Hypocrisy After Aristotle*

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> "A new word is like a fresh seed on the ground of the discussion."
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*

RÉSUMÉ : Cet article examine diverses façons d'exploiter l'éthique aristotélicienne pour rendre compte philosophiquement de l'hypocrisie. Aristote lui-même n'a pas dit grand chose d'explicite à ce sujet, mais nous nous employons à identifier et à scruter les passages qui sont les plus pertinents pour un traitement distinctif de l'hypocrisie, élucidant en cours de route un certain nombre de confusions à propos d'Aristote. Nous envisageons divers domaines d'émotion et d'action qui pourraient fournir un lieu propre au vice de l'hypocrisie, ceux en particulier de l'engagement personnel, du souci à l'égard des opinions d'autrui, et de la sincérité. Nous concluons de cet examen que la doctrine du juste milieu ne fournit pas une explication satisfaisante de l'hypocrisie. Nous proposons alors que si un système moral comme celui d'Aristote doit rendre compte de la moralité dans son entièreté, il lui faut trouver place pour des phénomènes qui excèdent les limites de la doctrine du juste milieu. L'hypocrisie, selon nous, appartient précisément à cette famille de phénomènes. Finalement, nous esquissons une approche de l'hypocrisie qui fait usage d'éléments aristotéliciens, mais sans pour autant s'y confiner.

1. Introduction

There have been several recent attempts to provide a philosophical account of hypocrisy,[1] and in some of these cases the authors have, understandably, looked to Aristotle for inspiration. For example, Jay Newman develops a sustained account of fanaticism and hypocrisy as Aristotelian opposites,[2] and Christine McKinnon suggests that hypocrisy might be

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understood as a sort of opposite of a notion often associated with Aristotelian-inspired virtue theories—namely, integrity.[3] On the other hand, Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton in a recent paper consider the hope that Aristotle might help with the concept of hypocrisy, yet quickly extinguish this hope.[4] Notwithstanding their view, the question remains: Can Aristotle's ethical theory shed light on the nature and phenomenon of hypocrisy?

We begin this paper with Crisp and Cowton's assertion that it is not possible to understand hypocrisy in terms of Aristotle's notion of virtues as means between two associated vices, a vice of excess and a vice of deficiency. We claim that they dismiss the possibility too quickly, and that a careful consideration of the available candidates can go a long way toward clarifying the nature of hypocrisy. Nevertheless, in the end we agree that the doctrine of the mean does not seem to provide an explanation of the vice of hypocrisy. The improved understanding of hypocrisy provided by the attempt, however, suggests other ways in which hypocrisy might fit within an Aristotelian morality. Drawing on specific passages in Aristotle, we consider the contrasting views that Aristotle would see hypocrisy as one of the things which is simply "itself bad," and that from the ancient Greek perspective hypocrisy would not be seen as a vice at all. We go on to suggest that if a moral system such as Aristotle's is to provide a full account of morality, it needs to find room for some important elements which cannot be understood within the doctrine of the mean, such as integrity and moral weakness. We argue that hypocrisy belongs to this family of elements. Finally, we offer an account of hypocrisy which makes use of, but is not confined to, Aristotelian resources.

Before embarking on the main argument, a disclaimer is in order. This is not a paper on Aristotle, as such. We do not invoke textual debates or contested readings from Aristotelian scholarship; rather, we focus on recent contributions to the literature on hypocrisy, and aim, for a start, at a critical revision of their impressionistic attempts to give an Aristotelian account of hypocrisy. While Aristotle himself says little explicitly on the subject, we engage him in the spirit of *philosophia perennis* to see what can be teased out of him, as the father of virtue theory, for understanding our notion of hypocrisy. Furthermore, we not only unravel some confusions about Aristotle which philosophers who took up the matter of hypocrisy engendered, but also retrieve and attend to unnoticed or neglected texts relevant to a distinctive treatment of hypocrisy. While we are not committed to an account of hypocrisy in Aristotelian terms, we nevertheless critically explore different possibilities of giving such an account. Our goal is to nourish reflection about hypocrisy, a phenomenon of perennial moral importance, thereby improving the philosophical analysis of hypocrisy, as well as offering something of interest to contemporary friends of Aristotle.

2. The Challenge

Consider first the argument provided by Crisp and Cowton, who state:

> unfortunately, hypocrisy, like justice, seems to be one of those character traits that causes a problem for Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Consider two central Aristotelian virtues, generosity (*eleutheriotēs*) and even-temper (*praotēs*). Each has its own respective sphere, viz., the giving and taking of money, and feeling anger. There does not, however, seem to be any neutrally describable act or passion that the hypocrite does or feels at the wrong time, towards the wrong people, or for the wrong reasons.[5]

The central claim of Crisp and Cowton's argument seems to be that there is no neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy can take its place as an excess or deficiency, along with an opposite vice and corresponding virtue. But how do Crisp and Cowton know that there is no such sphere? Their brief remarks contain no argument to this effect.

One way to support the conclusion that there is no such sphere would be to say that no such sphere is possible in connection with hypocrisy. In order to assess this possibility, it is necessary to consider what Aristotle might have meant by such a "sphere" of a virtue.[6] Aristotle speaks of virtues as "concerned with passions and actions."[7] The idea is that, for each virtue, there is some emotion or action in whose sphere the virtue belongs. An action, in turn, can be seen as manifesting some emotion in a way that reveals character.[8] If a person is disposed to exhibit such an emotion to the right amount, then there is virtue. If the emotion is exhibited too much or too little, there is vice. Briefly, then, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is that virtue or excellence of character (*ethike arete*) is a disposition, concerned with feelings (*pathé*), which is in a mean.

Given this background, it is difficult to see how one could argue that there could not be, in principle, a sphere of action or emotion within which hypocrisy might have its home. One would have to argue that there is no characteristic disposition or emotion associated with hypocrisy. It is certainly not obvious that there can be no such disposition or emotion, and it is not clear how one could go about proving their non-existence. Thus, there does not seem to be any straightforward conceptual argument to rule out the possibility that hypocrisy can be understood in terms of the doctrine of the mean.

In the absence of a conceptual argument showing that there could not possibly be a sphere in which hypocrisy could find its home, the best way to support such a conclusion would seem to be by exploring several possible such spheres and seeing whether they do, in fact, fit the bill. Crisp and Cowton, however, do not undertake this task. This cannot be explained by a lack of plausible candidates for such a sphere, for there are several. Among these are "commitment," "concern for the opinions of others,"

and "honesty." Perhaps, then, Crisp and Cowton's comments are best regarded as an invitation for a more patient exploration of the possibility of an Aristotelian approach.

