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Integrating Business and Human Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2016

Alejandra GONZA
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Abstract

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Keywords

indigenous rightsInter-American Commission of Human RightsInter-American Court of Human RightsOrganization of American States

Information

Type
Developments in the Field
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2016 , pp. 357 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

I. Introduction

The Inter-American Human Rights System, formed by the Inter-American Commission (the Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court), is associated with the Organization of American States (OAS). The issue of corporate involvement in human rights abuses is not new to the Inter-American Human Rights System (Inter-American System or the System). However, during the last two decades increasing foreign investment, development projects, and extractive industries in the region have required the Commission and the Court to address the intersection of business and human rights,Footnote 2 especially in the context of indigenous rights. This regional human rights system has begun to refine its guidance on state obligations including the duty to regulate and supervise corporations, in response to this trend.Footnote 3

The Inter-American System, however, has only infrequently assigned specific obligations to corporations through its award of remedies. Civil society and victims of rights abuse have recently pushed the business and human rights agenda forward, and have sought more explicit recognition of corporate responsibilities in the work of the Court and Commission. These stakeholders have urged the Commission to further develop standardsFootnote 4 explicitly addressing corporations and to apply the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN GPs).

This article explores recent initiatives and key cases that have attempted to move beyond ‘corporate social responsibility’ rhetoric towards a ‘business and human rights’ agendaFootnote 5 in the Inter-American System. Specific case law on corporations and the UN Guiding Principles is still lacking a robust presence, but the Inter American System’s initial steps do pave the way for future developments.Footnote 6

II. Starting With Solid International Human Rights Standards

There is much potential within the Inter-American System to develop state duties related to corporate accountability. A stronger state duty relating to corporations might lead to new legislation and policies for both host and home countries, improved local governance, and effective access to national and international justice for victims of corporate human rights abuse.

First, the Inter-American System recognizes that there are instances when certain acts or omissions by private actors can be directly treated as state acts and amount to a violation of state duties to protect people from human rights abuses and to provide victims with a meaningful remedy. This occurs when such actors are ‘empowered to act in State capacity’ (such as through a contractFootnote 7 ) and they act with the ‘acquiescence, collaboration, support or tolerance of state agents’.Footnote 8 State responsibility can also result when there is a failure to prevent, investigate, and punish rights violations.

Second, the Inter-American System has recognized previously the ‘obligation’ of non-state actors to respect human rights, including private employers, developing the concept of horizontal effects of international human rights law.Footnote 9 Still, there is substantial room for the development of the content of that obligation. Third, the Inter-American Commission has established extraterritorial obligations and the possibility of attributing state responsibility even when violations are committed abroad. As of this writing, this kind of attribution has mainly been found by the Commission in cases of military occupation, action or detention.Footnote 10

III. The Inter-American Commission: Integrating Business and Human Rights

The Inter-American Commission has discussed state responsibility for business abuse in its individual cases, precautionary measures, country and thematic reports.Footnote 11 More recently the Commission has been engaged in a more direct and specific dialogue on the integration of business and human rights in the region. I will highlight three recent efforts.

A. Creation of Special Rapporteurship on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

In November 2012 the Inter-American Commission created the Special Unit on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that currently is leading the effort to develop more explicit standards on business and human rights. In March 2014 the Commission decided to initiate a process of converting the Unit into a Special Rapporteurship with financial independency and a full-time expert that ‘will make it possible to delve deeper into the cross-cutting work the Commission does in this area’.Footnote 12 Two years later, the General Assembly of the OAS gave the Commission the mandate to work on the ‘promotion and application of states and business commitments in the area of human rights and business’,Footnote 13 encouraging the application of UN Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.Footnote 14 Complying with that mandate the Unit is leading the Inter-American Commission’s participation in colloquiums within the OAS to encourage an ‘open and informal dialogue’ among stakeholders.Footnote 15 It also signed an agreement with the Danish Institute for Human Rights to obtain their support, among others, in integrating human rights and business into the Commission reports, country monitoring and public hearings.Footnote 16 However, the Unit at present lacks sufficient human and financial resources to transform into a robust Special Rapporteurship.Footnote 17

