I have received your diary and have read it with immense interest. […] It fairly records the impressions I formed of our activities in the [British] War Cabinet. You know that I admired immensely the courage you showed and the tenacity with which you held to your cause.
Lord Beaverbrook to Sir Earle Page, 10 February 1956Footnote 1For many people Sir Earle Christmas Grafton Page (1880–1961) was a name synonymous with the Country Party of Australia. His obituary in the Canberra Times pronounced him ‘one of the most colourful figures in Australian history’.Footnote 2 Robert Menzies, Australian prime minister and contemporary of Page, described him as ‘a very distinguished Australian […] always fertile in ideas’.Footnote 3 Robert Heffron, the Labor premier of New South Wales (1959–1964) noted at the time that Page's ‘passing removes from the national scene a man of great character and patriotism, a man dedicated to the interests of men and women in our rural communities, and the great primary industries which they serve’.Footnote 4 His contributions to the domestic political sphere are indeed impressive, but less well known was his wartime mission to London when he acted as Australia's accredited representative in the British war cabinet between October 1941 and March 1942.
Fig. 1. Norman Lindsay (1879–1969): The Bulletin, 20 August 1941.
NOT UNDERSTOOD. “You couldn't have understood me, sir. I said ‘Single or return’ ”.
Permission to publish courtesy of the copyright holders H., C., and A. Glad (Sydney).
Originally trained as a medical practitioner, Page's attention was drawn to business and politics after the Great War. In 1919 he was elected to the House of Representatives for Cowper, a seat he held until 1961. Nicknamed ‘the Doc’, Page was renowned for his passion and energy. One former cabinet colleague, Percy Spender, described him as ‘cunning as a fox, and by any measure one of the most astute parliamentarians Federal politics has seen’.Footnote 5 His dynamism was evident by the many ministerial portfolios he held and his implementation of several high-profile domestic schemes; his ardour for hydro-electricity development on the Clarence River, and his foundational work in shaping Australia's national health care system between 1949 and 1956 are but two notable accomplishments.Footnote 6 Page was prime minister for nineteen days after the death of J.A. Lyons in April 1939 and was acting prime minister on four occasions during the interwar period. He also held the portfolios of treasurer (1923–1929), minister for commerce (1932–1939), minister for health (1937–1938 and 1949–1956), and, controversially, he represented Australia in the British war cabinet at a pivotal period in Anglo-Australian relations. During the Second World War, Page was briefly minister of commerce under Menzies (1940–1941) and, later, under Arthur Fadden's short-lived coalition government (August–September 1941). His mission to the United Kingdom was undertaken to secure both aid for Australia and the Pacific; and most importantly – as this diary reveals – he sought to provide an effective voice for Australia in London.
Wartime Domestic Politics
The genesis of Page's mission to Britain in September 1941 is complex, mired as it was in the intrigues of Australian domestic politics. On the eve of the Second World War federal politics was tumultuous, often bitter and extremely personal. The death of Lyons, prime minister and leader of the United Australia Party (UAP) on 7 April 1939 allowed Page, who was leader of the Country Party and deputy prime minister in the UAP-Country Party coalition, to assume the role of caretaker prime minister.Footnote 7 While the UAP were in the throes of electing a new leader, both Page and Richard Casey, then minister for supply and development, unsuccessfully appealed to the former prime minister and high commissioner in London, Stanley Bruce, to return to the Australian political arena in order to take office.Footnote 8 As a result, Robert Menzies was elected leader of the UAP despite Page's warning to UAP party members that the Country Party would refuse to serve under his leadership. The election of Menzies, rather than providing stability to the political scene served instead to precipitate a political crisis. ‘A man with no love for the Country Party’,Footnote 9 Menzies lacked majority support within his own party and had been a minority choice for leader, only gaining this position after three ballots for the leadership.Footnote 10 Page was convinced that Menzies would ‘lead everyone to political suicide. The feeling of my fellows is that they must take to the raft at once rather than sink in the same boat with him.’ Bruce agreed.Footnote 11
Page's view on Menzies led him to embark upon an act that represented the nadir of his political life. In addressing the House of Representatives on 20 April 1939, Page tendered the resignation of his administration and moved for an adjournment of Parliament until 3 May 1939 to allow for the formation of a new government. As war loomed, Page warned that the basis for the successful functioning of a composite government must be the ‘fullest mutual confidence and loyalty between the parties composing it’ and that the Australian government needed a leader with the ‘three essential qualities of courage, loyalty and judgement, in such a degree as will ensure that the people of Australia will give the last ounce of their energies and resource in a united national effort to secure our preservation’.Footnote 12 Page did not believe that Menzies was qualified for a task of such enormity. According to Carl Bridge, in one of the most ‘eviscerating speeches’ ever given in the federal parliament, Page called Menzies a coward for not having enlisted in the Great War.Footnote 13 Page had misjudged the mood of the legislature. He had hoped that by outlining the failings of Menzies as a potential leader for war it would open the way for an all-party government and the return of Bruce.Footnote 14
The vitriolic outburst against Menzies had quite the opposite effect. It not only provided the new UAP leader with a clear reason to exclude the Country Party from his cabinet; it also led to a split within the Country Party as both Arthur Fadden and Bernard Corser withdrew from the party to become independent Country Party members. Page's speech was roundly criticized within the press. The Sydney Morning Herald denounced it as a ‘despicable attack’.Footnote 15 In an editorial, the Bathurst Times, a Country Party paper, referred to the incident as one which ‘savoured of a thinly disguised puerility’, and that during this time of threat to Australia's security it was ‘no time for childishness’.Footnote 16 Page's leadership of the party was now brought into question and he was forced to step down in September 1939.
