could not be dealt with separately. There must be a plan in fact which co-ordinated the whole 3 to get anywhere.

To see Attlee who was very generous in his praise of my representation. Discussed question of cables, Empire Clearing Houses, extension of the principle. He made full note and said he would do what he could to carry out my ideas.

Tuesday, 23/6/42

Discussed many matters with Bruce – first China, present fairly hopeless insofar as getting assistance into it. Churchill discussing with Roosevelt. Something substantial being done by means of air transport in carrying stuff in and it is hoped to make a channel through Russia to enable them to keep fighting. Russia – both Churchill and Roosevelt seized with necessity of keeping supplies up to it. Now got to position where supplies that can send and shipping available about equal to twice handling capacity of Russians, roughly 8 million tons available a year and can only handle 3½. Position in Siberia is that Russians seem to have twice as many divisions available there as the Japs, though some indications that Japs might move despite that. Aleutian Islands taken by Japs of no real value, simply taken to offset in minds of Japanese people the Midway losses. Bruce thinks those losses caused much more caution by the Japs in their attack on the Australian side and that if some counter offensive could be undertaken in Rabaul the Jap menace to Australia would be definitely lessened. Air force of Australia steadily mounting and the number of squadrons asked for would be available as regards more than half by 30^th June, the whole by end of December. Naval strength of Britain and America building up and probably able to meet any threat in Indian or Pacific Oceans. Getting steadily stronger in aircraft carriers. Real problem was that the Jap [Zero] fighter which was carried on the aircraft carrier was a very much better fighting machine than anything we were carrying on boats though our land-based aircraft were better than theirs. Necessary to find some way of carrying something like a Spitfire which could knock theirs to pieces.

No question that even at the most optimistic Jap estimate[,] Japan had suffered a severe loss of [aircraft carrier] strength at Midway. U-boat menace steadily increasing in every ocean, particularly deadly in Mexican Gulf and Caribbean Sea though in Northern American coast convoy system had been adopted and would soon be adopted in Mexican Gulf and would pull figures down. Figures for last 3 months quite equalled the estimate I had given in my cable of March when I pointed out that shipping was the thing that mattered this year. American production of mercantile shipping however was steadily growing, and Roosevelt had said last week that the net loss for May when new production was taken into account was 80,000 tons.

If the subs could be held where they were, it seemed likely that by Xmas we would be on a full tide again. Germans were having some difficulty in training their U-boat crews for the immense numbers of U-boats they were putting out, and Bruce said in the last war 80-odd % of the sinkings had been by 3 commanders and it was fairly definite we had managed to capture or kill many of their most skilful operators already.

There had been rapid improvement in Britain and America in production of equipment. Americans satisfied with what was being done in Britain; we were still a long way from the position when we could look with equanimity on the relative position.

Lyttelton and NelsonFootnote ⁴⁹⁸ had established in America a Joint Production Board in which all manufactured goods were being pooled and there had been set up a Joint Food Board in which food resources of the two nations had been pooled. This Anglo-American Food Board was to some extent duplicating the activities of the post-war relief board that had been set up in January by the US, UK, Russia and China. The Anglo-American Board was primarily concerned with immediate post-war food relief.

The United Nations Board was also dealing with the question of post-war reconstruction. It was obvious that the organizations would have to merge into one ultimately to prevent unnecessary overlapping. This raised the question of whether it was possible to separate immediate post-war relief from the long range post-war reconstruction policy insofar as food is concerned. The opinion was steadily heartening both in British and American circles as well as in Russian and Chinese that they could not be separated. Plans must be laid down that not only must the stores of food be laid in, but the methods of securing collaboration in production and distribution must also be settled. This raised question of whether it was wise to stimulate production. Bruce felt insofar as the immediate post-war years were concerned the starving condition of the conquered nations would make Britain's supply lag behind demand. He agreed with my contention that if we stabilized the position of the consumers in the various countries and at same time made certain that the prices for foodstuffs were such that the nutrition of the people would be raised, this condition of demand exceeding supply would continue. He agreed also that if we could stimulate Australian development simultaneously with the increased production of food we would not only be able to enormously increase our primary production but would have difficulty in fulfilling export demands because of the local needs. He was 100% behind my ideas of using all these subsidiary means of bringing down costs of production and increasing real wages of the great mass of the community and felt a bit ashamed that Australia had not taken the initiative in bringing out a definite national policy on this subject when she had really brought down the idea of improving nutrition being the solution of trade problems. He felt sure I had a life's work ahead of me to put it across.

He had been disturbed over Evatt's attitude re Supreme Boards that dealt with these matters in that he wanted Australia to be represented in more. After a long fight in which Bruce had pointed out that the inclusion of Australia on these boards would mean the demand by all the conquered nations for representation as well which would make the whole organization unwieldy, the Australian Government had supported Bruce's view that they should not be on the Supreme Board but on the subsidiary board. I had already spoken to Attlee with regard to securing full representation on these boards.

Saw Winant at US Embassy. Discussed post-war food relief and international organization. He said right man to see in Washington was Dean Acheson, Under Secretary, Department of State, who was handling the Lease-Lend machinery and they hoped to make the organization they are building up for war available for peace and to find a means of providing finance. Stettinius was handling the actual disposal of the material and not the organization side, did not think he would be so useful to me on question of policy. On price fixation and agricultural development generally I should see Wickard, and on wheat agreement Appleby was the most useful man, his Under Secretary. At Washington Wallace, Vice President, was handling economic warfare and post-war reconstruction, and his head man was Milo PerkinsFootnote ⁴⁹⁹ at the Bureau of Economic Warfare. If I asked Wallace for Perkins’ paper on under-consumption he would post it to me wherever I was staying.

He said they had in America come to a dead end on wheat for 2 reasons. [First], they did not have the courage in wartime when shipping was so urgent a matter to say pat and plain that Britain should not grow any more wheat. Secondly they thought it better to have a general plan into which not only wheat but cotton and everything else could fit. I felt that line of action would lead to delay and might easily lead to chaos and nothing being done, it was better to deal with wheat and have it as a shining example of what ought to be done, there should be a plan whereby British production should be tapered off so that its reduction would not become an urgent political problem and there should be a substantial amount of elasticity during these years. He said possibly I was right. I said my experience of practical politics was that these general plans seldom got anywhere. What was necessary were concrete definite plans.

He told me Beaverbrook had a special oxygen apparatus his son the Wing CommanderFootnote ⁵⁰⁰ had worked out for him that enabled you to fly to any height if you were in trouble with your heart, and that I should have a talk with him and if necessary borrow it.

Went to see The King at Buckingham Palace to be invested with the Order of the Companion of Honour. The King opened up by saying he had seen a telegram somewhere that MacArthur was reported to be strongly anti-British and did I know anything about it. I said I would be surprised if it were so and would be very disturbed as well, so I will look into it when I get back. He said they seemed to be making some difficulties because there were not some British forces in Australia, but I said I felt sure the people of Australia did not want British forces there if they were wanted elsewhere. They had their own people scattered all over the place. What they really wanted was equipment and the presence of the British Navy in strength in their waters and the quicker that could be secured the more certain it would bring the right feeling about in Australia. We discussed Libya, told him my views, could not understand the quick surrender. Asked me whether all the Australians wished to go home. I told him about my experience of the Sunderland Squadron at Plymouth who had been keen at the beginning but were quite satisfied to stay in England now they were doing a real job. He was very worried about my illness and told me to look after myself.

Saw Leathers at Ministry of War Transport; said had backed me 100% and wished me to feel when I went back that I could rely on him to give me any assistance. He covered the shipping position all over the world, said labor in Australian ports had become increasingly difficult during the last few months, making considerable delays. The Australian position re actual tonnage of shipping available for Australia had improved, mostly by reason of the fact that boats which previously were making the Dutch East Indies their headquarters were now available for Australia and amounted to many tons to enable the Australians to handle the position, in which they were semi-independent owing to the entrance of the Japs. They had appointed a branch of the Shipping Board on which GordonFootnote ⁵⁰¹ represented the Ministry of War Transport and it was working very well. Oil position so far as Australia concerned, very good. The only real difficulty was there was not sufficient storage tank capacity to hold all the oil they could get down to them. They had been able, by reason of the Dutch East Indies going out of the picture, China not being a customer, Burma being blocked, to secure 35 extra tankers on this particular line and these were not merely acting to carry oil but were acting as store ships as well. In America I should see Salter who is acting for him, and IckesFootnote ⁵⁰² who was the Oil Co-ordinator for both the States and Britain.

In Indian Ocean shipping position better than anticipated though they had lost a few ships when the Jap aeroplane raid occurred on Ceylon, but very little trouble was really happening now by reason of the Jap submarine menace and the fact that at present they were actually sailing 90 ships around the west and east coast of India. This was relieving the railways. In fact they had been so free of damage that they were getting a bit more saucy than they should, he thought, and might easily strike disaster. They had kept these boats intact by continually altering the route and had every day in London a daily conference, a separate one for routing of tankers. Once they got them convoyed in American waters they would start to bring down the submarine sinkings. This would tend to drive away the subs to shadow those ports at which the convoy ended and they were working out a scheme whereby they would have an air potential able to protect the ships from subs till they had sufficiently spread or ceased to be an easy prey to any lurking subs. Insofar as the ship building programme is concerned, it looked as if the US would build between 7 and 8 million tons and the UK 1¼ million tons this year. They were taking some of these for aircraft carriers so it is not all available for commercial purposes. The estimated losses from enemy action and weather was thought to be somewhere about 6¼ million tons but it had gone up in the last 2 or 3 months substantially and looked now more like 7¼ million tons this year, which would mean that they were down about ½ million tons net loss during the year. This position was not as bad as it seemed, as the loss of territory that we had suffered in Burma, India, the closing of China, really lessened the distance in journeys that the various ships had to go so that even with a smaller tonnage they may be able to do the commercial work. In 1943 it was expected 14 million tons would be built in the US, so even if a substantial amount were taken for aircraft carriers we ought to be 3 million tons up on losses even if we did not find a way of dealing with losses better than at present. Last month they had the quickest turn round ever obtained both in America and Britain. They were able to go much further south in the North Atlantic route which makes the times 2 or 3 days shorter for every convoy. Tremendous congestion of shipping at South Africa and with a loss of many bases and docks or difficulty of entry like on the east coast of India, the problem of where repairs to ships would be carried out was very acute. Question of discharging difficult as well. Overcoming this to large extent by improving discharging facilities by having special cranes constructed on various boats that could lift stuff quickly from seagoing vessels into lighters and from lighters on to the docks. They were improving very much in some places, in others they still had bad tangles, for instance Bombay today had 103 ships in port which was 30 more than it could handle.

