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146 results in Trends in Southeast Asia

Page 1 of 8

Who's Doing What?
  • A Closer Look at Methane Climate Impact and Commitments in Southeast Asia's Energy Sector
  • Jiahui Qiu
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    06 June 2024
  • This article draws from a database of asset-level emissions to identify key methane-emitting coal, oil and gas facilities in Southeast Asia while taking stock of the methane commitments of their owners. Coal mines account for around a third of fossil fuel methane emissions globally, but in Southeast Asia they make up more than half of tracked fossil fuel methane emissions. Over half of emissions from the coal mining subsector is traced to its top ten emitters, mostly in East Kalimantan, Indonesia; while some coal mines in North Vietnam have high emissions intensities. Though the global discourse on fossil methane focuses on oil and gas, coal mine methane remains crucial for Southeast Asia due to the region's lack of decisive coal phaseout plans. As countries begin to tackle coal emissions at the power generation stage, a gap still remains when it comes to coal mining emissions. Methane monitoring and abatement actions are urgently needed for coal mines that will continue to operate, as well as those slated for closure. More clarity is needed on how private sector commitments in the oil and gas sector will translate to action under complex and changing ownership arrangements. These gaps and uncertainties in methane abatement are ripe opportunities for closer partnership in the region, including within the private sector.

The Rising Role of Chinese Firms in Southeast Asia's Automotive Supply Chain
  • John Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    01 November 2024
  • Chinese firms have become global leaders in the electrification, networking and intelligentization of vehicles. They are globally dominant in minerals extraction and processing and battery production for electric vehicles (EVs) and are becoming internationally competitive in the enabling microelectronics, components and systems. This report covers the role of Chinese firms in Southeast Asia across five segments of the EV supply chain, namely minerals extraction and processing; battery manufacturing, energy storage and charging; original equipment manufacturer (OEM) production of complete vehicles; microelectronics design and manufacturing; and research and development activities. The report focuses on Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. These are the five ASEAN economies where activities relevant to EV production are concentrated and where Chinese firms are involved in the supply chain. The report concludes with policy considerations for ASEAN governments. EVs and connected vehicles have become a new front in the technology contest and political tensions between China and the US, with other big players like the European Union now also moving towards measures to shield their automotive sector markets and companies. As 'technology-taker' economies at the forefront of climate change, the nations of Southeast Asia have much at stake in informed choices about this supply chain. They can benefit from participation in the evolving automotive sector without committing to one side, despite continued escalation in the global technology and trade war.

Party of Hardship
  • The Evolution of Malaysia's Parti Keadilan Rakyat
  • James Chai
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    14 May 2024
  • The People's Justice Party (PKR) may in many ways be synonymous with its larger-than-life leader, Anwar Ibrahim, who, although only president for six of the party's twenty-five years, has always been its de facto leader and adviser. However, PKR is much more than only about Anwar, and this paper traces the evolution of the party independently of Anwar as a person. PKR's evolution can be broken down into four main periods: 1998-2004 (formative), 2005-13 (golden era), 2014-18 (all-in for power), and 2019-22 (lessons on restraints). From 1998 to 2022, PKR tended to adopt a big-tent approach (internally and externally), ideological synthesis to find a middle ground, and a loose organization led by a charismatic personality at the top and self-organization at the grassroots. PKR was born out of a major crisis when Anwar, then deputy prime minister, was sacked in 1998 and subsequently jailed twice in the following two decades. For the most part, the party operated with its figurehead in jail, thus learning how to rely on coalition strengths, working with civil society, mass movements, and political parties to survive and win power.

    The post-election Unity Government with Anwar Ibrahim as the tenth prime minister marks PKR's first 'real' governing experience, and this would not have been possible without PKR's core identity operating in full gear.

Delivering Development, Enforcing Shariah
  • PAS's Dilemma in Terengganu
  • Azmil Tayeb
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    15 May 2024
  • Whenever the Islamist party PAS comes to power in Terengganu, its political agenda has been to combine populist-type development programmes with the wish to turn Terengganu into a shariah-compliant state. Terengganu's state budget is however heavily dependent on the federal government, to the tune of 80-90 per cent. This hinders the state government's policymaking and implementation, especially when the federal government is controlled by its political opponents.