B. Discussing Home State and Extraterritorial Obligations

The most visible activity focused on business and human rights at the Inter-American Commission takes the form of public hearings. The Commission had held public hearings on various impacts of corporate activities on human rights for a long time, particularly on the impact of extractive industries in host countries.Footnote 18 In November 2013 the Commission started to change the emphasis and spotlighted home state obligations, specifically those of Canada. In an unprecedented public hearing the Commission addressed the ‘Human Rights Situation of People Affected by Mining in the Americas and Responsibilities of the Host and Home States of the Mining Companies’.Footnote 19

The Commission received a report from a group of seven non-governmental organizations documenting 22 large-scale mining operations that had caused serious environmental impacts and human rights violations in the Americas. These projects were managed by 20 Canadian mining companies, whose subsidiaries operate in the following nine states: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru. While Canada was not called to that hearing, the Commission recognized that the petitioners brought ‘something new to the table’.Footnote 20

Petitioners requested, among other points, that the Commission develop standards regarding home state extraterritorial obligations for human rights violations committed by their companies and a joint liability for host and home countries for the consequences. During the hearing, the Commission’s former President Dinah Shelton pointed to Article 36 of the OAS Charter that states:

Transnational enterprises and foreign private investment shall be subject to the legislation of the host countries and to the jurisdiction of their competent courts and to the international treaties and agreements to which said countries are parties, and should conform to the development policies of the recipient countries.Footnote 21

According to Shelton, Article 36 comprises an affirmation by states parties to the OAS Charter that ‘they have accepted international responsibility of transnational companies and that transnational companies are to obey the treaties to which the states are parties’.Footnote 22

Not long after that public hearing, in October 2014, the Canadian government was called before the Commission to discuss their policies on business and human rights in the hearing titled ‘Impact of Canadian Mining Activities on Human Rights in Latin America’.Footnote 23 The Commissioners were not fully satisfied with Canada’s ‘corporate social responsibility’ approach to its mining companies and directed critical comments and questions to the state, in view of the fact that Canada faces many claims of human rights abuse by Canadian corporations.Footnote 24

Finally, in March 2015 the Commission held two regional public hearings, ‘Corporations, Human Rights, and Prior Consultation in the Americas’ and ‘Human Rights and Extractive Industries in Latin America’. The petitioners emphasized that the current framework to address cases of corporate abuse is insufficient and the concept of “territory” cannot continue to be used to exclude protection, affecting the rights of victims to prompt and effective administrative or judicial remedy.Footnote 25 They urged the adoption of the UN GPs standard of corporate human rights due diligence, Pillar III regarding access to remedy, and the development of concrete extraterritorial obligations for home states—at a minimum when home states provide public financial resources and for situations of international crimes.Footnote 26 The Commission has not yet drafted a report on these issues, after three years of committing to do so, but it has continued to hold public hearings addressing business and human rights.Footnote 27

C. Granting Temporary Measures to Prevent Corporate Human Rights Violations

The Inter-American System also offers a mechanism to prevent serious and irreparable harm to persons or groups of persons who are in imminent peril: precautionary measures at the Commission level and provisional measures at the Court’s. Preventive measures have been ordered for a wide array of situations, including instances of corporations endangering rights. Such measures were originally designed to allow the System to act fast, without deciding the merits of the case and without requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies.

