Gender stereotyping has captured public attention, from the courtroom to the everyday workplace – but the term encompasses a variety of beliefs, motivations, and contexts. This chapter first discusses prominent theories of gender stereotyping that have been primarily used in employment discrimination contexts (e.g., social role theory, the stereotype content model). I then identify how adjudicators across a variety of legal contexts (e.g., judges, juries, employers, social services officers) behave in a stereotyped fashion, according to those theories. An understanding of where stereotyping occurs across underexplored contexts is ultimately valuable for our understanding of how and where researchers might intervene in disparities research.

Experimental jurisprudence draws methods and theories from an increasingly wide variety of fields, including psychology, economics, philosophy, and political science. However, researchers interested in legal thought have thus far paid relatively little attention to its origins in development. This chapter highlights an emerging approach that leverages methods and insights from developmental science to better understand the nature and development of adult intuitions about the law. By studying children’s earliest intuitions about rules, laws, and other topics, this “intuitive jurisprudence” approach can provide new methods and theoretical frameworks for experimental jurisprudence, as well as clarify places in which the law does or does not match human intuitions about justice. Already, developmental psychology and legal scholarship may converge to be mutually informative in a number of diverse areas, and this chapter reviews several, including: intent and punishment; fairness and procedural justice; ownership and property rights; trust in testimony and evidentiary issues; and social biases and equal protection under the law.

Settlement, not trial, is the predominant way in which most legal disputes are resolved. Despite this, very little research has examined how the public thinks about settlement. This chapter discusses the need for such research and describes the first few projects trying to fill that need. People hold complex and fairly accurate beliefs about the nature and prevalence of settlement. They also show remarkable willingness to draw inferences when parties settle, including inferences about a defendant’s responsibility. Some avenues for the future of this burgeoning field are also discussed.

This paper argues for the normative priority of justice as compared to other values. A conception of justice must provide reasons concerning the kind of, for example, liberty or equality that members of a normative order can justifiably claim and demand of each other. Based on a distinction between two ways of thinking about justice, relational-structural accounts of justice versus outcome- and recipient-oriented approaches (such as luck egalitarianism), a conception of justice as justification is developed and located in the first paradigm. That conception considers the question of the power individuals and groups have to co-determine the basic structure of their society as the first question of justice. Developing the substantive and procedural aspects of this view, a particular view of the role and nature of a constitution is suggested. Its task is to establish a basic structure of justification that secures the status of non-dominated legal, political and social equals who ought to be the authorities within that order. In various ways, from enshrining basic rights to democratic procedures and social protections, a constitution raises thresholds of justification in contexts where subjection to forms of unjustified, arbitrary rule is a threat.

This chapter examines if the systems of evidence in annulment, failure to act proceedings, and actions for damages, are designed to support private parties’ access to and participation in actions brought directly before the EU courts. Against the backdrop of evidence theory and the so-called procedural abilities doctrine, this chapter argues that, in the context of direct actions, the principle of effective judicial protection receives a restrictive reading. As a result, the requirements that private parties must meet to launch those actions do not, in practice, give way to broad procedural abilities and an unhindered access to the Union courts. These requirements thus seem designed to uphold a (strong) presumption of lawfulness of the EU legislature’s normative action, seeking to preserve the stability and coherence of EU law, rather than to ensure an effective access to, and exercise of the legal remedies included in the EU Treaties’ system of procedures.

This chapter addresses the widespread perception that rural politics are characterized by irrational antigovernment sentiment, right-wing conspiracy theories, and other ideological drivers. This perception includes the stereotype that rural residents are generally conservatives who “vote against their interests” when liberal policies might appear to help their communities more. The chapter argues that rural views on government are just as often rational reactions to the unique impacts of law, regulation, and government in rural communities. Drawing on legitimacy theory, the chapter argues that rural grievances toward the federal regulatory state specifically reflect predictable concerns relating to procedural justice, substantive outcomes, and a sense that agencies prioritize concerns other than rural residents’ concerns. Although rural views vary, and intersect with other identities such as race, diverse rural populations exhibit common concerns about agencies posing threats to livelihoods and failing to offer protection from environmental threats. The chapter argues that overlap between subjective rural sentiments and objective structural features of the regulatory state lend credence to rural views as not irrational. Barriers to public participation in agency rulemaking, regulatory cost–benefit analysis, and implementation of the Endangered Species Act all illustrate instances of the regulatory state often failing to take meaningful rural concerns seriously.

Informal institutions in global governance are generally expected to favor powerful states. According to conventional arguments, procedural justice is best secured through formal institutional rules that constrain power, while informal institutions reinforce power asymmetries. This chapter revisits this position and asks, how and under what conditions can informal institutions enhance the voice and influence of less powerful or marginalized actors in global governance? The chapter argues that while informal institutions are useful to powerful states because they remove constraints to individual action, they can also be useful to less powerful states to the extent that they positively support action through social-integrative effects. Specifically, interactions within informal groups generate two types of social effects – capacity-building and coalition-building – that can enhance the voice of developing countries and increase their control over collective decisions. The chapter illustrates the arguments by profiling informal groups in the global governance of trade and finance.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion and consolidates ideas and findings. This chapter calls for and reflects on the possibility of a more transparent and fair anti-dumping system for all WTO members achieved by promoting procedural justice. It also considers the significance of the findings of the book for international trade law discourse more generally by relating them to contemporary trade issues such as the US–China trade war, Brexit, the WTO crisis and mega free trade agreements.

At the core of any legal decision is an assumption that the decision will be “fair,” yet this is an elusive term. A close study of cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities shows that many (perhaps most) of the decisions involving this cohort are not “fair” in the contexts of due process and justice. If legal decisions reflect principles such as procedural justice, restorative justice, and therapeutic jurisprudence, the chances of such fairness will be significantly enhanced. This chapter explains why this goal of fairness, in the context of these cases, can never be met absent a consideration of the virulence of sanism and pretextuality, along with the misuse of heuristics and false “ordinary common sense.” These factors enable much of society to ignore gray areas of human behavior, and predispose fact-finders to endorse beliefs in accord with their prior experiences.

Health-care systems within most countries are resource-limited – budgets are finite and not every service one would like to provide can be funded. In publicly funded health systems, those responsible for procuring health-care need to be able to explain how taxpayers’ money has been spent. Decisions are made at both individual patient and population levels. At an individual level, the decision might be: which statin should this patient get a prescription for to lower her blood cholesterol? At a population level, the decision might be: will a health and social care commissioning organization purchase a heart-failure specialist nurse or an additional sexual health clinic?

This chapter focuses on how such decisions are made and considers a framework for priority setting, a discussion of what factors should be taken into account when comparing options, a consideration of basic health economic concepts, and an overview of ethical principles which influence decisions.