    This article argues that the politics of development play a more central role in determining the durability of the PAS state government in Terengganu than it does in neighbouring Kelantan. PAS cannot simply carry out its Islamic agenda without being complemented by tangible economic progress if it aspires to govern beyond a single term; PAS's loss in the 2004 election after being in power for one term is a prime example of this dynamic. One reason that the current PAS state government managed to get re-elected in 2022 was the unimpeded flow of oil royalty payments into state coffers since 2018, which allowed the state government to fulfil its campaign promises; PAS's inclusion in the Perikatan Nasional federal government in 2020 further improved the state government's financial standing.

    The key for the PAS state government to rule beyond the current term is its ability to negotiate the tense federal-state relationship, develop other sources of revenue, and find ways to claim credit for economic progress, in addition to burnishing its Islamic governing credentials by making Terengganu a shariah-compliant state.

Building upon Deep Trust
  • ASEAN-Japan Ties at a Crossroads
  • Joanne Lin
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    01 December 2024
  • ASEAN and Japan share a robust and multifaceted partnership that has evolved over five decades, and that is grounded in mutual respect, trust and shared values. The establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023 further solidifies their commitment to advancing cooperation in traditional areas while expanding into emerging domains such as digital transformation and sustainability. In the security domain, Japan has consistently prioritized ASEAN's centrality in the regional order, even as it aligns with the United States and participates in frameworks like the Quad. Initiatives such as the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Initiative for Enhanced Defense Cooperation (JASMINE) and the Overseas Security Assistance (OSA) framework demonstrate Japan's evolving approach, transitioning from traditional capacity-building to a broader focus on enhancing maritime security, conducting joint exercises, and providing non-offensive defence equipment to ASEAN countries. The partnership's new emphasis on 'co-creation' marks a transformative shift through public and private sector collaboration to address pressing socio-economic challenges. By fostering innovation and co-developing solutions in areas like green energy, digital trade, and healthcare, the co-creation model underscores ASEAN and Japan's shared commitment to inclusive and sustainable development. Looking ahead, the ASEAN-Japan partnership is well-positioned to navigate the complexities of an evolving geopolitical landscape. By harnessing Japan's expertise in advanced technology, infrastructure development, and healthcare systems to address ASEAN's evolving priorities, and by leveraging on Japan's role as a stabilizing force amid intensifying major power rivalries, this partnership will become pivotal to the fostering of long-term regional stability, resilience, and inclusive growth.

Malaysia's Motorcycle Sector
  • Past and Present Possibilities in an Era of Energy Transition
  • Sara Loo
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    12 November 2024
  • Malaysia has traditionally adopted an intensive automotive industrialization model and created its own vehicles under national brands. The national car project started with Proton in 1983, and the national motorcycle project with Modenas in 1995. While policies and scholarship have focused on national car projects, the two-wheeler sector has stood in their shadow. Modenas witnessed early growth and remains a popular brand after Yamaha and Honda; it has however failed to hit export targets, owing to limited technology transfer and the inability to scale. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the two-wheeler sector, focusing on phasing out combustion motorcycles in favour of electric two-wheelers (E2Ws). Still nascent, Malaysia's electric two-wheeler (E2W) sector appears to prioritize an extensive model of assembly and distribution rather than the protection of home-grown brands. Still in its infancy, E2W adoption rates remain low at under 1 per cent, albeit there has been high year-over-year growth since 2022. Interviews with E2W manufacturers, regulators, dealers, and consumers reveal challenges beyond common issues like price, range, charging time, maximum speed, absence of servicing infrastructure and a second-hand market. Notably, Malaysia lacks a suitable product for Malaysian roads and lifestyle due to insufficient institutional support for Research and Development (R&D) and talent matching. With aspirations to be an E2Ws regional manufacturing hub, the government and businesses should step up on public education to bridge the information gap, rethink the R&D support model for the electric vehicle industry, and develop clarity surrounding what a 'Made in Malaysia' motorcycle entails.