Talk with General Hood, who promised to see if he could not get Iven kept here long enough to stay for the next Fellowship exam. Webb Johnson, Hope Gosse, Rundle,Footnote ⁵⁰³ Iven and Hood came to dinner. Interesting discussion on future of medical practice in Great Britain and all English-speaking countries. Rundle took view that future of medicine would lie practically in direct Government control with directors of medicine, surgery and so on in different regions controlling and doing work. Hope Gosse and Webb Johnson satisfied must have addition to Governmental or institutional work, certain amount of private work to really stimulate concentration of every case. Agreed amalgamation of hospitals to cut down overheads was sure to come, and universal agreement that about 600 beds was optimum size that hospital should take. Hood said in Madagascar there was a tremendous amount of malaria amongst British troops, much more than in Malaya, and it did not seem to respond to quinine.

Wednesday, 24/6/42

Discussed with Wardell general layout of liaison system. He was keen on great bulk of military liaison officers being at Australia House and just the actual liaison man himself being under the jurisdiction of the accredited representative. He thought he would probably need a secretary and a typist as the whole of his staff but there were so many things that had to be done by the military people in the way of ordinary equipment, quite apart from the special needs that were being pushed in the War Cabinet, and these could be done much more easily through Australia House. He did not think it necessary that there should be any junior man to himself to contact at lower levels so long as he was here. He had been able to make the contacts right through without any difficulty but it might be if fresh man came who was perhaps senior to him to begin with, and who made his contact with the COS, that a junior man might be necessary.

Sir Drummond ShielsFootnote ⁵⁰⁴ raised question of parliamentary delegation to Australia from Great Britain and one from Australia to Britain. He had £2,000 on the estimates which had disappeared in March and a further £2,000 this year. He thought he would get the other revived if possible to do something about it. He wanted my view, which was that it could do nothing but good to have some men go out from here and especially strong Labour men from Britain. He said Bruce was opposed to the idea but I pointed out that Bruce's outlook, because he was educated in England, was different from that of those in Australia.

Saw Lord Cranborne at Colonial Office who said he regarded with great pride the fact that he was in the Dominions Office while I was there. He said he was dealing with the whole question of Empire communication next week in the House of Lords and was going to develop the plans I had laid down, and illustrate the possibility of their general application. He realized to the full the necessity of the very rapid development of this Empire liaison to enable us to offset the definite impetus that there was towards closer collaboration with the US and other countries during the war which might persist afterwards. His son was getting better except for muscular paralysis; the feeling was coming back in his hand and the nerve was not completely severed.

Saw Eden, who laid down the general position re Turkey, Portugal and Spain. Re Turkey, he felt sure she would stand on our side so long as there was not a major disaster such as the loss of the [Nile] Delta. She was somewhat fearful of Russia but did not think she had definite Germanophile tendencies. So far as Portugal was concerned there was an acute interval some 2 months ago but they had now settled down, the Japs were irritating the Portuguese in Timor and the Australians and Dutch were still fighting all over the island and undoubtedly had active Portuguese sympathy and help. He thought their attitude would remain benevolently neutral as it was. In Spain the position had not altered – there had been attempts to secure restoration of the monarchy but he did not think the prospective claims to the throne would be willing to be set up by German sympathizers as he would have a permanently divided Spain under him. There were numbers of the old Republicans still in internment camps. Labor was scarce and except at harvest time conditions so far as food was concerned were very bad.

Saw Bruce, who was worried about StevensFootnote ⁵⁰⁵ who apparently had deceived the British Government as to his status and had secured some money to enable him to get to America by air. He wished me to speak to DixonFootnote ⁵⁰⁶ and warn him by word of mouth.

Stirling told me progress of liaison so far as Foreign Office was concerned up to date. Said good-bye to Australia House.

Saw Sinclair, who told me unavoidable delay of squadrons. He had made an explanation which he hoped would be acceptable.

Saw Woolton who dealt with food reserves, said conditions fairly easy but he was taking every precaution to make certain there was no trouble next winter, he was prepared to buy everything that Australia could export in the way of food, but could only provide shipping for it in order of priority that they had determined here. If we did not have complete cargoes of the highest priority, better to fill up with whatever else we had, but he did not want the canned fruit fellows to put a swift one over by taking the place of refrigerated cargo that would come as it was more urgently needed here. He was going to do his best to make certain stabilized prices lasted after the war and he would assist me in every way and would write regularly as to the progress he was making. Discussed plan of campaign and determined as a basis of our joint policies that it should be to subsidize the cost of living rather than unemployment – to keep the standard of living high and the cost of living low and recoup the industries that had to provide the low cost of living out of the profits of industry, that this would enable us as an Empire to maintain our export trade and keep employment generally going.

He was a bit sick about the way in which the Australians contrasted so badly with the other meat producing countries insofar as de-boning meat was concerned. They felt they should have the least possible bones here and Brazil and the Argentine and NZ had been able to lift their deboned meat up to 100% but Australia only got to 36% in February and 56% in the end of April. Begged me to shake them along as much as possible when I got home to increase their canning. He told me his wife had a child in the worst period of the last war when the meat ration was low and the food was not of the best, and though he was quite well off at the time, 7 years afterwards the youngster was still suffering from the effects of the malnutrition of the mother.

Met heads of Australian Press, […] Found they had a good appreciation of the job of work that had been done. They thought there had been almost an open rupture during February and March and they were quite satisfied that nobody else could have saved the position. They had not been able to publicize it very much because it was better to keep it under ground. Their principals in Australia knew the value of the work I had done even though they had not been able to use it in the press.

Thursday, 25/6/42

Saw Bevin at Ministry of Labour, who was keen on working out with me a system of Empire consultation with regard to industry generally and especially agricultural development. He felt as a result of the war it might easily be that the Dutch East Indies and Malaya fell almost entirely in the orbit of American influence and under those circumstances it would be indispensable for us to develop our probably African possessions, that this might lead to conflict of interests if there was not preliminary co-ordination.

I told him of the proposals I had brought down in 1937 Imperial Conference for an Empire Council which could be called the Commonwealth Council of Agriculture to take out the name of ‘Empire’ which was obnoxious to some people. Though this would be a ministerial body, yet the important part of it would be the secretariat which would be continuous and would take the place and do the work of the old Empire Marketing Board under a different name, assuring production, distribution and marketing of our Empire goods in an orderly fashion, and carrying out the research work as well. He thought this was a good idea and said would keep in contact with me. So long as in England they could keep the coal mining and agriculture free from being depressed, they could maintain employment generally. He thought that the adoption of this national coal mining council that he had managed to get through in the last 2 or 3 weeks, combined with some such organization as I suggested, would enable that to be done. The stabilization of prices for agricultural products would tend to give such stability to industry and employment as to make industrial problems much smaller and easier to handle. The colonies that we could develop might easily have productions in some lines in which the temperate dominions were already competing of such an amount as to prove serious competitors and to disorganize markets. Speaking of American production, he said it would take some time to show results, though it was undoubtedly increasing, but their labor problems were rather different from those of England and he himself had been rather averse to going to America until there was more finality reached in the method they would ultimately adopt to handle their labor problems. For that reason he had delayed, and in fact he felt they would solve their own problems better than any outsider coming in to tell them what to do. The real difference between England and America was that England was a homogenous country and there was needed a certain amount of shaking down in American industry with the various races that had migrated there.

Parting dinner with Elizabeth, Iven, Miss Ross and Bill Low. Caught 7.15pm train to Bristol.

Friday, 26/6/42

Left Bristol 10am. Arrived Rineanna airport 11.45am, lunch at Dunraven Arms Hotel, Adare. Dinner at Foynes, left 8pm.

Saturday, 27/6/42

Arrived Bottwood, Newfoundland, 9.30am, left 1½ hours later. Arrived Shediac, Canada, 1.30pm, stayed overnight owing to bad weather ahead.

Sunday, 28/6/42

Left Shediac 7.30am.

Arrived New York 12.30pm, met by Mr and Mrs Garside,Footnote ⁵⁰⁷ to Ritz Carlton. While on clipper had long discussion with Leith Ross Economic Adviser to British Government,Footnote ⁵⁰⁸ coming to discuss with America best form of set-up for immediate post-war relief and post-war reconstruction. He was fearful of too many of the smaller countries getting on to the executive organization which was to handle the immediate job and hoped to be able to try and arrange that only Britain and America really did the executive work. I told him I thought that as a practical proposition, a satisfactory way of dealing with the subject in the post-war reconstruction side (which I agreed could be not separated from the post-war food relief side) was not to form a general organization to deal with the whole matter but to take each major item by itself and have an executive organization of the countries most interested in that subject to deal with it, that this would have the effect of ensuring that only practical propositions and not academic propositions were put forward and also would lead to a greater measure of compromise between conflicting views, as countries that were deeply involved in each particular matter would be very anxious to secure a satisfactory settlement, whereas countries that were only lightly involved might stick out for some theoretical consideration which loomed large in words but was of no real practical importance. He thought this was a first-class idea and hoped that I would raise it when we met at Washington with the people who were handling the general proposals.

He urged that wool should be one of the subjects that Australia should arrange some international collaboration for, and I told him that Owen Dixon was the best authority in Australia on wool and he should seek his aid. If they had a practical proposal ready for me to take back to Australia, I could get it through because the wool industry in Australia was really the most far-sighted industry that we had, and the most ready for practical international co-operation.

He thought the Argentine might be slow in coming in, because America was evidently roasting it to some extent as they were inclined to favor [sic] the Germans, with the result that at present the Argentine had to practically use the whole of its maise [sic] crop for fuel. Brazil, on the other hand, which had played the game was being very well treated and all surplus was being dealt with.