Origins of the Mission to London
Britain's declaration of war upon Germany on 3 September 1939, closely followed by Australia's, did not lessen Australian domestic tensions. The possibility of a national government to meet wartime exigencies was ruled out by John Curtin, leader of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) who, whilst willing to support all necessary measures of defence, preferred not to be tied to the government by actual participation in the cabinet.Footnote 17 Menzies, however, offered the Country Party places within the cabinet on the proviso that he retained sole control over the selection and number of ministers in a new coalition government. Even with a new Country Party leader, Archie Cameron, Menzies refused to budge from this position and, with the refusal of the Country Party to acquiesce, Menzies declared that the entire question of composite government was now closed and proceeded to form his own war cabinet.
The dilemma for Menzies was his fragile minority government. With the appointment of Richard Casey as Australian ambassador to Washington in February 1940, a by-election was triggered and won by the ALP candidate, John Dedman. As a general election had to be called within six months, Menzies needed to buttress his position and therefore, in March 1940, offered five cabinet portfolios to the Country Party, including its leader, Archie Cameron, who joined as minister for commerce and minister for the navy.
Racked by divisions in his own party, Menzies and his cabinet struggled to shake the apathy imbedded in many sections of the electorate about the urgency of the war overseas. Despite the herculean efforts of some ministers, such as Percy Spender, to streamline the treasury, abandon outdated fiscal orthodoxies and inject a sense of urgency into the war effort,Footnote 18 a ‘business as usual’ attitude pervaded the Australian public who saw it as a remote conflict, despite the deployment of Australian naval and air units to the Caribbean and the United Kingdom in September 1939, and the despatch of the 6th Australian Division to Palestine in early 1940.Footnote 19 Conversely, influential newspapers like the Sydney Morning Herald and the Daily Telegraph (Sydney and NSW) were, according to Menzies, out to discredit the government on what they saw as a lethargic war effort. British observations were equally critical. Sir Geoffrey Whiskard, the United Kingdom's first high commissioner in Australia (1935–1940), was growing frustrated with what he saw as a lack of political leadership within the dominion: ‘Well, the war has woken up all right, but Australia is fast asleep.’Footnote 20
The election failed to clear the political log jam as neither the UAP-Country Party coalition nor the ALP won a clear mandate. Once again, Menzies tried to negotiate a national government; but Labor again refused to participate. Instead, in October 1940, an advisory war council was established. It comprised an equal number of government and opposition representatives and meant that the government had to inform and consult the advisory war council on all matters relating to the conduct of the war. However, an opposition that was privy to classified information, possessing an equal voice in providing advice, but not having to share in the responsibility for the consequent decisions did not make for an easy truce.Footnote 21
Worse was to come as ominous news was received from overseas. That September, a joint British-Free French task force – which unbeknown to Menzies included the heavy cruiser HMAS Australia – had botched an attempt to capture the Vichy port of Dakar in French West Africa. For his part, Menzies, primed by Bruce in London, had been deeply critical of the attack and had chastised the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, for not consulting the dominions. Like the Chanak crisis almost twenty years earlier, and despite promises of improved consultation, the dominion leaders had learned of the attack's failure through the press! Growing pressure from within the British prime minister's own cabinet about his autocratic style of government combined with growing public dissatisfaction over recent events, forced a cabinet reshuffle on 3 October and the revival of the idea of an imperial war cabinet.Footnote 22 As one Australian external affairs officer in London put it, because of the ‘cumbersome’ and convoluted methods of (mis)communication between London and Canberra, Churchill was reluctantly forced to revive the idea of an empire war council.Footnote 23
At the beginning of the war, Menzies had remained indifferent to the resurrection of an imperial war cabinet which had proved so successful in highlighting dominion concerns and interests in 1917–1918. But German successes in western Europe over the summer of 1940, combined with the humiliation of the Dakar operations, prompted him to advocate face-to-face personal contact between Commonwealth leaders which he perceived as essential if concerted military plans and common strategic ideas were to be updated. Australia already had ‘special interests’ in the Middle East, but the festering sore which prompted Menzies to accept the British government's invitation to go to London was the defence of Singapore.Footnote 24
The Singapore Defence Conference, held in late October 1940 between British, Australian, Dutch, and New Zealand military representatives, tabled its report in late November, which revealed deep concerns in antipodean eyes about the deficiencies of the defence of Malaya, especially Singapore. Both the Australian war cabinet and the advisory war council unanimously supported Menzies' mission to London to discuss matters of mutual importance. Mindful of his perilous position domestically, Menzies instructed Bruce to give him a frank report of the value of a visit. Bruce offered a very astute set of observations:
Prompt and sufficient opportunity for consultation with Chief Ministers would be forthcoming but this [will be] of limited value. As regards major policy as this [is] increasingly centred in Prime Minister's hands and little influenced by other members of War Cabinet who frankly are not prepared to stand up to him [Churchill], my view is Prime Minister would endeavour to treat you in much [the] same way – most cordial welcome – utmost courtesy – invitation to attend meetings of War Cabinet and apparently every possible opportunity for consultation. When however you tried to pin him down to definite discussions of fundamental questions of major war policy I am inclined to think that you would find him discursive and elusive necessitating you either (a) taking a line that would mean a considerable show down between you or (b) leaving with a sense of frustration.Footnote 25
The results of Menzies's four-month trip to the United Kingdom via Singapore and the Middle East (and home via Canada and the United States) were less than satisfactory for Australia. Menzies had secured a programme of aircraft delivery for the dominion and a new UK high commissioner for Australia, but little else. In fact, the strategic blunder of the Greek campaign to which Menzies had committed the 6th Australian Division in February 1941, coupled with his visit to Ireland in April against Churchill's explicit wish, only served to embitter relations between the two leaders.Footnote 26