3. Hypocrisy as a Deficiency of Commitment

Consider "commitment" first. Jay Newman utilizes this sphere to provide a little-noticed Aristotelian account of hypocrisy in his book *Fanatics and Hypocrites.* For Newman, fanaticism and hypocrisy are "perversions of the virtue of healthy, socially constructive commitment."[9]

Bearing Crisp and Cowton's concern in mind, we might first wonder whether the action one performs in committing oneself to a cause or a way of life can be described in the required neutral manner. It seems it can. When we say that a person is a committed vegetarian, this does not appear to be a "thick" description, in the sense that we are not expressing any moral judgement about whether it is good, bad, or indifferent to be a vegetarian. We need not be evaluating the person either positively or negatively. Hence, commitment seems to be a neutrally describable type of action. Accordingly, commitment meets at least the basic requirements to become a candidate for being the sphere in which a virtue and vices can occur. Presumably, the virtue would then be called something like "proper commitment," and (if Newman is right) fanaticism and hypocrisy would be the vices of excessive and deficient commitment.

One may want to stop the investigation right here, on the basis that "proper commitment" is not a real virtue; if it were, we would have a word for it, as we do for such concepts as justice, generosity, and courage. It is well to note, however, that Aristotle himself does not believe that our everyday language provides us with an exhaustive moral vocabulary and a complete language for virtue and vice. For example, when Aristotle discusses some virtues and vices that appear in social intercourse, he quite explicitly says, "now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow."[10]

Perhaps we should be willing to follow Aristotle's lead and simply allow moral language and conceptual complexity to grow and develop as needed. In any case, the discussion here is anchored to everyday moral language because the ultimate aim is to give an account of the everyday moral term "hypocrisy." It seems "proper commitment" is the sort of thing which *could* be considered as a candidate for an Aristotelian-type virtue.

Newman claims that fanaticism and hypocrisy have parallel structures. While fanaticism involves overbelieving, overemoting, and overvaluing, hypocrisy involves underbelieving, underemoting, and undervaluing. To call someone a fanatic is to make an ethical, not an epistemological, judgement. For it is not necessarily the case that the fanatic believes something false or wild or extravagant. Rather, it is his or her excessive certi-

tude or emotionality that leads to callous and contemptuous behaviour toward other human beings and their interests.[11]

On Newman's portrait, the structure of hypocrisy is asymmetric to fanaticism. The hypocrite's commitment is "weak" and "deficient."[12] He or she is marked by emotional impoverishment, lack of energy and vitality, by conspicuous emotional restraint. The essential feature of deficient commitment is evident by the hypocrite's undervaluing: he or she does not act in accordance with his or her true values. Moreover, this may be not an occasional lapse but a settled disposition to flout professed values.

The link between fanaticism and hypocrisy may be supported by the fact that each is often used in connection with religious faith, wherein fanaticism could naturally be viewed as an excess of faith, and hypocrisy as a deficiency. But this account can be easily extended to the moral life by secularizing faith as trust in our shared moral principles, practices, and fellow human beings.

The account Newman offers is instructive, but careful analysis reveals that "commitment" cannot, after all, provide the sphere in which the vice of hypocrisy has its home. For one thing, the description of hypocrisy as a failure to act in accordance with one's own true values does not seem correct. A person might believe (as Plato's Thrasymachus appears to) that "morality" itself is something which is to be twisted and used for one's own interests. Such a person may pretend to accept popular moral principles, while secretly preferring other, more egoistic ones. Although such a person would indeed not be committed to socially shared values, his or her actions would in fact be actions consistent with the person's true values. Yet such a person could quite naturally be described as a hypocrite; indeed, such a description might apply to some of the best-known literary hypocrites, such as Molière's Tartuffe and Dickens's Uriah Heep. It is hard to see how hardened hypocrites such as Tartuffe and Heep display any lack of commitment to the principles they in fact endorse, as opposed to those they profess to accept. This is not to say that lack of commitment to some socially shared values may not be a necessary condition—even though it is clearly not a sufficient one—of hypocrisy. Perhaps some account of hypocrisy might be offered which formulated more carefully the conflict between word, belief, and deed, but the proffered account of hypocrisy as a failure to act in accordance with one's true values is clearly inadequate as it stands.

There is an even deeper problem with Newman's analysis: fanaticism and hypocrisy are not simply flaws in the manner of commitment, but also, and equally importantly, in the content and extent of commitment. Consider a person who is an avid believer in a religion which requires both sexual restraint and "good neighbourliness." Suppose this person persecutes his or her neighbours because of their promiscuity, thereby attempting to appear morally superior, or more pious. This person might well be

described as a fanatic because of the zeal with which he or she criticizes the neighbours' sexual morality, yet at the same time we might say these actions betray a kind of hypocrisy, in that the person falls short of the requirements of neighbourly love which his or her professed religion calls for. So this person is a fanatic and a hypocrite at the same time! If it is possible to be a hypocrite and a fanatic at the same time and in virtue of the same action, then surely they cannot be Aristotelian opposites. One cannot be both deficient and excessive with regard to the same thing at the same time. Indeed, hypocrisy can be found not only in the person who has no commitment to principle, but also in the self-righteous moral fanatic, and even in the allegedly Aristotelian "person of moderation" who is willing to ignore social evils for the sake of maintaining a privileged lifestyle.

The flaw of fanaticism, it seems, is not really a matter of excessive commitment after all. Rather, it should perhaps be understood as a lack of sensitivity to other values. Perhaps commitment to something such as promoting proper sexual ethics becomes a vice only when it blinds one to other commitments which have as great a call on one in the circumstances. If the religious person were able to campaign for improved sexual ethics without violating his or her obligation to respect others, there might well be no fanaticism, even though such a person might feel the wrongness of sexual misconduct just as keenly as the fanatic described above; that is, this person may have just as much commitment to the belief. Such a person may be mistaken about what is or is not morally required, but such a mistake is not a basis for allegations of fanaticism.

It seems the attempt to describe hypocrisy as the Aristotelian opposite of fanaticism is doomed, but the possibility of such an account has shown that the notion cannot be dismissed quickly. Perhaps other candidates can be found for the neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy appears.

4. Hypocrisy as an Excess of Concern for the Opinion of Others

One characteristic of the hypocrite seems to be that he or she is concerned about the opinions of others, and, indeed, presents a public face designed to give a more favourable impression than is really deserved. Although, again, there is no convenient, ready-made name for it in our moral vocabulary, perhaps this "concern for the opinions of others" could be another candidate for the sphere in which the vice of hypocrisy has its home. It does seem to be a neutrally describable type of passion, so if it is possible for there to be an excess, a deficiency, and a right amount of concern for the opinions of others, that could be where hypocrisy fits in.

