Ethno-religious nationalism has been an integral part of the Georgian identity since the country regained independence. Since the early 2000s, Georgia has had a constitutionally enshrined pro-European foreign policy, which has been reflected in a strong identification with Europe, its culture, and values. Survey data show that Georgians prefer European and Christian ethnic outgroups to Asian and Muslim ones. These factors could have explained the rise of the far right in Georgia, had Georgia experienced a wave of refugees comparable to EU states in mid-2010s. However, only few people fled from the Syrian civil war to Georgia. Nevertheless, in and around 2016, various far-right groups with a strong anti-liberal ideology appeared in the Georgian public sphere. In 2017, a far-right rally was organized, demanding that the rights of Turkish, Iranian, and Arab business owners and citizens be restricted in Georgia. This was accompanied by violent incidents involving physical abuse and property damage of non-white foreigners. The sudden rise of the far-right political organizations in Georgia gives rise to various questions: Do the far-right ideas have grassroots origins, or was the activation of the far right a top-down process? Which domestic and external factors could have contributed to these developments?

The recent rise of authoritarian populist and far-right parties in Western democracies has raised concerns about democratic stability in these countries. While existing research often focuses on electoral outcomes, we argue this approach inadequately captures citizens’ regime preferences due to the complexities of electoral processes and national politics. To address this limitation, we examine the relationship between immigration and regime preferences through a democratization framework using structural equation modelling across 17 established Western democracies between 2008 and 2020. Our findings reveal a positive association between immigrant population rates, individuals’ authoritarian predisposition and anti-immigrant sentiments, with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes correlating with increased support for authoritarian governance models such as dictatorship and army rule. This relationship appears particularly pronounced among individuals with low authoritarian predispositions, underscoring the mobilizing effect of immigration. This research offers insights into the recent political landscape in Western democracies, contributing to debates on democratic resilience and challenges posed by changing demographics.

This study examined how immigrant status and socioeconomic status influence racial self-classification among U.S. Latinx adults aged eighteen and older across multiple nationalities. Using data from the 2010–2018 National Health Interview Survey, we analyzed a nationally representative sample of Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Dominican, and Central/South American adults (N = 41,133) who identified as White, Black, or Another race. Socioeconomic status was measured using a composite index of income-to-poverty ratio, education, employment status, and homeownership. Multinomial logistic regressions and average marginal effects revealed significant heterogeneity in examined predictors of racial identity. U.S.-born Latinx adults, particularly Puerto Ricans and Central/South Americans, had higher probability of identifying as Black compared to recent immigrants. Latinx adults with low and middle socioeconomic status backgrounds were more likely to identify as Black or Another race across most nationality groups. Findings highlight the complexity of Latinx racial identity, whereby Latinxs may experience racialization differently depending on indicators of acculturation and socioeconomic status. The inclusion of multidimensional measures of race, such as skin color and street race, in future research is needed to better understand Latinx racial identity formation. Findings inform interventions to address race-related stress and anti-Blackness, particularly among AfroLatinx populations, and provide considerations for improving race data collection practices, such as those impacted by recent federal policy changes to the U.S. Census.

The analytical framework, “policy innovation through bureaucratic reorganization,” elucidates how the policy implementation process can be restructured to affect its outputs. Three steps from the framework are applied to the case of Republican officeholders between 1906 and 1913, who centralized their control over immigration, by adding naturalization and enforcement in the new Bureau of Immigration & Naturalization. The Roosevelt and Taft administrations used budgeting, staffing, and infrastructure to regulate immigration and naturalization laws, pivoting between easing and tightening them (resource adjustment). The shifts responded to coalitions for and against immigration (coalition management). Until the Bureau became obsolete and was reconfigured (system redesign). Although immigration was open in the Progressive Era, this study reveals how Republicans managed inflows with mixed results, leading to the structural foundation for the restrictive laws that followed. This furthers the immigration history and political control literatures as they emphasize policymaking through legislative and procedural, not structural, means.