Managing State-Federal Relations
  • Growing Pressure on Malaysia's Madani Administration
  • Tricia Yeoh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 November 2024
  • Since the Sheraton Move in 2020 which led to the fall of the Malaysian government, many state governments in the federation have held their elections separately from the central government. This has resulted in a dynamic political situation in which coalitions have been formed in different ways at different times in different states. At present, there are seven states ruled by the Pakatan Harapan - Barisan Nasional (PHBN) grand coalition, while four states are under the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition. States have increasingly demanded greater political and policy autonomy over the last few years, particularly in the area of fiscal revenue-sharing between the federal and state governments. Progress has been most forthcoming for issues related to the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the federal government's newly set-up Malaysia Agreement 1963 Implementation Action Council has been meeting regularly. Contentious state-federal issues remain for states apart from Sabah and Sarawak, to which the federal government has not seriously responded. Limited space exists for formal state-federal negotiations that can result in firm decisions.

    Sabah will be holding its state election in 2025, followed by Sarawak and Malacca in 2026. Pressure will continue to build up as these timelines draw near, and the federal government will need to identify better federal-state negotiation platforms than are currently available.

Understanding Vietnam's Foreign Policy Choices Amid Sino-US Rivalry
  • Thi Ha Hoang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 June 2024
  • Vietnam's foreign policy towards China and the United States (US) involves a delicate process of reconciling and balancing competing perceptions, goals and interests within the country. This leads to foreign policy decisions that may respectively lean towards either China or the US, depending on specific circumstances and issues, while trying to maintain an overall equilibrium between the two powers. Vietnam's foreign policy adopts the paradigm of 'cooperation' and 'struggle' in its relations with major powers, and defines 'national security' as encompassing both national sovereignty and regime security. Given the common ideology and imperative of preserving political control of their respective communist parties, China may be a critical partner for Vietnam in terms of regime security but is often an 'object of struggle' on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the US is Vietnam's partner in the South China Sea but an 'object of struggle' when it comes to regime security.

    The Vietnamese public's favourable sentiments towards the US, contrasted with their distrust towards China, pose a challenge for the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in mobilizing public opinion to bolster its legitimacy while preventing any potential threat to its political authority.

    Vietnam has thus far benefited from the US-China rivalry but it faces substantial challenges ahead, including heightened vulnerabilities to an assertive China in the South China Sea and Lower Mekong, potential trade tensions if Donald Trump is re-elected as US president, and risks in balancing its ideological ties with Beijing while maintaining its strategic alignment with the US.

Autonomy in Sarawak and Sabah
  • Different Paths and Diverging Outcomes
  • Arnold Puyok
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    05 July 2025
    Print publication:
    02 December 2024
  • When Malaysia was formed in 1963, the Borneo states of Sarawak and Sabah were granted special provisions under the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63) to safeguard their autonomy. However, centralization measures pursued by the federal government over time have eroded these rights, particularly pertaining to education, development spending and revenue sharing. Despite being on the same island and sharing a history distinct from Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah have evolved very differently in asserting their autonomy. Sarawak has managed to attain a greater degree of self-government, while Sabah has been more influenced by priorities pursued by Peninsular Malaysia. These varying outcomes are due to three differences between the two states: distinct historical developments in the run-up to independence; varying degrees of political control attained by the parties in power; and different priorities pursued by state leaders.

    This 'Trends in Southeast Asia' explores the different political trajectories of Sarawak and Sabah through a structured comparison of the two states across these three aspects. Sarawak's combination of sub-nationalism, dominant state-level coalition, and astute political leadership has enabled the state to push the boundaries much further than its neighbour. The downfall of the erstwhile-dominant Barisan Nasional coalition has increased the room for manoeuvre of Borneo-based groupings, heralding a new power relationship between West and East Malaysia. Sarawak is well-poised to push for further privileges and prerogatives. Should it want to push for more autonomy and resources, Sabah will need to emulate key aspects of its neighbour's strategy.

Learn from Your Comrades
  • Understanding Authoritarian Diffusion between Vietnam and China
  • Khac Giang Nguyen
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    09 September 2024
  • Since the normalization of relations in 1991, Vietnam and China, two of the five remaining communist regimes, have established a robust framework for mutual learning and cooperation. This collaboration has primarily centred around party governance and cadre training. Vietnam has actively studied and adopted elements of China's successful model, which combines economic reform with strict political control. This approach has allowed Vietnam to maintain communist rule in the face of increasing global pressure for democratic reforms. The process of learning from China involves two key dynamics: desirability versus capability, and effectiveness versus appropriateness. While Vietnam desires to achieve the same level of effectiveness as China in certain policy areas, it has been cautious in fully replicating the Chinese model, and shown consideration for its appropriateness to Vietnam's unique circumstances and for China's underlying motivations. Vietnam has adopted a mixed approach to learning from China, incorporating direct emulation, selective adaptation and drawing inspiration from China's experiences. One notable example of this is the ongoing anti-corruption efforts of both regimes, which share some similarities but also have distinct differences. The learning relationship between Vietnam and China is not without its challenges. Historical animosities, maritime disputes and anti-China sentiment all play a role in shaping this partnership. As a result, Vietnam has had to employ innovative tactics to adapt Chinese lessons to fit its own circumstances.