Hypocrisy, seen in this light, would have to be an excess of concern for the opinions of others. Its opposite, then, would be showing too little concern for the opinions of others. That does seem like a candidate for an Aristotelian vice. A person who does not care what others think cannot

be a good member of the community. Perhaps "disdain" will do as a name for this vice. And although "proper concern" is not a catchy name, it seems plausible that there would be some amount of concern between the two extremes which could be considered "just right," and therefore virtuous.

Although there does seem to be a candidate for an Aristotelian sphere of virtue and vices here, the problem with this account is that the vice of excess it describes does not, after all, correspond with our understanding of the concept, "hypocrisy." It is true that hypocrites tend to exhibit this feature, but that fact does not establish that everyone who exhibits this feature is a hypocrite. For example, some people might be willing to bend over backwards to please others. Such people may be extremely sensitive to the needs and desires of others, and extremely self-denying in catering to them. These people could be motivated by a desire to get the high opinion of others, but it does not seem appropriate to label them "hypocrites" because they are willing to earn this reputation by good actions. If we were intent on coming up with a vice to describe their behaviour, we might call them "obsequious," but that is not quite the same as "hypocritical."

Another problem with the proposed account is that the hypocrite may not be at all concerned with the opinion of *others*. A person who cannot face up to some personal failings might deceive himself or herself into believing those failings are not present. Such a person may be unable to bear a low opinion of his or her own self. This insincerity and pretense about the self could be considered a form of hypocrisy.[13] Note, however, that in this case the corresponding virtue could not really be thought of as being part of a good community in which each is concerned with the opinions of others without being enslaved by their opinions. Here the corresponding virtue would seem to be something like "self-knowledge," but that suggests the vice of hypocrisy cannot be linked with concern for the opinions of others.

5. Hypocrisy as a Deficiency of Honesty

Consider, as another candidate, the notion of "honesty" or "truthfulness." In fact, Aristotle mentions truthfulness (*aletheia*) as one of the "nameless virtues."[14] It seems that people can show a deficiency or an excess of honesty. The deficiency could be shown by lies and deception, and the notion that a person who is dishonest demonstrates a vice is not very controversial. It also seems natural to think that hypocrites are dishonest, pretending to be something they are not, so this deficiency might seem to be linked to the vice we are looking for. The claim that one can be excessively honest may require more explanation, but careful examination reveals some plausibility to it. Sometimes informing a person of one's honest but negative opinion of him or her would cause pain and achieve no good end. Indeed, there could be times when "constructive criticism" of one's friends or loved ones is not appropriate—for example, if the per-

son being criticized is already lacking in self-confidence. Furthermore, it is at least not obvious that telling people truths about other people is always morally right; if you learn, say, that a friend's life partner is keeping a secret from your friend, it would not always be appropriate to divulge the secret. So it seems there can be both an excess and a deficiency of honesty. Perhaps the virtuous "right amount" could be called "tact."[15]

The main problem with this account is that hypocrisy cannot be understood, after all, simply as a deficiency of honesty. If hypocrisy necessarily involves deceit, it must be a particular kind of deceit. Eva Feder Kittay has identified hypocrisy as a form of "'self-referential deception,' a deception in which one pretends to be other than one is, or pretends to hold beliefs, have feelings, motives or attitudes other than those one truly has or adheres to."[16]

Suppose it is right that hypocrisy must involve self-deception. The opposite vice, then, cannot be being painfully honest as in the examples above. The opposite of being deceiving about oneself would have to be "revealing too much about oneself." We might metaphorically call revealing too much about oneself being "too transparent," and being deceptive or hypocritical "too opaque." But does it make sense to say that being too transparent is a vice?

We might well think that a person who reveals too much is foolish. Such a person makes himself or herself vulnerable to others, which may suggest a certain naïve trust that others will not use this information for hurtful ends. Such a person also runs the risk of becoming a bore: others may not be interested in hearing that much about him or her. These vices do not seem to be parallel with hypocrisy, however. If there is anything morally significant lurking here, it is not the Aristotelian account of hypocrisy we have been looking for.

In any case, there is another problem with this account. A person who is hypocritical may not be self-consciously dishonest at all. Crisp and Cowton offer the following example: "consider a teacher who tells his pupils not to put their hands in their pockets because it looks slovenly and ruins one's clothes and yet always has his own hands in his pockets."[17] Dan Turner offers a somewhat similar case when he asks us to consider a person who believes it is morally wrong for people to eat meat, and says so, but who occasionally eats meat.[18] In both these cases, charges of hypocrisy might be leveled, but it is not clear that there is any deception. Even if there is a sense in which such people are deceiving—for example, the teacher may be said to deceive about the rule's applicability to himself—it seems clear that it need not be conscious or deliberate. It may be that the mere inconsistency between word and deed is enough to warrant *prima facie* the label "hypocrisy," even in the absence of deceit.[19]

Perhaps, in light of these sorts of cases, we should understand hypocrisy as a conflict between how one really is, and how others are led to perceive

one. Yet this account is too broad as it stands. It would apply to con-artists and spies, for example, but such people seem to be distinguishable from hypocrites. It would also cover people who make promises they find they cannot live up to, such as "I will finish my book manuscript by the end of the month." Perhaps it can be refined to something like "advocating as a norm, through word or deed, a kind of behaviour one does not in fact embody in one's own behaviour or beliefs." This type of account would need to be developed further, but, in any case, this account of hypocrisy is no longer the one which tried to link that vice to the virtue of honesty. It is also not easy to see what other neutrally describable sphere would be needed to make sense of the vice as now being described. The opposite could not very well be leading others to perceive one too accurately—too much as one really is—for that does not make sense as a vice. Although the nature of the vice seems to be getting clearer, the possibility of giving it the desired sort of Aristotelian treatment seems to be getting more and more remote.

6. Hypocrisy as Something "Itself Bad"

The upshot of our discussion so far is that, despite our best efforts, we have been unable to give an adequate account of hypocrisy in terms of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. In one interesting passage, however, Aristotle seems to suggest that there are types of passions or actions which matter morally, but to which the notion of the mean does not apply. If there can be things which are "themselves bad," and to which excess and deficiency do not apply, then perhaps hypocrisy is one of those things. If so, perhaps we are here given an explanation of the wrongness of hypocrisy which accounts for the inability to locate it in terms of a mean. The passage from Aristotle in question is as follows:

> But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong.[20]

If this passage is applied to hypocrisy, it might be thought that hypocrisy simply refers to something which is bad in itself, without requiring reference to the mean. In this case, ascriptions of hypocrisy necessarily imply a negative moral evaluation, and the statement "hypocrisy is bad" is a moral truism like "murder is bad." Perhaps each carries the notion of being unjustified as part of its very meaning. There are important questions to be addressed before accepting this as an adequate Aristotelian

account of hypocrisy, however. First of all, it is not clear that Aristotle really meant to suggest that there are areas to which the doctrine of the mean does not apply. If he did not, then we have still not found a place in which hypocrisy can appear. Even if it turns out that there are such areas, it is not clear that hypocrisy belongs there. For one thing, we are given no guidance as to how to identify things that might belong in such an area, and the examples are not conclusive in this regard. For another, if it turns out that hypocritical actions are sometimes morally right, then it is hard to see how one could claim that hypocrisy is something which is "itself bad."