Satisfied that some form of stabilized currency had to be brought into being to permit international exchange to take place as soon as possible after the war, but its exact form he did not then see though he thought the matter had been considerably advanced by Roosevelt's statements in Congress which indicated fairly clearly that America's Lease-Lend donations were real gifts without any monetary string to them, though they might be used to force a satisfactory common economic policy on the recipients. He thought there would be no immediate problem as regards sugar and wheat. In 5 years’ time there might be a big problem re sugar, as the Dutch East Indies and the captured Pacific possessions came into production again. There might easily be a shortage of meat. Proper propaganda for adequate nutrition might ensure such consumption in Europe as to bring about a shortage of butter and dairy products. With wool there might be some difficulty except there was a scheme similar to BAWRA after the last war, but this time including the US. He thought base metals ought to be absorbed.

He agreed with me that my work in getting Empire Clearing Houses established in the various aspects of supply had been invaluable in helping the approach to this problem, but the extension of this system to the Board of Trade and Agriculture would simplify the difficulties that were inherent in those problems and would stimulate international collaboration by making a huge Empire unit in a position to deal with other big units, similar ones automatically coming in to any arrangement made.

BaileyFootnote ⁵⁰⁹ met me with Australian pressmen. Told me some of the difficulties Evatt had come up against, as did also Garside.

Monday, 29/6/42

Drove through Bronx and visited Botanical Gardens. Lunch with Sir Ashley Sparks, head of Cunard Line, British Ministry of War Transport's representative in NY. […] Told me story of mercantile shipping so far as America concerned in last 8 months. Sinkings during last fortnight so terrific as to practically bring about closing of Panama Canal, Americans at least had become ready to adopt British naval advice that all boats should be escorted or convoyed. Until they could do this, they were going very easy. In tankers especially had been heavy losses. As against this, the ship building production had made greater progress than expected – this year we would not be so far behind losses.

Staggered me by saying that next year American and British ship building should produce 20 million tons of mercantile boats, which was about 6 million more tons than Leathers had told me last week. When I queried the figure he said he himself doubted it until he verified it.

I raised question as to whether such a huge increase of tonnage could be properly manned and engineered and he said the Americans had gone into this thoroughly, had several big training schools brought into being, with from 800 to 1,000 men being trained intensively. Meantime he expressed appreciation of the work the privately-owned American railway system was doing in handling railway transportation and especially in trying to establish a shuttle system to enable the American boats to be concentrated as far as possible on the Pacific.

He was sure that Australia would be able to get much more shipping than anticipated. He did not think, however, they would prove of much value to our refrigerated cargo as first of all there was not much refrigerated space available for boats – they had to some extent adopted my suggestion made last October that a certain proportion of the new ships should be insulated, but even if this difficulty could be overcome they did not have enough refrigerated railway trucks in America to handle the volume of refrigerated cargo that would come from Australia and NZ. Hence supreme importance of our carrying out to its fullest extent the canning programme I envisaged last year.

Then to National City Bank, where Rentschler,Footnote ⁵¹⁰ President, had been able to squeeze in an appointment for ½ hour; as Sparks had kept me ½ hour late there was only about 5 minutes of time left, but after I had talked to him for 5 minutes he brought in the whole of his Vice Presidents and nearly murdered his myrmidons who kept coming in telling him he would miss his train. Left him at 5.30pm with promise to return and have lunch. Told him roughly the programme I had mapped out for Australian development and showed him how that linked up with the international programme that was being worked out in Washington, how important that development would be to American investment, how useful American investment and brains would prove in development of Australia and how important that might be in the stability of world politics. In Australia 30 or 40 million people would make the Pacific an ocean absolutely true to its name – the US on one side and the well-populated Australia on the other.

He had not been brought up on a farm, was still interested in farming in Ohio, had practical experience of general principles I was trying to get adopted in Australia, there were districts in America where those principles had been successfully practised for many years, their system of co-operation having come down from the old days when they used to help one another get in their hay and crops to beat the weather. He was satisfied by the means of universal extension of this in not merely Australia but America and in all agricultural countries, we could begin to get the costs of production down so that we could begin to look at the huge financial commitments that stabilizing the price of the necessaries of life on the food side would involve in all countries.

He felt every possible means should be adopted to bring these costs of production down and make amount of subsidy that had to be paid the least possible, as Governments and electorates might get tired of subsidies whereas the permanent reduction in cost would always be there. The National City Bank handled the whole of the business of the Edison Consolidated Electrical undertakings in the US, the new deal in wartime taxation had raised their taxation bill from $3 million to about $100 million a year. They had found by experience that the methods I was suggesting in Australia were the only ones whereby they could pay the taxation and at the same time extend their business which was absolutely vital to having enough money to meet these excessive burdens. He was satisfied the flat rate was absolutely sound and felt sure they were prepared to back substantially with money for private electrical undertakings that we wished to instal.

He was disturbed at difficulties in establishing a stabilized currency after the war. I said there was only one country that could do it and that was the US, who had to put these financially disabled countries on to their feet. I did not think that money should be just given to them unconditionally – I thought it might have to be given to them but it should carry the obligation of those countries collaborating to the fullest extent in the industrial agricultural policies that were necessary to bring permanent peace to the world and full employment to all the peoples of the different nations and especially to permit the backward countries like India and China to raise their standards of living by industrialization.

He raised question as to whether there would be a market for their products, and when I expanded my theory about improved standards of living would cause a definite shortage of agricultural products and secondly how raising of standard of living and purchasing power in these countries would increase total quantum on international trade as well as internal trade, he said his own mind had run in the same direction. It appeared, however, that if the carrying out of that policy was left entirely to Government officials and not to private enterprise, first of all it would not be effectively carried out and secondly there would never be any reduction on the cost of production.

Told him what I had done in Australia during last 20 years in statutory control Boards established in which, although the Government by legislation had unified handling of the product as a whole, yet it was always done through existing private agencies. When we stabilized wheat last year we still retained the wheat merchants and agents as the experts that were indispensable.

I felt that business men generally had made a mistake in leaving the modelling of plans for post-war development too much in the hands of civil servants, it was a matter of practical application of their own experience to handle these jobs, and urged that everything they drew up should be in the most elastic form. What terrified him about the proposals made were the carefree way in which bureaucrats were fixing the price of various products years ahead of the ending of the war when no-one really could conceive what price levels would be. Carey,Footnote ⁵¹¹ head of the CIO, had tried to insist that into every Lease-Lend agreement in every advance America made there should be a provision that the country receiving aid should incorporate into its legislation provision for a minimum working week and a standard basic wage. I said that was impossible, chaps who wanted to put these ideas in had to be kept away from the agreements, the most certain way to wreck the world again was to make it impossible say for Brazil or China or India to gradually approximate to the conditions of America, England or Australia. The only way in which anything like fair competition between our countries and these other low wage countries could be assured was by raising their standards of living, and that had to be a gradual process. In fact if it was not done, these countries would force down our own standards of living either by direct trade competition in peacetime or by bringing about another world war in which for years we had colossal waste, the redemption of which was a terrific tax on every member of society.

Rentschler said the universities in the US had been doing a very fine job in connection with reorganization of agriculture and especially agricultural economics, the different universities had taken a special subject, one cheese, one beef, one wheat, one butter, and so on, and had demonstrated by actual work in the field as well as by laboratory experiment just where the main causes of failure were, how they could be remedied, the sort of stock that could be used in different localities and so on. They had also stimulated the establishment of conservancy boards. In one county of 3,000 farms this conservancy Board had been declared by statute to be a legal authority and had power to compel all farmers to come into various schemes for training their land and for handling various problems that could only be dealt with in common. This work was supervized by men that the local board paid and controlled, and because of this they were able to choose men of the widest possible experience to do the work.

Tuesday, 30/6/42

Floyd BlairFootnote ⁵¹² of National City Bank called, discussed programme of visits in US.

Lunch with Garside at Gallagher's steak cafe, where saw pictures of sportsmen, rulers of Tammany and America.

Saw HaggardFootnote ⁵¹³ (nephew of Rider Haggard), British Consul-General. True Britisher with all their phlegm, good sense of humour.

Then to J.P. Morgan's, saw T.W. LamontFootnote ⁵¹⁴ and […] one of his senior partners, and had afternoon tea. Discussed position in England and Middle East. They agreed with my attitude that we should give them a blow on the head and heart rather than the toes and fingers but not before we were ready.

To Kellway's office where handling Lease-Lend. [Three] of his senior men dealing with machine tools side of requisitioning, set out for me most of their difficulties which are of the same character as the London ones. They are so at their wits’ end to overcome the difficulties brought about by Australian methods that they made a recommendation that one of their technical men should go back to Australia to point out to them exactly how they were hampered in this country by persistence of lack of detailed technical data. While they are wiring backwards and forwards, Britain and Russia were getting the machine tools we might easily have had. I suggested that if they were sending a man he should fly first to Britain and take with him the double picture of both countries as that would be sure to give them a definite impression that the same factors were holding them up in both places.

Wednesday, 1/7/42

Saw WattFootnote ⁵¹⁵ who said the alterations I had been able to get in taxation assessments were as much as they could reasonably expect and would make a great difference. One thing needed to be done – to divide their allowance into a representation and a living allowance. If the representation allowance could be made a substantial one he thought they would not be unjustly treated.

Mr RablingFootnote ⁵¹⁶ of Vacuum Oil saw me, said McColl who had been so good to me in London and sent flowers, had wired to him to make sure he saw me. Confirmed what Leathers had said, that the position of oil in Australia was conditioned now, not by tanker position as there were plenty available to carry all that Australia could desire, but by the storage capacity in Australia which was practically overfull. It looked as if some tankers might have to stop there for awhile to give tankage capacity. The extra storage our Government had built had practically been all taken for aviation spirit, of which Australia had more than thought possible. I thought the demands on aviation spirit in Australia might be much in excess of any previously anticipated use. I asked him whether my old suggestion of using the country bowsers that were not now necessary because of pooling of the spirit and uniform brands was being adopted as reserve storage. My understanding was that this would be worth about 30 million gallons of space and he understood they were doing it in NZ and beginning to do it in Australia. He said they were building pretty hard to get additional storage as soon as possible. He said there were 3 sources from which Australian supplies were drawn – Abadan in Persian Gulf, Peru and California. Whole of Peruvian supplies being sent to Australia and balance made up by Californian. Control of oil position in hands of companies which had formed a Foreign Operations Committee which met in Washington and NY. It had a Supply Sub-Operations Committee which receives monthly a cable from Australia for supplies it needs for 4 months ahead, setting out ports at which it should be delivered, grades, etc. This information simultaneously supplied to London where Overseas Supply Committee, British opposite number, was functioning, and then as a result of their collaboration they prepared the tanker movements, laid out their cargoes – and programme. British and American companies had now whole tanker fleet of United Nations operating as one unit and the use of shipping was very efficient. All Australian oil was now being obtained under Lease-Lend so that there were no dollar commitments.