Nevertheless, Menzies's trip had convinced him that a return journey to London was necessary. Throughout July 1941, Menzies attempted to co-opt the support of the other dominion prime ministers by suggesting that dominion representation on the British war cabinet should be a permanent feature, especially since the dominions secretary was not a member of the war cabinet and was therefore ‘little more than a channel of communication’.Footnote 27 Menzies successfully procured the assent of his cabinet to proceed to London once again, but he lacked the wholehearted commitment of Labor members within the advisory war council. With a parliamentary majority of one, Menzies once again offered to form a national government but this was rejected on 26 August 1941. Amidst growing calls for his resignation amongst his own UAP and the Country Party in favour of the affable Arthur Fadden, Menzies resigned on 29 August. Lord Gowrie, the Australian governor general (1936–1945), bemoaned the political squabbles, intrigues, and ‘place-hunters’ that dogged Australian politics at such a critical moment. Australian legislators did not appreciate the seriousness of the situation facing the Commonwealth alliance; ‘and that private animosities, personal ambitions and Party jealousies should still be the dominating factors which influence their actions’ was deplorable.Footnote 28 Prior to his resignation, however, Menzies had announced to the House of Representatives that a minister other than the prime minister would be despatched to London as soon as possible, presumably this would be Menzies once he was relieved of the position as prime minster. Viscount Cranborne, secretary of state for dominion affairs, who had no sympathy for Menzies or his predicament, concluded that the former prime minister was better out of the way for his ‘intriguing [had been] a constant danger’.Footnote 29
The Despatch of Page
Upon Fadden's elevation to prime minister, Churchill did not waste any time in attempting to dissuade Fadden from sending an Australian representative. He outlined that the position of any emissary that was not a dominions prime minister would be very different; he ‘would not be a principal but only an envoy’. Not only that but the envoy's relationship with the existing high commissioner and the dominions secretary would complicate current relations; and if the envoy remained in London as a permanent fixture it would no doubt cause some duplication of the existing functions between the high commissioner, the dominions secretary, and the envoy. Churchill also ruled out any possibility of dominion ministers joining the war cabinet since it would make it too unwieldy for effective decision making.Footnote 30 He did, however, offer an olive branch in the form of a meeting of dominion prime ministers, ‘but the difficulties of distance and occasion are, as you know, very great’.Footnote 31
Fadden was undeterred. Sir Robert Garran, an experienced lawyer and seasoned public servant, was commissioned to examine imperial consultation and co-operation with special reference to the representation of the dominions in the British war cabinet. Garran concluded that a senior minister, in the confidence of his prime minister, and representing his government on a special mission, was not in a fundamentally different position to the prime minister. Whether prime minister or not, a minister could not commit his colleagues to a course of action without consulting them first.Footnote 32 Fadden did not hesitate in employing the arguments put forward by Garran in a cable to Churchill on 6 September. Echoing Menzies in referring to the Australian war effort, especially its contributions in the Middle East, Fadden reminded Churchill that the Australian people felt that ‘this effort warrants the right to be heard when vital decisions affecting their interests are being taken’; particularly since the secretary of state for dominion affairs had not been a member of the British war cabinet since May 1940.Footnote 33 With Menzies out of the picture, perhaps Churchill could afford to be more magnanimous towards his troublesome ally: ‘Anyhow, we have got to treat these people, who are politically embarrassed but are sending a splendid army into the field, with the utmost consideration.’Footnote 34
Why, on 7 September 1941, did Fadden appoint Page to this pivotal role as special envoy to London? Several inter-connected factors come into play. Page possessed a detailed grasp of Australia's domestic economy in terms of resources and how these could most fruitfully be employed. In November 1940, he had been reappointed to Menzies's cabinet as minister for commerce, a position he had held in the Lyons coalition. Page had also travelled to London as leader of the Australian trade delegation in 1936 and 1938.Footnote 35 His experience was therefore unique, although Page boasted in his memoirs that Menzies had reached the begrudging conclusion that his participation in the composite government was essential for it to function.Footnote 36 He may have been right, although some public commentators saw Page's restoration to the cabinet as a ‘much-publicised reconciliation’ between the two men,Footnote 37 which was cemented further in May 1941 when Page retracted what he had said about Menzies during that stormy parliamentary session in April 1939.Footnote 38 But Page was also an inveterate traveller prior to the war possessing an immense number of contacts worldwide that few Australian politicians could match. Moreover, he was acutely aware of America's growing industrial power and the challenges this posed to Australian markets in the post-war world. Just days after Menzies's resignation, Page outlined his views to Fadden on how Australia could intensify her war effort and meet the increasing demands of the conflict by despatching ‘a man at the earliest possible moment to London to urge for the strongest possible support at Singapore’.Footnote 39
The remit of Page's mission was twofold: first, to make an urgent case for improved defences in the Pacific; and, second, to design a machinery of representation for Australia in the British war cabinet that would allow Australia a definite voice in policy-making.Footnote 40 As Page was making arrangements for his departure, Menzies had prepared a memorandum, at Page's request, outlining what he could expect when he got to London. Its contents were largely reminiscent of the cable Bruce had similarly prepared for Menzies prior to his departure for Britain in January 1941. Menzies warned Page of a more marked disposition for matters to be referred to Churchill for the ultimate decision. It was therefore imperative that any discussions with ministers should be detailed so that when a matter was referred to Churchill it would reach him in a sufficiently precise form to enable a decision to be taken. In matters of naval dispositions, Menzies recommended that Page get down to ‘brass tacks’ as soon as possible with A.V. Alexander, the first lord of the admiralty. Of Alexander's advisors, Menzies suggested Sir Dudley Pound, first sea lord, and Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, deputy chief of the naval staff, ‘who is active, keenly sensible of our point of view and of our problem and disposed to a realistic conception of modern naval strategy’.Footnote 41