While scholars document associations between competing parties’ policy disputes and citizens’ cross-party hostility, that is, affective polarization, we lack causal comparative evidence of how different types of ideological disagreements shape partisan affective evaluations. We investigate this issue with a priming experiment across ten Western publics, which prompts some respondents to answer questions inviting them to discuss debates over either cultural or economic issues versus a control group that receives a non-political prompt. Respondents in the economic and cultural priming conditions expressed greater distrust of out-partisans, and, among respondents who received cultural priming, those who discussed immigration in their open-ended responses expressed far more distrust towards opponents – an effect driven by right-wing respondents who discussed immigration. These findings provide comparative evidence that economic and cultural debates cause affective polarization, with immigration as a primary cultural driver.

The literature in political science considers (sometimes inaccurate) perceptions of immigrants as a factor in anti-immigration attitudes among natives, but much less is known about perceptions regarding immigrants from specific regions. In this paper, I explore Americans’ perceptions about immigrants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. To measure these perceptions, I apply a conjoint experiment with a multinomial outcome, in which respondents are asked to categorize hypothetical immigrants as coming from one of the five regions. Results from a nationally diverse sample demonstrate that immigrants from all regions other than Europe are associated with speaking poor English. Immigrants from Latin America are also associated with welfare dependency and rule-breaking behavior, while the opposite is true for immigrants from Asia. These negative perceptions may at least partly explain opposition to non-European, and specifically Latin American, immigration in the United States.

Narratives and studies of Latino partisanship often emphasize Democratic identification, but some have recently suggested a shift towards Republicans. We address these by examining Latino party identification over a 34-year period, leveraging 35 national surveys with a total of over 103,000 Latino respondents along with Census data to create post-stratified survey weights to correct for biases. We emphasize changing partisanship over time by nativity, birth cohorts, and by national origin. From 2000 to 2012, we observed a slight overall increase in Democratic identification and a decrease in Republican identification, but this was driven by foreign-born Latinos. After 2012, we see declining Democratic identification overall, greater Republican identification among foreign-born and older native-born Latinos, and accelerating Independent identification among native-born Millennial and Gen Z Latinos. These results show that generational turnover and differences by nativity challenge extant theories of Latino partisan change over time.

Diversity policies have become a common element of public policy-making in Europe. At the European, national, regional and local levels, efforts are made to meet demands arising from a growing socio-cultural diversity and to ensure more equal participation of disadvantaged groups. And yet, little is known about the reception of such policies among the general public. This article addresses this gap. Based on an original and representative survey conducted in German cities, we examine the extent and structure of popular support for a range of diversity policies. Our results demonstrate that the German urban population altogether supports diversity policies, although unevenly across policy items. Somewhat surprisingly, it is not membership in groups expected to benefit from a diversity policy that mainly drives supportive attitudes, but general views on social equality and intergroup contact.

This article argues that antifascism began to acquire a new meaning in the early 1990s, making a vital contribution to the emergence of a national antiracism movement in Italy and the spread of an antiracist culture built on new foundations. This thesis is based on observations of Italian society. The first section reconstructs the operations of the association Senzaconfine and analyses the contents of its publication of the same name. The middle section describes an exhibition entitled La menzogna della razza, its connection to the ‘Pantera’ student protest movement and its continued travels around Italy until recent years. The final section is dedicated to the reaction of several segments of the youth population and political community to the neofascist Luca Traini’s attempted racial massacre in Macerata in 2018. The article concludes that although the new focus on antiracism is not the only way the Italian antifascist tradition is being remoulded, it remains one of the most important, given the issues we face in a globalised, postcolonial world.

Members of the ethnic majority tend to view immigrants and ethnic minorities as less willing to contribute to the collective. Why is this the case? I argue that in Europe, ethnic attributes signal citizens’ socioeconomic resources, cultural values, and norm compliance and that these factors, rather than ethnic identities per se, explain why citizens are expected (not) to contribute. Through a novel conjoint experimental design in Denmark that manipulated respondents’ access to information about these different mechanisms, the argument finds support. First, in information-sparse environments, ethnic majority members expect that minority members contribute substantially less to the provision of public goods than majority members. Second, this ethnic bias is reduced by each of the three mechanisms and explained away once information on all three is available. This demonstrates that negative expectations toward minorities operate through multiple, complementary channels and that stereotype-countering information can reduce the majority-minority expectation gap.