The first question concerns whether Aristotle is really suggesting, in the passage at hand, that there are areas to which the notion of the mean does not apply. The words seem to suggest it, but perhaps they should not be interpreted so straightforwardly. In this connection, consider the commentary offered by W. F. R. Hardie:

> The opening words of this passage might suggest that Aristotle was asserting or admitting that there are exceptions to the doctrine of the mean, ranges of actions or passions to which it does not apply. But he is making a purely logical point which arises from the fact that certain words are used to name not ranges of action or passion but determinations within a range with the implication, as part of the meaning of the word, that they are excessive or defective, and therefore wrong. Thus envy is never right and proper because "envy" conveys that it is wrong and improper. Again it does not make sense to ask when murder is right because to call a killing "murder" is to say that it is wrong. . . In our vocabulary for referring to actions and passions there are words which name misformations; and, in such cases, there is no sense in asking what is the right formation of the object named. This, and no more than this, is what Aristotle means when he says that "not every action nor every passion admits of a mean."[21]

So perhaps the mean does apply to these concepts after all, and Aristotle is claiming merely that certain words are used to describe the excesses or deficiencies. This seems to fit with the rest of the quoted passage, in which Aristotle goes on to say, "It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and self-indulgent action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency."[22] Aristotle may be saying, simply, that it is enough to divide spheres of passion or action into three parts—a vice of excess, a virtuous mean, and a vice of deficiency—and that there is no need to subdivide the vices into three further parts. Everything within the realm of the vice is a vice, and there is no need to reapply the notions of excess, mean, and deficiency within that realm. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the examples Aristotle uses here include "envy" and "shamelessness," which

are themselves listed elsewhere as vices corresponding to a typical "mean" virtue.[23]

So perhaps Aristotle does not think, after all, that there are some areas exempt from the doctrine of the mean. But in that case, in light of the failure of our best efforts to find a neutrally describable sphere in which hypocrisy (together with its corresponding virtue and opposite vice) can find its home, the problem concerning hypocrisy remains.

What if Aristotle does mean to suggest a separate area to which the mean does not apply, however? This interpretation might be bolstered by focusing on the actions Aristotle cites as examples in the passage under discussion. All three kinds of actions (murder, theft, and adultery) are morally bad instances of a neutrally describable type of action (killing, acquiring, and having sex). Interestingly, none of these bad actions seems to be distinguished from its morally acceptable parallel through reference to an excess or a deficiency.[24] Murder is not killing too much or too little; it is killing in the absence of conditions such as war, punishment, or self-defence which might render the killing justifiable. Theft is not acquiring too much; it is acquiring that which does not belong to one. And adultery is not having too much sex; it is having sex with the wrong person. So perhaps there is a separate area here after all which cannot be captured neatly by the doctrine of the mean.

Even if this is true, however, it is not clear that hypocrisy can be captured within this area. For one thing, the boundaries are poorly defined, and we are given no guidance as to how to identify actions or passions that fall within them. Assuming that we could find a neutrally describable type of action of which hypocrisy could be an unjustifiable instance, what should we look to in order to distinguish hypocrisy from the acceptable instances? The examples provided are little help here, because the stories we need to construct to explain why a particular action is unjustifiable are not generalizable to other actions. For example, explaining the wrongness of adultery might well involve a story about the value of committed monogamous relationships, which would not go far toward explaining the wrongness of theft or murder. Stating simply that hypocrisy is "itself bad" like these other actions does not really provide much of an account of hypocrisy. We still would not know what type of action it is, what type of emotion causes it, nor what characteristics distinguish it from its morally acceptable cousins. This category of things "themselves bad" is too vaguely defined to help much with the desired account of hypocrisy.[25]

There is one further significant worry about the notion that hypocrisy might belong in this separate category of things "themselves bad." If there can be morally acceptable instances of hypocrisy, then it is hard to see how it could be described as "itself bad."[26] While we agree that hypocrisy is part of the language of moral criticism, and a *prima facie* wrong, we believe there can, indeed, be morally acceptable cases of hypocrisy.[27]

To take what is perhaps the starkest sort of case, consider people whom Eva Feder Kittay has called "victim hypocrites."[28] Broadly speaking, these are people who deceive others about their true beliefs so as to protect themselves. Kittay offers as an example a man whom she calls Franck, a German-born Jew in Nazi Germany, who must pass as Aryan to survive:

> Franck, in order to be accepted as an Aryan German, may occasionally have to adopt mildly anti-Semitic attitudes and profess beliefs he does not hold. In that case, Franck would be a hypocrite, for he would be apparently assuming the prevalent set of beliefs thought to be good—the prevalent ideological good—and masking his true beliefs.[29]

In this sort of case, the behaviour of the "victim" does seem to have the same sort of structure as cases where we would normally attribute hypocrisy. As a result, it seems reasonable to call Franck's behaviour hypocritical as well. Yet it would seem harsh indeed to attach any moral blame to Franck in these circumstances. Accordingly, this seems to be a case in which hypocrisy is not morally wrong.

It might be suggested that the hypocrisy is still "itself wrong" here, but is less wrong than the alternatives. Similarly, it might be argued that murder, theft, or adultery could be justified if the alternatives were sufficiently dire. (Stealing to feed one's starving children may be the clearest example, but one could imagine cases in which one is told that if one does not murder, say, or commit adultery, then thousands of people will be tortured and killed.) The instances of acceptable hypocrisy need not involve such extreme consequences, however. Indeed, some people have labeled as hypocritical some of the polite insincerities which many people take to be valuable for oiling the wheels of social intercourse.[30] In any case, there is enough doubt about whether hypocrisy is necessarily morally wrong that it does not fit easily into the category of things which are themselves bad. This is especially true in light of the uncertainty about how to decide which things belong in this category in the first place.

It appears, then, that the passage in which Aristotle raises the possibility that some things are simply "themselves bad" does not cast much light on the concept of hypocrisy. It is not clear that Aristotle really meant to suggest the existence of a category of such things which are exempt from the doctrine of the mean. Even if there is such an Aristotelian category, however, no account of hypocrisy is forthcoming which could link it directly to Aristotle's stated examples, or even to an explanation of *why* it should be thought of as something itself bad. Finally, there seem to be cases in which hypocrisy is not bad, which does not fit well with the description of it as "bad in itself." This perspective, too, fails to provide an Aristotelian account of hypocrisy.