In dealing with the colossus himself, Menzies recommended that Page should be able to leave Churchill with a memorandum that he could peruse and one ‘which is most likely to affect his mind’. Churchill ‘is accustomed to studying documents and his regular weekend routine [is] to stay in bed all Sunday morning reading despatches and memoranda and dictating comments or directions about them. It is most useful therefore to supplement all oral representations with written material.’ If Page needed supplementary advocacy then Menzies recommended Ernest Bevin as the ‘Labor [sic] Minister most likely to find entrance to the Prime Minister's mind […], while among the Conservatives Beaverbrook undoubtedly carries most weight’.Footnote 42 General ‘Pug’ Ismay, Churchill's chief of staff, and Cranborne, the newly appointed dominions secretary, were those noted by Menzies to also be close to Churchill. Finally, Menzies suggested that Page make a ‘full-blooded attack on Eden's mind early in the piece’, since, while Menzies found Eden to be sympathetic to his views on the Far East, he felt that the Foreign Office was not at all anxious to be either precise or forceful in relation to Japan. ‘You will no doubt find that a good red-headed explosion in that quarter early in your visit will be of marked benefit. A certain amount of anger and table-thumping will be in order.’Footnote 43
London Bound
On 22 September 1941 Page departed for London from Rose Bay with Muriel Ross, his typist; Bill Low, his secretary and confidant; and Major P.E. Coleman, assistant secretary to the department of air, who acted as his defence advisor.Footnote 44 Sir Frederick Shedden had been instrumental in securing Coleman this position for two reasons. Since 1937, Shedden had been secretary of the defence department. Shortly after Australia declared war, he was appointed secretary of the war cabinet where he instituted a series of innovative reforms in cabinet procedure. According to David Horner this was nothing short of a revolution in Australian government administration because a highly efficient and tightly organized cabinet secretariat was now established under Shedden's watchful eye.Footnote 45 Nicknamed the ‘pocket Hankey’,Footnote 46 from September 1940 his remit was expanded when he was appointed secretary to the advisory war council. Equally significantly, Shedden had been Menzies's principal advisor on his 1941 trip to the Middle East and the United Kingdom where he had witnessed first-hand the British prosecution of the war. Unable to accompany Page on this mission,Footnote 47 Shedden undoubtedly wanted an official he could trust and who could steer Page out of any hasty promises to the British.
Fully briefed by Shedden,Footnote 48 Page arrived in Singapore on 25 September having travelled via Brisbane, Gladstone, Townsville, Darwin, and the Dutch East Indies. Whilst in Singapore, Page toured a variety of naval installations and coastal defences, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) camp at Sembawang, and the Australian military hospital at Malacca commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. White, deputy assistant director medical services, Malaya. It was in Singapore on 3 October that Page learnt of Fadden's parliamentary defeat. Despite Page urging Fadden to continue, Curtin was sworn in on 7 October as Labor prime minister.Footnote 49 It looked as if Page might be coming home sooner than he thought.Footnote 50 However, Page received a cable from Curtin asking him to continue with his mission and followed this up by informing Churchill that his government had decided Page should proceed to London as planned. Why?
Curtin could have replaced Page with a loyal Labor man, but who? Or, as was suggested by the Australian diplomat Alfred Stirling, Curtin, ‘rising above party politics’, made the pragmatic decision to let Page continue with his mission.Footnote 51 There was certainly no love lost between Labor and Page, whose selection as the special envoy in some sections of the ALP was reckoned a political ‘slap in the face’.Footnote 52 Personality aside, David Day argues that there was a degree of anxiety in Curtin's inner circle about ‘making too dramatic a change from the policies of their predecessors’.Footnote 53 The new government was elderly and untested, with only four men having previous ministerial experience. Most were former trade union officials of disparate ability who saw their elevation to office as a sinecure for faithful service.Footnote 54 Few had travelled overseas. Another quandary was that Curtin needed to retain the support of the two independent MPs, which had been the Achilles heel of his two predecessors, Menzies and Fadden. Stability was the watchword as wartime necessities trumped political allegiances.Footnote 55 In addition, a wholesale change of non-Labor representatives overseas might unnerve Australia's allies. For instance, to replace Casey in Washington and Bruce in London might send the wrong signals and undermine Anglo-American trust in their antipodean ally.
On 6 October, Page left Singapore for Manila. It was during his time in the Philippines that Page met Lieutenant-General Douglas MacArthur, commander of United States Army forces in the Far East. MacArthur was convinced that war with Japan was inevitable. His own view was that it would be much better to defer conflict with Japan until such time as there was an overwhelming superiority of British and American forces in the region. MacArthur reinforced Page's belief that the ‘presence of a battleship squadron at Singapore, combined with adequate air reinforcements, would be sufficient to deter [Japan] until such time as we had disposed of the major difficulty in Europe’.Footnote 56 According to Page, MacArthur's general attitude was that the British had ‘been very dilatory in the Pacific and Indian Oceans’; that, in fact, ‘the Americans had advised aggressive naval action and the British had rather advised against it […] the Americans felt Britain, while willing to defend her trade routes, was not willing to put in more ships to take the offensive’.Footnote 57 He did not believe that Japan would accept the status quo unless she was defeated both militarily and economically, or else gained considerable successes. MacArthur urged Page to advocate this point of view strongly with both the United States president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the army chiefs in Washington should Page be able to meet them. MacArthur stated that ‘the further away the problem was, the less it was understood’;Footnote 58 a sentiment that resonated with Page in view of Australia's position at the far reaches of empire.
On 8 October Page departed for the US mainland via Guam, Wake Island, Midway Island, and Honolulu, arriving in San Francisco on 15 October. Two days later Page arrived in Washington and began a whirlwind of lunches, dinners, and meetings with American officials. What is evident is that Page was not only thinking about American support against Japan in the Far East, as shown by his meeting with Cordell Hull, United States secretary of state, but it is also worth noting the emphasis that Page placed on commerce and agriculture – themes which dominate the wartime diary. For example, Page discussed the use of surplus products in building up the health and nutrition of the people, post-war reconstruction based on international collaboration and on surpluses of primary and secondary industries with the vice president, Henry Wallace. These conversations were continued with Jesse Jones, secretary of commerce, and Claude R. Wickard, secretary of agriculture.