From Paper to Practice
  • Utilizing the ASEAN Guide on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance and Ethics
  • Kristina Fong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    09 June 2024
  • The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies has been nothing less of awe-inspiring. Policymakers are put in a bind as debates over how the deployment of these AI systems is to be managed - with good governance and ethical considerations in mind, and without stifling innovation. ASEAN's response has been the formulation of the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics, or the ASEAN AI Guide. This Guide serves more as a 'practical guide' for organizations involved in the development and deployment of AI for commercial and non-military or dual-use applications, as opposed to a policy playbook for governments. Though voluntary in application, it does have some positive attributes including laying out the groundwork for regionwide discussions around AI governance and ethics issues, promoting human involvement in AI system management and having an ecosystem approach to policy.

    For the ASEAN AI Guide to translate into actionable outcomes, some public policy areas warrant additional consideration. Firstly, some focus will need to be redirected to ex-post regulations, such as legal recourse for AI-generated Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. Furthermore, how new technologies and human capital can be leveraged to better manage potential ill-effects of AI system deployment should be given more focus, along with keeping tabs on psychological changes among different segments of society with greater AI system usage. Lastly, the ASEAN AI Guide should be used as a basis for greater regional engagement in this integral area.

Myanmar's Resistance and the Future of Border Trade
  • Challenges and Opportunities
  • Jared Bissinger
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    25 April 2024
  • Since the start of Operation 1027, Myanmar's resistance groups have gained control over large parts of key overland trade routes and a number of important border crossings, fundamentally changing the realities in the control of border trade. Despite these losses, the State Administration Council (SAC) retains control-of-trade-related institutions that are vital for accessing an international trading system characterized by state-to-state interactions - giving them significant influence over trade even if they do not control trade routes and border crossings.

    International precedents from territories such as Palestine, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia show that non-state actors face significant challenges engaging in trade, and are vulnerable to frequent changes in trading arrangements. Perhaps the most important factor shaping trade in these territories is the state of their relationship with either the state of which they are nominally a part, or a neighbouring state. Thailand allows small-scale trade and limited movement of people through 'checkpoints for border trade', which exist outside the formal system and are unilaterally established by Thailand. These checkpoints represent an alternative opportunity to reshape border trade.

    If Myanmar's resistance hopes to transform trade from a revenue source to a meaningful strength, their prospects are best if they collaborate and develop a status-neutral plan (e.g., not requiring diplomatic recognition nor denying recognition to the SAC) for trading arrangements with neighbours, and enhance dialogue with them about this plan.

Shifting to a Higher Gear
  • The Saga of Malaysia's National Carmaker Proton
  • Pritish Bhattacharya, Francis E. Hutchinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    07 April 2024
  • Proton has been a vital part of Malaysia's industrialization journey and a key pillar of its modernization drive. Launched in 1983 to fulfil then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's vision of a pride-infused national car company, the state-owned Proton grew quickly and captured a dominant share of the country's domestic car market, aided in no small measure by generous protective measures and subsidies. However, in the subsequent decades, the car giant lost market share and power due to a variety of challenges, such as non-market performance requirements, less effective protection, and growing competition from a second national car firm and from global car companies. The automaker has had a variety of ownership structures over time, but was resolutely kept in domestic hands - public and private. This did increase control over the corporation, but did so at the expense of exposure to and adoption of leading-edge technology. This impasse was resolved in 2017, when Proton sold a 49.9 per cent share to the Chinese auto firm Geely. The joint venture has rejuvenated the carmaker, which has begun to reconquer market share through a number of popular SUVs. Despite this, the Malaysian auto market is becoming increasingly competitive. Going forward, Proton will need to begin to export significantly to expose its vehicles to new niche markets as well as global standards, obtain and retain skilled workers, and continue to rationalize costs in its supply chains and distributorships.