7. Is Hypocrisy a Modern rather than an Ancient Vice?

Throughout the discussion so far, it has been assumed that hypocrisy is at least *prima facie* a bad thing. It is possible, however, that Aristotle would not have seen hypocrisy as morally problematic at all. It is important to remember the differences between the social and political contexts of Aristotle's moral concepts on the one hand and our contemporary moral outlook on the other. Perhaps these differences in context would result in the view that hypocrisy as we understand it would not have been seen as a vice at all by Aristotle.

One reason for thinking Aristotle would not have seen hypocrisy as a vice has to do with the etymology of the word. Hypocrisy has its roots in the Greek words *hupokrasis* and *hupokrinesthai*, the former meaning "a reply" or "acting a part," and the latter meaning "to speak in a dialogue" or "to act on a stage." The Greek words, unlike ours, were not part of the language of moral criticism until the evangelists used them to report what Jesus called the Pharisees. Acknowledging these creative efforts to forge a new term for moral criticism should not make us forget the theatrical basis for the word's extension, namely, that the hypocrite is often like an actor pretending to be what he or she is not, acting out a part to which he or she has only momentary, if any, allegiance.

Of course, the fact that the word was used differently in ancient Greece does not prove that the concept it now represents had not entered into use at that time. Indeed, the ancient Hebrew prophets often offered moral criticism of behaviour we would term hypocritical, and even Plato can be understood at times to be condemning what we would consider hypocrisy. Whether the same term was used or not, there is reason to think that the concept of hypocrisy was in use long before the time of Aristotle.

It is still possible, however, that the term as it is currently used has been influenced by Judæo-Christian morality. For example, the recognition of hypocrisy seems to play upon the difference between what the person really is (what God sees) and what he or she presents himself or herself as being (what we see). Perhaps, despite Plato, there needs to be a thousand years of the practices of confession and examination of conscience to reach the stage where truthfulness about the self is so great a concern that hypocrisy becomes a vice. Aristotle may not have admired self-knowledge or truthfulness about oneself the way modern and mediæval thinkers tend to. But there is reason to think that he did. First, when he discusses social virtues, which "are all concerned with intercourse in words and actions,"[31] he distinguishes between those concerned with truth and those concerned with social pleasantness:

> With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boast-

> fulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest.[32]

This evidence that Aristotle does see truth about oneself as a virtue is bolstered by some of his remarks about friendship. He states that friends who love each other help each other "to keep from error" and grow in self-knowledge.[33] He goes on to state, however, that there might well be ground for complaint about a certain sort of "friend" "if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character."[34] It is not that he thinks there is anything wrong with friendships of utility and pleasantness, but he does think that something is wrong about pretending to a friendship for its own sake when in fact the friendship is one of utility. Concerning the assignment of blame, he writes:

> So when a man has made a mistake and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; but when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against his deceiver.[35]

Although Aristotle does not, of course, use the word hypocrisy, his condemnation of a person who seeks to gain an advantage through pretending affection can quite naturally be seen as the condemnation of hypocrisy in friendship.

It is interesting in this context to consider also what Aristotle has to say about flattery. He does not seem at all upset by flatterers; they appeal to our self-love and so produce pleasure.[36] This might indicate again that Aristotle does not seem to share Plato's concern for self-knowledge, and that truthfulness about the self does not loom large for him, as it does for Plato. If some sorts of flattery are akin to hypocrisy, this might provide another reason to think that hypocrisy does not loom large for Aristotle.

The case is more complicated than this, however. Consider the following:

> With regard to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.[37]

Aristotle here refers to a case of flattery motivated by ulterior purposes such as gaining an advantage and classifies this as a vice of excess. He also marks this off from similar conduct which has no such ulterior motivation. The former sounds much like a species of flattery, with the dimension of hypocrisy as a specific difference. Take as an example paying false compliments to the boss to facilitate one's promotion. It seems that the

sorts of flattery which contain a tinge of hypocrisy are exactly the sorts which Aristotle wants to condemn morally.

One last bit of textual evidence that Aristotle did not see hypocrisy as a vice in the way contemporary thinkers do is to be found in the *Rhetoric*, in which he comments on the necessity of the forensic arguer's presenting the appearance of being the right kind of person, because people are persuaded by appearances.[38] The tone of these comments might be read as a tactical recommendation of hypocrisy. In such circumstances, it is not sufficient for a person to present good arguments; he or she must do so in an appropriate and authoritative way, so that his or her personal idiosyncracies do not stand in the way of achieving the rhetorical goals. For example, the speaker should not be light-hearted or frivolous when the subject matter is serious. There must be a fit between style and demeanour on the one hand, and occasion on the other.

Is Aristotle really recommending hypocrisy as a tactical device for forensic argument? It would seem that his real intention is not that the forensic arguer present the appearance of knowing what he is talking about even when he does not, but rather that he must not only know but also be seen as a person who knows. There need be no deception or pretense involved. The analogy is seen in the dictum, "Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done."

The upshot of this is that Aristotle did see hypocrisy as a vice and that arguments which insert too great a distance between him and us show, at most, that hypocrisy did not have such a great importance for him as it does for Judæo-Christian morality. The latter aims to discount appearance and accent the state of one's soul (the inner, what God sees) in a way alien to Aristotle. Yet Aristotle, too, would have claimed that hypocrisy is generally morally bad, but we have still not uncovered a way in which an Aristotelian account can make sense of this moral badness.

8. Morality Beyond the Mean?

There is one other significant prospect to examine. It is possible that some concepts necessary to a complete theory along Aristotelian lines do not fit into the doctrine of the mean. Such concepts might include "integrity" and "moral weakness." Hypocrisy appears to have an affinity with these concepts. Thus, it seems plausible that hypocrisy, too, might find its conceptual home in Aristotelian morality somewhere outside the doctrine of the mean, if at all.

Integrity seems to be an important concept in our moral framework, and particularly in contemporary virtue ethics, which often looks to Aristotle for inspiration.[39] Integrity does not, however, seem to be the kind of thing that fits into the model of the "mean." It is hard to see how one could have too much integrity, or how we could find some neutrally describable sphere which allows of both deficiency and excess and has

integrity as the mean. Perhaps integrity should be seen as a sort of "meta-virtue," which involves the relationships between other virtues.

Similarly, although it is notoriously difficult to provide an adequate account of weakness of will either within or without an Aristotelian schema, it is possible to suggest that moral weakness operates in a fundamentally different way from such typical "mean" vices as cowardice or stinginess.[40] Failure to act in accordance with any particular virtue could be traceable to weakness of will, for it does not seem to be tied down to any particular sphere.