In addition to offering protection to the right of life and personal integrity, the Commission has also protected indigenous communities and land rights, by ordering, for example, the ‘immediate suspension of the licensing procedure of a hydroelectric plant’ in Brazil until consultation takes place.Footnote 28 It has also called for the suspension of mining activities in Guatemala, ordering the prevention of environmental pollution and the decontamination of the water sources, among other ‘minimum conditions to continue’.Footnote 29

The Commission has been granting these kinds of measures ordering the suspension of licensing process and projects’ activities for a long time.Footnote 30 Recently, however, such actions have caused a backlash among certain OAS member states, leading to political and financial repercussions. The Commission was eventually pressured to undergo internal modifications of its rules of procedure—ironically this was called a ‘strengthening process’—that ended up weakening the precautionary measuresFootnote 31 by questioning the origin of such power and making it more difficult for petitioners to access the mechanism for protecting land rights.

Facing the weakness of its own decisions, the Commission tried to convince the Court to grant provisional measures when corporations’ activities could harm ancestral land rights. Waiting for the System to decide the merits in these cases could make their decisions obsolete and the harm substantial, but the Inter-American Court has rejected the idea of directly protecting land rights by ordering suspension of concessions or projects when the case is not yet under its consideration, because the Court considers that it would be deciding the merits of the matter.Footnote 32 It has protected communal property rights tangentiallyFootnote 33 and pushed the Commission to urgently decide those cases on the merits.Footnote 34

IV. Corporate Behaviour in the Court’s Case Law: Bridging the Remedy Gap

The Inter-American Court has examined the impacts of oil,Footnote 35 logging,Footnote 36 mining,Footnote 37 and other exploration and exploitationFootnote 38 of traditional territories by non-state actors. Case law on indigenous and tribal peoples contains express references to corporate actions endangering rights.Footnote 39 After establishing the facts and finding human rights violations ranging from communal property to the right to life, the Court has emphasized state obligations—but not what international human rights law requires specifically of corporations in such circumstances.

As a consequence, the remedies ordered—while substantial and often including full land restitution,Footnote 40 removal of explosives, and reforestation of the affected territoriesFootnote 41 —usually neglect a full consideration of the violations at issueFootnote 42 and their connection to corporate accountability. For example, the Court has not ordered the review and revocation of mining concessions, as requested by petitioners,Footnote 43 only requiring that the government institute a consultation process for awarding future concessions.Footnote 44

But the experience at the Inter-American System shows that corporations, although not parties to the process and not directly accountable before the Court, are scrutinized internationally and feel the impact of the System’s decisions. First, the Court in some cases has done a detailed analysis on corporate conduct gravely affecting human rights,Footnote 45 on their contractual relationship with the countryFootnote 46 and on the domestic regulation that provided obligations to contractors.Footnote 47 Second, after the case is examined by the Court or the Commission, corporate concessions and contracts often terminate due to the international visibility created by the litigation process or efforts from countries to comply with the System’s decisions. Unfortunately the ending of the contractual relationship comes without any obligation for corporations to pay reparations to affected communities.Footnote 48

For example, in the case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador the Commission granted precautionary measures in 2003 protecting, among others, land rights affected by oil extraction by Compañía General de Combustibles S.A. (CGC). Sarayaku is an indigenous community with its ancestral land legally recognized in Ecuador. Their ancestral territory was affected by oil extraction without consultation and free, prior and informed consent. The Commission’s measures did not stop the activities.Footnote 49 On 26 April 2010 the Commission submitted the case to the Court. Only a few months after presenting the case, on 19 November 2010, the State Oil Company of Ecuador (PETROECUADOR) and the Compañía General de Combustibles S.A. (CGC) signed a Deed of Termination of the partnership contract for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil in Sarayaku lands, but with the agreement that ‘there is no environmental liability’.Footnote 50

In this respect, the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples has rightly stressed the need of states to ‘adopt regulatory measures for companies . . . that are aimed at . . . sanctioning and remedying violations of the rights of indigenous peoples’.Footnote 51

It was not until the 2015 judgment in Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname that the Court explicitly ‘took note’ of the UN GPs for the first time. The Court did not fully embrace the UN GPs content to interpret the American Convention’s rights yet, as it has done with other widely accepted UN Principles, by directly requiring countries to adopt them in domestic law. For example, the Convention’s Article on the right to life is silent about law enforcement’s ability to use lethal force. But considering it a legitimate option, the Court required countries to include in their legislation all the limitations and requirements described by the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.Footnote 52 The Court could further elaborate in the future the same interpretation method, pushing for a more concrete development of the corporations’ obligations in the specific case and ordering changes in domestic law.