As a result of war, every company possessing tankers developing a short haul policy. He thought this would be invaluable after war if it could be maintained, in cutting down costs of handling. I told him of proposals I was trying to get written into the post-war food relief agreements and post-war reconstruction agreements re stabilization of food prices and this suggestion of theirs to cut down tanker costs and marine transport of oil would have the most far-reaching consequences in cutting down transport and production costs in all countries. Transport costs generally amounted to about 30% of total, but more mechanized industry became, the more petrol of various sorts entered in actual costs of production, and the smallest reduction in price of petrol would be pyramided in continually reducing prices throughout whole of industry.

I raised question of flat rate for petrol in Australia, pointed out how unjust that country farmer or sawmiller who had no other means of transport should pay 6d or 7d gallon more than pleasure users in cities. He thought it could only be done if every company contributed its full share of stabilizing cost. He said he felt sure the 4 big companies could, by many economies and elimination of duplication by getting together if they were protected by the Government, make a substantial contribution to flattening of rate which would be reflected in production costs as well throughout industry everywhere.

He said that though petrol position was good, he was not as satisfied with lubricating oil position, they had a great deal of trouble in getting enough cargo space in ships going to Australia to carry this out in cases and tins. Most of lubricating oil produced on eastern coast of America, very expensive to rail it across to western coast for shipment. He wanted to know whether I thought Australian Government would pay for this and I said I thought the big companies might just as well pay for it because the Government would take out whatever profits they had by heavy taxation.

Thursday, 2/7/42

Saw Macgregor, told me piteous story of lack of co-ordination in America re Australian activities. Anxious to get something done of a constructive nature.

Lunch with Blair at Knickerbocker Club. Discussed future of financial investment in Australia vis-à-vis America. Then took me to River Club and set out to make programme for rest of trip.

Saw Besse, Chairman of Wool Manufacturers of America, told of difficulties arising owing to price fixing. Said gradually getting Government into frame of mind to accept his mediation in arbitration on difficult and technical problems that arose. Thought they would be able to work out their own salvation. Said that recent rise in manufactured goods had been fixed before rise took place. They were not clear as to how much of increase in price they would have to bear in America. He said he had heard that Britain was to absorb ½ and America the other half of the 15%. Did not indicate my surprise at this because I had been given to understand in London that the idea was for America to absorb the whole increase.

Dinner with Haggard who had Sir Ronald [I] Campbell,Footnote ⁵¹⁷ Halifax offsider there, with whom had interesting talk re American diplomatic position and general layout of combined strategy. Went to film showing Eagle Squadron at work.

Friday, 3/7/42

Train to Hartford, […] meeting of Board of Directors at which Rentschler,Footnote ⁵¹⁸ brother of Chairman of National City Bank, was in chair, and Mr Wilson,Footnote ⁵¹⁹ who had been in US Navy. Showed me figures indicating tremendous increase in production which had gone up 40 times in 2 years. Equipment had increased 10 times and labor grown 7 times. This enormous increase in production relative to amount of extra capital and labor involved was due to system employed of getting everything done automatically especially by what they called the push-button method. Had been able to get all equipment made in US and had finally trained automobile industries in their methods of aeroplane engine production so that inside next 2 years it looked as if American industry would be able to produce 75,000 planes a year. They themselves had been surprised to find that they had kept on doing better than their estimate. They had produced a 2,000 horse power engine which was 20% better than anything else in the world and would give our aviators and bombers a first-class chance to down Jerry and the Jap.

They said the Jap had shown great ingenuity and adaptability in copying our designs, had evidently organized their aeroplane industry very efficiently and steadily making improvements in design, speed and power, some of this achieved at expense of safety of pilot as they had stripped their fighting planes now of armour and protection for fighter pilot to enable him to attain greater height and smash our people from above, but as they had nothing comparable to the 2,000 horse power engine we would be able to maintain our armour on our fighting planes. Wilson said when he was in the Navy and practising with seaplane carriers, some Jap tanker would always manage to get involved in the manoeuvres and he thought they had been unable to do anything of which the Japs were not cognisant.

They were having some trouble in getting all raw materials desired especially for alloys (not that these were not procurable) but because manufactures of these goods had not kept pace with demands on them in other war industries.

Interesting talk on general strategy. They felt that though we had won the war of what they called procurement (of getting supplies practically level with the enemy powers now and would steadily forge ahead) we would not ever win until we had real strategy and leadership. They thought MacArthur might do the job and I said I was all for bringing him home and letting him have a try, though he had not yet a victory. I raised question as to whether review of war strategy would not place Far Eastern theatre into more prominent light than the European. I felt Germany could be beaten ultimately by a blockade. The conquests she was making in Africa, even if she made and held them, gave her nothing of real value except more starving people to feed. But Japs had conquered immense territory of unbounded resources, and the longer she had possession of them the stronger her equipment position would become and the more difficult she would be to dislodge.

Went around the works. They had acquired from Worlds’ Fair 3 motor tricycles on which we rode – 3 miles of lanes and tracks. Wonderful job.

Saw Hamilton propeller manufactures, make 75% of American propellers for aeroplanes and licenses De Havilland makes 75% of British.

Arrived Boston, Ritz Carlton.

Saturday, 4/7/42

Drove […] to Fitchburg through Concord where British were beaten at bridge, and Lexington. Saw Munro Tavern […] Excellent but heavy repast at Oak Hill Country Club. Assisted in flag raising ceremony.

Dined with […] Professor and Mrs Cross.Footnote ⁵²⁰ Cross very interesting, had good deal [of] experience under Hoover, also Russian and European commercial and diplomatic experiences. Had been sitting in on conversations between Roosevelt and Molotov,Footnote ⁵²¹ interesting sidelights on those proposals.

When told him what I had been doing in London, he said liaison of that sort was necessary in America, what had been happening was that Roosevelt and Churchill would agree and those in their immediate confidence would understand terms of agreement, but those terms would not filter down to the men who really did the work in the Departments, with result that frequently the ideas that Churchill and Roosevelt had were never carried out. Thought my ideas on methods of collaboration for post-war reconstruction would be of material assistance in this direction.

Discussion on question of executive control of post-war food relief. Cross thought I should try and see HopkinsFootnote ⁵²² in Washington – he would very readily absorb the idea of liaison and carry it out, and also had the President's ear.

Sunday, 5/7/42

To Duxbury and Plymouth where saw rock on which Pilgrim Fathers landed, saw Miles StandishFootnote ⁵²³ monument, King Caesar's house, wallpaper 150 years old. Met interesting people including Dr BumpusFootnote ⁵²⁴ […]

Monday, 6/7/42

Called on Governor SaltonstallFootnote ⁵²⁵ at Massachusetts State Executive Building, with Professor Cross […] Talk on difficulties of State finance and promised to try and see his son in Australia – Private Peter Saltonstall, […]

Visited Bunker Hill monument which is really on Breed's Hill.

Lunch with wool men […] raised the 2 points dealt with previous day with Dixon.

Tuesday, 7/7/42

Arrived Washington, met by Sir Owen Dixon and O'Connor. To Shoreham Hotel. Dixon had talk about his difficulties – said Evatt's appeal for extra help the first 2 or 3 days had done good, but he made such a moan about it that finally the American Generals pulled themselves together to get the answer to his complaints and hypnotized themselves so that they did nothing for him. Discussed organization with Dixon, who was worried at triple set-up that had developed, especially as some of the set-up tended to duplicate work already done. Told me difficulties re shipping. I said I thought if he could draw a sharp line between provision of shipping, which was McCarthy's job, and the procurement of supplies which was Macgregor's job, at any rate that element of trouble would disappear.

He was pleased with the way in which the other diplomats in Washington had visited him and expressed themselves freely insofar as their troubles were concerned, though he thought they had an ulterior motive in trying to draw him into making Australia's case a separate one from Britain's. He felt there was a great deal of German propaganda here trying to discount British activities and fighting spirit and efforts and used every opportunity to praise Australians to detriment of British. He thought they were doing their propaganda very skilfully.

Keen I should see Nash, NZ Minister,Footnote ⁵²⁶ whom he had found very stout chap. Told me difficulties of Pacific War Council where presence of China and Dutch tended to restrict scope of discussions and information given. Told him I thought Nash should be in London, that is where he could push greatest weight, and he was to arrange for me to see him. He had summed up Roosevelt as a chap who could make a first-rate appeal that would appeal to everybody with a most comprehensive view and yet have great local political sagacity.

Lunch with Macgregor and his cohorts in Supply Department. Present were […] Father Walsh, who was Principal of Georgetown University.Footnote ⁵²⁷

Saw Clayton at Ministry of Commerce, who handles financing and arranging for import of commodities for American use and for Allies with exception of food. Said US had not bought Argentine wool clip but it was being sold privately to American merchants, they had bought all the lead, copper and zinc they could, Britain and America had bought the whole of the Bolivian tin, which with the African tin put them in a fairly good position. They were not as well supplied with rubber as they might be, but the synthetic company was making good progress, they were pretty well off for chrome and tungsten and thought they would be able to keep going with the supplies they had. Said he felt sure that there would be no surplus wool in the reserves in a year's time to dislocate the market but it would all go to current consumption. He was in favour of international arrangements that would look after these surplus commodities and assured me they were being well looked after by the best brains they could make available in the US.

Then to see R.H. Brand,Footnote ⁵²⁸ Director of British Food Supply Pool, and co-director with American; saw him with bright young chap named Hutton;Footnote ⁵²⁹ discussed prospects of American Agricultural products displacing Australian. Said he thought there had been a great increase in total volume of American production of food, though there had been considerable diversion, that whether the production was maintained and diversion continued would depend largely on price given; the American farm blocks seemed to have great political power, very selfish and forcing issue all the time, getting 110% parity.