Mitigating Carbon Emissions and Haze in Southeast Asia's Peatlands
  • Opportunities and Challenges in Integrating Policy and Governance
  • Helena Varkkey, Matthew Ashfold, Gusti Z. Anshari, Alex M. Lechner, Sharon Seah, Nurisa Wijayanti, Fatimah Tuzzahara Alkaf, Siti Asdiah Masran
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 September 2024
  • Peatland ecosystems in Southeast Asia are globally important as carbon sinks, rich in terrestrial and aquatic fauna and flora, and important sources of livelihood for local communities. However, agribusiness-driven land-use change and drainage cause peatland degradation and peat fires, which generate 'haze' air pollution and lead to significant economic losses and health impacts. Disturbed peatlands also become substantial sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. While the problems of haze and climate change are connected through peatlands, these issues have been treated largely separately in policy and governance. We provide an overview of Southeast Asian peatlands, assessing opportunities and challenges for greater integration of policy and governance in addressing haze, climate change and other sustainability dimensions. We focus on Indonesia and Malaysia, the Southeast Asian countries with the largest peatland areas.

    We summarize key developments, along with evidence indicating that peatlands represent a large proportion of national GHG emissions in both Indonesia and Malaysia. We trace the evolution of peatland policies at the national and regional levels, from focusing on conservation to addressing fire and haze issues, reflecting their complex relationship with national development and the corporate sector. We found that for these two key countries, the most recent government-reported peatland emissions appear somewhat lower than is suggested by academic studies for Indonesia and substantially lower in the case of Malaysia. We emphasize the complex challenge of integrating policies across multiple scales and issues, with international, regional and national actors, and in multiple industries, all active in peatland governance.

Beyond Slacktivism
  • The Dynamic Relationship between Online and Offline Activism among Southeast Asian Youths
  • Iim Halimatusa'diyah
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    08 April 2024
  • As digital platforms continue to evolve, youths increasingly employ social media, online forums, and digital campaigns to advocate for social and political change. While this phenomenon is often considered disparagingly as slacktivism, recent studies find that individuals engaging in digital activism often also participate in other conventional forms of activism.

    Despite a surge in youth activism across Southeast Asian countries, comparative analysis in this region remains scarce. Using data from the World Values Survey of several studies, and case studies on Indonesia, this article examines the extent to which online political activism serves as a catalyst for mobilization, awareness and community building among young people in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. Additionally, it examines the interplay between online and offline political activism and its impact on traditional forms of activism.

    The study argues for a reciprocal relationship between online and offline political activism, particularly noting the potential for digital efforts to influence real-world action, especially on cohesive issues such as corruption.

Why Young Malay Voters in Malaysia Are 'Turning Green'
  • Syaza Shukri
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    02 May 2024
  • There is an increasing trend among young Malay voters in Malaysia to support the Perikatan Nasional coalition, with a particular emphasis on the Islamist party PAS. Despite recognition of the weak economy as a significant national concern, young Malay voters continue to place a higher emphasis on Muslim leaders who assert their commitment to safeguarding the rights of Islam in Malaysia. Consistent with theories on political socialization, the influence of family members significantly affects young Malay voters in Malaysia, particularly due to their limited political awareness of alternative channels like formal schooling.

    Young Malay voters acknowledge the significant impact of social media and TikTok, particularly in how these shape the voting patterns of their peers. They nevertheless maintain a perception of their own impartiality in this regard. Interestingly, the influence of Islamic institutions, with their own educational philosophy, on the political behaviour of Malay youth is minimal, as their political ideas are already shaped by their early experiences.

Scrutinizing the DAP's Success in the 2023 Malaysian State Elections
  • Kian Ming Ong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    04 April 2024
  • Following the formation of the Unity Government in December 2022, two of its component coalitions, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN), jointly campaigned during the state government elections held in August 2023. A key question arising from this cooperation between PH and the BN lead party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was the extent to which it would strengthen the appeal of both coalitions, especially among Malay voters. This ‘Trends in Southeast Asia’ finds that, contrary to expectations, DAP actually gained voter support from campaigning with UMNO. DAP would probably still have won at least forty-one of these state seats without transferring BN/UMNO votes, but working with UMNO allowed the DAP to win by comfortable margins some of what would usually be marginal seats for the party. DAP gained the largest transfer of Malay votes from older voters who show stronger allegiance to BN. These findings show that UMNO's grassroots outreach is still somewhat effective among older voters but much less so among younger voters. Clearly, more of the Malay votes that previously supported the BN went to the Perikatan Nasional (PN) than to PH. The calculations in this article show that four out of five Malay voters who previously supported BN in these seats voted for PN in the 2023 state elections. Going forward, the DAP's stranglehold over these seats may well become weaker, due to demographic changes, and if turnout and support for PH and the DAP should decrease among non-Malay voters.