If there could be such elements of morality which cut across the "mean" virtues and associated vices, then it is possible that this is where hypocrisy will find its moral home. Indeed, this possibility is strengthened considerably by the observation that philosophical attempts at characterizing hypocrisy have often, either explicitly or implicitly, suggested connections with these other concepts. In what follows, we will compare these other concepts with hypocrisy, highlighting points of contact, yet maintaining that hypocrisy is a distinct concept which resists the attempts of some philosophers to characterize it purely in terms of these other concepts.

Consider again the cases of the hands-in-pockets teacher and the meat-eating supporter of vegetarianism. Although it is quite natural to describe such cases in terms of hypocrisy, filling in the details in the right ways might make them seem more like cases of weakness of will. For example, suppose the teacher puts his hands in his pockets out of habit, without thinking about it, or the supporter of vegetarianism is simply unable to resist the aroma of a well-cooked steak. We might describe such behaviours in terms of weakness of will. Weakness of will and hypocrisy do not appear to be identical here, but the fact that cases of one can be turned into cases of the other simply by changing a few crucial details suggests that there are important conceptual links between them.

A similar conceptual parity appears when we consider hypocrisy in contrast to integrity. To see the conceptual link here, note first that Aristotle believed, as did many others in the ancient Greek world, that moral virtue is necessary for one's well-being. Thus he states, "it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral excellence."[41] Someone might believe, however (wrongly, in Aristotle's view) that it is sometimes acceptable (and possible!) to indulge one's self-interest at the expense of virtue. Such a person might know which actions are virtuous (that is, in accord with the mean), but reject any direct inference from that fact to the view that these actions are obligatory. Perhaps the fact that hypocrites can pay lip service to one conception of morality while acting on another indicates that hypocrisy is this sort of moral failing. Clearly, on the model of the mean, this type of moral failure would not appear to be a vice, as such, but rather a different sort of failure. A person who has integrity, on the other hand, must

be a person who acts in accordance with what he or she believes to be right, even at a cost to himself or herself. More generally, a person of integrity must take moral reasons for action to be overriding. Indeed, the etymological conception of a person with "integrity" as one who is "whole" stands in clear contrast to the sort of division between words, actions, and beliefs one associates with hypocrisy.

Christine McKinnon has tried to provide an account of hypocrisy in comparison to integrity.[42] Following Bernard Williams, she describes the person of integrity as follows:

> One guiding second-order constraint with which she operates when confronted with decisions to make, is to ask herself whether certain proposed options would be consistent with her considered valuations. It is important to her that she act only from those motives which she deems to be truly her own, those that identify herself as the moral agent she is. She values this honesty of intention and homogeneity of purpose in herself and others, even when she does not share with others all their first-order desires.[43]

McKinnon goes on to say that integrity is "so unlike other virtues as not to be in the running with them in any ranking of the virtues according to importance or merit,"[44] and that hypocrisy is similarly unlike other vices. She also offers a direct comparison of a hypocrite, who is seen to allow the desire to *appear* virtuous to outweigh the desire actually to *be* virtuous, with the person of integrity, who is concerned with substance rather than appearance.[45]

McKinnon's insights suffice to establish a sort of parity between integrity and hypocrisy, which suggests they do indeed belong together in an area of morality beyond the doctrine of the mean. Although one can see the appeal of her suggestion that we should understand hypocrisy as a lack of integrity, however, careful consideration shows that this account is inadequate. Hypocrisy needs to be recognized as a moral notion related to, but distinct from, a lack of integrity. Although hypocrisy shares with integrity a resistance to characterization in terms of the doctrine of the mean, it should not be seen merely as lack of integrity.

To see why this is true, notice that integrity requires not just acting in accordance with one's moral beliefs, but also deliberating about them.[46] A person who unthinkingly accepts and acts upon values might be said to lack integrity, but would not be considered a hypocrite. So hypocrisy cannot simply be a lack of integrity. Perhaps more significantly than that, however, a thoroughgoing hypocrite such as Tartuffe or Uriah Heep may be internally consistent, and, in that sense, have a high degree of integrity. Our condemnation of such individuals does not seem to depend on attributing to them the view that their deeply held moral views can be ignored. On the contrary, we condemn them for pretending to endorse shared moral norms while following too effectively deeply held egoist moral views which we

believe to be seriously flawed. If some of the most thoroughgoing hypocrites can be seen to possess integrity, then, clearly, hypocrisy cannot be a lack of integrity.[47] As with weakness of will, lack of integrity has a close conceptual link with hypocrisy, but must be seen as distinct from it. This further supports our contention that hypocrisy is an independent concept which nevertheless belongs to the same family as these others.

In trying to characterize hypocrisy, Crisp and Cowton offer yet another concept of this type. They suggest that we understand hypocrisy as a failure to take morality seriously.[48] On their view, a hypocrite can be one who "fails to make himself and his view of morality open to others," or is "unready to assess himself, to make himself and his real view of morality open to himself," or who "fail[s] to live up to the moral prescriptions that he himself believe[s]," or is "satisfied too easily with [his] moral self and therefore unwilling to consider whether the demands of morality [are] greater than [he] took them to be."[49]

As an account of hypocrisy, this is an improvement on the integrity model, but it, too, seems inadequate to the task. First, there could be people who set such high, even saintly, standards for themselves that they inevitably fall short, and end up being hypocrites because they take morality *too* seriously. Furthermore, there could be people who do not take morality seriously, and make it quite clear that they do not (e.g., avowed egoists); such people could hardly be considered hypocrites. If one can be totally lacking in moral seriousness and yet not a hypocrite, clearly at least some other element must be included in the account of hypocrisy.

So it seems that Crisp and Cowton, too, have failed to provide an adequate characterization of hypocrisy. The obviously close connection between hypocrisy and the meta-virtue of moral seriousness, however, merely supports our claim that hypocrisy must find its home somewhere beyond the mean, together with such concepts as integrity, moral weakness, and moral seriousness. Philosophers have found it particularly difficult to provide an adequate account of these concepts which fall outside the doctrine of the mean. Hypocrisy is no exception.

9. Conclusion

We are left with the question of how useful the Aristotelian framework is for developing an account of hypocrisy. No less a philosopher than Bernard Williams has gone so far as to suggest that "the doctrine of the Mean is better forgotten,"[50] since it "oscillates between an unhelpful analytical model . . . and a substantively depressing doctrine in favour of moderation."[51] The advocacy of amnesia, in the history of moral philosophy or elsewhere, strikes us as fraught with danger. But apart from that issue, Williams's assessment is partly wrong. For the Aristotelian framework, as we have shown, can be useful in exploring hypocrisy's conceptual terrain

and its complex motivational underpinnings, whether or not it can ultimately provide an adequate account.