In reply to my question as to whether amount being sent to Britain was determined by production available or by shipping facilities, he said it was shipping facilities. There was more produced than they could send and there was not the slightest reduction of consumption in the States. A little bit of rationing of food here would fill up many hundreds of boats. They feared, in fact, that the great demand for food which had developed owing to the high wages as a result of war activities, was causing inflation. I said it probably was not as bad as the inflation that came from goods that had no influence on nutrition.

I raised question whether it would save refrigerated tonnage if a shuttle system were adopted whereby Australian refrigerated products were brought to west coast of America and then transported in refrigerated railway trucks and carried across Atlantic. He admitted there would be a saving of 2 or 3 weeks’ time but the extra handling would involve such a wastage of labor as to more than discount the saving. He did not think they had the trucks in America to handle the job of transportation.

They were short of storage, and in reply to my other question whether it would not pay from the post-war food relief aspect to store the food we preserved in Australia in America so that it would be closer to the famished zones and to use the shipping coming back practically empty to Australia that had carried down soldiers and munitions. He said it would be a good thing but if the food came they would put it straight into England who would eat it; thought it would be safer in America.

Dixon had told me a story early in the morning about wool stored in Australia being in some danger of being bombed by enemy action, and Yeo had said to him ‘Well, so long as it has been paid for and we have a clip and a half stored in Australia, it might be a good thing if they did bomb it.’

Wednesday, 8/7/42

Discussed American policy with Dixon. He was disturbed that they mixed politics very much with their war effort and thought we would not get the maximum drive until after the November elections. Disturbed at manner in which information served out to them at Pacific War Council.

Saw Clive Bailleau, discussed raw materials. Illuminating talk on rubber, said they would produce at least 300,000 tons of synthetic rubber in 1942/43, 800,000 in 1943/44. They expected 150,000 tons of natural rubber and with that they thought they could get through. They were using petroleum for ¾ of the raw material and alcohol derived from grain and other sources for the balance. They had enormous plant already operating in number of places, 40,000 tons being in Canada. Thought it impracticable to get one established in Australia as we would never get permits to shift the special steel for its construction quite apart from the labor problem and our lack of raw material especially petroleum.

Clapp had been invaluable to him, as had also been his association with Dunlop of the rubber company.Footnote ⁵³⁰

As regards tin they had boosted the production of Bolivia and Nigeria and it looked as though they would get 85 to 100,000 tons and had already erected enormous refining plant at Galveston, Texas, which should see them through the acute shortage period.

Called on Henry Wallace, Vice President. Worried over political situation, much more concerned with what Leith Ross thought about how to finance post-war food relief and reconstruction than about other methods of dealing with it, but we did not get properly going because the shadow of my appointment with Cordell Hull hung over the interview. Repeatedly he came back to the war situation and said that hitting with one unit now this year would be equal to hitting with 3 next year against the Jap.

Saw Cordell Hull, very worried over talking about anything except the war effort, though privately prepared to discuss the whole mechanism of the job.

Lunch with Clapp at Carlton, told me inside story of effort made to get rubber project going, easily the biggest single undertaking in world. Told me story of his leaving Australian service, how much he regretted my scheme not being carried into effect, and how worried he was at certain of the proceedings especially obtaining of tobacco and cotton under Lease-Lend. Felt sure this was certain to lead to bad repercussions with American administration and possibly to cutting off our supplies. I said the most important thing with the Americans was to gain and keep their confidence. McCarthy had succeeded in doing this and was universally trusted, but if they found we were requisitioning for what were practically civilian requirements to save dollar exchange, they might go very cold on us. If the Americans would fight for us on our shores as long as it suited them, we must do everything in our power to make certain of the British bonds being maintained 100%.

Saw Appleby, head of Agriculture Department, anxious to talk of practical work, dealt fully with manner in which could secure best international collaboration and agreed with general lines I had put up beginning with an Anglo-American executive and going on to organizing nations to deal with their own particular surpluses. He was much more concerned about finding who were the dynamic forces in the various countries on whom he could rely to give requisite punch to secure full co-operation. Said he had me taped, satisfied with Bruce, and Bevin, so told him Greenwood, Woolton, Leathers and Churchill were all right in Britain and I thought the best man in NZ was Nash.

Saw Monnet,Footnote ⁵³¹ who is handling armament and munition programme of war, admitted that at end of last war he had represented French Government in distribution of post-war food relief. The various countries had got an international organization together and wished to distribute the food, but HooverFootnote ⁵³² said America was finding the food and would make the distribution. Then they found they could not get any payment in dollars for it, with result that nobody got any food.

Told him the International Wheat Agreement provided we were going to hand out the food for anything to the tune of 250 million bushels which he thought was the only way we would get it distributed. Talked of organization necessary. He had the idea that instead of us getting the other executives that were talked about to deal with the job, the most effective way would be to use the Food Board which had been created with Brand to handle it, and the Raw Materials Board to deal with it as well. Then we would start off with a Government authority actually in being. Thought worth while putting it up to Leith Ross. McCarthy and I agreed it was a practical suggestion. It was what I had always advocated, and to create a vested interest for it.

Dinner with Sir Owen Dixon, sat between Sir Ronald [I] Campbell and Brand. Told Brand about my talk with Monnet, he agreed with that view and went on to say that it might be interesting to know that in order to present a uniform view to Food Board, the American Departments had been forced to adopt a system of liaison between themselves which saved a tremendous amount of argument before the Board.

Talk with Judge FrankfurterFootnote ⁵³³ who took interest in Australian constitutional legislation and reform and in the description I gave him of how I had been able to secure a statute control over the whole of the export surplus of the various commodities and yet left it in the hands of the industry themselves. Asked for copies of the legislation as it seemed to him to be the only hope of maintaining in existence anything approximating the present economic system after the war, he feared if we were not careful we would Bolshevize the whole community by complete governmental control and this seemed the most constructive and satisfactory way of dealing with it.

Talk with Admiral Land about shipping, told me some of their failures, especially of the Sea Otter, a wooden boat constructed with engines in the middle and propeller there, very shallow draft so that submarine torpedoes would go underneath it, designed to make one trip to England and then to be broken up and engines taken out, but he said not too many of them ever got to England.

Thursday, 9/7/42

Saw Nash who told me of troubles in NZ, apparently have 4-barrelled Government now. Discussed liaison in London.

Saw Berle,Footnote ⁵³⁴ asked him whether Americans meant to continue artificial production they had indulged in to feed Britain, to which he answered no, they intended to get back as quickly as possible to the old lines and not interfere unnecessarily with our trade. I asked what sort of organization they were thinking of; it seemed to him there would be necessary some international bank which would provide the currency and external exchange for those countries whose goods were not immediately saleable. I asked him would they charge interest on these advances and he said no. Apparently what they have in mind is to utilize the gold of the US which at present is not bearing any interest, for the purpose of forming the basis of the currency that will be necessary.

So far as the immediate organization was concerned, he had not thought of that, but he thought it possible that these statutory organizations being created could do the job of getting ready for the peace though he did not think they had done anything in regard to it up to the present.

Saw Admiral Land, joint head with Leathers of the Anglo-American shipping pool, who told us story of construction, which runs into 24 million tons over 2 years, probably 9 million this year and 8 million next. Whatever they are short this year they will catch up because they are increasing their capacity very rapidly.

Sinkings of American ships was less than current production, but sinking of all ships was greater. They have proved their method of working enormously so that they could turn out a boat in 60 to 90 days. Their 3 ‘C’ classes ranged in speed [from] 14 ½ to 18 knots. There was not much refrigeration put in them as it interfered with the standardized design but there were [a] few, probably 2 or 3% of the total. The new method of electric welding instead of riveting and building segments of the ship enabled a lot of work that used to be overhead work for the men to be now done beneath him. Welding eliminated a lot of weight.

Very disturbed at continued growth of subs, thought they would be able to build a great many in Germany but would finally run out of crews. I asked about the crews of the new ships being built, and he said they were lucky in that 5 years before the war he had started a training service which went from 50 to 500 now, and there were 8 or 10 scattered throughout the States – with an 18 months’ course was able to produce fairly competent officers. He felt sure by the time we had the ships we would be able to man them, and in many of the ships that had been torpedoed we have been able to save the crews.

Bailey finalized press statement.

Dinner with Marriner,Footnote ⁵³⁵ head of American Wool Textile industry war organization in US. Woolton there, head of the cotton and other textile industries, and 2 other Boston men, […] Discussion re future of American Wool industry – they admitted it was inefficient and were prepared to support the American attempt to secure decent reductions in tariff.

Friday, 10/7/42

Saw Leith Ross, told me they had prepared a complete plan for heads of various Departments to deal with post-war food relief and reconstruction but when it came down for consideration by Hull and Wallace they objected to it as being so elaborate as to cause them political difficulty in pushing off a proposal that looked as if we were thinking more of winning the peace than the war. Told him what was in my mind, about using existing executive authorities and that would save the face of the Government spokesman and might give time for their reconsideration of his scheme. He said it would be a great help because Russia usually took about 4 months to come to a decision and his idea was to push out his complete scheme secretly to the negotiating nations and let time run on, which would take them past November. Meantime they could easily link up with the existing organizations as I had suggested.

Saw Hartnett who said he thought Pan American should run a service to Australia. Gave draft cable to Dixon.

[…] Saw Sir John Dill who gave me story of working of machine here and military and naval position.

Lunch with Nash, tried to persuade him to go to London and stay there permanently. Thinking along the lines I have been thinking myself about post war conditions and especially industrialization of India and China. He uses the argument of 30/- a head instead of £1 that I use, working it out on the basis of 1d a day improvement in condition of each resident.

Press conference.

Dinner with Sir Ronald [I] Campbell, Sir Frederick Phillips,Footnote ⁵³⁶ Secretary of the British Treasury over here as Financial member of British Purchasing Commission, and a Major who is going to Australia as British Liaison Officer on MacArthur's staff.Footnote ⁵³⁷

Discussed war, they were inclined to agree that we might do more good by concentrating on the Pacific and just defending Egypt rather than by trying the offensives we had been carrying out there. Discussed how world would be reconstructed after war. Phillips said the Americans were the only people who had any money and that their debts would enormously exceed their gold holdings, yet those debts were practically all internal and there would still be available several thousands of millions of pounds of gold as the basis of international exchange, but he thought the debts would have to be reduced by means of a capital levy. When I cross-questioned him as to how a capital levy could possibly be collected, he admitted the difficulties and it was obvious he had never thought it out, because even a relatively small levy like 10% would so flood the market with real estate as to mess the whole thing up.