From Washington, Page travelled to Ottawa via Montreal and met with the Canadian premier, W.L. Mackenzie King. King recorded in his diary that Page was determined that the British cabinet needed to be made aware of the ‘isolated position in which Australia was finding herself in the matter of defence’. King also reassured the Australian that Churchill would give him a cordial reception in London and that every opportunity would be offered of ‘discussing matters fully’ with the British leader.Footnote 59 From there he travelled to New York where he met with leading US bankers and members of the Californian Oil Company. During his stay in New York, Page was a little perturbed to discover that despite plying the press with ‘£4 worth of drinks and a lot of excellent dope’ during a press symposium, ‘not an item appeared anywhere so far as I could find out’ the next morning.Footnote 60 Page arrived in Britain via Bristol on 29 October 1941, having spent two days in Portugal visiting Sir Ronald H. Campbell, British ambassador to Portugal, at the British embassy in Lisbon. At Paddington station, he was met by Cranborne; Bruce; Rear Admiral Arthur Bromley, ceremonial secretary to the colonial and dominions offices; and staff from Australia House. Page was invited to attend the war cabinet the very next day.Footnote 61
Defence of the Far East
Given the remit of Page's mission, he lost no time in meeting with ministers and the chiefs of staff to discuss the defence of Singapore – on land, in the air, and on the sea. Page believed that by strengthening Singapore's defences it would both act as a deterrent against the Japanese as well as increasing the British empire's prestige in the Far East. In particular, he advocated an increase in air strength for the defence of Singapore. At each turn, however, he was met with the response that any reinforcement of Singapore would be at the expense of forces already actively engaged in the Middle East. The defence of Singapore, of course, formed part of a wider concern over the exposed nature of Australia's position within the Pacific which he felt that ‘up till now the importance of the situation in the Far East had not been sufficiently recognised’.Footnote 62 Churchill affirmed Britain's commitment to the safety of Australia for which Britain took ‘supreme responsibility’, and that if Australia was under immediate threat, Britain would ‘be prepared to abandon our position in the Middle East’ in order to come to Australia's aid.Footnote 63 Words accompanied by little, if any, military resources were not enough for Page and he expressed disbelief in the attitude of Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal: ‘Rather staggered me by indicating that if Singapore were lost we would pick it up again and they might not fight if the Dutch East Indies were invaded. I told him we could not contemplate even those possibilities and that if Britain did they were quite unconscious of the feeling of Aust[ralia] and NZ and it would break the Empire if they did nothing about it.’Footnote 64 Australia's voice needed to be heard and, with this in mind, Page turned to securing Australia's representation within the British war cabinet.
Page was encouraged by the Canadian-born food manufacturer and industrialist, Garfield Weston, a National Unionist MP for Macclesfield, to use his contacts with British ministers, especially Lord Beaverbrook, in order to secure Australian representation in the war cabinet.Footnote 65 Unsurprisingly, he also found support in Maurice Hankey, a former cabinet secretary and once influential Whitehall mandarin. A persistent critic of Churchill's conduct of the war, Hankey advocated that an imperial war cabinet, quite distinct from the British war cabinet and on which the British war cabinet could have representation, should be established to allow dominion representation in the innermost circles of wartime policy-making. Page took this conversation to Bruce and together they drafted a model for representation: a minister from Australia would visit Britain at regular intervals for two or three months with complete access to all documents and materials. Once the Australian representative returned, the high commissioner would take on the role and enjoy exactly the same access to information until the next representative arrived; at which point the high commissioner would be able to ‘show him the ropes’.Footnote 66 In the course of this discussion it became clear to Bruce and Page that Alfred Stirling, Australia's liaison officer between London and Canberra, was ideally placed to co-ordinate this representation. Since Stirling worked in the British cabinet office, as well as with other agencies such as the Foreign Office ‘it was the easiest thing in the world’ that all cabinet documents be placed in Stirling's possession. Thus ‘without any formal machinery of any sort or without any song and dance that would upset the other Dominions we could make our own special arrangements with the British Gov't that would enable us to be represented and fully informed and to get our stuff to the Gov't at the appropriate time’.Footnote 67
Page met with Cranborne on 31 December 1941 to discuss this new machinery of representation. The Australian initiative was timely for the dominions secretary. Throughout 1941, Cranborne had become increasingly critical of how his ministerial authority had been steadily eroded by the prime minister; and how Churchill had continued to exclude the dominion high commissioners from the inner circle.Footnote 68 Fearing that these channels of communication were becoming invalid, he pushed for greater contact and more consultation with the dominions. For Page, the major complaint against the current system was that whilst the dominion governments were often consulted and given an opportunity of expressing concurrence on matters of high policy, they were only brought into consultation at the final stage, when the actual formulation of policy was already settled. Page lobbied for earlier collaboration at lower ministerial levels, while policy was still being formulated and before it came before the war cabinet.Footnote 69 In practice this would involve the appointment of a dominion representative in the Foreign Office and a ministerial representative on the defence committee. He suggested that each dominion appoint men of significant repute to represent their respective interests in the Foreign Office and on the defence committee in London. For those dominion ministers appointed to the defence committee, each representative would be supported by their own chiefs of staff committee, comprising one senior officer from the army, navy, and air force of their own country. Page's proposals met with a mixed response from Cranborne and the Foreign Office, but it was recognized that dominion consultation had become a political issue that needed to be addressed especially as the situation in the Far East rapidly deteriorated.