Another element that the Court could use to promote corporate accountability at the domestic level is employing the UN GPs to develop a more concrete description of the scope of corporations’ duties according to the American Convention. While the UN GPs call for corporate responsibility only to respect human rights, the Court stated that they ‘establish that businesses must respect and protect human rights, as well as prevent, mitigate, and accept responsibility for the adverse human rights impacts directly linked to their activities’.Footnote 53 With that statement it seems that there is room for the Court to go beyond the UN GPs and interpret the Convention as requiring corporations to respect and protect (‘ensure’ is the term that the Court uses). At a minimum, the Court could have explored the obligation to respect human rights in the specific case. However, it did not sufficiently explain what is required of corporations in its analysis.

Even without a full development of corporations’ obligations, the Kaliña case is still significant as it represents the first time that the Court designed a specific reparation to restore the indigenous territories, placing the obligation not only on the state but also ‘in conjunction with the company’. The Court required Suriname to establish ‘the necessary mechanisms to monitor and supervise the execution of the rehabilitation by the company’.Footnote 54 Still, the Court did not order any measure clearly indicating that states must hold corporations or their directors criminally accountable,Footnote 55 even when embracing Principle 1 of the UN GPs:

States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication.

This tentative first step indicates that the Court will likely require stronger substantiation of remedies by petitioners, including more detailed evidence and economic assessments of damages in order to ascertain whether the state has or has not fulfilled its duty to protect people from potential corporate human rights abuse.

V. Conclusions

The Inter-American System has laid the foundation for developing concrete standards relating to corporate accountability, both for home and host states. The System needs to better apply the UN GPs and further explore their connection with the American Convention and Declaration. Within the case system the Inter-American bodies have the opportunity to address the impunity of corporations in the region. This will require a different approach from petitioners and better documentation of damages on their end, as well as more concrete remedies from the Court and the Commission.

The Inter-American System’s remedial approach is already distinguished among regional human rights systems. By developing remedies to redress the harms of corporations and hold them accountable, the System could significantly impact global legislation, policies and regulatory frameworks.

Footnotes

1

Alejandra Gonza directs the International Human Rights Clinic (Business and Human Rights), at the University of Washington School of Law, Clinical Law Program.

References

2 Salazar, Katya, ‘Business and Human Rights. A new challenge for the OAS?’, Blog de la Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal (14 October 2015)Google Scholar, http://dplfblog.com/2015/10/14/business-and-human-rights-a-new-challenge-for-the-oas/ (accessed 22 March 2016).

3 Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 149 (2006), 141, regarding private health care facilities; and Gonzales Lluy et al. v Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 298 (2015), regarding the Red Cross as ‘private entity’. See also Cecilia Anicama, ‘State Responsibilities to Regulate and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the Inter-American Human Rights System’. ‘Report on the American Convention on Human Rights to inform the mandate of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) on Business and Human Rights’, (April 2008).

4 Due Process of Law Foundation, ‘The impact of Canadian mining in Latin America and Canada’s responsibility’, (May 2014), (only in Spanish), http://dplf.org/en/resources-topics/human-rights-extractive-industries (accessed 6 February 2016).

5 OAS General Assembly, ‘Promotion and protection of human rights in business’, AG/RES. 2840 (XLIV-O/14) (4 June 2014), http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/AG-RES_2840_XLIV-O-14.pdf (accessed 6 February 2016).