We have seen that hypocrisy does not fit readily into the Aristotelian mean-oriented approach, since it does not appear as one extreme along a continuum of emotion and action, whether it be commitment, concern for the opinion of others, or truthfulness. Our pre-analytical intuitions have suggested that hypocrisy might be better understood as a sort of meta-vice. But perhaps we should venture at least a stab at a more detailed sketch of an account of hypocrisy, which makes use of, but is not confined to, the resources provided by Aristotle.

Hypocrisy is a vice. There are classic literary examples of thorough hypocrites such as Molière's Tartuffe and Dickens's Uriah Heep, but it is important to demythologize the conception of hypocrisy and recognize that it is an ordinary vice, common and difficult to avoid.[52] It is also important to note that one need not be a "pan-hypocrite"; many of us are hypocritical with respect to particular aspects of our lives, such as religion, politics, or sex.

One important aspect of Aristotle's moral theory which can be applied so as to improve our understanding of hypocrisy concerns the relationship between character and action. Aristotle makes feeling or emotion central to virtue and vice. It would be a mistake to conclude from this that hypocrisy is merely an inner matter, however, for Aristotle also insists on the performance of actions appropriate to the feeling or emotion in question. Accordingly, a person's actions can be used by others (the "audience," as it were) to make judgements about a person's virtues or vices. Hypocrisy is particularly problematic in this regard, though, for the ascription of hypocrisy implies a contrast between a person's actions or speech and the person's state of mind.[53]

There is a central Aristotelian insight which is directly relevant to this characteristic of hypocrisy: doing the correct thing is truly virtuous only if it is done for the "right reason," or "for the sake of that which is noble" (*tou kalou heneka; dia to kalon*).[54] For example, one who behaves courageously simply to show off is not truly courageous. Similarly, a hypocrite who does the right thing simply to get a reputation for virtue is not being truly virtuous.

It is important to note, however, that the Aristotelian elements of "right reason" and "for the sake of that which is noble" cannot be unpacked in the language of quantity. Acting "for the right reason" or "in the right spirit" is not a matter of acting for just the right number of reasons, rather than too many or too few, but for the *right* reasons.

A hypocrite, then, is typically someone who, even when doing the right thing, does not do it for the right reasons. What motivates the hypocrite to behave in ways that conform with what is morally required on many occasions? Typically, hypocrisy involves a pretence of being better than

one is in terms of prevailing standards, and this appearance of virtuousness enables hypocrites to better pursue their self-serving goals or vices with impunity. This explains why in hypocrisy, unlike in weakness of will, there is no regret or remorse, but rather special pleading and rationalization to cover up the fact that what is preached and what is practised do not dovetail. What motivates all this is largely a pursuit of self-interest.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that hypocrites are necessarily self-consciously deceitful or selfish. Think of the morally complacent who ignore or deceive themselves about social evils so as to maintain their privileged way of life, yet still manage to think of themselves as good.[55] Again, think of the self-righteous hypocrite who feels morally superior to others and uses the pretence of moral superiority to manipulate those around him or her.

Our analysis is in keeping with the adage that hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue,[56] and hence in line with treating hypocrisy as a meta-vice. Whereas for the moral person being moral is an end, the hypocrite inverts this and typically uses the appearance of morality as a means to promote self-serving ends.

So much for a sketch of hypocrisy which builds upon Aristotelian elements but goes beyond them. Several Aristotelian insights prove helpful in developing an adequate account of hypocrisy. First, although the doctrine of the mean seems ultimately unable to accommodate the concept of hypocrisy, the lessons about how it fails enrich our understanding of hypocrisy. Furthermore, Aristotle's understanding of the relationship between character and action, and his insistence on things being done with "right reason," in "the right spirit," and "for the sake of the noble," all help illuminate the nature of hypocrisy. As with its conceptual cousins—integrity, moral weakness, and moral seriousness—in the end we must go beyond Aristotle's framework to provide an adequate account of hypocrisy. The quantitative language in which Aristotle's discussion of the doctrine of the mean is couched cannot easily be made to accommodate the sort of pretence and deception about being moral itself which hypocrisy requires. In the spirit of the quotation at the start of our paper, our hope is that the "new word" we have introduced to the Aristotelian ground of discussion nourishes Aristotelian scholarship as well as moral understanding.

Notes

* Thanks are due to Janet Sisson, Eugene Bertoldi, Kenneth McGovern, and our anonymous referees, whose comments helped us to mould this final product. We are especially grateful to Peter Loptson for his remarks and patience.

1 See Roger Crisp and Christopher Cowton, "Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 31, 4 (1994): 343-49; Eva Feder Kittay, "On Hypocrisy," *Metaphilosophy*, 13, 3-4 (1982): 277-89; Christine

McKinnon, "Hypocrisy, With a Note on Integrity," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 28, 4 (1991): 321-29; Jay Newman, *Fanatics and Hypocrites* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986); Eldon Soifer and Béla Szabados, "Hypocrisy and Consequentialism," *Utilitas* (1998); Béla Szabados, "Hypocrisy," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 9, 2 (1979): 195-210; and Dan Turner, "Hypocrisy," *Metaphilosophy*, 21, 3 (1990): 262-69.

2 Newman, *Fanatics and Hypocrites*, pp. 18-27 and *passim*.

3 McKinnon, "Hypocrisy," pp. 327-29.

4 Crisp and Cowton, "Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness," p. 346.

5 Ibid., p. 346.

6 We follow Crisp and Cowton in using the common translation "sphere." J. O. Urmson uses the term "field"; see his "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 10, 6 (1973): 223-30.

7 Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. O. Urmson. In Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1106b17 and 1106b24-25 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 1747.

8 This is the interpretation offered by Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," p. 224. Urmson interprets Aristotle as committed to the thesis that for each virtue there corresponds just one emotion whose field or sphere it is. But Aristotle nowhere says this. In fact, when discussing courage, Aristotle refers to two emotions—fear and confidence—in whose field it belongs. See Rosalind Hursthouse, "A False Doctrine of the Mean," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 81, pp. 57-72, for a critical perspective on Urmson's views. For some new essays on Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, see Richard Bosley, Roger Shiner, and Janet Sisson, eds., *Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean* (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1995). Martha Nussbaum, in "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 13 (1988): 37, offers a somewhat different account, according to which "the reference of the virtue terms is fixed by spheres of choice, frequently connected with our finitude and limitation, that we encounter in virtue of shared conditions of human existence." On this account, it would be even harder to see how one could establish the impossibility of a sphere in which hypocrisy has its home.

9 Newman, *Fanatics and Hypocrites*, p. 11.

10 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a 16-19, p. 1749. Aristotle paradoxically names the virtues and vices he calls "nameless." The paradox disappears if we understand him to mean that the Greek terms are not really adequate to capture the virtues and vices he intends to describe. It is interesting to note that the examples Aristotle offers of "nameless" virtues are all in the realm of social relationships which are concerned with the ways one should present oneself and treat other people, and the ways one should accept their treatment of oneself. See Paula Gottlieb, "Aristotle's 'Nameless' Virtues," in *Apeiron*, 27, 1 (1994): 1-15.