Saturday, 11/7/42

Flew […] to Knoxville, head of Tennessee Valley Authority. Very rough trip […] drove into Knoxville, […] huge aluminium plant that uses 1 million horse power. Lunch with Board of Management consisting of D.E. Lilienthal,Footnote ⁵³⁸ Dr H.A. MorganFootnote ⁵³⁹ and J.[P]. Pope.Footnote ⁵⁴⁰ About 30 of the leading executives of organization […] after which spoke of Australia. Adjourned to Board Room, showed me whole of plans and operations, spent about 100 million pounds and have generated roughly 3 million kilowatts of electric current. Have built about 12 dams in main Tennessee stream and about 8 or 9 on the tributaries. They actually control 40,000 square miles of country and portions of 7 states.

Explained that organization was brought into being first of all to deal with flood control and navigation and then followed on regional planning in order to properly control floods. Explained Mississippi really heart of America. Really the bread basket of the nation, producing great bulk of its food and must be protected. They first of all started to protect the valley of the Mississippi by building levees along banks at a cost of $800 million, then they had to build sluiceways at various points of the levees to take the flood when it was rising too fast into the sea. Cost of levees and sluiceways mounted up with no paying partner like electrical development to help pay the cost.

Tennessee River was greatest contributor to the floods on the Mississippi. Has a great rainfall, 40 to 80 inches, drains a country which ranges from 6,000 feet high to about 300 feet at Ohio and it drops this 5,700 feet all in 600 miles. When it came down it added 25% to the flood tide and easily lifted the flood on the main Mississippi 2 or 3 feet, the last 2 or 3 feet which proved so disastrous. The third way in which they attempted to deal with the floods was to build check dams in the tributary watersheds. It was found that terrific erosion from the heavy rainfalls had been going on. The more the erosion, the quicker the water came down the river and so attempts were made to control the water flow at flood time, to give navigable stream and secure water power at the same time.

A material control was determined by the adjustment of the dams at the right spots. 46% of the water was found to run off the hills. In dry weather when the water table in the stream was lowered because of this intermittent flow, the tributary streams and the wells associated with them went dry and the famers were forced to dispose of their livestock or carry them over without being able to fatten them, so in addition to the check dams the organization decided to plan to control and hold the water where it falls. This is really another type of dam by giving a grass covering to the hills and catchment areas so that it acts like a sponge instead of just like a water race. To do this it was found necessary to have abundant fertilizer especially superphosphate, in fact it was found that by adding very little superphosphate you could raise 30% production to 100%. Especially this was true of phosphorus. They have been able to make phosphatic rock up to 50% strength as compared with the 16 or 20% Australian superphosphate. Then they were able to fix nitrogen from the air by the use of electricity and this of course gave them an inexhaustible supply. Then they use the income from the power sales to pay the total expenses of providing navigation to the 9 foot waterway and flood control. By the presence of this huge amount of electric power they had been able to show new ways of developing new projects through the electric furnace and to work out a plan for the conservation of the elements from new industries which will ensure conserving the water where it fell. The phosphorus enables legumes like clovers and lucerne to grow, and these develop nitrogen in the soil, which is much cheaper than making it out of the air. In this way the farmer is made to feel he has the same investment in the Tennessee Valley project in conserving his interests and giving him an income, as the Government has in power production which gives the Government its income.

Morgan said there were 3 great obstacles to the progress of the undertaking which was a community undertaking and of the man on the land. The first was the greed of the industry which was quite reckless of others’ rights and was ready to exploit the native resources of the community for the benefit of the farmer or anybody so long as they could make money. The second hazard was the possibility of no co-ordination between the research engineers and the executive. They had overcome this by continual contacts. The third was that there might be failure to realize that everybody associated in the undertaking, whether they were making electricity or fertilizer or using fertilizer or power, had a common interest.

[…] Back to Andrew Johnson hotel, named after the only President of the US who was impeached.

Sunday, 12/7/42

Saw work done in overcoming erosion, found that places where they had been growing corn and tobacco for many years on hillsides had gradually been almost torn to pieces by the rains, huge gullies, and whole farms had become derelict. Results produced by these people had been wonderful. It took about 7 years to transform a derelict farm into a prosperous grass farm. The effect was that instead of the dams being sealed up, the water ran off quite clear, but it took many weeks to seep into the rivers.

Saw Douglas Dam Company, 1800 feet long, 185 feet deep, contained 475,000 yards of concrete. This was the third dam of this size they had built. The first cost about 5 million pounds and took 4 years to build; this one was being built inside a year at a cost of 3 million pounds. Every possible labor-saving device working 3 shifts all around the clock. Going to put in 335,000 kilowatt generators to get power from flow of water.

Then to Cherokee dam where they have put in similar dam about year ago and now had water within 6 feet of top.

To Norris dam, completed several years. Then hurried to catch plane. Arrived NY 9pm.

Monday, 13/7/42

Lunch with National City Bank, where Randolph [Burgess]Footnote ⁵⁴¹ said to Rentschler who had been away at the early part of my talk, that he thought I had given them the key to ensuring that industry played its full part in the post-war reconstruction.

Saw Bailey who told me of his difficulties – promised to see Curtin about them.

Saw Herod of American General Electric,Footnote ⁵⁴² who recalled that in 1936 I had put up the proposal of a co-operative international electrical enterprise in Europe as the most certain way to prevent war. [Handwritten annotation]

Caught train 7pm to Detroit.

Tuesday, 14/7/42

Arrived Detroit, Book Cadillac Hotel 8.15am, 25^th floor.

Went to Willow Run where they are putting through an aeroplane in an hour for the Allied cause. Really a triumph of engineering skill and design and management. A year ago there was just a playing field for a boys’ school which Ford had established. Today there is an immense works, making the frame work at the aerodrome without the engines on mass production lines, and a huge aerodrome with a hanger that will hold 22 monster planes. They have done a good deal to simplify and lighten the planes, first by stamping out great portions of the aluminium framework, thus avoiding the use of thousands of rivets, and actually strengthening the fabric; their discovery of methods of bending the aluminium when it is filled with a special metallic mixture, prevents it from cracking and being bent, and by the devices they have perfected to enable the working of the machines to be done at body level. The design of their works enables them to assemble the parts when they are made on a handy and quick basis. There is no doubt that the methods when the war is over should materially cheapen the cost of aeroplanes as well as strengthen them.

Bray,Footnote ⁵⁴³ British Consul-General, telephoned – had got Packard permit.

Wednesday, 15/7/42

Saw Chrysler tank arsenal. Shop is 1800 feet by 700, well designed and well equipped with machine tools. Intricate character and despite this they have been able to train their men so quickly as to have almost all of them under one man's control. In some places they have second man helping, but they are really being trained to take other shifts. Turning out 20 tanks a day, working 3 shifts, tons of material in sight, modifying them all so that the whole turret swings 360 degrees with the gun. 11 other places in America producing tanks. One of outstanding pieces of work they are doing is to send out 100% spare parts with the tanks. All the early men who came back said this was what was holding up most of the tanks out of the line and these people who were used to handling the spare parts of the motor business had got down to it in a most efficient way. Whole of work is being done on mass production lines, completely by men.

Saw Dodge truck place, building trucks entirely for army use, all private car manufacture having finished. LeonardFootnote ⁵⁴⁴ who showed me around Chrysler's had been 6 years in Australia.

Went to see Packard, met McCauley,Footnote ⁵⁴⁵ Chairman Directors, and Christopher,Footnote ⁵⁴⁶ President. Taken around works by Public Relations Officer. Doing wonderful job in making in their machine shops the British Rolls Royce and turning out as good a job as the English people. Nearly all the work has to be hand finished as it is of such a high degree of accuracy running into millionths of an inch. When engines assembled they are tested for 8 hours, then pulled completely down to see if there is the slightest sign of wear, and put together again. Not only making Rolls Royce for aeroplanes and well ahead in their design of anything the Germans had, but they had highly developed marine engines which they were using in the M[otor] T[orpedo] B[oats]s.

Then to Ford's in Canada where [toured] plant and shown […] young tanks, Bren gun carriers and special scout car to jump over obstacles. Took us to test. Dinner at Country Club. Theatre. Caught train midnight.

Thursday, 16/7/42

Arrived Chicago, Drake Hotel, saw press. King,Footnote ⁵⁴⁷ who was one of the four who had been sent to Australia to spy out the land [for] reestablishment of International Harvester manufacture in Australia, and whom I had converted in the train, came to take us to their works where they showed us the enormous forgings and castings and weight of the Mark Fours which are being worked by their tractor units. Interested to see they were making tremendous number of tractors for farm use which had high priority and especially interested to see that in 40 yards they assembled the tractor from the differential casing to the finished job.

Lunch with whole McCormick Deering directorate. McCormickFootnote ⁵⁴⁸ himself there – about 53, keen, intensely interested in my ideas as to way to make certain industry keep control after the war. He realized the whole future method of handling industry will depend on way they did something along lines I suggested or let whole business slip into governmental hands. He agreed if that happened we would probably see the decay of western civilization and a return to the state of the Middle Ages.

Called on Bernays,Footnote ⁵⁴⁹ British Consul-General, lover of Adam Lindsay GordonFootnote ⁵⁵⁰ and quoted him at length.

Drove around city, met Mr. Daines,Footnote ⁵⁵¹ Controller of Finances of Chicago University then to Country Club on lake side, interesting buffet dinner.

Friday, 17/7/42

Went to Milwaukee, train did 85 miles in 75 minutes. Met by Mr. Uihlein,Footnote ⁵⁵² one of the pioneers of the district, grandfather had been there for 91 years, which was length of time since my grandfather came to the Clarence. Milwaukee, however, town of 750,000 people, with industry supplying whole world, and Grafton is only about 10 or 12,000. What determined site of Milwaukee was harbour on lake which started first of all boat building there, then wheat gristing, sawmilling, and then engineering works. Took us to Allis ChalmersFootnote ⁵⁵³ where 2 Directors, […] showed us the activities – most comprehensive I had seen in America. They were making huge electric turbines, like the Metropolitan Vickers at Trafford, and also making propeller shafts and engines for big boats. Making super chargers for engines being constructed for aeroplanes, tractors, and all the things necessary to equip tanks. Carrying out much of their civil activities for the farmer. Good office set-up, very competent staff. Using women for much of the finer technical work and finding them very good.