A corollary of dominion consultation was that of empire supply and it was a theme that Page pushed hard whilst in London. Page met with Ernest Bevin, minister for labour, who admitted that there was no method of co-ordinating supply with the dominions and that ‘unless we had some Empire arrangement […] we w[oul]d get into a mess with regard to America, and the Americans would gain control practically of the whole of our production’.Footnote 70 Bevin advised Page that in order to influence policy ‘you had to get in low down […] with key men as well as high up’ as once policy entered the war cabinet it was ‘crystallised and unable to be altered’.Footnote 71 Page believed that the co-ordination of supply arrangements was one of utmost importance, an economic arrangement to complement the political machinery of consultation.Footnote 72
At the end of January 1942, Churchill informed the war cabinet that Australia's request for an accredited representative to be heard in the war cabinet in the formulation and direction of policy had been granted. In addition, any dominion government could, if they wished, appoint a service liaison officer to keep in touch with the chiefs of staff in London.Footnote 73 This would thereby ensure that the dominion representative in London would be informed of any plans that might affect the dominion at an early stage before definite conclusions were reached, so as to afford an opportunity for the expression of dominion views whilst the matter was still in its formative stage. Nevertheless, the American entry into the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the rapid progression of events in the Far East at the beginning of 1942 and the consequent proposal of some form of wider allied co-operation in the region rather changed the nature of the debate over Australian consultation on imperial strategy. Perhaps this was unsurprising because, for the British, Far Eastern strategy had always pivoted on the attitude of the Americans.
The Japanese Onslaught and Growth of United States Power
According to John Robertson, Australia, in the weeks following the attack on Pearl Harbor witnessed the most ‘frenetic months’ in the nation's history. The country's transformation to a ‘total war’ footing and the redeployment of Australian forces from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific theatre dominated war cabinet discussions. So, too, did Canberra's growing anxiety about the defence of Malaya and the intensifying pressure brought to bear on Churchill not only to reinforce the colony, but also to grant Australia direct representation at the highest levels formulating Far Eastern strategy.Footnote 74 From his vantage point in London, Page was involved at the centre of many of these deliberations.
One of the hallmarks of this period was the increasing dissatisfaction in Australia with Churchill's leadership.Footnote 75 This was compounded, and justifiably so, by deep-seated concerns in Curtin's administration that the ultimate arbiters of overall allied strategy would gravitate into the hands of Churchill and Roosevelt, who favoured a ‘Beat Hitler First Strategy’.Footnote 76 As the Japanese threat to Australia mounted, the correspondence between Curtin and Churchill became increasingly testy, if not acrimonious, at times. The first clash of views occurred in response to the evolving war situation and Curtin's calls for Australian representation on councils formulating Pacific strategy. Churchill proposed a Far Eastern council. This council would be composed of Churchill as chair and Clement Attlee as deputy. Members would include Page, a New Zealand representative, and a Dutch cabinet minister. The council would be assisted by a staff group of dominion liaison officers in consultation with British joint planners. The duties of the council would be to focus and formulate views of the represented powers to the US president, whose own views would also be brought before the council. Page's attendance at war cabinet meetings when Australian affairs were under discussion would be unaffected, thereby enabling the Australians to be heard in the general sphere of war.Footnote 77
Churchill's proposal was rejected outright by the Australian war cabinet and advisory war council. Curtin complained that the proposed Far Eastern council would be purely advisory and ‘quite out of keeping with our vital and primary interest in the Pacific sphere’. Instead, Curtin proposed a Pacific war council in Washington comprised of representatives from Britain, America, Australia, China, the Netherlands, and New Zealand.Footnote 78 For their part, both Page and Bruce urged the Far Eastern council to be located in London. Page argued that Australia, New Zealand, and the Dutch would dominate in London and would be able to bring to bear the strongest pressure on the chiefs of staff and ensure that instructions to their representatives in Washington would be more along the lines that Australia wished to follow. Page noted in his diary that Australia was ‘at the moment, swinging towards America’ and put it down to the fact that ‘it was obvious that Aust[ralia] did not understand what was offered’.Footnote 79 Curtin, however, would not be moved; but with Washington, Whitehall, and Australia House ranged against him he could do little, for the moment, but accept that the council be held in London.
Burma, Ceylon, and the Diversion of Australian Manpower
Anglo-Australian relations reached rock bottom over the (attempted) diversion, by Churchill, of the 7th Australian Division to Burma. The Japanese advance down the Malayan peninsula and the humiliating surrender of Singapore on 15 February 1942 caused Curtin to re-evaluate the disposition of Australian forces in the Middle East. He felt that Australia was inadequately safeguarded and therefore it became ‘a matter for urgent consideration that some of the AIF [Australian Imperial Force] should not proceed to [the] Netherlands East Indies but return to Australia’.Footnote 80 As ministers and military chiefs in Canberra grappled with the return and redeployment of Australian manpower,Footnote 81 the question of what to do with Australian reinforcements was also discussed in London at the defence committee, chaired by Churchill, and by the British chiefs of staff. Was Java, in the Dutch East Indies, to be abandoned and all Australian troops and reinforcements to be concentrated on the defence of Australia? Was Australia to be the new base from which to launch a counter-offensive against the Japanese?