11 Newman, *Fanatics and Hypocrites*, pp. 42-48 *passim*. This suggests "feeling sure" as a candidate for the emotional sphere or field characteristic of the virtue of proper commitment and its associated vices—namely, hypocrisy and fanaticism. On this picture the fanatic feels too sure and the hypocrite does not feel sure enough, given the same belief supported to the same degree.
12 Ibid., pp. 88-100 *passim*.
13 For more on this aspect of hypocrisy, see Szabados, "Hypocrisy," pp. 206-10.
14 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a 19-23, p.1749.
15 Thanks to David Johnston for this "mean" suggestion.
16 Kittay, "On Hypocrisy," p. 278.
17 Crisp and Cowton, "Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness," p. 345.
18 Dan Turner, "Hypocrisy," p. 263.
19 Ibid., pp. 265-66. Turner holds that the fundamental feature of hypocrisy is just such an internal conflict or disparity, involving some of the following: genuine beliefs, pretended beliefs, desires, words, and deeds. He acknowledges that the account as given is too broad, failing as it does to distinguish hypocrisy from changing one's mind, but he views it as a merit of his account that hypocrisy does not always turn out to be bad.
20 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1107a 9-17, p. 1748.
21 W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 137-38.
22 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 6, 1107a 17-21, p. 1748.
23 See the list of virtues and vices Aristotle offers in his *Eudemian Ethics*, translated by J. Solomon, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. 2, Book 2, Chap. 3, 1220b 37-1221a 13, p. 1933.
24 Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," p. 228. Urmson provides a broad interpretation of the doctrine of the mean, according to which these actions can indeed be seen as excessive or deficient. If his interpretation is correct, then Aristotle simply faces the problem we have already addressed concerning the application of the mean to hypocrisy.
25 One might also doubt that hypocrisy fits into Aristotle's category of "things themselves bad" if one thinks that it involves a defect of character in a way different from Aristotle's examples of murder, theft, and adultery. Note, however, that Aristotle also mentions envy and shamelessness, which clearly involve defects of character, as "things themselves bad."
26 It might be said that murder, theft, and adultery can also be morally acceptable under some circumstances. If this is correct, then Aristotle's entire category of "things themselves bad" becomes problematic, and all hope of accommodating hypocrisy evaporates.
27 "Acceptable" here is meant to include both "morally justified," meaning that the action is not wrong, and "morally excusable," meaning that the action is wrong, but because of extenuating circumstances we do not blame the agent for doing it.
28 Kittay, "On Hypocrisy," pp. 287-89.

29 Ibid., p. 287.

30 Judith Shklar, "Let Us Not be Hypocritical," in *Ordinary Vices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 45-86, *passim.*

31 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a 11-12, p. 1749.

32 Ibid., Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a 19-23, pp. 1749-50.

33 Ibid., Book 8, Chap. 1, 1155a 12, p. 1825.

34 Ibid., Book 9, Chap. 3, 1165b 4-5, p. 1842.

35 Ibid., Book 9, Chap. 3, 1165b 7-12, p. 1842.

36 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, translated by W. Rhys Roberts, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Book 1, Chap. 11, 1371a 22-25, p. 2182.

37 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 2, Chap. 7, 1108a 26-30, p. 1750.

38 Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book 2, Chap. 1, 1377b 21-1378a 6, p. 2194.

39 Bernard Williams deserves much of the credit for bringing this concept to the fore in contemporary ethical debate. See Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Other important works on this topic include Stephen L. Carter, *Integrity* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Mark S. Halfon, *Integrity: A Philosophical Inquiry* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Eric Mack, "Integrity, Recognition, and Rights," *The Monist*, 76 (January 1993): 101-18; Gabriele Taylor, "Integrity," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. 55 (1981), pp. 143-59; and Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 5.

Although Aristotle himself does not talk of "integrity," he speaks of "practical wisdom" and "general justice," both of which have the common feature of the "actual exercise of virtue." Consider: "A man has practical wisdom not by knowing only but by acting" (*Nicomachean Ethics,* Book 7, Chap. 10, 1152a 8-9, p. 1820). Also, Aristotle says of general justice: "It is complete excellence in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete excellence" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 5, Chap. 1, 1129b 30-31, p. 1783). It is hard not to see in these words that Aristotle conceived of something which was at least an approximation of our concept of integrity.

40 Aristotle distinguishes weakness of will (or "incontinence") from vice by saying that the former is contrary to choice and regretted by the agent, while the latter is in accordance with choice and without regret (*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 7, Chap. 8, 1151a 5-8 and 1150b 29-31, p. 1818). It is tempting to think of this as a sharp distinction unless we attend to the backtracking engaged in, when he says after his pronouncement that weakness of will is not a vice, "though perhaps it is so in a qualified sense" (ibid.). This qualification, coupled with his remark that "of moral states to be avoided there are three kinds—vice, incontinence, brutishness" (*Nicomachean Ethics,* Book 7, Chap. 1, 1145a 15-17, p. 1808), supports our suggestion that weakness of will, at least in the moral realm, may be seen to fit into an Aristotelian framework as a meta-vice. But it is important to keep in mind that we are talking about our notion of

moral weakness which is a species of the general notion of weakness of will and this is largely considered a vice in our moral framework.

41 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 6, Chap. 13, 1144b 30-32, p. 1808.

42 McKinnon, "Hypocrisy," pp. 327-29.

43 Ibid., pp. 327-28.

44 Ibid., p. 328.

45 Ibid., p. 327.

46 One account of integrity which stresses this element of moral reflectiveness can be found in Carter, *Integrity*.

47 Crisp and Cowton offer a somewhat different argument to the same conclusion—that hypocrisy cannot be merely an absence of integrity (Crisp and Cowton, "Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness," pp. 346-47).

48 Ibid., p. 347.

49 Ibid.

50 Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 36. Roland Puccetti has offered sustained argument toward the kind of claim Williams makes. See "Aristotle's Golden Tautology," *Ratio*, 6 (1966): 161-67.

51 Ibid.

52 Shklar, "Let Us Not Be Hypocritical."

53 Kittay, "On Hypocrisy," and McKinnon, "Hypocrisy," take this aspect of hypocrisy to be crucial for understanding its moral importance.

54 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1115b12-13 and 1116b31.

55 Shklar, "Let Us Not Be Hypocritical," pp. 54-55. Shklar has offered as an example of this sort of hypocrite Victorians who behaved as if the Mayhew slums of London did not exist.

56 An insight of La Rochefoucauld. See his *Maxims* (New York: Haworth Press, 1931), p. 65. "L'hypocrisie est un hommage que le vice rend à la vertue."

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