Then to A.O. Smiths where we were shown around […] This company, by inventions of its chairman, L.R. Smith,Footnote ⁵⁵⁴ had completely revolutionized the whole steel pipe industry of the world. They had first of all welded the curved steel plates into tubes instead of casting them as in the old days, and then they had managed to line them with an unbreakable porcelain lining which practically made them everlasting. Before war with Japan they were able to turn out 40 miles of piping a day. By reason of their welding they had been able to capture the whole of the chassis work of America. When the war came they turned this system of steel welding of plates to the service of the manufacture of bombers and of aerial torpedoes; instead of the aerial torpedo being made out of the forgings which involved the removal of the whole centre of the steel, and required very great labor and time, they simply turned the steel sheets in the direction they wanted, welded them, and then with an intricate series of tremendously powerful steam hammers and moulders, some of which exerted up to 20,000 lbs pressure, they were able to put noses on the bombs and shape them in any way they desired. Now turning out about 165,000 a month of different sorts from the 4,000 lb down to the 500 lb bomb. Roughly the bomb casing is half as heavy as the loaded bomb. On the aerial torpedo side they had saved enormous time by the use of this system, now turning out 186 a month and hoped to be able to double that production inside 3 or 4 months when they get more machines.

When one remembers that at the time of the Singapore trouble we could only rake up about 200 aerial torpedoes in the whole British forces, one can see what difference this one concern is going to make to our striking forces.

Also making landing gear for heavy bombers and fighters. The heavier these became, the more difficult it was to get something absolutely safe. It was quite a hopeless proposition to build a huge bomber and put in months of work and then run the risk of it being smashed [o]n landing. The ingenuity put into the construction of landing gear had been very great, and the finished work in connection with all the parts was of the highest degree of minuteness. They had gear-cutting machines and polishing machines that enabled them to bring their precision to within millionths of an inch, and so careful were they of every piece of material manufactured that after it had been honed they wrapped it in paper before putting it down. Turning these out very fast and would be ahead of the enormous progress made in so many factories in the manufacture of planes and engines themselves. They had already some for the very big developments.

The whole of this work gave me very great heart for the future.

Sunday, 19/7/42

Finished supply part of report. Flew to Washington, stopping Cincinnati on the way. Met by Watt at 10.45pm.

Monday, 20/7/42

Talk with Watt and Heydon at Legation. Lunch with Lady Dixon.Footnote ⁵⁵⁵ Saw Milo Perkins with McCarthy (Permanent Head Department Economic Warfare) on side of German reserves. He did not give cheerful picture from our point of view – all the tanks, aeroplanes and munitions generally showed to be still very high quality, Germans a bit short of some foods but gradually making narrower concentric ring on conquered peoples, starving those on the outskirts and feeding themselves. There was not much chance of them getting into trouble except through an epidemic starting in the conquered starving countries. Their rail transport system which [they] had been conserving before the war, was giving certain amount of trouble, but otherwise they were getting their stuff up. Not too much oil – everything depended on whether they got through to Caucasus. Views on future similar to my own. In favour of using existing executives rather than creating new ones. In difficult position at present to say much about it because he had unfortunately just finished substantial quarrel with State Department to whom had been given job of handling commercial foreign relations, and he was inclined to think he would have to leave progress of administration to evolution, though everything I was saying was of very material help to him, and Wallace appreciated it.

He believed that huge capital expenditures on reproductive development were the only thing that would keep the people of the world fully employed after the war. This must be spent especially whether we liked it or not, in Allied countries, especially in backward Allied countries. He rather agreed with me that the order was China, Russia, Australia, and despite our high wages where we [were] hopelessly lacking in electrical and industrial equipment and development. He said half as much money available to win the peace than the war would be sufficient to put this position right and would raise the standard of living. I told him I had seen TVA development and thought if that were done on the Indus, the Ganges and the Clarence, it would provide work for the big undertakings that were turning out shells and aeroplanes immediately, but to keep employment anything like it should be, there should be at least the first year 85% of the money being spent on winning the war spent on winning the peace, and then you might go down perhaps to 75 and 60% in successive years. He agreed that if we did not get our schemes working before the war finished so that we could [move] smoothly into the post-war period, there would be such chaos that we might easily be at war again in 5 years. Anyhow there would be no organized Government able to be established.

On the question of the amount of food available, he had seen my statement about wheat, and though it was substantially correct, the position was that owing to the shortage of shipping there had been a great accumulation in the States of food that should have gone to Britain. He agreed we should go hell for leather on the job. He had had a talk with Brand since I had seen him, and they were getting on with planning the future as well as dealing with current supplies.

He said that in the last 3 or 4 weeks he had drawn into his organization something like 2500 business men. These were men who had been drawing in their ordinary occupations anything from $15,000 to $100,000 a year and had been willing to work at the ordinary civil service salaries of 5 to $6,000. They had all sorts of qualifications which they had put up but he did not worry about that. He only asked them one question – were they afraid of the future, were they satisfied we can pull the world out of the mess. If they said they were, he would not have them on his mind under any consideration, we must not let our policy be dictated by fear. The peace would only be won by men who were confident of the world's future. He agreed that the current production of the world, if properly developed and all the people kept employed, would soon wipe out the damage and loss caused by the war. Kept me 1¾ hours.

Talk with McCarthy to see whether I could leave something behind to keep the flag flying in America. He said the real difficulty arose with Brigden,Footnote ⁵⁵⁶ who was his senior, and who was interested in the statistical side but not in the practical side. I said the best thing to do was to try and interest Dixon and get him to direct the plan of campaign.

Watt had dinner with me and discussed American setup. Satisfied that with the 4 activities we had, only very loosely connected, Australia was steadily losing prestige in the American mind – there had been a time 7 or 8 months ago when it had stood very high. Now there were so many counter orders that they did not quite know where they were and this especially applied to the administrative departments.

I asked how an organization like Australia House would function and he thought that was really ultimately the only way out. The difficulty arose in the reluctance of the Australian Government to give any man in America the same powers that the High Commissioner had gradually developed in Britain.

Macgregor told me story of his woes. Wanted to know whether I could see any way out. He was prepared to go out himself to get anything like cohesion again. I think the only way to get it is by making certain that everything is under Dixon's control, even though each separate department handles its own job just as they do in Australia, but with a final veto by the Prime Minister, so there should be the final veto by the Minister here.

Tuesday, 21/7/42

Dixon had lunch with me, told me story of Boston and wool. Felt sure there would be trouble except there was a preliminary organization of Australia, South Africa, NZ and the UK and they should get together and stabilize the thing as far as possible.

Thought political interest in America too difficult to deal with on any permanent basis unless war lasted a long time. Could not understand why American Government did not buy whole of wool clip from American farmers as we had done in Australia.

Re: organization America, Dixon felt worried about position because Evatt had been there and though he had seen what a mess things were in, he had offered no constructive solution.

Then to see Roosevelt who Dixon said had been rather eager to see me, could not understand difficulties. He raised question of Pacific, Japan and Germany, and said in his opinion the great thing was to defeat Germany, the surrender of Japan would follow almost automatically. I contested this on the grounds of their fanaticism, the resources at their disposal, and of the difficulties of smashing them to bits, but he said it was a question of mathematics – they had 8,000 planes to start with, they now had only 6,000. He had evidently had some trouble with the Chinese. It is obvious that as both KingFootnote ⁵⁵⁷ and Marshall were away they were flinging their whole weight into the question of a second front.

Discussed relationship between Empire and US and especially Dominions and US. Said they must speak with one voice through some British representative, it was a good thing that they should visit the States fairly frequently. Had induced Mackenzie King to come down in 1934 by getting an Opposition member to move in King's Parliament that he should do so. Now he came twice a year to the States.

He wanted me to take a message to Curtin saying he thought it a good thing if he could come to America for 3 or 4 weeks. Had spoken to SmutsFootnote ⁵⁵⁸ who was trying to do it, and was going to speak to Fraser. Did not wish them there at same time but thought their presence in America would do a lot of good in many ways. Seemed averse to fighting too hard to get back the Aleutian Islands just now, wanted to conserve his forces, but felt certain Japan would attack Russia in next 2 or 3 weeks.

Dinner with McCarthy. Spoke to Mackenzie King on telephone from Ottawa. Said he could make any day available for me to see him if I wanted. Said Churchill had spoken in highest terms of me. Caught plane to Los Angeles, sat up all night.

Thursday, 23/7/42

Visited Fox Studios at Beverley Hills. […] Saw several ‘shots’. Then to Warners, picture taken with Olivia de Havilland;Footnote ⁵⁵⁹ saw Irene Manning;Footnote ⁵⁶⁰ picture taken with Humphrey Bogart.Footnote ⁵⁶¹

Friday, 24/7/42

[R]e shipping to Australia. Fair number Swedish ships at […] disposal for charter. […] To make sure tanks would not be shifted they had welded them on to the deck. Saw pictures of how they had stowed 20 aeroplanes in one boat.

Went to see Lockheeds, saw […] Mr Gross,Footnote ⁵⁶² who was despondent after visit to Washington where had made very little progress re getting materials. He feared that the Army and Navy were not conducting a really selective choice of men and that there was going to be a solid slump in production of raw materials because of men being pulled off these works. I told him how long it had taken to get going in England but now they had a good system and most of the men were being used in the place they were best fitted for. I was satisfied that if industry got in and insisted on some definite say in the handling of the job here, it would come all right. He was keen on concentrating war strategy on 2 or 3 vital objectives rather than spreading the stuff all over the world. He said they had quite a number of aeroplanes we could take delivery of at once if we could get authority from Washington, many of them lying in the desert guarded by cowboys.