Curtin outlined two options to his envoy in London: first, that all Australian troops be used in the Pacific area but; second, if saving Java by doing so was uncertain, then troops should not be wasted.Footnote 82 For his part, Page suggested that the ‘proper line of protection was the line New Guinea, New Caledonia, down to NZ, and if this c[oul]d not be held then the line must be back in Aust[ralia]’.Footnote 83 The British, however, deemed that the maintenance of the line of communications with China by the Burma road was of the ‘utmost importance’. The decision rested on whether ‘we ought not to divert to Burma and to Australia reinforcements now on their way to the Far Eastern theatre, which might otherwise be employed to stiffen resistance in Sumatra and Java’.Footnote 84 That same day, 16 February 1942, Churchill admitted to President Roosevelt that the Australians seemed inclined to press for the return of their two divisions. ‘I could not resist them for long’, he confided.Footnote 85
At the second meeting of the newly constituted Pacific war council on 17 February 1942 the assessment of Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, C.-in-C. of India and commander of the America-British-Dutch-Australia Command, was outlined. For him, if there seemed a good chance of establishing the Australian troops in Java and fighting the Japanese on favourable terms, he recommended the diversion of the Australian convoy. In view of the ever-worsening situation, however, Wavell believed that the risk was ‘unjustifiable from [a] tactical and strategic point of view’.Footnote 86 Wavell's recommendation against the diversion of the Australian troops to the Netherlands East Indies was not explicitly shared with Curtin. It did not matter. The Australian chiefs of staff, for their part, recommended that the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions be diverted home.Footnote 87
Page, supported by Bruce, gave Churchill a tantalizing opportunity to explore the reinforcement of Burma with Australian forces. At that same Pacific war council meeting, Page suggested that in his view ‘and that of the Australian Government’, those reinforcements now approaching from the west should be diverted from Java ‘to other threatened points’. He added, however, that the precise dispositions to be made would require further discussion.Footnote 88 In summing up, Churchill agreed that defensive positions vital to the struggle against Japan should be augmented: namely Burma, Ceylon, and Australia. Furthermore, he emphasized that Canberra should be ‘invited’ to permit the leading elements of the 7th Australian Division that were off Colombo to proceed to Burma until they could be relieved by other forces.Footnote 89 Privately, Page took credit for the idea of deploying Australian troops to Burma. He noted in his diary: ‘I felt certain that Burma was the place and was prepared to recommend it with the qualification that they would be relieved at earliest opportunity. Ch[urchill] said [he was] prepared to accept this and to base the whole of the advice to Wavell on this foundation and asked that Ismay and I sh[oul]d get cable ready.’Footnote 90
Three days later, both Churchill and Roosevelt attempted to dissuade Curtin from his decision to return his troops home directly. Churchill cabled Curtin: ‘I suppose you realise that your leading division the head of which is sailing south of Colombo to Netherlands East Indies at this moment in our scanty British and American shipping is the only force that can reach Rangoon in time to prevent its loss and the severance of communication with China […] There is nothing else in the world that can fill the gap.’Footnote 91 Churchill also warned Curtin to remember that Roosevelt attached supreme importance to keeping open the connection with China, without which America's bombing offensive against Japan could not be started and the most grievous results would be likely to follow in Asia if China was cut off from all allied help. ‘I am quite sure that if you refuse to allow your troops which are actually passing to stop this gap, and if in consequence the above evils affecting the whole course of the war follow, a very grave effect will be produced upon the President and the Washington circle on whom you are so largely dependent.’Footnote 92 Page referred to this communique as ‘stupidly’ sent to Australia.Footnote 93 In another telegram from Roosevelt to Churchill and repeated to Curtin, Roosevelt hoped Churchill could persuade the Australians to the temporary diversion of their leading division to Burma. In return, Roosevelt promised additional troops as well as much-needed aircraft to Australia. The president also cabled Curtin directly. He underlined the importance of fighting ‘to the limit for our two flanks – one based on Australia and the other on Burma, India, and China. Because of our geographical position we Americans can better handle the reinforcement of Australia and the right flank. […] the left flank simply must be held. If Burma goes it seems to me our whole position including that of Australia, will be in extreme peril.’Footnote 94
Curtin would not be swayed. With the recent disasters of Greece, Malaya, and Singapore fresh in his mind, he cabled Page that the ‘convoy should not be committed to Burma’.Footnote 95 Page noted in his diary that he was ‘staggered’ by Curtin's wire declining to reinforce Burma.Footnote 96 Critically, despite Curtin ordering the 7th Division to Australia on 19 February, Page (according to his diary) did not show Curtin's cable to Churchill until 20 February.Footnote 97 In the meantime the Japanese had bombed the port of Darwin the day before which stiffened Curtin's resolve (and language) to refuse Churchill's request.Footnote 98 On 22 February Churchill cabled Curtin to inform him that the convoy had been temporarily diverted northward. Curtin was furious. ‘In your telegram [20 February] it was clearly implied that the convoy was not (repeat not) proceeding […] Northwards. From your telegram [22 February] it appears that you have diverted the convoy towards Rangoon and treated our approval to this vital diversion as merely a matter of form.’Footnote 99 Churchill replied, in a much more conciliatory tone, that the Australian convoy was proceeding to Colombo to refuel and then would sail for Australia. Churchill explained that his decision to divert it northward whilst awaiting Curtin's (final) reply was necessary since ‘your help, if given, might not have arrived in time’.Footnote 100
Bruce was ‘appalled’ over the affair: ‘it is arrogant and offensive and contradicts the assurances given to Page that the convoy was not being diverted from its direct route to Australia’.Footnote 101 Page, who had supported (if not initiated) the idea of diverting Australian troops to Rangoon,Footnote 102 wrote to Churchill asking for clarification of the position to prove there had been ‘no double dealing’. In response, Page received a ‘most penitent letter’ from Major-General Sir Hastings Ismay, dictated at Churchill's request, which set out Page's position ‘beyond any dispute’. In Page's view it proved by the actual sequence of events that Churchill had ‘simply acted inadvertently rather than deliberately’ in infringing the rule of prior consultation with Australia.Footnote 103 One wonders if that was indeed the case. As for Page's role in this sordid affair, L.S. Amery, secretary of state for India and Burma, admired the Australian's efforts: ‘Old Earle Page I know did his best from here to persuade them.’Footnote 104
Illness and Return to Australia