6 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 309, (2015), 224.

7 Ximenes-Lopes v Brazil, note 3, 87; and Gonzales Lluy et al. v Ecuador, note 3. See also, Case 12.053, Maya Indigenous Community (Belize), ICHR (2004), 136–156.

8 In the paramilitary context, see Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 134 (2005), 162.

9 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 18 (2003), 140, Drittwirkung theory.

10 Cerqueira, Daniel, ‘The Attribution of Extraterritorial Liability for the Acts of Private Parties in the Inter-American System: Contributions to the Debate on Corporations and Human Rights’, 20 Aportes DPLF, Magazine, August 2015, 20 Google Scholar.

11 See also, Cecilia Anicama, note 3.

12 Press Release, ‘IACHR to Create an Office of the Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’ (3 April 2014), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/034.asp (accessed 22 March 2016).

13 Promotion and protection of human rights in business, OAS, (4 June 2014), AG/RES. 2840 (XLIV-O/14), http://www.oas.org/es/sla/ddi/docs/AG-RES_2840_XLIV-O-14.pdf (accessed 6 February 2016).

14 Ibid.

15 Coloquio en la OEA sobre Derechos Humanos y Empresas, (29 June 2015), http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/desc/actividades/ (accessed 6 February 2016).

16 Memorandum of understanding between the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States through the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Danish Institute for Human Rights, (16 March 2015), http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/mandato/docs/IACHR-DIHR-2015.pdf (accessed 6 February 2016).

17 Quick, Paloma Muñoz, ‘The State of Business & Human Rights at the Organization of Americas States, bhramericas blog (23 August 2015), https://bhramericasblog.wordpress.com/2015/08/23/the-state-of-business-human-rights-at-the-organization-of-americas-states/ Google Scholar (accessed 6 February 2016).

18 Thematic hearings of IACHR, ‘Situation of Indigenous Peoples with regard to Extractive Industries’ (2004); ‘Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Energy and Extractive Industry Policy in Peru’ (2010); ‘Human Rights Situation of Persons Affected by the Extractive Industries in the Americas’ (2012); ‘Situation of Persons Recruited for Extraction of Rubber (soldados da borracha) in Brazil’ (2013).

19 Thematic hearing, IACHR, 149th session (2013).

20 Ibid, words from Rose-Marie Antoine, minute 42.

21 Charter of the Organization of American States, UN Doc 1607, 119 UNTS 3 (adopted 30 April 1848, entered into force 13 December 1951), art 36.

22 Video of thematic hearing, ‘Human Rights Situation of People Affected by Mining in the Americas and Responsibilities of the Host and Home States of the Mining Companies’, ICHR, minutes 36–8, (November 2013), http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/audiencias/default.aspx?lang=en (accessed 6 February 2016).

23 Thematic hearing, ‘Impact of Canadian Mining Activities on Human Rights in Latin America’, (October 2014), IACHR.

24 Ibid, video minutes 48–9, 54–6.

25 Presentation, ‘Extraterritoriality and Responsibility of Home States in the Protection of Human Rights for the Activities of Extractive Industries in Latin America’, Human Rights Research and Education Centre, University of Ottawa (2015).

26 Thematic hearings, ‘Business, Human Rights, and Prior Consultation in the Americas’, ICHR, 154th session, (2015); ‘Human Rights and Extractive Industries in Latin America’, ICHR, 154th session, (2015).

27 Public Hearing ‘Business, human rights and prior consultation in the Americas’, (March 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DGvASYx_j5c (accessed 6 February 2016).

28 Indigenous communities of Cuenca del Río Xingu, Pará, Brazil, ICHR, PM 382-10 (2010).

29 Comunidades del Pueblo Maya (Sipakapense y Mam), Guatemala, ICHR, PM 260-07 (2007).

30 E.g., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni, Nicaragua, ICHR, PM (1997). On 31 October 1997, the Commission requested that the state adopt whatever precautionary measures were required to suspend the concession granted to SOLCARSA.