Showed me huge passenger plane that would carry over 92 people. 125 feet across from tip to tip, four 2,000 horse power engines. Could cruise 360 mph if half full of men. Had another job, the Lightning,Footnote ⁵⁶³ a pursuit plane, which would practically go straight off the ground, about 2700 horse power […] not very safe, if they nose-dived they were hard to straighten out, but better than Wirraways.Footnote ⁵⁶⁴

Went on to DouglasFootnote ⁵⁶⁵ where they showed us what they were doing, building Boston bombers,Footnote ⁵⁶⁶ Douglas passenger plane and big transport plane that would carry about 60. Both Douglas and Lockheed were fastening extra tanks on to their fighter planes and the bomber planes too, that would enable an enormous increase in distance they could fly Lightnings range 3,000 miles. If we had anything like this range at the time of Singapore we could have flown the fighters right out to the battle front.

Production steadily gone up, their only limitation was materials. Plenty of labor, starting to use women, giving bigger output than men.

Saturday, 25/7/42

Tennis with TildenFootnote ⁵⁶⁷ […] 3 sets. Interesting to remember played at Heliopolis in last war with Norman Brookes.Footnote ⁵⁶⁸

Sunday, 26/7/42

Went to Santa Barbara and saw mission. Drove along coast road and back through hills to ’Frisco.

Monday, 27/7/42

To San Diego, saw Consolidated Aircraft Company with huge transport planes able to take 100 fully equipped soldiers, making big flying boats larger than Catalinas and bombers, with range of 4,000 miles. Anxious to arrange a daily ferry service to Australia. Asked my assistance in getting American Assignment Board to allot 16 extra planes to enable the service to be established. They pointed out it would be of extraordinary value to Australian personnel travelling as well as to the taking of the spare parts across.

Had dinner in dining room on top of hotel, overlooking whole of San Diego. Back to ‘Frisco.

Tuesday, 28/7/42

Visited Californian Shipping Company, saw ship building going on in 14 shipways at once, launching on 30 days, actually delivering finished boat in 48 days, averaging delivery of 12 a month.

Lunch with Gock,Footnote ⁵⁶⁹ President of Bank of America, to which he had the Governor of the State,Footnote ⁵⁷⁰ the Mayor of Los AngelesFootnote ⁵⁷¹ and heads of the Chamber of Commerce and all the leading financiers and business magnates, at the Los Angeles Club.

Wednesday, 29/7/42

Breakfast Los Angeles Wednesday Club. Spoke over air to whole of western America.

Started by train and business to Fresno, travelling about 7 hours. Fresno town of about 60,000 people, like an enlarged Mildura. Had very famous dining room with palms, almost like a Hawaiian scene.

Thursday, 30/7/42

Shown all over Californian Packing Company […] in afternoon driven by Walter HinesFootnote ⁵⁷² around vineyards. Long talk with Leslie,Footnote ⁵⁷³ President of Sun-Maid Co-op Packing Company.

Dinner at El Rancho, 5 or 6 miles out of town. Dining tables al fresco, round swimming pool into which people in between intervals of dancing dropped in and had a swim.

Friday, 31/7/42

Driven to Yosemite Valley by Walter Hines, about 100 miles each way, huge granite cliffs standing straight out with waterfalls dropping thousands of feet. Huge redwoods at Sequoia.

Dinner with Hines’ daughter [Jeanne], who is going back to university at Seattle.

Arrived at Frisco, […] taken to Fairmont.

Saturday, 1/8/42

McGibbon called, begged me promise to help him fly to Australia. I spoke to Sir Owen Dixon.

Lathrop,Footnote ⁵⁷⁴ head of California Packing Company, called to see me. Took me to Kaiser's ship yardsFootnote ⁵⁷⁵ at Richmond and Oakland where Kaiser Jnr took us over the whole works. Saw 4 ship yards actually producing, and here they were getting down to about 20 days in between the actual laying of the keel and launching of the boat. At Richmond they had built 6 docks big enough to build 18,500-ton boats in 3 months and they had actually built all this concrete in about 10 weeks and cut half the hill off.

Sunday, 2/8/42

Had good look at Berkeley University. Played tennis on Berkeley tennis courts where Helen WillsFootnote ⁵⁷⁶ and Miss MarbleFootnote ⁵⁷⁷ had learned their tennis. Played with district champion of far west. Dinner Fairmont Hotel with Lathrop.

Monday, 3/8/42

Lunch with Californian Packing Company directorate at Pacific Club at which […] heads of practically all the financial and commercial institutions of Frisco.

Long talk with DunscombeFootnote ⁵⁷⁸ who owned Berkeley daily paper and […] his editor.

Tuesday, 4/8/42

Saw General President, First Security Bank,Footnote ⁵⁷⁹ and Scott, Manager, General American Steamship Company, whom I had seen previous October.

Wednesday, 5/8/42

Visited San Jose Valley with Lathrop […] San Jose is main city of the St Clair Valley and they have a most efficient system of handling dried fruits.

Called to see Leland Stanford [Junior] UniversityFootnote ⁵⁸⁰ in which Lathrop had family interest. Amazing chapel that would hold 5,000 or 6,000 pupils. Buildings and general layout ideal.

Thursday, 6/8/42

Dinner with Lathrops, tennis in afternoon with Mrs Gross, champion of far west, and Dunscombe.

Lunch at Bank of America which they gave us at the Bohemian Club, Giannini,Footnote ⁵⁸¹ general President for all America, being my host.

Paid courtesy call on British War Relief organization at St Albans. Courtesy call on American Admiral who had been good enough to arrange all my itinerary right through to Australia.

Friday, 7/8/42

Had Fisher, British Consul-General, and couple of commanders of US Navy to lunch. Admiral could not come. Saw […] Foreign Editor of San Francisco News. Very pro-British, anxious to see us with an Australian representative in Brazil. Told him of difficulties we had in finding suitable men, especially in wartime.

Newhall,Footnote ⁵⁸² editor of San Francisco Chronicle, saw me – pro-British, worried about agitation in America for second front, regarded huge advertisements for building up public opinion for second front at exclusion of fight against Japs as pretty well close to treason.

Armati,Footnote ⁵⁸³ who had been editor of Sydney Sun, called – told me of position in Australia and of terrible inroads taxation was making in salaried men's incomes.

Spoke to Owen Dixon on telephone, asked him to send cable. Wires to Curtin, Fadden and Ethel.

7pm set sail for Australia by Pan American.

Saturday, 8/8/42

Arrived Pearl Harbour 7.45am. Met by Lieutenant Blake, Aide to Nimitz,Footnote ⁵⁸⁴ and Logan, Aide to Admiral Bagley,Footnote ⁵⁸⁵ Commandant of Honolulu. Car to Takulani Hotel. Drove out and had 1½ hours talk with Nimitz dealing with Pacific strategy. Seemed fired off with offensive idea. Told me of action taking place in Solomons. Said if Curtin kept on moaning, Americans would do the job without him.

Liaison with MacArthur was good, though he was not completely satisfied with boundaries between the south-west and south Pacific and his own immediate command.

Admiral GhormleyFootnote ⁵⁸⁶ on good terms with MacArthur and Admiral Leary.Footnote ⁵⁸⁷ Assured me damage done at Pearl Harbour practically repaired. Only one battleship destroyed beyond repair. The other two had been fixed. Minor damages to all the others and they were all back in service or going to US under their own power to get ready for action.

New battleships coming on all the time. Nimitz said he would immediately arrange for Catalina to take me down direct.

Sent me on to Admiral Bagley, talk on best method of getting through – arranged bunk for me – ordinary couch, with no pillows or cushions.

Saw press in afternoon, emphasized my ideas of what Pacific strategy ought to be.

Dinner with […] Bill Low who had arranged birthday party at which they had cake with candles.

Later listened to Hawaiian songs on Esplanade.

Sunday, 9/8/42

Visited Kailua on opposite side of Honolulu to Pearl Harbour, where we had morning tea with retired American soldier who had been in Philippines, and his wife, who told us of Jap attack on Pearl Harbor and Honolulu on 7^th December. They knew nothing about actual fight till they saw an aerial dogfight on their own beach. Everyone was under impression it was heavy-scale manoeuvres.

Monday, 10/8/42

Flew in PBY23 from Pearl Harbor at 5.45am. Captain McKibbonFootnote ⁵⁸⁸ in charge. Really Coranado which we had seen in Consolidated works in San Diego. Accompanied by Bill Low, […]

Arrive Palmyra [Atoll] after fairly rough flight at 2pm, about 1200 miles. Quartered with [commander] […] in charge of station, and had bath and sleep despite fact that almost on Equator. [He] had been on aircraft carrier USS Lexington during last fights in Coral Sea – told me Lexington finally went down under the disorganization of her fuel controls and not by enemy action.

Tuesday, 11/8/42

To Canton Island, after 5 hours’ flight. Arrived in time for lunch at officers’ mess and stayed at Pan American rest house which unfortunately had been largely destroyed by fire. 1200 men on island. Tremendous runways, deep places underground to camp, well protected against possible attack.

Thursday, 13/8/42

Arrived Suva after very good flight. Met by […] ADC to Governor Sir Philip Mitchell,Footnote ⁵⁸⁹ late political adviser to GHQ staff in Middle East. His attitude towards American occupation was that of the idiot boy, he let them do what they liked without interfering, as he felt satisfied that was the only way to get anything done. Told me of Solomons landings and of our heavy losses. Pointed out chances we had missed by not going to Sicily instead of Greece. First reform necessary was that of getting GHQ out of Cairo.

Friday, 14/8/42

Arrived Noumea where met by US Naval Officer and taken on to their flagship, rescued by BallardFootnote ⁵⁹⁰ who took me to his house. HMAS Australia and the rest of the convoy which had been in the recent fight were there.

Interesting talk with man in charge of Australian Air Force and man in charge of Texas rangers. New Caledonia only place where they are using cavalry in present war.

Saturday, 15/8/42

Arrived Sydney unexpectedly as we had managed to get Admiral Ghormley to give us a direct plane to Sydney instead of going to NZ.

Struck Australia about 20 miles north of Port Stephens instead of Broken Bay, flew down coast and finally landed at Rose Bay about an hour before we were flagged.

Met by Ethel, Sis and […] Bruxner,Footnote ⁵⁹¹ by representatives of the Government and the press.

Sunday, 16/8/42

Curtin drove to Sydney to see me to get me to have dinner with him at the Wentworth with his wife. Discussed things in general and suggested that I should see him on the following Friday to make up my mind what I would like to do.

DIARY ENDS