On 10 March, Page made the first of several requests to return home. He informed Canberra that because he had nearly finalized the machinery of liaison and co-operation with British authorities, it was now time to report back on the established procedures, especially on the all-important aspects of Australian supply and production.Footnote 105 Underpinning this request was his deteriorating health. The arduous workload, combined with the long, bitterly cold winter in England, had taken its toll. By the end of March, Page was near physical and mental collapse. After spending several days in bed, on 28 March, he was admitted to St Mary's Hospital in Paddington suffering from double bronchial pneumonia. On 8 April, with the advice of his close friend the South Australian-born Harley Street consultant, Dr Hope Gosse, he again requested to return home. Writing from his hospital bed, he admitted to Curtin that since January 1942 he had experienced one of the worst periods of ‘acute mental distress of my life’. The pneumonia, he confessed, had nearly killed him and, if it had not been for ‘the best man in London looking after me’, he would have succumbed.Footnote 106
Events were already in train to get Page home. H.V. Evatt, Australia's minister for external affairs, was about to depart on a three-month trip to Washington and London. It had been decided by Curtin that upon his arrival in England, Evatt would assume the role as Australia's accredited representative in the British war cabinet and on the Pacific war council. In the interim, Bruce would fulfil this role. Evatt arrived in London via America on 3 May 1942, which allowed Page to spend the majority of that month convalescing in Devon. When Evatt departed for Australia in early June, Curtin confirmed Bruce as the accredited representative, relieving him of his routine duties as high commissioner. As part of the restructuring at Australia House, the official secretary J.S. Duncan, was given the new post of deputy high commissioner.Footnote 107 A fortnight before his departure, Page cabled his final thoughts to Curtin on 12 June. He recognized that Australian representation on the war cabinet was vital but, in fact, representation on the defence committee, the empire clearing house for raw materials, the munitions assignment committee, and the empire production council were also key areas that were vital for ‘exercising continuous influence on war policy’. Page also pointed to the future and to the development of post-war industrial and commercial relationships, and recommended a team of liaison officers in order to maintain Anglo-Australian consultation across all areas. ‘Our objective should be to make this system of intimate consultation between the British and Australian Departments influence more than war activity. It should be developed into a means of assuring the closest possible mutual knowledge of each country's post-war aims and policies.’Footnote 108
Page spent much of the remainder of his time in Britain touring the country, visiting family and friends, and saying goodbye to those many business contacts and government officials he had worked with so closely during the past eight months. That his customary dynamism had returned is evidenced by exuberant entries in his diary before he left England. This fact is reinforced by the punishing six-week itinerary that he was planning in the United States and Canada on his return journey to Australia. In a final meeting with Cranborne, Page appreciated the British minister's realization ‘to the full necessity of the very rapid development of this Empire liaison to enable us to offset the definite impetus that there was towards closer collaboration with the US and other countries during the war which might persist afterwards’.Footnote 109 With one eye on post-war issues, Page departed from Bristol on 26 June and arrived in New York two days later.
The homeward-leg via North America was packed full of meetings from coast to coast with politicians, leading manufacturers, and financiers. Dinners with diplomats and leading policy-makers at all levels of government were interspersed with the odd game of tennis, trips to the theatre, and the ubiquitous photo shoot with stars of stage and screen. Page, however, could not resist visiting Knoxville, Tennessee, the headquarters of the Tennessee Valley Authority, where he saw first-hand how dams across the Tennessee River and its tributaries were being tamed to control flooding, provide irrigation, and produce vast quantities of hydro-electricity for American industry. In Detroit and Milwaukee, Page marvelled at how quickly leading farm implement and automotive corporations, such as International Harvester (McCormick-Deering), Ford, and Dodge, had completely revamped their assembly lines to mass produce military vehicles, tanks, and aircraft. In California he witnessed the stunning achievements of west-coast shipbuilders in producing cargo vessels in twenty days. He admired the ingenuity of American industry and its mass production techniques which were churning out weapons and equipment at an ever faster rate. The transformation of American industry, its ‘tempo and variety’ of production was astonishing compared to eleven months before when he began his mission.Footnote 110 However, he noted that Australian officials in the United States were fearful that Australia was ‘steadily losing prestige’ in the minds of many influential Americans.Footnote 111 Canberra had to do something about this, and he suggested augmenting diplomatic representation and wartime liaison in Washington along the lines that he had secured in London.
On 7 August Page left America by air and arrived in Sydney on 15 August to be greeted by his wife and family, close friends, Country Party associates, and a gaggle of pressmen. ‘Australia’, he reported, ‘can rest assured that her voice will be heard in the Pacific War Council in London. We now have a definite place in Allied war strategy and organisation has been put up which will place our particular war problems in their proper perspective. Australian liaison officers are attached to all the chief supply departments in Britain and they are putting our point of view to the proper authorities.’Footnote 112 In a more detailed report submitted to Curtin on 19 August, Page reiterated the highlights of his mission outlining his achievements; in particular, the establishment of greater consultation with Whitehall departments.Footnote 113 He expanded upon these accomplishments in two supplementary memoranda where he elaborated on the new machinery of consultation and the all-important issue of supply. Without ‘comprehensive international organisation and co-operation’ the allied nations would not succeed in defeating the totalitarian regimes. Crucially, ‘if the British Empire does not find a common line of policy’, and unite behind a ‘single voice of expression’, that task would be undermined. In Page's eyes, perhaps his most valuable contribution of the entire mission was the establishment of a ‘less spectacular system of silent but continuously working liaison […]’.Footnote 114
Enormously proud of his achievements, the Grafton Daily Examiner reported that the civic reception organized to welcome him home resembled more a family reunion, such was the interest his successful return had generated.Footnote 115 The plaudits continued over the next several weeks where demands were being made in the Country Party press for him to be appointed to the advisory war council. This would allow Page, a member of the opposition, a unique opportunity to sit at war cabinet meetings. Initially, Curtin baulked at the idea, but quickly agreed that his experience would be useful, as the allies had just launched their first counter-attack against the Japanese in the Solomon Islands. Page's appointment was announced on 28 August 1942. A new chapter in an already long and distinguished political career was about to unfold.