31 There is a pending request to halt the transoceanic Nicaraguan Canal project that will cause the displacement of thousands.

32 Gonza, Alejandra, ‘ Derecho a la propiedad privada ’ in Christian Steiner and Patricia Uribe (eds.) Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Siftung, 2014), 524 Google Scholar; and Matter of Four Ngöbe Indigenous Communities and its members regarding Panama, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2010).

33 Matter of Pueblo Indígena Kankuamo, Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2004), protecting freedom of movement; and Matter of Comunidades del Jiguamiandó y del Curbaradó, Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2003); Matter of Pueblo indígena de Sarayaku regarding Ecuador, Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. (2004), protecting freedom of movement, and in 2005 protecting the use of natural resources in their territories by removing explosives from ancestral lands.

34 Matter of Four Ngöbe Indigenous Communities and its members regarding Panama, note 32; corporation AES Changuinola.

35 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, Inter.-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 245 (2012).

36 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v Nicaragua, note 30, para 104f.

37 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, note 6; Saramaka People v Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 172 (2007).

38 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 125 (2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 146 (2006); and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 214 (2010).

39 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v Nicaragua, note 30; Saramaka People v Suriname, note 37; Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, note 35; Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, note 6. For further analysis of this case law, see Antkowiak, Thomas M, ‘Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-American Court’, 35 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 113 (2013)Google Scholar.

40 For a full description of indigenous people remedies see Antkowiak, Thomas M, ‘A Dark Side of Virtue: The Inter-American Court and Reparations for Indigenous Peoples’ (2015) 25 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 1 Google Scholar, 2014.

41 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, note 35: the Court stated ‘this measure of reparation is an obligation of the State’, 295.

42 Ibid, 54: It only granted US$90,000 for compensation for material damages in cases of environmental disaster and a fund of US$1,500,000 for non-pecuniary damage.

43 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, note 6, 287.

44 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, note 35, 299.

45 Ibid, 101, 105: loading indigenous territories with explosives, destroying caves, water sources and underground rivers, cutting down plants of environmental and cultural value, used for subsistence food by the Sarayaku. Also considered proven ‘that the oil company’s activities led to the sporadic suspension of the Sarayaku People’s ancestral cultural rites and ceremonies’ and access to ‘sacred sites’, 73 and 74. The Court described several corporations’ questionable conduct, directed to obtain consent by questionable means.

46 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, note 35, 63–72: ‘Partnership contract with the CGC for exploration of hydrocarbons and exploitation of crude oil in Block 23 of the Amazonian Region’. The contract was between State Oil Company of Ecuador (PETROECUADOR) and the consortium formed by the Compañía General de Combustibles S.A. (CGC) and Petrolera Argentina San Jorge S.A (later Chevron-Burlington). Initially four years for exploration, with a possible two years’ extension, and 20 years of exploitation.

47 Ibid, 76.

48 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Community v Nicaragua, note 30, complying with the ICHR recommendations, in 1998 Nicaragua suspended the logging concession to SOLCARSA (30 years to utilize the forest area), 104f.

49 Matter of Pueblo indígena de Sarayaku regarding Ecuador, Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. (2004) protecting freedom of movement and in 2005 protecting the use of natural resources in their territories by removing explosives from ancestral lands.

50 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador, note 35, 123

51 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, Anaya, James, ‘Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights Council’, 48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (1 July 2013)Google Scholar.

52 Nadege Dorzema et al. v Dominican Republic, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 251 (2012), 78; and Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al. v Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 281 (2014), 124.

53 1 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, note 6, 224.

54 Ibid, note 6, 190.

55 The Court rarely ordered states to investigate and has only done so when findings are linked to the violation of the right to personal integrity and right to life: Community Garifuna Triunfo de la Cruz & its members v Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 305 (2015) (only in Spanish), 267.