Malaysia's Responses to Issues Pertaining to Palestine
  • Mohd Faizal Musa
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    05 May 2024
  • Malaysia's support for Palestinian independence has always been based on religion. Historically, Malaysia has had warm relations with Palestinian leaders including the Palestine Liberation Organization - during Hussein Onn's and Mahathir Mohamad's administrations - and Hamas since Najib Razak's administration. However, Malaysia's support is not just based on their affinity to Palestinians as fellow Muslims but is also a matter of domestic politics. Support for Palestine has been used as a political tool for various quarters to prove that they are more Islamic than the other.

    Malaysia is now led by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, a former student leader who rose to prominence in the 1970s for his activism on issues regarding the Muslim ummah, including Palestinian independence. Over the years, Anwar has demonstrated consistency in his support for Palestinians, and this has especially been the case since the outbreak of Israeli aggression against Gaza which began on 7 October 2023. As a result, Malaysia has gained global prominence for its aggressive stand against Israel. Thus, this paper discusses the Malaysian government's responses to issues pertaining to Palestine over the years. In doing so, it illustrates that while Islam has been a crucial rallying point in supporting the rights and independence of the Palestinians, it is also arguable that Malaysia's foreign policy outlook is also influenced by domestic politics and the need for the government of the day to maintain its support from the Muslim voter base.

The Evolution of Economic Reforms across Myanmar's Administrations
  • Winston Set Aung
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    06 August 2024
  • Myanmar's economic trajectory has shifted across various governmental regimes, transitioning from socialist to democratic systems and from planned to market economy structures. The economic policies implemented by successive governments often lacked coherence and were characterized by ad hoc measures aimed at short-term solutions rather than addressing underlying issues.

    Policymakers since 1989 have endeavoured to guide Myanmar towards a market-oriented economy, characterized by what could be termed the 'Burmese/Myanmar Way to Market Economy', which includes significant restrictions and controls. Both the military-backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) and civilian-led National League for Democracy (NLD) administrations made significant efforts to enhance liberalization and strengthen market economic principles, despite multidimensional challenges including inadequate capacities for policy formulation and over-reliance on past domestic experiences rather than international lessons. All these reforms and economic pillars, established through intellect and hard work to ensure liberalization and a market economy, collapsed under the State Administration Council regime following the military coup of 1 February 2021.

    Effective policy formulation and implementation are pivotal for Myanmar's economic trajectory, and policymakers must navigate historical practices and global standards with discernment, fostering policies that promote transparency, accountability, and inclusivity while adapting to feedback and interconnected economic realities.

Generational Divides in Understanding Thailand's History Grow Amid Political Polarization
  • Panarat Anamwathana
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 July 2025
    Print publication:
    18 July 2024
  • Amid political polarization, knowledge and understanding of Thailand's history have also diverged radically. This divide is especially evident between younger and older generations. Driving this phenomenon is the growing rejection by students of the traditional history taught in public schools, which in the past had been a means for the Thai state to instill in the young a sense of nationalism, national pride and shared values. Poor pedagogy that emphasizes memorization, and that discourages discussions and critical thinking, has alienated many from the subject. Education professionals and student activists have also been critical of this development. Moreover, the democratization of information and the availability of alternative sources of historical knowledge have allowed young people to learn about history in ways that challenge the traditional narratives taught in classrooms. The alternative sources include social media, websites by historians and enthusiasts, as well as books printed by independent publishers. Young people have also begun to engage with history in new ways. They have organized themselves to commemorate aspects of history overlooked in school textbooks and have used history to legitimize their political activism. This diverging understanding and engagement with history has two main consequences. First, political polarization can deepen, with different sides utilizing their versions of history as legitimization for their political views. Second, it will be harder for the Thai state to instill communal values and a basic understanding of the nation among young people, which can have implications for the building of a shared Thai identity in the future.

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